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Abstract
This thesis examines the impact of the current land ownership arrangement on the use 
and management of collective forestland in China. Increasingly, the focus of China’s 
forest and forestry is shifting from timber production to the conservation and 
protection of the forest ecosystem. So far the Chinese government has carried out a 
number of major programmes that seek to increase the forest cover and to reduce 
commercial exploitation in its natural forests. These large-scale state-sponsored 
programmes involved not only the state but also the collective forests.
The government has overwhelming control over the collective forests in relation to 
the production and use of forest resources. This thesis argues that this is mainly 
induced by the current land ownership arrangement. Although the collectives are 
‘self-governing’ bodies and democratic elections are practised, the collectives 
nevertheless act more like the ‘agents’ of the government than true representatives of 
the collective members. By retaining control over collective governance, the state 
manages to assert control over the use of collective forests; in other words, the state 
has chosen to regulate land and forest use via the ownership structure. With little 
protection for individual rights, the state imposes rigid and intrusive measures that 
severely limit the autonomy of land users and create instances of abuse of power by 
those who are in control. This has resulted in various serious and negative 
consequences: inefficient use of forest and land resources; slow growth of rural 
economy; limited and incomplete private rights; increasing wealth gap; and last but 
not the least, slow development in the rule of law.
As a result, future reforms of collective forests will be futile if the ownership regime 
is not changed. It is argued that a private ownership regime is now viable and will 
help China’s rural society to achieve further economic, social and legal development. 
Under a private ownership regime, the government can exercise control over forest 
and land use via public regulation, which would allow land use to be regulated in a 
more transparent and efficient way without compromising individual autonomy.
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Theory of Property Rights and China’s Forestland: An Overview
1. Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of China’s forests and the role of property rights in 
addressing the difficulties related to its existing forest regimes. We shall see that in 
the face of the intensive industrialisation and urbanisation processes that are taking 
place in China, whilst cropland area has been decreasing, forestland area has been 
increasing consistently over the past decade. This has been achieved after years of 
neglect and exploitation of the forest in the early years of the establishment of modem 
China. Deforestation was particularly severe during the Great Leap Forward period 
(1958-1962), the Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976) and in the 1980s 
immediately after forestland de-collectivisation. As China develops at a breathtaking 
pace, its demand for timber and other forest products has greatly increased, for both 
the local and international market. As a result, China’s forests have been under 
substantial pressure. To meet the demand shortfall, China has increased its forest 
products imports and investment in plantation forests.
On the other hand, as the demand for forest environmental services has also increased, 
China’s forest policy has altered significantly in the last decade. Ecological forests 
have been established all over China under various state-sponsored schemes, 
including the Natural Forest Protection Programme and the new forest ecological 
benefit fund scheme. The latter aims at compensating the efforts of private entities in 
providing forest ecological benefits to the public. The long-term target of the Chinese 
government in relation to its forestland use is to source timber solely from 
commercial forest plantations whilst protecting and conserving its natural forests. In 
addition, man-made forests in strategic areas such as the sloped land and riverines are 
also protected by government policy. A logging ban that was introduced by the 
Chinese government in response to two severe natural calamities that took place 
around Yangtze and Yellow Rivers is now effective in large tracts of forests, both 
natural and plantation forests. In essence, since the last decade, the focus of China’s 
forest and forestry has shifted from timber production to environmental protection. 
This shift of focus is reflected in the newly re-organised forestry department, whose
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mandate is now almost exclusively about forest protection. Lastly, the number of 
nature reserves in China has also increased greatly since the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China.
In 2003, the State Council adopted the Decision on Acceleration of Forestry 
Development, which provides the blueprint of government’s long-term policies on 
forestry. The Decision contains eight main points, all of which point in the direction 
of sustainable development of China’s forest base and industry. The Decision requires 
the involvement of all people to develop and manage forests, and the use of science 
and technology. It also requires that the ecological benefits of forests should be given 
priority over the economic and social benefits. It also reiterates the aim to increase 
total forestland to above 26 per cent of the landmass by 2050. It emphasises the 
importance of continuing the effort to rebuild the ecology by planting trees in both 
rural and urban areas, and to protect the existing environment that hosts valuable 
biological resources. In relation to the forest industry, the government further 
emphasises the need to develop downstream wood processes, and the diversification 
of forest product markets. It also requires government guidance and control of the 
forest industry with reference to the needs of the market; this includes giving 
incentives and assistance to local enterprises.
The Decision also states the need to reform the current structure of forestry. Apart 
from securing the land use tenure, it also asks for further liberalisation of the land 
market to facilitate the transfer of land use rights. More importantly, it highlights the 
need to have different management regimes for public benefit/ecological and 
commercial forests: the state should be the main financial supporter and manager of 
the former, whilst the market should regulate the latter. The Decision also requires the 
government (both central and local) to increase investment in forestry, especially in 
silviculture and forest protection. In addition, it requires the reduction of forestry 
taxes and abolition of various fees and charges; the financial shortage caused by this 
should be the responsibility of the Treasury. Lastly, the Decision further emphasises 
the use of legislation, and science and technology to regulate the use, protection, 
management, development and monitoring of forests. It reiterates the civic duty of 
every citizen to help the government to attain the targets and to implement the policies 
set out.
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Despite the adoption of the policy, many things still need to be done if the aims and 
targets listed above are to be achieved. In particular, the government needs to provide 
more detailed and comprehensive regulations on forestland use; the existing policy 
‘declaration’ is in itself not enough to bring about the changes. In addition, the nature 
of forestland governance has to be changed from centrally controlled to one where 
users have more say as to how and when to use the resources. The government also 
needs to change its role in forest and resource management: instead of acting as a 
‘manager’ of forest resources actively involved in its management, it should work as a 
guardian of public land by providing guidance and necessary controls via policy and 
regulations. Given the still very strong ‘top-down’ character of China’s forest 
governance, the core of forest and forestry institutions needs to be overhauled before 
any sustainable changes can take place.
One of the important components of China’s forest and forestry that has had a great 
impact on forest management is forestland ownership. As will be discussed below, 
property rights are social, political and economic tools that govern the human 
relations with regards to resource use. The legal and political system of a state 
provides the framework for the specific form or forms of property rights; the property 
rights institution will in turn dictate the economic activities within the state. In some 
circumstances, however, the economic system will influence the property rights 
institution as economic actors push for change. Currently, China’s forestland is 
subject to only two types of ownership: state and collective ownership. Generally, the 
owners of collective forest are the ‘self-governing’ village units that are supposedly 
independent and do not form part of the government’s administration. In reality, 
however, these village units are ultimately responsible to the government, despite the 
fact that the village representatives are elected by the members of the collective. The 
vitiation of the collective ownership rights is compounded by the fact that in many 
cases the definition of the ‘collective’ itself is vague. In short, although collectives are 
the de jure owners of the land, in many situations the state actually usurps the role and 
acts as the de facto owner.
The implications of a ‘weak’ collective ownership are substantial. It not only impacts 
on the legal and political rights of the collective members who are also the land users,
but also the investment in and production of forest resources. Although private land 
use rights have flourished and have gained legal recognition and protection, they still 
face some fundamental difficulties or restrictions due to the ownership arrangement. 
As the state has control over the ‘weak’ collective ownership of land, it is able to 
impose various restrictions on forestland use, some of which would have been 
deemed unacceptable if the land were indeed privately owned. The prohibition on 
selling and transferring land for non-agricultural use is one example. The logging 
quota system that arbitrarily restricts the right of tree owners to harvest the timber is 
another example. In addition, the negligible compensation given to users of protected 
forest may also be the result of the attenuation of ownership rights. More recently, 
the logging ban that has been imposed in some of the collective forest without 
compensation shows the vulnerability of collective forestland users. Lastly, continued 
land reallocation and a short land use period may discourage long-term land use 
planning and sustainable use of forest resources. As will be discussed in the following 
chapters, these restrictions have created an unfavourable environment for the land 
users and dampened forest users’ enthusiasm for investment.
In addition to the impact on the investment in and production of forest resources, the 
current forestland ownership arrangement also has serious social and legal 
implications. The ‘weak’ collective ownership rights can hardly be relied on by 
collective members to defend their rights against the encroachment by the state. More 
importantly, the government is able to control the socio-economic aspects of the rural 
population via the control over land. For example, control over access to land ties 
individuals and families to the rural areas. This not only denies rural population the 
freedom to move, it also puts discretionary power in the hands of the decision-makers. 
In addition, strictly controlled land exchanges also hold back economic growth and 
increase the wealth gap between rural and urban populations. More importantly, the 
absence of secure property rights has exposed the rural population to the abuse of 
power by government officials, who may escape supervision by the central 
government. Without the assurance of rights, and without the right to protect their 
interests, forestland users are not able to take direct action against government 
officials or even village representatives who have abused their position and harmed 
the interests of the collective members.
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Property rights of rural land (forestland more specifically) thus have huge 
implications for China’s rural economy and society. Despite the fact that private land 
use rights are now prevalent in rural China, they nonetheless exist within the 
framework of the ‘weak’ collective ownership. It can be argued that future reform of 
collective forests would be futile unless it takes into account the need to reassess the 
current property rights arrangement. This thesis analyses not only the extent of private 
land use rights, but also the nature of collective governance and collective forest 
management in depth. The conclusions that are derived from the discussions 
inevitably point to the need to introduce a more secure and independent forest 
property rights regime, a regime that could offer better protection to the rural 
population’s social, economic and legal rights.
This introductory chapter proceeds as follows. The next section of this chapter takes a 
brief look at the theory of property rights, which offers an insight into the relationship 
between property rights, resource use and social development. The subsequent section 
examines the present state of China’s forest and forestry. These are the ‘stylised facts’ 
of forests in China. Section four is a discussion of the main problems faced by forest 
users, including the logging quota, ineffective law enforcement, the logging ban, 
inadequate compensation for environmental services, and tenure insecurity. The last 
section summarises the purpose of this research, and outlines the discussions of 
subsequent chapters.
2. Methodology
This thesis seeks to analyse the various aspects of rural land property rights in China. 
It discusses not only the legal characteristics but also the economic, social and 
political implications of land property rights. Essentially, it aims to take an integrated 
approach in looking at how land property rights have impacted and will impact on 
China’s forest and forestry. The existing literature takes a less integrated approach 
when it comes to analysing the impact of tenure security and property rights on the 
use of forest resources. They usually only focus on one particular aspect of land and 
land use, and have failed to make empirical analysis in the context of the wider 
picture. In addition, the majority of the existing literature focuses on arable land or 
agricultural land in China generally, rather than on forestland exclusively. The latter
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issue, however, is not an impediment to the research due to the fact that forestland and 
arable land share many similarities and have been treated in a similar fashion by the 
Chinese government until recently. The discussions of the general characteristics of 
agricultural land (or more precisely arable land) have provided a valuable source of 
information regarding the issue of forestland property rights and use in China.
This research is based on primary and secondary sources, and includes both English 
and Chinese language materials. Although the research focuses mainly on empirical 
discussions of what actually happened (and are happening) on the ground, sections on 
theoretical discussions of Chinese law are also included. This focus, however, means 
that the thesis relies mainly upon the various reports and case studies that analyse the 
current state of affairs of forestland use, rather than on Chinese legal sources that 
discuss the development of Chinese law from a theoretical point of view. 
Nevertheless, a section on the theory of property rights is included at the beginning, 
which is mainly based on the mainstream Western legal and economic analysis of 
property rights. This section is particularly relevant to the discussions of the 
instrumental value of property rights in a market system and also the inherent value of 
property rights as an aspect of human rights and as a defining feature of the role (and 
power) of the state. The primary sources relied on come from two surveys carried out 
in China in which the author participated. Although the outcomes of the case studies 
are not directly employed in the thesis, they nevertheless provide important 
background understanding of the relevant issues covered in this research and have 
informed the scope and direction of the thesis.1 The methodology employed in the 
surveys will be further elaborated at the end of this section.
The secondary sources used for the account of China’s current state of affairs in 
relation to forest and property rights include textbooks, contributions to periodicals, 
reports by international organisations, seminar papers and newspaper reports. 
Newspaper reports provide a particularly valuable source of information on current 
cases that involved land disputes and abuse of power by local officials. Both media
1 The surveys looked at the impact o f two forest-related programmes on local communities. The results 
from the surveys provide information about, inter alia, the involvement o f the members o f local 
communities in forest protection and forestry, the income sources and changes, the property rights 
structure and use patterns o f forestland, and the impact of the two environmental programmes on local 
livelihood. These information give an overall understanding o f the main issues or problems faced by 
the collectives and the structure o f forestland use governance.
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inside and outside China are used, and to overcome the problem of inaccurate or 
biased reporting, the most reputable media outlets are used, such as the. British 
Broadcasting Cooperation (for overseas coverage) and the Nanfang Daily (for 
mainland China coverage). With regards to statistics, the data in this thesis is derived 
from primary and secondary sources, which include mainly statistics released by the 
Chinese government and international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations.
Due to the fact that the communist/socialist ideology is still profoundly relevant in 
China, at least at the theoretical level, bias resulting from ideological orientations can 
be found in some Chinese literature. The majority of the works relied on, however, 
are non-biased and are based on objective empirical studies. The results of these 
empirical studies are particularly relevant to this research. Due to the fact that 
practices vary from place to place in China, it is important to have case studies that 
covered as wide an area as possible in China in order to grasp the overall picture. As it 
would have been impossible for the author to gather information of such abundance 
personally, the reliance on the various case studies by different scholars has proved 
invaluable. Most of the case studies were carried out at the household level, although 
some have also included village level research. These case studies not only provide 
the foundation of analysis in this thesis, they also give a comprehensive insight into 
the existing land ownership and use arrangements in China. As a consequence, the 
existing literature will form an integral part of the thesis and will be fully referenced.
Most research on China rural land use carried out so far has studied the economic 
consequences of land tenure improvement on the investment in and the use of 
agricultural land including forestland. Various case studies have been carried out in 
the 1990s to assess and quantify the changes in people’s behaviour following changes 
in tenure arrangements. Behavioural changes are mainly captured by the change in 
investment decisions and productivity. The results from these empirical studies show 
that households have reacted positively to the improved security of tenure. In
2 For a few examples, see Rozelle, S., Huang Jikun and Benziger, V. 2003; Schwarzwalder, B. et al., 
2001; Sun Yan, Xue Jintao and Li Ling, 2006; Hyde, William et al. (eds), 2003; Rozelle, Scott et al., 
2000; Ho, Peter (ed), 2005; Liu Fengqin, 2005; Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004; Whiting, Susan. 2001; Yao 
Shunbo, 2005; Cheng Yunxing, 2004; Lu Xueyi, 2002; Kung, James Kai-Sing, and Cai Yong-Shun, 
2000
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particular, it was found that investment in economic forest such as bamboo forest and 
other cash crops such as fruit trees have increased. In addition, household income 
changes are also used as indicators of the impact of tenure reform on rural welfare. 
Generally, rural land tenure reform in China has played an important role in reforming 
rural economy that has released millions of people from poverty.
However, nearly all of these studies have only looked at the impact of the early 
rounds of the property rights reforms, which started from the adoption of the 
household responsibility system in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They have not 
assessed the continuous impact of property rights on land use, especially the impact of 
the gradual and more subtle changes in land use rights. For example, private use rights 
have been afforded more legal protection following the adoption of several major 
legislations, and the increase of commercial value of land has increasingly pitched the 
interests of private land users against the interests of local governments who rely on 
the sale and development of agricultural land for income. These changes, coupled 
with the rapid urban expansion in China, have also had a huge impact on investment 
and land use decisions. The only land-use related issue that has been looked at in the 
context of the ongoing economic changes is land use transfer. Some studies analysed 
the impact of economic development on the pattern of land use transfer and vice 
versa. Apart from this, the impact of the existing property rights arrangements on the 
future of economic growth in rural China has not been subject to scrutiny.
Some literature, on the other hand, looked at the social significance of rural land. For 
example, it has been found that land plays an important role as the main form of 
social security for the rural population, and that the social significance of land differs 
from less developed regions to more developed regions. These findings have mainly 
come from research that looked at the practices of land reallocation and land use 
transfer in rural China. These research show that there is currently indeed a real and 
serious conflict between tenure security and the need to provide social security to the 
members of the collective; and in many cases, especially in less-developed regions, 
the social importance of land prevails. Recognising the importance of land, many
3 Ho, Peter, 2005; Ho, Peter (ed), 2005; Liu Fengqin, 2005; Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004; Whiting, Susan, 
2001; Cheng Yunxing, 2004; Lu Xueyi, 2002; Kung, James Kai-Sing. 1995, 2000, and 2002; Kung, 
James Kai-Sing and Liu Shouying, 1997; Rozelle, Scott and Li Guo, 1998
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papers have come to the conclusion that although the existing collective ownership of 
land may not promote efficient land use, it is nevertheless necessary in order to 
maintain the social order among and social well-being of the rural population. Some 
even went so far as to argue that collective ownership of land is necessary for the 
achievement of the egalitarian goal.
These studies, however, have not typically looked into the alternatives to the current 
arrangement. Furthermore, these studies have not actually assessed the impact of the 
rapid social changes that have been taking place in rural China on the value and use of 
land. For example, access to off-farm employment is now the number one factor that 
has vastly increased rural income and as a result, has also become the main source of 
income disparity among the rural population. An egalitarian goal of access to land is 
no longer attainable by just controlling the ownership of land. The studies have also 
failed to illustrate that the current rigid land arrangement may no longer reflect the 
social changes that are taking place. Discussions of the social importance of rural land 
not only should be set against the background of the rapid economic and social 
changes that are taking place but should also include the implications of the current 
tenure arrangement on the establishment of a viable social welfare system in rural 
China in the future.
Some of the existing literature has also analysed the implications of legal reforms on 
land ownership and use.4 These legal papers mainly outlined the existing laws and 
policies that are affecting land ownership and land use, and discussed the legal 
implications of the main provisions. In particular, these legal discussions highlighted 
the rights and obligations of the parties involved in land use, which are the collective 
(acting as the owner) and the households (acting as land lessees). Apart from a few 
legal papers that focused mainly on the issue of rural land use and ownership, the 
majority of the literature discussed the general state of China’s legal system. The main 
reference books used in this research are critical of the current state of China’s legal 
system, which reflects the ongoing legal and judicial reform that China has embarked 
on since the transition from a planned to a market economic system. The legal
4 Prosterman, Roy et al. 1998; Prosterman, R., Schwarzwalder, B., and Ye J. 2000; Schwarzwalder, B., 
Prosterman, R., Ye J., Riedinger, J., and Li P., 2002; Chen Xiaojun et al. 2003; Chen, Albert 1999; 
Chen, Albert, 2000; Peerenboom, Randall, 2002.
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analysis also involved the discussions of parallel issues such as law enforcement and 
judicial reform.
Policy makers and legislatures sometimes assume that the letter of the law will be 
duly adhered to while in reality they are not. This could be due to the underestimation 
or ignorance of the existing problems that make enforcement ineffective, including 
the less than desirable collective governance structure. As a whole, there have not 
been many critical assessments of the legal aspects of land ownership in China. This 
could be because land ownership is still a very sensitive issue in China and the 
discussion of which will evoke emotional ideological debates. In addition, many may 
have regarded that legal reforms of land rights have stagnated and that any significant 
and radical reform in land ownership is not to be expected in the near future.
This last paragraph briefly outlines the methodology used in the two case studies in 
which the author participated.5 The surveys were carried out in the Ningxia and 
Guizhou Province in 2005 and 2006. The main purposes of these surveys were to 
assess the impacts of the Sloping Land Conversion Programme (SLCP) and the 
Natural Forest Protection Programme (NFPP) respectively on the local communities. 
Generally the two surveys were executed by using the same methods, namely 
interview and questionnaires. Both surveys were coordinated between the teams from 
Peking University, University College London and University of Cambridge. Both 
surveys started with reviews of the existing literature on the subjects in order to 
understand the background of the two programmes and to look for issues that have not 
been dealt with. Once the literature reviews were done, all the participants in the 
survey met up to discuss about the relevant issues and information available; 
conclusions of the discussions led to the formulation of the questionnaires. The 
questionnaires were formulated according to the information the case study groups 
would like to obtain from the interviewees. For example, a huge section of the survey 
on the NFPP consisted of questions that were aimed at retrieving information about 
property and land use rights. For the SLCP case study, a theoretical farm household 
model was developed that would clarify how households who have taken part in the
5 The author was involved in the general discussions and background research phase for the Sloping 
Land Conversion Programme survey, and also in the drafting o f the questionnaires and data analysis 
phases for the Natural Forest Protection Programme survey.
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SLCP and which have been subjected (with varying degrees) to different types of 
market and institutional constraints would respond with respect to their labour and 
land allocation choices. Both the SLCP and NFPP surveys developed separate 
questionnaires for households and for village leaders. A pilot survey was carried out 
in late June 2004 in Zhangbei County, Hebei Province for the SLCP survey. It was 
aimed at extracting as much information as possible to be used for the formulation of 
the questionnaire used in the subsequent survey.
3. Theory of Property Rights
The theory of property rights is central to the discussion of China’s forest regime 
because it explains how different governance systems allocate rights and 
responsibilities for land between users, officials and others. These rights and 
responsibilities affect how the different entities perceive the value of the land and its 
resources; this in turn influences how land resources are used (method and rate of 
exploitation). In addition, the institution of property rights also has a great bearing on 
the political and social development of a society as it defines the boundary of the 
rights and power between those that are governed and those that are governing. 
Essentially, property rights are social instruments which govern human relations with 
regards to the use of resources. As such, the implications of property rights permeate 
every aspect of our society. The significance and relevance of property rights will be 
explained in detail in this section.
The study of property rights and natural resources is well researched. In Western 
literature, jurists had attempted to understand the meaning and implications of 
property rights. As society evolved, the interpretation of property rights had become 
more and more liberal, which ultimately resulted in the predominance of private 
property rights. The development of private property rights not only reflected political 
development, but also the rising capitalist economic system following the industrial 
revolution. Since then, the studies of property rights have continued to flourish and 
the different property rights theories have greatly contributed to our understanding of 
the role of property rights.
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This discussion of the theory of property rights in this section is divided into two main 
groups: the socio-political and legal studies of property rights, and the economic 
analysis of property rights. The former looks at the philosophical and jurisprudential 
discussions of property rights, which associate property rights with the theory of 
government (and society) and more recently with human rights.6 In particular, these 
theories aim to explain how ownership right and allocation of resources affect the 
achievement of justice and equity between individuals and societies. On the other 
hand, the latter focuses on the role of property rights in influencing economic 
behaviour. Economists generally see property rights and allocation of natural
n
resources as important determinants of efficiency in resource use. Hence, this 
analysis of property rights is a combined analysis of both equity and efficiency.
3.1 Socio-Political and Legal Analysis of Property Rights
The notion of property rights was first explored during the time of ancient Greece:
o
Aristotle wrote about property rights as a means of achieving a good life as a citizen. 
Since then, political philosophers and other social theorists have discussed property 
rights and their relationship to human and social life. According to Macpherson, there 
are two main directions in the discussion of property rights in the Western literature of 
philosophy and social studies, i.e. property as the means to some other end and 
property as an end in itself.9 For example, to Rousseau, property is the means to 
individual freedom. On the other hand, John Locke and Bentham regard the 
accumulation of property as the end in itself, meaning that property ownership is the 
aim that everyone should pursue.10 This latter theory is the essence of a free-market 
capitalist society where wealth accumulation is the norm.
6 According to some philosophers such as Emmanuel Kant, property rights are part o f the ‘social 
contract’ that governs the relationship between individuals in a society. Property rights are also 
associated with self-reflection, self-advancement and self-projection, which turn the rights into one 
form of human rights.
7 The two main textbooks on natural resource and environmental economics are: Tietenberg, T., 2003; 
and Perman, R. et al, 2003. According to Titenberg, the characteristics o f private property rights are 
exclusivity, transferability and enforceability. Property rights affect the marginal cost o f production and 
the discount rate, which in turn influence the decision o f how and how much to produce.
Environmental problems arise when property rights are ill-defined, where these rights are not 
exchanged under competitive conditions and when social and private discount rates diverge, ibid.
8 Mathie, W., 1979
9 Macpherson, C.B., 1979
10 To Bentham, the ultimate end o f all social arrangements was the maximization o f the aggregate 
utility or pleasures o f the members o f a society. Wealth ‘was so essential to the attainment o f all other 
pleasures that it could be taken as the measure o f pleasure o f utility as such’ (ibid. p 5). Locke’s theory
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Apart from this dichotomy, there are also disagreements over the extent of property 
rights: limited and unlimited rights. As we shall see, most of the philosophers have 
adopted the idea of social contract or reciprocal consent, and accepted that property 
rights are limited for the purpose of the security and stability of the society. In fact, 
most economists base their theories on this assumption and recognise that property 
rights are not absolute. Consequently, the state/govemment has the power to regulate, 
inter alia, the use and allocation of property. On the other hand, there is a minority 
group of philosophers who see property rights as one of the main cornerstones of 
liberty, which are inviolable and unlimited. Robert Nozick11 and other libertarians 
have advocated the ‘minimal state’, which corresponds to the importance they assign 
to private property rights. However, the fiercest debate on the issue of property rests 
upon the subject of the distribution of wealth. In a capitalist society where goods and 
money can be exchanged freely, accumulation of property is tantamount to the 
accumulation of wealth. As a result, property ownership and allocation has direct 
implications on wealth distribution. Different jurists use varying approaches to 
address the issue of distributive justice. Despite the proliferation of the different 
approaches, each of which is equally persuasive, a universal consensus is still lacking 
and the debate continues.
3.1.1 Property Rights as Natural Rights
John Locke in his Second Treaties o f Government put forward the theory that 
individuals have natural rights to unlimited property.12 According to Locke, in the 
state of nature, all things belong to the common where ‘God, who hath given the 
world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best 
advantage of life, and convenience’.13 Individuals are entitled to appropriate (and to 
own) things with which they have mixed their labour.14 This ‘labour-mixing’ 
argument is the essence of Locke’s natural rights theory where it explains and justifies
focused on individual ownership o f property, which was used to rebut ownership right o f the Monarch 
and was justified on the ground o f the right to sustain life.
11 Schmidtz, D., 2002
12 Macpherson, C.B., 1980
13 Ibid. p 18, paragraph 26
14 Ibid. p 19, paragraph 27
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how a person acquires ownership of a thing.15 As a natural right, ownership can exist 
before the establishment of a government, and the government has a duty to protect it. 
Accompanying the ‘labour-mixing’ argument are two provisos that Locke inserted as 
the conditions of ownership: first, one should leave as much and as good for others 
(sufficiency rule)16; and second, one may appropriate only as much as he can use 
before it spoils (no-spoliation rule).17 These provisos restrict the unlimited right to 
exploit un-owned natural resources by individuals to ensure that fairness is achieved 
and over-exploitation by an individual is avoided.
Another prominent advocate of property as a natural right is a 20th century libertarian 
philosopher, Robert Nozick. According to Nozick, along with the rights to life and 
liberty, right to property is an inviolable right that is to be afforded the greatest 
protection from third party interference.18 This is so because, according to Nozick, 
men have exclusive right to self-ownership, and self-ownership gives rise to property 
rights in other resources through individuals “mixing their labour” with un-owned 
resources.19 Basically everyone is surrounded by a ‘sphere of rights’ with which no 
one may interfere;20 this is recognised as individual’s rights to non-interference 
(negative rights). If a property was obtained entirely as a result of a transaction or 
series of transactions, which was freely entered into and without the use of force or
fraud, then it was a fair distribution and the ownership right should be recognised and
91not interfered with. According to Nozick, property rights are not prima facie rights 
but unlimited rights, which should be respected by others, and should only be 
interfered by the state under very limited circumstances.
3.1.2 Property Rights as Creation of Law
The prevailing social theories nowadays do not see property rights as natural rights, 
but rather as rights created by law. John Stuart Mill regarded property rights not as
15 Ibid. p 25, paragraph 40. However, this ‘value-adding’ argument was criticised by Robert Nozick in 
his book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) pp 174-5. Nozick used the 
example o f spilling a can o f tomato juice into the sea to rebut the argument that the mixing o f labour 
with something make one the owner o f it.
16 Ibid., p 21, paragraph 33
17 Ibid. p 24, paragraph 38
18 Wolff, J., 1991, p 9
19 Simmonds, N.E., 2002 p 78
20 Ibid. p 8
21 This is Nozick’s ‘Entitlement Theory o f Justice’, ibid. p 90
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natural liberties but as social privileges conferred by law on the ground of general 
utility,22 whilst according to Rousseau, property rights cannot antedate political 
constitution.23 Both Rousseau and Kant were of the opinion that property rights exist 
because the law creates and sanctions them. For example, Kant wrote that ‘men only 
have property in external things when a legal order gives them that property and 
provides remedies for its loss’.24 According to Rousseau, property in goods refers to a 
legal power and right, supported but also regulated by the state.25 A state exists to 
protect property and where this protection is not upon fair terms, the state is
9Aillegitimate. Apart from legal legitimacy, to Rousseau, morality also plays an 
important role in the regulation of property rights.27 Moral became a guiding principle 
in order to avoid property relations to swallow up and stand in the place of human 
relations, a process of which referred to as ‘alienation’. On the other hand, Kant paid 
more attention to the concept of ‘social contract’. According to him, the constitution 
of a society is founded on a will binding everyone, and this ‘contract’ guides the 
behaviour of the society so that everyone is bound to leave another’s property 
untouched.29 A state is founded on, and exists to serve private property, and the duty
O A
of the state is to regulate the dealings of independent possessors of property. More 
importantly, a state must also possess some kind of reserved authority to alter the 
principles on which property is held, and property rights are inviolable only against 
other private citizen but not against a legitimate state.
Another important school of philosophy that has offered extensive discussions on the 
nature of property rights is the utilitarian school of thought. According to 
utilitarianism, property rights are not natural liberties but social privileges conferred 
by the law on the ground of general utility. The two main concerns of property rights 
under utilitarianism are the welfare of everyone, and the secure expectations that will
22 Ryan, A., 1984, p 144
23 Ibid. pp 54-55
24 Ibid. p 79. However, Kant also uses the notion o f ‘natural right’ to appropriation in the state o f nature 
as a logical fiction for juridical purposes to explain how somebody would have originated the property 
rights in the first place, ibid. pp 79-80.
25 Mac Adam, J., 1979, p 194
26 Ryan, A., 1984, p 63
27 Ibid. p 196. In fact, in his view, property should be regulated by moral values o f liberty, equality and 
fraternity
28 Ibid. p 192
29 Chadwick, R., 1992, p 394
30 It prevents each man from exercising his freedom in such a way as to impede the free actions of 
others, and it employs coercion to defeat coercion and nothing more.
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induce people to work productively and effectively. According to Jeremy Bentham 
(who is generally regarded as the Founder of utilitarianism), property rights increase 
utility as expectations are fulfilled when rights are protected, and fulfilment of 
expectations is a form of happiness. At the same time, property rights are not 
absolute, and the legislators should make sure that the general welfare of the people is 
maximised. In relation to property, the role of the state is to guarantee security, 
subsistence, abundance and equality.
Lastly, Hegel provided a theory of property rights that accentuates the anthropocentric 
approach in relation to the relationship between man and objects or things. To him, 
ownership of things promotes and reflects self-advancement. Properties provide 
sentimental value to the owners as people can identify with and express themselves in 
things they make, control and use. Hegel’s view was that property is the first 
embodiment of freedom and is in itself a substantive end. To him, placing one’s will 
into an object and making it a possession makes the inward properties of the mind to 
turn toward the outside world. These rights are substantiated in civil society through 
positive law.34 However, this freedom is not unqualified and we are not entitled to do 
whatever we want with what we own. Individuals’ decisions are subject to the larger 
purpose of their society. Reciprocally, in order to achieve the larger purpose, the 
society must take into account the multitudinous plans of the individuals.
The two approaches (natural rights versus creation of law) have also taken different 
views on the role of the state. For Nozick, property rights exist irrespective of the 
existence of the state. His theory of non-interference or negative rights does not 
advocate a state or government playing an active role in regulating individuals’ 
property rights; on the contrary, it requires the least interference from the state, which 
is called the ‘minimal state’. A minimal state, or the ‘night-watchman state’, exists to 
protect people against force, fraud and theft, and to enforce contracts. Another
31 Ryan, A., 1984, p 92
32 Ibid.
33 Whelan, D., 1998
34 Ibid.
35 Ryan, A., 1984, p 133
36 Wolff, J., 1991, p 10. The state will be deemed to violate rights if it undertakes any more extensive 
programmes, such as collection o f taxes for income redistribution purposes or for the purpose of 
provision o f health service. Individuals’ rights are made inviolable and are protected against 
interference by the state.
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natural rights advocate had taken a less rigid view on the role of the state. According 
to John Locke, people surrender their rights to a sovereign civil society; however, this 
sovereign state will not possess arbitrary and absolute power. For example, 
distribution of wealth through taxation can be carried out with the consent of the 
majority of people through their representatives but no government has the right to 
take a man’s property without his consent. On the other hand, as already discussed 
above, for those who see property rights as something conferred by the law, the state 
is given a more active role to play to safeguard some fundamental ideologies that are 
deemed important such as general utility (utilitarian), moral values (Rousseau), and 
self-management (Mill).38
In reality, the extent of a state’s power over private properties very much depends on 
the socio-political structure of a country. For example, in a democratic country where 
government is elected by the majority, state power is subject to more rigorous scrutiny 
and private properties are, as a result, afforded more safeguard against the 
encroachment by the state. On the other hand, if a country is governed by an 
authoritarian government, private property is more vulnerable to the power of the 
state. Equally, in a country that practises socialism, the state will have more power to 
redistribute properties, which inevitably means that the scope of protection for private 
properties will be less extensive.
3.1.3 A Bundle of Rights
Lay people usually associate property rights with the relationship between the owners 
and things, whilst most academics accept that the notion of property rights is actually 
about the relationship between the owners of things and other people. According to 
Pejovich, property rights are defined as the ‘behavioural relations among men that
37 Macpherson, C.B., 1980, p xviii - xix
38 The role of the state is even more prominent in relation to the governance and use o f natural resource 
and the environment as the issue o f public interest is ever-present when it comes to common goods. 
Apart from regulating exercise o f property rights via legislations, an extreme power that the state uses 
to frustrate property rights is expropriation. One argument provides that changes in social 
expectations/interests (such as a shift in environmental awareness) are part o f the idea o f property. 
According to this concept, ‘property represents individual interests, fluid in time, established and re­
established as circumstances warrant’, and sometimes individual interests have to give way to the 
collective change, Underkuffler, L., 2003, pp 46-51.
39 However, many economic analysis o f property rights still treat property rights as the relationship 
between a person and a thing. For example, Yoram Barzel’s notion of economic right refers mainly to 
the relation between the possessor and the thing. More detailed discussions o f this aspect can be found 
in Cole D.H. and Grossman P.Z., 2002
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arise from the existence of things and pertain to their use’.40 One of the most widely 
referred to definition of property rights is provided by Hohfeld. Hohfeld’s 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions provides an explanation to the nature of the relations 
between people with respect to things.41 Hohfeld’s ‘jural relations’ lists out the 
possible property relations, which encompass claim-right, privilege, power and 
immunity, and these relations are explained by correlatives and opposites. 42 
According to Hohfeld, rights are always accompanied by the corresponding duties to 
do or to abstain from doing something. If there is no corresponding duty on others not 
to interfere with the enjoyment of the thing, then the possessor of the thing does not 
have a right over it, but only power or privilege. By referring to the ‘correlatives’ and 
‘opposites’, one can find out the nature of the relations between the thing and the 
possessor, hence the relations between the possessor and other people. Hohfeld’s 
theory of property relations is one of the few property rights definitions that are 
widely recognised and used, references to his ‘jural relations’ are commonly found in 
state and federal case law in the United States.43
Another widely used definition of property rights was presented by Honore, according 
to whom ownership is ‘the greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system 
of law recognises’.44 Honore treats property rights as a ‘catalogue of things’. This 
catalogue includes the rights to possess, use, manage, and receive income; the powers 
to transfer, waive, exclude and abandon; the liberties to consume or destroy; 
immunity from expropriation; the duty not to use harmfully; and liability for 
execution to satisfy a court judgment.45 These are the ‘sticks’ in the bundle called 
property, and ownership of a thing need not contain all ‘sticks’, it all depends on the 
extent of rights. This description of property rights is useful in the sense that it avoids 
the need to produce evidence of absolute components of rights, and it gives a general 
range of the possible rights and power to use a thing without specifying all the 
possible uses or the actual or possible limitations 46
40 Pejovich, S., 1972, p 40
41 Munzer, S., 1990, pp 17-22. These ideas were present in W esley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, Yale Law Journal, 23 (1913), 16-59
42 Ibid.
43 Some examples o f these cases can be found in the article by Cole D.H. and Grossman, P.Z., 2002, 
pp319-322.
Taken from A.M.Honore, Ownership, in Guest, A.G., 1961, p 108
45 Ibid.
46 Keeve, A., 1986, p 18
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On the other hand, some economists usually refer to property rights as a ‘bundle of 
rights’, which include the right to use, right to derive income, right to transfer and 
right to exclude others. This is in a way a ‘watered-down’ version of Honore’s 
definition, which specifies only the four main features of property rights that are 
deemed vital. Others prefer to make a distinction between legal and economic 
property rights, with economic property rights usually consist of much simpler and 
straightforward definition of rights.47 For example, Yoram Barzel defined economic 
property rights as rights ‘an individual has over a commodity (or an asset) to be the 
individual’s ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the
A O
asset) [original emphasis] directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange. In 
other words, these direct and indirect links to benefits establish property rights. This 
form of explanation of definition of property rights is ‘consequential’, meaning the 
status of the thing or relation is directly linked to outcome of the use. It avoids the 
discussions of duty, right, power, privilege and etc. as elaborated by Hohfeld. This 
‘consequential’ approach is akin to the utilitarian approach, which gives emphasis not 
to the content of the right, but the result produced, i.e. the amount of utility. In fact, 
Posner has tried to show that law and economics are both after the same aim, namely 
efficiency,49 which in the legal world is known as ‘utility’. According to Posner, the 
‘greatest utility’ of Bentham is the same as the ‘efficient solution’ sought after by 
economic analysts.50
3.1.4 Distribution: Justice and Sustainability
Theories of distributive justice are concerned with two things: intra-generational and 
intergenerational equity. Both of these have a great impact on what and how resources 
of the world are consumed. Intra-generational distributive justice addresses the issue 
of the distribution of wealth and resources among people of the same generation. 
Intra-generational distributive justice is important because while poverty leads to
47 For discussions of legal and economic property rights, see Cole, D.H. and Grossman, P.Z., 2002, and 
Keeve, A., 1986, ibid. Chapter 2.
48 Barzel, Y., 1997, p 3. While Barzel’s economic rights seem not to be confined by legal rights,
Sheehan J. and Small G. defined economics rights as rights dependent on, and are subsidiary to, the 
capacity of legal rights to permit and to allow the holder to enjoy as a benefit from the thing in question, 
in Sheehan J. and Small G., 2002, p 11.
49 Harris, J .W ., 2004, pp 45-50.
50 Ibid. p 46.
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ecological degradation and resource depletion51, extreme wealth encourages people to 
engage in the unsustainable consumption of resources. As such, equity will be 
achieved when these two extremes are reduced or eliminated. Intra-generational 
distributive justice aims at reducing the gap between the rich and the poor, and a more 
equitable allocation of resources so that everyone can have a fair share of the world 
resources. Intergenerational equity addresses the issue of justice between generations. 
It refers to the concept that each generation should ‘use and develop its natural and, 
cultural heritage in such a manner that it can be passed on to future generations in no 
worse condition than it was received’. This concept is closely related to the notion 
of sustainable development, which is now treated as the guiding principle for the use 
of the world’s resources. Even though the concept of intergenerational equity has 
become more established during the last two decades (especially in the international 
law field), the applicability of the different theories is still questionable and far from 
certain.53
In a market economy where most goods and services can be freely exchanged for 
value, accumulation of property equals to accumulation of wealth. As a result, 
distribution of property has a direct impact on the issue of justice. Most philosophers 
and economists are resigned to the fact that in a market economy, absolute equality of 
wealth or property is not attainable. Bentham’s utilitarianism provides a theory on 
distribution of income. Utilitarianism does not aim to achieve equality; the crux of 
utilitarianism as a whole is the maximisation of welfare. According to Bentham, the 
needs of those in distress are more urgent and exacting than the needs of the better 
off, that anything transferred from the latter to the former will do more good to the 
recipients than the loss of it will do harm to the better off. In other words, due to the
51 The link between poverty and ecological degradation has been widely recognised and many studies 
have been carried out to look into this matter. For example, the UNEP established a ‘Poverty and 
Environment Unit’ (http://www.unep.org/dpdl/povertv environment/index .a sp ), which carries out 
projects in partnership with a few countries in Africa. The aim o f the projects is to promote sustainable 
development and reduce poverty; the overall objective o f the projects is to help developing countries’ 
capacity to mainstream environment into their development strategies. Another official programme is 
the Poverty Environment Partnership (PEP), which is a organised donor group set up by the European 
Union Commission o f Development.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/develonment/bodv/theme/environment/env int Pov Env.htm
52 Birnie, P.W. and Boyle, A.E., 2002, p 89.
53 Inter-generational equity will not be discussed in more detail in this section. For more information on 
the topic, see Birnie, P. and Boyle, A., 2002, pp 89-91; Redgwell C., 1999; Jamieson, D., 2000; 
Alexander Gillespie provides a detailed account o f all the international environmental law instruments 
that contain the principle o f intergenerational equity, Gillespie, A., 1997, pp 107-114; Thompson, J., 
2003; Weiss, B., 1989; Rawls, J., 1999, pp 251-258.
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different units of utility enjoyed by different groups of people, total utility can be 
maximised if some wealth from the rich is transferred to the poor. This is known as 
the theory of diminishing marginal utility.54 Under utilitarianism, a welfare state is 
advocated, partly because the government can then help to ‘redistribute’ income or 
wealth through government policies, such as taxation. Re-distribution of wealth is 
necessary to increase the total welfare of the society.
On the other hand, utilitarians do not accept the constant redistribution of wealth. 
According to Bentham, one of the main roles of the state is to provide security of 
property or income. Constant redistributive efforts by the state to achieve equality 
would frustrate expectations and cause insecurity that even those who get the least out 
of the existing system and might anticipate doing well out of greater equality would 
suffer over the long run. As a result, total utility will be diminished. Utilitarian sees 
inequality as a necessary feature for the security of property rights, and may even be 
desirable for a small group of people to hold an ‘abundance’ as these resources can be 
of great use in time of trouble. Nevertheless, the utility of the population or society as 
a whole must be maximised through the use of a welfare state, where the government 
adopts various policies to divert wealth from the rich to the disadvantaged.
Robert Nozick offers an alternative theory of the distribution of property or wealth. 
Unlike Bentham and other earlier philosophers, he is of the opinion that distribution 
of property should not be based on moral judgment (such as equity or justice), but 
should be based on entitlement. The entitlement theory suggests that the holding of a 
property is justified if and only if it came to the possession of the individual by the 
correct procedure. 55 Nozick divides justice in holdings into three: justice in 
acquisition, justice in transfer and justice in rectification. In essence, Nozick’s
54 Bentham’s distribution theory has been subject to many criticisms. In particular, the utilitarian theory 
focuses on the maximisation o f utility or happiness, it does not address the issue o f justice, especially 
individual justice. It has always been argued that utilitarianism achieves the utility o f the majority at 
the expense of individual rights, Simmonds, N.E., 2002, pp 44-45. In addition, the issue o f the 
practicality and desirability of inter-personal comparisons of utility is ever present. Apart from the 
difficulty o f quantifying happiness, individuals have different perceptions o f what is good and derive 
different levels o f satisfaction from the same thing. An objective comparison o f happiness is hence 
impossible.
55 Nozick distinguishes patterned historical theory from unpatterned historical theory. Patterned 
historical theory refers to a theory that advocates distribution to be made according to some pattern, 
such as according to needs, or according to ability etc.. Nozick’s entitlement theory is an unpatterned 
historical theory because according to the theory, just distribution is a matter o f procedural correctness.
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position is that the justice of one’s holding of a particular item of property depends 
entirely, and solely, on how it came into one’s possession. Thus, the state has no right 
to carry out redistributive efforts except in cases where rectification is needed because 
goods have been obtained by fraud or force. Property rights are almost inviolable 
under Nozick’s libertarian theory and distribution of property is only subject to the 
justice of holdings and nothing else.56
John Rawls published A Theory o f Justice51 in 1971, offering a new perspective on the 
understanding of justice.58 Unlike other philosophers, John Rawls did not provide a 
theory that emphasises a certain political value as the ultimate aim to be achieved. 
Instead, he advocated a theory that provides an objective process through which 
conclusions about justice are arrived at, and that this process is neutral between 
different conceptions of goods. According to Rawls, ideally conclusions about justice 
should be deduced from a starting point from which rational agents could not dissent. 
This is the so-called test of ‘reflective equilibrium’ where people are asked to choose 
a set of principles that will govern the basic structure and institutions of their society 
behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, meaning that individuals are to choose the principles on 
the grounds of rational self-interest and without certain types of knowledge about 
themselves. They should also be aware that the principles they have chosen will be 
binding upon them.59 A person in this ‘original position’ does not have the knowledge 
of all those features that distinguish him from another, and even though he knows that 
he has his own conception of a good life he does not know what that conception is. 
However, the person would have the knowledge of what is valuable and worth 
pursuing which are called the ‘social primary goods’ (this is theoretically the same for 
everyone), such as liberty, income, wealth, opportunity and so on.60 Rawls believed 
that this ‘veil of ignorance’ enables individuals to set aside personal interests and to
56 Nozick’s theory can be criticised on the ground that ‘procedural justice’ is achieved at the expense o f  
‘substantive justice’: it does not address the substantice issues of justice and fairness in relation to 
acquisition and distribution o f property. The issue o f distribution has become more prominent as 
human population has increased and world resources have become more and more scarce. If the 
entitlement theory were used as the basis o f distribution, it would seem inevitable that the gap between 
the rich and poor would become much greater.
57 Rawls, J., A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)
58 Rawls’ theory of justice is applicable to both intra- and inter-generational distributive justice.
59 Rawls uses the hypothetical contractarian or the social contract approach to explain the formulation 
and functioning o f a society.
60 This is referred to as ‘the thin theory o f the good’. The criticism to this concept o f Rawl is that the 
‘thin theory of the good’ is inherently biased in favour of the bourgeois individualist conceptions o f the 
good life.
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judge the matter from a more impartial point of view. According to Rawls, a rational 
person in the original position will choose two principles of justice. First, each person 
is entitled to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties that is compatible with 
a similar system for everyone else. Second, social and economic inequalities are just 
only in so far as they work to the advantage of the least advantaged people in 
society.61
Rawls’s theory of justice offers a different approach to the understanding of a just 
society but it is not without criticisms. It is questionable whether or not the ‘original 
position’ or ‘veil of ignorance’ will ever be attainable in real life. In reality, everyone 
is conscious about his or her own status and interest, and will always make choices 
that will maximise self-interest. Furthermore, everyone has a preconception of what a 
good life is and which values will help him or her to achieve a good life. Thus, 
choices made by individuals will always be biased toward their meaning of what 
constitute a good life. Second, Rawls’s attempt to provide a means whereby 
individuals can make choices free from preconceptions of what a good life means is 
itself questionable. Rawls’s idea of social primary goods, such as liberty,
f\0opportunities, wealth, income, self-respect and so on are by no mean neutral. Rawls 
assumes that people want these goods and they prefer more of them to less 
(preconceptions of what a good life is). However, it is arguable that while these goods 
are particularly suitable for life in a modem capitalist society, such as countries in the 
West; they might not reflect what people strive for in other parts of the world with
different cultural, political and economic background. For example, there could be
non-commercial, more communal, forms of existence, and in these circumstances, 
income and wealth might have a lesser role to play. Thus, Rawls’s theory of justice is 
not as objective and free from bias as he wishes it to be.
3.2 Economic Analysis of Property Rights: The Issue of Efficiency
61 The interests o f the least well off are given special consideration because justice requires that 
everyone to have the same opportunity to strive in life, and success should be based on merit or hard 
work, rather than on natural talents and abilities or parents’ wealth. Rawls thinks that we do not deserve 
the fruits o f our natural talents, and those natural talents do not give us particular claim to a social 
system that would reward us for possessing them. As a result, we should choose the social 
arrangements that do not reinforce and exaggerate the inequalities stemming from such talents. 
Simmonds, N.E., 2002, p 59-60
62 Simmonds, N.E., 2002, pp 69-70; W olff, J., 1996, pp 187-189
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One of the earlier works on the relationship between property rights and production 
was by Karl Marx.63 Both Marx and Engels link property rights to production and 
view economics as the study of property rights over scarce resources where the 
emergence and allocation of property rights is endogenously determined.64 Production 
without exchange would be rendered meaningless. In fact, the primary purpose of 
capitalist production is to carry out exchanges, where property rights change hands. 
Property rights are defined as claims over future income from assets65 and the purpose 
of trade is to exchange bundles of property rights. According to Marx and Engels, 
property rights are the impetus for social (relationship between man and nature, and 
between man and man) and technological changes. More specifically, the emergence 
of private property rights enables man to achieve production efficiency through more 
intensive and efficient use of the accumulated wealth. In addition, the logic of the 
theory of production and exchange shows that property rights are in turn influenced 
by the productive forces, i.e. technology, labour forces, education and so on.66 
However, Marx concludes his analysis with the demise of private property rights (and 
the beginning of communism) as a result of the collapse of capitalism and the revolt 
by the proletariat against the owners of the means of production.
ftHRonald Coase’s paper in 1960 highlighted the role of property rights. His Coase 
Theorem,68 as it was later called, basically contended that if the transaction cost is 
zero, market allocation of resources would be efficient regardless of how property 
rights are initially assigned. This concept brought the relationship between property 
rights and transaction costs to the surface. Following Coase, many economists started 
to take interest in the issue of property rights and economic performance. Harold 
Demsetz tried to shed light on why property right changes took place by looking at 
the case study of Native Americans’ fur trade at the end of the 19th century.69 Douglas 
North took a step back from property rights analysis to look at the structure of
63 Marx’s most famous work on political economy is Das Kapital where he explored the nature o f  
capitalism and the employer-employee relationship.
64 Pejovich, S., 1972, p 48
65 Heltberg, R., 2002
66 A more recent analysis o f the factors influencing the context o f property rights is provided by 
Libecap in his book Contracting fo r  Property Rights, Libecap, Gary, 1989.
67 Coase, R, 1960
68 For a recent detailed analysis o f the Coase Theorem, see Medema, S. and Zerbe Jr, R., 1999.
69 Demsetz, H., 1967.
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70property rights or the so-called institutions. He concluded that property rights 
allocation is governed by the relevant institutions, and institutions are controlled by 
people who may or may not want to adopt the most efficient allocation of property
71rights for the purpose of self-interest. Gary Libecap , on the other hand, emphasised 
the importance of property rights in providing economic incentives that shapes 
resource allocation. Yoram Barzel72 followed the footsteps of Libecap and carried out 
an intensive analysis of property rights in relation to market and economic 
performance. In addition, the theory of the firm, which was also first elaborated by 
Coase,73 has also been used to explain the consolidation of property rights. These 
different aspects of property rights will be discussed below.
3.2.1 Transaction Costs
As already pointed out, Coase contended that when the transaction cost is zero, 
allocation of resources would always be efficient irrespective of the original 
allocation of property rights or the structure of law.74 In Coase’s world, there is no 
predetermined rule of liability; the original assignment of rights should be of no 
concern. In addition, Coase did not make a distinction between personal and social 
gains75; instead, he argued that every choice of property rights assignment/allocation 
involved social costs that must be balanced against each other. Thus, in order to 
maximise social gains and to minimise social cost, any arrangement should not be 
predetermined by the existing property rights allocation or the structure of the law, 
which might not represent the most efficient allocation of resources. Coase gave 
examples of the arbitrariness of assignment of rights in the decisions of the court that
7 f \used the conventional rule of liability. To Coase, what has to be decided is ‘whether
70 North, D., 1990
71 Libecap, G., 1989
72 Barzel, Y., 1997
73 Coase, R., 1937. The firm theory has been elaborated by economists such as Coase, Alchian, 
Demsetz, Williamson, Hart, Grossman, Moore and so forth.
74 For different interpretations o f the implications o f Coase Theorem see Medema, S. and Zerbe, R. JR., 
1999, pp 837-838
75 Contrast this view with Pejovich, S., 1972, p 42. According to Pejovich, from the social point of 
view, property rights allocation is necessary for more efficient allocation and use o f resources within 
the society, while from the individual’s point o f view, the specification o f property rights is associated 
with the search for more personal utility.
76 Coase, R., 1960, pp 8-15. However, this alleged arbitrariness might be the result o f Coase’s lack of 
understanding of the legal definition o f property rights, which is very different from the definition used 
by economist and other social theorists. Consequently, his analysis might be biased as he focused only 
on economic, not legal, implications o f the cases. For an analysis o f the differences between legal and 
economic definition of property rights, see Cole, D.H. and Grossman, P.Z., 2002.
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the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered
77elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm.’
Coase, however, acknowledged that in reality, there would always be transaction costs 
involved in carrying out market transactions. These transactions costs may be so high 
in certain cases as to prevent the market transactions to be carried out. In the world 
with transaction costs, people always look for ways to minimise transaction costs. 
Coase gave two examples of how transaction costs could be minimised: the theory of
70
the firm and state regulations. According to the theory of the firm, property rights 
are coalesced under one entity so that costly individual bargains can be avoided. Thus, 
costly negotiations are substituted by administrative decisions. This will be discussed 
in further detail in the following section. Secondly, according to Coase, the
70government is, in a sense, a super-firm. Thus, it acts in the same way by 
internalising costs if negotiations are too costly. But unlike the firm, the government 
has more power and is able to conscript or seize property. The state may act like a 
monopoly and can allocate and use factors of production in a way that would 
minimise costs. In addition, the state can also minimise transaction costs at the market 
generally by imposing regulations that clarify the assignments of rights (and 
liabilities), set out clear transaction procedures, make information exchange more 
transparent and more available to the public, and so forth.
80Despite some of the criticisms , Coase Theorem has indeed shown the significance, 
or insignificance, of property rights. By first showing that property rights do not 
matter in a world without transaction cost, it subsequently explains why and how 
property rights matter in reality where transaction costs exist. It has shed light on the 
relationship between transaction costs, property rights and efficiency. Secondly, it 
highlights that property rights affect transactions costs, and are part of transaction 
costs. Since transaction costs affect efficiency, property rights are an important factor
77 Ibid. p 27. According to Harold Demsetz, the legal system should ‘improve the allocation o f resource 
by placing liability on the party who in the usual situation could be expected to avoid the costly 
interaction most cheaply’, Demsetz, Harold, 1972, pp 13-28.
78 Coase, R., 1960, pp 15-19
79 Ibid., p 17
80 For example, it has been criticised for not taking into account the moral dimension o f ownership. 
Coase Theorem explains the nature o f market transactions solely on the basis o f efficiency; it does not 
take into account the sentimental value o f the thing to the owner, or the issues o f equity and justice. For 
more detail, see North, G., 2002.
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to be taken into account when one looks at the issue of the use and allocation of 
resources, and the issue of liability. Thirdly, it gives examples of how property rights 
can be exchanged in order to minimise transaction costs, such as by incorporating 
property rights into the realm of a firm to reduce the cost of constant negotiation. 
Coase Theorem has in fact successfully made a powerful insight into the significance 
of property rights in market transactions.
3.2.2 The Theory of the Firm
The theory of the firm was used by Coase to explain how economic players use the 
firm as a means to economise on transaction costs in the market. According to Coase, 
a firm is an alternative form of economic organisation which could curtail transaction 
costs and subsequently increase the value of production by altering and combining 
rights through the market.81 In a market, it is common that different people own 
different factors of production and negotiations have to be carried out to make the 
production process possible. If the transaction cost is zero and parties are fully 
informed about the price and costs, exchange will be carried out to achieve the most 
efficient use of resources. However, in reality, transaction costs are positive and there 
is also asymmetry of information. Negotiations between parties will inevitably 
involve costs and the outcome achieved may not be the most efficient one (the 
positive transaction costs and asymmetry of information enable those who possess 
more information and medium of exchange to have an upper hand). By altering and 
combining property rights of the various factors of production, bargaining or 
negotiation is substituted by administrative decision, which is made within the firm. 
In short, Coase viewed the firm as a means to economise on the use of prices. Thus, 
the difference between an employer-employee relationship and one between 
independent contractors is that in the former relationship, not only can the firm retain 
residual rights of control over the factors of production, it can also tell its employee 
what to do (thus saving on transaction costs), while it can only persuade the
R9independent contractors to do what it wants with the use of price.
Grossman and Hart, and Hart and Moore focus on the issue of asset ownership in 
relation to the theory of the firm. By combining the ownership over array of assets,
81 Coase, R., 1960, pp 16-17.
82 Hart, O. and Moore, J., 1990, p 1150.
32
the firm saves on contracting costs with the individual asset owners. Through this 
transfer of assets, the firm (or rather the manager of the firm) will have an incentive to
83increase the productivity of the assets so as to increase the ex post surplus. Asset 
ownership not only gives the owner the residual claim right over the assets and their 
products, but also the ability to exclude people from the use of the assets. This 
authority over assets translates into authority over people; Hart and Moore theorise 
that an employee will tend to act in the interest of his boss.84 This theory argues that 
vertical integration of property rights within a firm will not only save transaction 
costs, but will also give incentives to both the manager and employees within the firm 
to make the assets more productive.
The theory of the firm shows that integration of assets and resources is aimed at 
achieving and maximising production efficiency. It has also been used to explain 
management of common resources. Elinor Ostrom carried out various studies on 
community forest management, and on collective management of common resource
Of
generally. She referred to the market firm theory as an example of collective action, 
where individuals come together to solve the problem of ‘independent action in an 
interdependent situation’.86 According to Ostrom, an entrepreneur puts in effort to 
coordinate the actions of independent individuals, and each of these individuals 
voluntarily chooses whether or not to join the firm. Due to the fact that the 
entrepreneur retains the residual profits after paying each of the agents, he is 
motivated to organise the activity in the most efficient manner, and the entrepreneur 
can terminate the contract of an agent who does not perform to his satisfaction. More 
importantly, because the agents are free to choose whether or not to join the 
firm/organisation, it is considered private, voluntary and perhaps also non-
on
exploitative. She also drew an analogous example from the theory of the state where 
the state is likened to a ‘super-firm’, and acts like a firm in responding to incentives 
and costs.
83 Ibid., p 1120
84 Ibid.. p 1150
85 Ostrom E., 1990
86 Ibid. p 40
87 Ibid.
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However, the question remains whether or not the market and the management of 
common resources are analogous. Even though generally individuals or a society tend 
to be motivated by incentives and would strive to avoid costs, there are specific 
features in natural resource management that may make the theory of the firm 
inapplicable. Firstly, activities in the market are profit-driven, while in many cases, 
the main aim of natural resource management is to provide sufficient and sustainable 
services to the community. This is particularly true in places where either the resource 
is near depletion (so no more exploitation is possible), or the resource is tightly 
controlled and no economic exploitation is allowed. In these cases, there will be no 
incentive for individuals to become entrepreneurs and organise management in an 
efficient way. Secondly, property rights over common resources may not be as clear- 
cut as assets traded in the market. The basis of the firm theory requires that individual 
property rights over the assets are relatively clear and unambiguous so that exchange 
can be carried out, and without too high a cost. In many cases natural resources are 
commonly owned and individual shares of the resource are impossible to define. 
Thirdly, the asymmetry of information in natural resource cases is much more severe 
than in a market. For example, the true value of much of the resources remains 
unknown, some are even impossible to ascertain. Libecap’s analysis of the unitisation
OQ
of oil fields in the West of the US gives a good example of this problem. In addition, 
the exact value of biodiversity and the environmental services provided by the forest
OQ
is difficult, if not impossible, to determine. Without some relatively accurate 
information about the true value of the goods, transactions are bound to encourage the 
behaviour of advantage-taking and produce severe deadweight loss.
3.2.3 The Evolution of Property Rights
The final strand of the economic literature looks at the development of property rights 
as an institution through some case studies. Demsetz’s article Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights discusses property rights by primarily referencing the concept of 
externalities.90 According to Demsetz, when a transaction is concluded in the
88 Libecap, G., 1989, pp 93-114.
89 Attempts have been made by economists to value the functions of forest and its biological diversity, 
see Adamowicz, W.L. et al., 1996, Forestry, Economics and the Environment (UK: CAB International), 
and Pearce, D. et al. (eds), 2002, Valuing the Environment in Developing Countries: Case Studies (UK: 
Edward Elgar).
90 In his following article Toward A Theory o f Property Rights II, Demsetz further elaborates the 
competition between private and collective ownership. According to him, specialisation o f  production
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marketplace, two bundles of property rights are exchanged. Property rights are a 
social instrument, and they give the owner the right to exclude interference from the 
others. With this exclusive right to deal with the thing, the owner is able to exchange 
or transfer the rights for a value. Furthermore, property rights also specify how 
persons may be benefited or harmed, and this recognition subsequently leads to the 
main essence of his article, which is that the role of property rights is to internalise 
externalities. Activities entail externalities, which include external costs and benefits; 
externalities exist because the activity has a ‘spill-over effect’ outside the boundaries 
of the owner’s right. ‘Internalising’ externalities means that the owner is made to bear 
the side effects from the use of the property; and internalisation usually takes place 
when the gains from internalisation are greater than the cost. If property rights can be 
exchanged freely and easily, then these externalities can be ‘internalised’ through the 
exchange of property rights (the ‘maker’ of the externalities can ‘buy’ the spill-over 
effects so that they can be properly included within his realm of responsibility). 
Alternatively, new property rights can be created in order to reach a new benefit-cost 
equilibrium.
To illustrate that, Demsetz uses the studies of fur trade of the Montagnes American 
Indians at the end of the 19th century by Eleanor Leacock.91 Before the beginning of 
the commercial fur trade, hunting was carried out by the Indians mainly for food. 
Because the externalities were insignificant (due to the large stock and relatively 
small demand), hunting could be practiced freely and the animals were treated as 
common stocks. However, when the prices of fur rose significantly, hunting was 
intensified and as a result, the animal stocks were threatened and conflicts between 
hunters occurred more frequently. As a consequence of this, two actions were taken 
by the communities involved. First, tribe members started to husband fur-bearing 
animals and set up farms. Second, the ownership of animals was established and was 
allocated to community members according to defined agreements. In short, private 
ownership over the animals was established. Demsetz explains that this happened 
because intensive hunting of animals under the original communal ownership regime 
produced great externalities. For example, under communal ownership, hunting was
process (and ownership) influences productivity, the compactness and complexity o f exchange, which 
helps to explain the need for private ownership.
91 The Montagnes “Hunting Territory” and the Fur Trade, a memoir by Eleanor Leacock.
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not controlled and the animals were over-exploited. This happened because the tribe 
members had every incentive to kill every animal they could find before it was taken 
by others; as a result, the number of animals dwindled rapidly. Under private 
ownership where the community recognised the owner’s right to exclude others, 
hunting became more sustainable and the concentration of benefits and costs on 
owners created incentives to utilise resources more efficiently.
Another theorist who has tried to explain the nature and creation of property rights is 
Gary Libecap. Libecap’s book Contracting for Property Rights92 seeks to explain in 
more detail why property rights take the form they do, and how property rights affect 
resource allocation and economic performance. Libecap first sets out the basic 
characteristics of property rights: property rights institutions are determined through 
political process and are enforced by political entities; property rights reflect the 
conflicting economic interests and bargaining strength of those affected (this is 
defined by precedent and expectations; negotiations may involve side payment 
scheme to compensate those who would otherwise oppose the change in property 
rights); and lastly, history matters because today’s choice is often constrained by 
yesterday’s decisions. Libecap uses the word ‘contracting’ to describe efforts by 
individuals to assign or to modify property rights.
In his book, Libecap also asserts that the nature in which property rights are defined 
and enforced has an impact on the performance of an economy for two reasons: 
firstly, the property rights structure affects the way in which resources are allocated 
and exploited, which in turn affects the efficiency of the production process; secondly, 
the prevailing property rights arrangement determines who the key actors or decision­
makers are in the economic system. He also explains that contracting of property 
rights will only take place either where the interested parties see that their welfare will 
be improved or at least they are not made worse off, or that the pressure for change is 
so great that they have no choice but to agree to change (for example the threat of riot 
or a coup). Each interested party will seek to maximise the share of the rent under the 
new arrangement. According to Libecap, the primary motivations for contracting for 
property rights are common pool losses: individuals decide to establish or modify
92 Libecap, G., 1989
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property rights to limit access and to control resource use when motivated by the aim 
of capturing a share of the expected gains from mitigating common pool conditions. 
As already mentioned above, uncertainty or lack of property rights arrangements 
increase transaction costs, and may inhibit efficient use of resources.
According to Libecap, three factors may create a situation in which individuals are 
motivated to change the existing property rights arrangement: shifts in relative prices; 
changes in production and enforcement technology; and shifts in preferences and 
other political parameters.93 This is not dissimilar to the ‘production forces’ described 
by Marx that have a constant impact on the production process. When one or more of 
these factors is present, it is often the case that the status quo is not sustainable or too 
costly, so changes of the existing property rights arrangement are inevitable. Despite 
the fact that according to neoclassical economists, the existing arrangements will 
always ‘adjust’ to achieve efficiency, Libecap recognises that adjustments are largely 
subject to the self-interest behaviour of the interested parties, and may not necessarily 
be geared towards efficiency.94
Furthermore, Libecap identifies a few factors that influence the likelihood of 
agreement on institutional change; sometimes these factors may even inhibit 
contracting for property rights from taking place at all even though the status quo is 
no longer sustainable or efficient. First, the size of the aggregate expected gains: the 
greater the expected gains, the more likely a politically acceptable share agreement 
will be achieved. Second, the number and heterogeneity of competing interests: the 
greater the number and the heterogeneity of the parties involved, the more difficult it 
is for an agreement or agreements to be arrived at. Third, information problem: 
distrust and advantage-taking tendency are more likely to be present in situations 
where information (such as information about the value of the resources, or the 
bargaining strength of the parties and etc) is incomplete, making negotiations more 
difficult. Fourth, the skewness or concentration of the current and proposed share 
distribution: all things being equal, very skewed rights arrangements lead to political 
pressures for a redistribution of wealth; changes will also be more popular if the
93 Ibid., pp 16-19
94 Ibid., pp 19-26
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proposed distribution within the new rights arrangement is not concentrated in the 
hands of a few people.
Libecap concludes by pointing out that because of distributional conflicts, which may 
present political risks, politicians tend to propose legislations that do not seriously 
upset the status quo rankings and that offer only limited relief from common pool 
losses; rational and swift institutional responses to common pool losses cannot be 
taken for granted. The scope within which an institution can act is restricted by the 
various political, legal, social and economic constraints, making the adoption of 
rational decisions to maximise efficiency difficulty, if not impossible. Libecap’s 
analysis provides valuable insight into the theory of institutions, which seeks to 
explain the institutional aspects of property rights including the structure, vested 
interest, historical path dependence and so on.
Both Demsetz and Libecap have illustrated the evolution of property rights in the 
context of natural resource exploitation. A few observations can be made with regards 
to the results of their studies. Firstly, property rights are vital for the development of 
resource exploitation. To be economically viable, resource exploitation needs to be 
carried out in an environment where expectations of gains are fulfilled and with 
relative stability so that resources will not be wasted on guarding against constant 
interference with the possession. Without property rights, the cost of safeguarding 
possessions from the intrusion of others will be too high and makes the exploitation 
activity not profitable; in short, without property rights, large scale exploitation will 
not likely to take off. From the examples above, property rights of an un-owned 
resource evolves towards private property rights.
Secondly, property rights are used as an economic incentive to encourage efficient 
exploitation and management of natural resources. By allocating ownership and 
exploitation rights to individuals, the problems of over-exploitation and free-rider can 
be stopped. With secured private property rights, individuals not only can plan for the 
current and future use of resources, but are also motivated to invest in improving the 
cost-effectiveness of the exploitation process. Thus, property rights encourage rational 
and efficient utilisation and management of natural resources. Thirdly, property rights 
can be analysed as an institution which consists of a structure, legal rules and a group
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of individuals with vested interests. Interactions between the institutions and outside 
factors, and within the institution itself, are defined and constrained by not just the 
outside physical forces, but also forces within the institution. The history or path 
dependence of the institution also influences how it reacts to any change of 
circumstances. Thus, changes of property rights are not just determined by one or two 
factors, but are the result of an interplay and mixture of the different elements.
Fourthly, the case studies seem to show that property rights will always evolve 
towards the direction of private ownership in the process of development of resource 
exploitation. This gives the assumption that for large-scale commercial exploitation of 
natural resources, private property rights will help to achieve efficiency and optimum 
utilisation. Demsetz has set this out clearly in his first article and explains it as if that 
is the natural evolution of property rights once large-scale commercial exploitation 
began. Whether or not this is a general tendency in all situations still needs to be 
investigated. Fifthly, these case studies again point out the relationship between 
transaction costs and property rights. Transaction costs in the form of information 
have a significant impact on the contracting or exchange of property rights: the more 
incomplete the information, the less likely that contracting for property rights will 
take place. Lastly, the literature shows that in all market transactions individuals are 
motivated by self-interest and act accordingly, this is of no exception to the 
management and use of natural resources. According to Libecap, distributional 
conflicts arise because of the competing pursuance of self-interest by individuals.
Following the analysis of the literature, many authors have actually advocated that in 
order to achieve efficiency and sustainability, natural resources should be privatised.95 
On a similar note, many authors have felt that it is necessary to use property rights as 
an incentive to encourage better utilisation of natural resources, based on literature 
like those by Demsetz and Libecap, which inevitably come to the conclusion that 
private ownership is essential for the attainment of efficiency. However, many other 
authors have since looked at cases where natural resources are managed by 
communities. Here, private ownership is the exception rather than the norm, and in 
many places in the world, common management and ownership of natural resources
95 Such as Harold Demsetz and Svetozar Pejovich.
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has worked. Common management of resources will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four below. Suffice it to say that concerns for justice and equity are usually 
prominent in situations where common management or ownership of resources is 
present, and that the viability of the common resource regime is contingent on various 
political, social, cultural and historical factors. The nature of the resource itself rarely 
dictates the type of property rights adopted.
The issues and theories discussed in this chapter have significant bearing on the use 
and management of natural resources. In particular, they show how the extraction and 
use of resources are dictated by or related to property rights. Property rights affect 
transaction costs and as a result a change in property rights would induce a change in 
individuals’ behaviour in relation to the withdrawal and use of resources. Apart from 
their role in influencing economic behaviour, property rights also have huge social 
significance. The regime of property rights not only reflects the sharing of power 
between the state and its people, it also reflects the extent of individual freedom 
enjoyed within a state. The right to own property is regarded as one of the 
fundamental components of human rights as it facilitates or promotes self-expression 
and independence. As a result, private property rights are regarded as indispensable in 
a liberal democratic society.
4. An Overview of China’s Forest and Forestland
Before we turn to the problems and hypotheses explored in this dissertation, we first 
set out some of the basic facts of forests and forestry in China. Even though China’s 
total forestland area is the fifth largest in the world96, forest cover per capita is only 
0.1 hectare, which is only one sixth of the world’s average of 0.6 hectare per capita. 
This reflects the reality of China’s large land mass and population, with a relatively 
small forest resource base. Table One below shows the changes in forestland area in 
China over a period of three decades. Both the figures of forest cover and standing 
forest volume have increased consistently from the end of the 1970s.97 This is mainly 
due to the many large-scale afforestation projects carried out by the government, and
96 Even though it is only 16.55 per cent o f China’s total landmass, well below the global average o f 27 
per cent.
7 Lu, Wenming et al, 2002, p 11
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also the plantation forests established in the Southern collective forest areas. China 
ranks first in relation to the areas of plantation forests established in the world, with a 
total of 45 million hectares of plantation area.98 However, only 5 million hectares of 
these plantations are fast-growing high-yielding forests, the rest consist of either slow- 
growing marginal forests99 or non-commercial forests.100 Whilst forest cover and 
standing volume in collective forests (usually in the South of China) have increased 
significantly, comparatively state forests (mainly in the Northeast and Southwest of 
China) have suffered from slow and sometimes negative growth.101
Table 1 Forest resources expansion 1973-2003















1973-1976 257.60 9,530 121.86 8,660 12.7
1977-1981 267.13 10,260 115.28 9,030 12.0
1984-1988 267.43 10,570 124.65 9,140 13.0
1989-1993 262.89 11,790 133.70 10,140 13.9
1994-1998* 263.29 11,306 153.63 11,267 16.6
1999-2003** 284.93 13,618 174.91 12,456 18.21
Source: The First of Fifth China National Forest Resource Inventory (1973-1998). Forest 
resource inventories have been undertaken every five years, except for a gap between 1982- 
1983. (Obtained from Lu Wenming et al, 2002, p 11).
* The data for 1994-1998 was assessed by the new criterion that the crown density of the 
forest is at least 20 per cent. In previous years forests were associated with a crown density of 
at least 30 per cent. Figures exclude forest resources in Taiwan 
**Source: Sixth China National Forest Resource Inventory (1999-2003) 
http://www.allcountries.org/china statistics/12 16 forest resources bv region.html
All forestland in China is divided into five different categories, namely timber, 
ecological, economic, fuel-wood and special purpose forests. Timber forests are 
forests that are used for timber harvest purposes. Protection forests include forests that 
are deemed important for the ecological services they provide. Many of these forests 
are situated in important areas such as riverine and coastal areas, and they provide 
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resources, especially timber, in these forests are heavily regulated (no commercial 
timber harvest is allowed). Economic forests consist of bamboo forest, fruit orchards, 
and other cash crops. Timber is not the principal product from economic forests. Fuel- 
wood forests provide energy supply to both the rural and urban residents. In fact, the
i m
forests of China provide 40 per cent of the country’s rural energy. Lastly, special 
purposes forests include forests used for scientific research or military purposes, and 
nature reserves. Commercial timber harvest in these forests is also prohibited.
China is seeking to increase its forest cover from 16.6% in 1994-98 to 19.4%, 24.4% 
and 26% of the total land area by 2010, 2030 and 2050 respectively.103 The 
government has embarked on several large-scale afforestation projects since the end 
of the 1970s, starting with the Three North Shelter Belt project that stretches from the 
Northeast to the Northwest. This was then followed by other area-specific 
afforestation projects including the Central Plain Afforestation Project, Taihang 
Mountain Afforestation Project, and Coastal and Pearl River Protection Projects. The 
most recent forest protection and afforestation projects include the Natural Forest 
Protection Programme and the Sloping Land Conversion Programme. The latter 
project has so far converted two million hectares of cropland into forest- and 
grassland. 104 In recent years, silvicultural investments have accounted for 
approximately 70 per cent of state investment in forestry.105
4.1 Timber Trade and Timber Market in China
China’s timber market has increasingly been dominated by timber products imported 
from the neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia and Russia. This is mainly due to 
the dwindling mature forest stock and the increasing demand for timber for 
construction and other purposes. The timber market has been for decades dominated 
by the state, which owns about 50 per cent of the total forest cover and accounts for 
70 per cent of production forest reserves.106 Furthermore, most timber harvests were 
carried out in state-owned forest farms by state-owned forest enterprises. State-owned
102 Rozelle, S. et al., 2000, p 5
103 Lu, Wenming et al, 2002, p 11
104 For a breakdown of these different projects and the areas o f trees planted, see Zhang Daowei, 2003.
105 Ibid. p 87
106 Richardson, S.D. 1990, p 113
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forest enterprises also carried out timber harvest and processing in many non-state 
forestland, effectively controlling the whole timber market. In 1995, the central 
government’s share of state investment in the forestry sector alone (not including 
investment from other levels of government) stood at 35 per cent, compared to only 5
per cent in all state-owned enterprises.107 These state-owned forest farms and
108enterprises mainly concentrated in the Northeast and Southwest parts of China , 
which contain most of the natural forest in China. Forest stocks in these forests have 
started to decline due to unsustainable logging and lack of afforestation efforts. 
Mature and over-mature timber forest area and volume have shrunk overall, although 
most of them are still found in state-owned forests.109 The area of mature and over­
mature timber forest has shrunk from 48 million hm2 pre-1949, to 22 million hm2 in 
1981 and 13.31 million hm2 in 1998.110 Mainly due to the shrinking timber stock and 
inefficient management, a lot of the state-owned forest enterprises and farms were 
suffering losses. Apart from the dwindling stock, state dominance of the timber 
market was reduced first by the introduction of the household responsibility system in 
the early 1980s, and then the adoption of the Natural Forest Protection Programme in 
1998.
Since the devolution of forestland use rights to the household level in early 1980s, 
production from collective or privatised plantations and secondary forests assigned to 
households was subject to less state control. The unified procurement system was 
officially ended in 1985111; but in 1987, the central government introduced a quota 
system for both commercial and non-commercial timber harvest. The quota system 
was adopted in order to curb excessive logging in 1987 and has remained in place 
since. Under the quota system, anyone who wants to cut down trees (except trees on
107 Zhang Daiwei, p 87
108 Such as the provinces o f Jilin, Heilongjiang, Sichuan and Yunnan.
109 State-owned forests have 71 per cent o f the mature and over-mature timber forest area, while the 
collective forests have 12 per cent and Tibet has 15 per cent; in relation to the volume distribution of 
mature and over-mature timber forest, state-owned forests have 66 per cent of the overall volume, 
while collective forests and Tibet have 6 per cent and 27 per cent respectively, Zhang L. et al., 2005.
110 Cheng Yunxing , 2004, p 4
111 This system was put in place for the central government to control both the production and sale of 
timber, and also the price. Under the unified procurement system, most timber was sold to the state at a 
price stated by the government; not surprisingly, the price was usually lower than the market price. 
However, due to the concern o f over-logging, the procurement system was re-established in major 
timber-producing counties in 1987. All price controls were finally lifted in 1993, Richardson, S.D., 
1990, p 168.
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112family plots) needs to get a permit from the local forest bureau; a permit is also 
required for transporting logs.113 The annual quota is set by the central government 
every five years and is stated in the forest five-yearly plan.114 The quota system works 
in a hierarchical way: central government allocates quota to the provincial level, the 
provincial level then assigns the quota to the county level, and lastly the county level 
further distributes the quota among the township governments.
Officially the Natural Forest Protection Programme was adopted as a response to the 
severe drought and flooding that took place in the Yellow River and Yangtze River 
areas in 1997 and 1998 respectively. However, it has been suggested that the 
programme was adopted by the central government to reform the ailing state forest 
industry, which was suffering from inefficient management and dwindling forest 
stock.115 The programme involves 17 Provinces, Areas and Cities, 734 Counties and 
167 state farms and enterprises. The 17 Provinces (and Areas and Cities) encompass 
73.37 million hectares of natural forests, which consists of 69 per cent of the total 106 
million hectares of natural forests in China. Under the programme, most commercial 
timber harvest in state-owned natural forests (in the Northeast and Southwest) has 
been stopped, and the nature of operation in these forest farms and enterprises has 
been changed from commercial timber production to forest management and 
protection. Hundreds of thousands of state workers were either re-assigned or made 
redundant. A lot of the re-assigned workers are now engaged in tree-planting and tree- 
tending projects. The government of China has reported an annual reduction of 19
o ii zr
million m of timber production from the affected areas due to the logging ban.
To solve the problem of supply shortage, China has increased its wood import greatly. 
It is now the world’s second largest wood product importer after the United States, 
and is the world’s largest importer of lumber and plywood.117 Another solution to the 
problem of timber shortage is the establishment of commercial forest plantations. 
Plantations in the Southeast collective forest region increased from 6.8 million ha in
112 Article 32 o f the Forest Law 1984 (amended 1998)
113 Article 37 of Forest Law
114 Article 29 of the Forest Law states that annual quota should be set based on the principle that 
harvest should be less than the growth volume.
115 Private communication from a Professor from the Peking University.
116 Zhang Zhida. 31 October 2005
117 Sun Xiufang, Katsigris, Eugenia and White, Andy, 2004, p 2 6 .
44
the 1984-1988 forest inventory to 8.7 million ha in the 1989-1993 period; those in the 
Southwest increased from 1.3 million ha to 1.75 million ha over the same period.118 
The annual rate of increase in both these areas was around 6 per cent, which was 
almost double the rate of the increase in state-owned forests.119 The majority of the 
newly established forests consist of timber plantations, commercial forests and 
shelterbelts.120 Although investment in non-state forests has increased, evidence 
suggests that many forests that have been clear-cut for timber have not been 
reforested.121 This, coupled with the popularity of the single-species fast-growing 
trees, may result in a decline in diversity and the associated environmental services 
provided by forests in China. Apart from tree-planting, investment in the secondary 
sector, mainly processing products from commercial forests such as bamboo and 
fruits, by non-state entities has also increased.122 However, direct involvement of 
farmers and rural households in the processing sector is little: most of the collective 
members act merely as the providers of raw materials or receive rent from the use of 
land. Furthermore, many of the non-state forest enterprises are small and produce
19Tlow-grade, non-specialised forest products. Lastly, forest investment by non-state 
entities so far has taken place within the 70-year time-frame of the land use agreement 
between the collectives and their members. Whether or not investment will still be 
consistent once the end period is approaching is still open to question.
5. Problems with the Existing Regime
The various problems related to forestry faced by China today indicate that the current 
regime is not adequate and needs to be reformed. Furthermore, as China’s forestry is 
moving towards the strengthening of private ownership, the regime has to be adapted 
to accommodate private interests. This section will look at a few problems related not 
only to unfavourable policies but also to forest law/policy implementation. All these 
problems impede development of the timber market and act as disincentives to private 
investment. In addition, protection and conservation of forests in China also faces 
enormous challenges, in particular in relation to the new public payment scheme for
118 Liu D.C. and Edmunds, D., 2003, p 32. Sourced from China Forestry Yearbook 1990, 1995.
119 Ibid.
120 Rozelle, S. et a l.,2 0 0 0 ,p  18
121 Ibid.
122 Yao Shunbo, 2005, p 127
123 Cheng YunXing, 2004, p 157
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forest environmental services. The core of these problems is the prevalence of the top- 
down approach, where orders and commands are passed down from the central 
government, regardless of what the situations are like on the ground and the quality of 
governance that differs from place to place. There is also a lack of a local and central 
monitoring mechanism in place, which is made worse by the absence of public 
scrutiny and accountability.
5.1 Timber Harvest Quota
China’s timber harvest quota, or annual allowable cut system, was adopted in 1987124, 
two years after the Unified Procurement System for timber was scrapped. The main 
purpose of introducing the quota was to limit timber harvest to a sustainable level and 
to protect the environment. The annual timber quota is set every five years by the 
central government on the basis of ‘sustainable harvest’, meaning that the rate of 
harvest must be slower than the rate of growth of the forest. The annual allowance is 
allocated by the central government to the provincial governments according to the 
requirements of the different provinces; the quotas are then broken down to be 
allocated to the different prefectures in the province, and are subsequently divided 
among the counties. Except timber harvest from homestead land and family plot, all 
other harvests need to be approved by the forestry bureaus, which makes sure that the 
harvest quota is not exceeded. Logging without permission or exceeding the permitted 
volume may be a criminal offence and the perpetrator can be prosecuted.
The effectiveness of the annual allowable cut system in China is questionable, 
especially given that in 1998, a decade after its implementation, the government felt 
the need to take emergency measures to impose a logging ban in most of the forest 
areas to stop further degradation of forest resources. Furthermore, the timber harvest 
quota system has not proved to be successful in controlling excessive logging, as up
19Sto 56 percent of the annual logging volume was without a permit in 1998. These 
problems may be due to two reasons: flawed planning and ineffective implementation 
that led to rampant illegal loggings. Timber harvest quota is not unique to China. 
However, it is usually adopted in protected forests owned by the state; and where it is
124 Timber harvest quota was first introduced by the Forest Law 1984 but only officially commenced in 
1987.
125 China Forestry Yearbook 1998,106-107
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taking place in private-owned forest, some sort of payment scheme would be put in 
place to compensate for the public services provided by the private entities. In 
China, the timber harvest quota is imposed not only in state-owned forests, it also 
applies to all other collective-owned forests and forests managed by private entities.
The first issue related to the harvest quota system is the problem of implementation. 
Cutting with permission or within the permitted volume needs to be monitored and 
verified, which means that a reliable system and adequate human resources need to be 
in place. In 1998, there were more than 3,000 county-level and above forestry 
enforcement offices, with more than 30,000 officers. The total number of checkpoints 
(roadside, river and so on) approved by the provincial governments amounted to 
4,230, with 35,000 workers working at the checkpoints.127 To support and fund this 
huge workforce is not an easy matter; as a result, many local governments have 
imposed high charges and fees on forestry that are used to sustain the local forest 
managers and workers. The high percentage of illegal logging showed that even the 
existing arrangement was inadequate.
The second problem related to the annual allowance system (AAS) is its impacts on 
the timber market. The annual quota set every five years is highly likely to fail to 
reflect the ever-changing market for timber. One of the main requirements of the 
functioning of a market is flexibility, which is essential because the suppliers need to 
be able to adapt according to the market’s timber demand, in an efficient and quick 
manner. If demand for wood has increased, the supplier needs to be able to increase 
the supply to fulfil the requirement of the market. Similarly, when the timber market 
is unfavourable, the supplier needs to be able to hold back the timber supply. Under 
the AAS, the supplier needs to apply for a permit in advance and the process may take 
a while to complete. It is possible that the supplier may apply for the permit when the 
market is favourable, and get the permit when the market has changed to be not 
profitable. Also, the annual allowance set by the central government for all timber 
harvest cannot be carried forward. Hence, suppliers are not able to hold on to their 
permits and wait indefinitely for the market to turn favourable again. This causes the
126 Xu Jintao and White, Thomas A., 2002
127 Yao Shunbo, 2005, p 36
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market to function in a distorted way and may lead to inefficient use of timber 
resources.
The third problem relates to the issue of property rights. The State Council’s Decision 
on Issues Regarding Forest Protection and Development 1981 and the Forest Law 
1984 gave households and individuals use rights over forest resources. This 
devolution of right has since been recognised and strengthened by the 1998 
amendment to the Forest Law, the Land Management Law 1998, and the Rural Land 
Contracting Law 2002. The recently adopted Property Law further strengthens the 
protection of private rights. The AAS restricts households’ rights to use and to derive 
income from timber. It effectively prohibits the right holders from exercising the 
rights unless approved by the government.
In addition to the incomplete ownership right, the AAS also increases the cost of 
timber harvest. Logging permits are issued by the County Forestry Bureaus, which are 
usually situated in towns. This creates problems for households or farmers who live in 
remote villages which are far away from the towns. Households may find it 
impossible to travel every time they want to carry out logging and the cost of 
transportation could also be high. This not only adds to the cost of timber harvest, it 
also causes hardship to poor households who may be the ones that have the greatest 
need to use the timber resources. A case study in Tageba Administrative Village in
198Guizhou Province showed that the over-restrictive harvest quota not only has 
discouraged people from investing in forestland, it has also caused households to 
behave in a way that was not beneficial to the sustainable management of forestland. 
Tageba Administrative Village is a Hmong ethnic minority and forest dependent 
community; the harvest quota was reduced from 1.6 million m per year in 1998 to 
210,000 m3 per year after 1998 (this was most likely the result of the Natural Forest 
Protection Programme which limits timber logging). According to the study, the local 
elite and middlemen obtained more benefits from the AAS, and state-owned 
enterprises had easier access to the quota. The study also found that as a consequence
128 Yang Congming, 2004
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of the harvest quota, many timber forests had been converted to fruit tree cultivation
i 90
and there was frequent illegal logging.
Last but not the least, the harvest quota system puts a lot of discretionary power in the 
hands of forestry bureau officers. This increases the risk of corruption and abuse of 
power by the decision-makers. As the case study in Tageba Administrative Village 
shows, not only do state-owned forest enterprises had easier access to the quota, the 
local elite and leaders also gained more benefits from it in the same way. Abuse of 
power and corruption are rife mainly because of the lack of effective monitoring both 
from the upper level of government and scrutiny from the people. It could also be due 
to the absence of the concept of private ownership right, which would have given 
more say to the right holders as to how and when their rights should be exercised.
5.2 Excessive Taxes, Charges and Fees
Taxation in rural China consists of various agricultural and rural development taxes. 
The most important ones are the Agricultural Tax, Special Agricultural Product Tax, 
and Value Added Tax. Forestry charges are forestry fees collected by local forestry
* i  'xoauthorities and are earmarked to be spent on forestry. These charges include 
afforestation charge, maintenance and upgrading charge, and forestry protection and 
construction charge. In addition, there are many different types of local charges that 
are used to pay for local amenities such as health care and education. Only the central 
government can impose taxes; local government collects taxes and impose local 
charges and fees on top of that. The Chinese government has for decades levied heavy 
taxes on its rural population to support the economic development in the cities. Until 
recently, tax paid by a rural household was one or two times higher than tax paid by 
an urban household.131 High taxes and price control have long put farmers in a 
disadvantaged situation: taxation and charges in certain areas ate up more than 50
129 Ibid.
130 Reform in the general charges system is being carried out where revenue is now fed into local 
government budget, and application must be made to use this fund by the forestry sector, Lu Wenming 
et al., 2002, p 60.
131 Before the tax reform, a farmer paid an average of 140 yuan as tax per annum compared to a city 
resident who paid only 30 yuan, Chen Guidi and Chun Tao, 2004.
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percent of the forest product value 132 , seriously affecting profitability of
133investment.
One of the problems caused by excessive taxation is tax avoidance. Tax avoidance 
takes the forms of illegal extraction and bribery of officials.134 To curb tax avoidance, 
the government has to hire more manpower to oversee tax imposition and collection. 
In fact, it is said that in some counties, over 50% of manpower and resources is
iic
assigned to the collection and management of forestry charges. For example, in 
Fengyi County in Jiangxi, staff salaries took up 20% of the total revenue from forestry 
charges in 1985; in 1999, it had risen to 78% of the total revenue of forestry 
charges. To cover the cost of the manpower, many counties imposed excessive 
charges, thus creating a vicious circle where ultimately the investors have to bear the 
heavy burden of taxes.
High taxation and charges have brought negative economic, social and environmental
impacts on local communities. Although household incomes had increased
significantly since the tenure reform and the abolition of the Unified Procurement
System in the 1980s, incomes from forestry investment have subsequently been
slashed down by the excessive taxation burden.137 High taxes reduce the value of
forestland and forest stands as they result in a decrease in profitability. Low
profitability also leads to constrained forest industrialisation and increasing illegal 
1harvesting. In terms of social impacts, high taxation increases poverty in forestry 
areas and accentuates rural-urban inequality. Ironically, a lot of the revenue collected 
is spent on forestry management in townships or is channelled into the urban areas to 
carry out development projects.139 When taxes and fees are high, existing forests are 
harvested without subsequent reinvestment.140 Furthermore, it also causes conversion
132 In the Southern Collective Forest Region, tax burden could be as high as 60%-70% of farmers’
gross profit from timber, Yao Shunbo, 2005, p 39 
33 Zhang Shiqiu et al., 2005
134 Liu J.L. and Landell-Mills, N., 2003, p 49
135 Lu Wenming et al., 2002, pp 73-74
136 Ibid.
137 Liu J.L. and Landell-Mills, N., 2003, p 53
138 Ibid., p 53-54
139 Ibid.140
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of forestland into cropland and fruit orchards, which are more profitable economically 
but do not provide as full an environmental service as forests.
As the wealth gap between city dwellers and rural farmers became wider, rural tax 
reform became inevitable. In relation to forestry, in 2000, the State Forestry 
Administration (SFA) permitted provincial forestry authorities to deduct forestry 
charges by a certain percentage.141 Different provincial governments have responded 
to this devolution of power to various degrees. For example, in the Guangdong 
Province, 50-70 percent of the fees for afforestation and for maintenance and use can 
be returned to foreign investors after their enterprises have reforested the harvested
147area. Also, up to 85 percent of the forest protection and construction fee can be 
returned after the foreign enterprises afforest more than 33, 000 ha to support a pulp- 
making facility or other facility producing fine wood products.143 In the Jiangxi 
Province, the forestry authority is piloting a scheme that lowers the price base used 
for calculating charges by half.144 Furthermore, the Province has also abolished 
Special Agricultural Tax for all agricultural products (especially timber and bamboo) 
except tobacco, and has allowed the county government to keep most of the charges 
received.145 Similar attempts are also taking place in the Hebei Province, which, like a 
few other provinces, is currently carrying out collective forest reform.146 In the Hunan 
Province, Huaihua Prefecture, local forestry authority has attempted to eliminate all 
unofficial forestry charges.147 All of these initiatives are aimed at providing incentives 
for forestry investment.
Forestry tax reforms are still in their early stages and the consequences of these 
reforms are yet to be affirmed. However, some lessons can be learned from the 
agricultural tax reform that has been carried out for a few years now.148 At the start of
141 Ibid., p 49
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid., p 50. However, this reduction has been offset by increases by lower level authorities, which 
usually set forest product charging price bases much higher than that approved by the provincial 
authority.
145 Liu D.C. et al., 2007
146 Hebei Province People’s Government’s Opinion on the Further Reform of the Collective Forest 
Property Rights, 2005, Number 97
147 Cheng Yunxing, 2004, pp 183-188
148 The central government reviewed the rural taxation policy in 1999 and a pilot scheme was carried 
out in the Anhui Province and three counties in other provinces in 2000. The three main components of
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the pilot scheme, farmers’ lives had improved dramatically as the farmers themselves 
could keep a large portion of their production incomes.149 However, as time passed, 
some problems started to appear that could potentially jeopardise the reform. One 
consequence of the decentralisation of production control that took place in the 1970s 
was that villages have been made more financially independent, meaning that they 
were responsible for raising their own revenue. In addition, since 1994, the Chinese 
government has restructured its tax allocation system, where the township 
government gets a percentage of the tax collected instead of having everything 
subsidised by the government.150 A result of this reform is that central government’s 
revenue from rural taxation has increased significantly whilst township government’s 
revenue has decreased.151 As the tax burden on farmers decreases, local authorities are 
faced with an ever increasing shortage of income sources. Many township
1 S9governments and villages have also built up huge debts as a result of the decrease 
in income. This has put constraints on the ability of local authorities to pay salaries to 
their staff and to provide public services. As a result, some local governments have 
continued to increase fees and charges after the initial reduction following the tax 
reform.153 To overcome the problem, some local authorities have attempted to either 
diversify income sources or to carry out institutional/administrative reforms within the 
government structure to reduce expenses and to increase efficiency. The gap between 
incomes and expenses of local governments, however, continues to widen.154
Similarly, some evidence has shown that forestry tax reform has also harmed local 
government finances. Without alternative revenue sources, some local governments 
have no choice but to defy central government policy. For example, in the Hebei 
Province, even though some unofficial forestry charges had been eliminated, new
this were: (i) the reduction, elimination and conversion o f fees and charges into taxes; (ii) the 
centralisation of tax and charge collection; (iii) the reduction in government overstaffing. Lu Wenming 
et al., 2002, p 66
149 A review carried out by the Anhui Province Statistics Bureau at the end of 2000 showed that the 
average tax paid by every farmer had fallen from 123.98 yuan to 83.14 yuan, a clear indication that the 
farmers’ tax burden had been eased, Chen Guidi and Chun Tao, 2004, p 134.
150 Lu Xueyi, 2002, 101-103; Wo Wenbo, 2003
151 Ibid.
152 For an example o f the difficulties faced by local governments in the Jilin Province, see Wang 
Xiaoming, 29 November 2005
153 Chen Guidi and Chun Tao, 2004, p 164
154 It was estimated that the gap could reach up to more than 400 billion yuan for the whole country, 
ibid., p 149.
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unofficial charges re-emerged later.155 And in the Jiangxi Province, local authorities 
set forest product charging price bases much higher than that approved by the 
provincial authority to offset the reduction in charges. Until, and unless, the central 
government assists local governments to develop and to find more alternative income 
sources, the problem of financial difficulties faced by the local governments will 
make reduction of rural taxes and charges very difficult if not impossible.
Some researchers have offered another way to explain the problem of rural taxes 
(including local charges and fees). According to the theory, under the household 
responsibility system, the relationship between the collective and the households is 
equivalent to the relationship between a landlord and a tenant.156 Instead of paying 
rent, households are subject to the different charges and fees imposed by the local 
authority.157 Due to the fact that demand for land is much higher than supply (mainly 
because of population congestion in rural China and labour immobility)158, the cost of 
land use is high. As a result, local authorities exploit the vulnerability of farmers (their 
reliance on land) and impose extortionate charges and fees. 159 It is argued that until 
and unless the degree of farmers’ reliance on land is reduced significantly, charges 
and fees will always be high, reflecting the high land rental in the land market.160
5.3 Forestland Tenure and Land Use Rights
As the issue of rural land tenure will be looked at in more detail in subsequent 
chapters, this section will only give a short introduction to the subject. During the last 
50 years, major reforms have taken place in rural China regarding rural land 
ownership, management and use. Rural land ownership has moved from private to 
collective since the mid-1950s when compulsory large-scale collectivisation took 
place, and most of the land has remained collective-owned since. Unlike urban 
land161, rural land is presumed to be owned by the collectives unless the law provides
155 Lu Wenming et al., 2002
156 Liu Fengqin, 2005, pp 170-180
157 Ibid.
158 Demand for agricultural land does not always outstrip supply in all places. In places where off-farm  
employment is available and farming is not profitable, land are abandoned by farmers who have opted 
to take up off-farm employment, Chen Xiaojun et al., 2004, p 16.
159 Liu Fengqin, 2005, pp 170-180
160 Ibid.
161 According to the Chinese law, the state owns all urban land. Article 8 o f the Land Management Law  
1998 stipulates that all urban land belong to the state, while rural and suburban land belong to the
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otherwise (state ownership). Private bodies (including individuals, households and 
enterprises) cannot own land although they can obtain land management and use 
rights either from the collective or the state. In relation to forestland, many collectives 
were hesitant to allocate or contract out forestland to households and many had taken 
back the forestland use right when mass loggings took place immediately after de­
collectivisation.162 As a result, unlike the cropland, the collective still manages a large
1tract of forestland in China.
Currently, forestland tenure and use rights are plagued with problems, most of which 
will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. Here, the author would like to 
highlight three problematic areas in relation to forestland tenure security, which are 
the characteristics of the law, the power of state, and land registration. Firstly, the 
government adopts the ‘one rule fits all’ approach in relation to rural land use 
arrangements. This approach is impractical and causes hardship because there are 
great differences across China in relation to the geography, people-land ratio, 
economic development, off-farm employment opportunities and so forth. The 
importance and use of land varies according to the factors mentioned above. By trying 
to apply one set of rigid rules for all agricultural land, the government has created 
both unsatisfactory implementation results and the opportunity to disobey the law. A 
comprehensive survey of hundreds of households across China found that more often 
than not local governments flouted the law on contractual period, issuance of land 
certificates, and land reallocation.164
Secondly, the overwhelming power of state over collective land in rural China not 
only symbolises the socialist nature of the Chinese state, it also has a deeper 
implication on the meaning of collective ownership of land. Individual households in 
a collective are not in fact ‘co-owners’ of the collective land; rather, collective land is
collectives unless the law provides that the land belong to the state. However, Article 2(1) of 
Regulations on the Implementation o f Land Management Law provides that forestland is presumed to 
be state-owned unless collective ownership can be proven.
162 This took place mainly because of the uncertainty in the long-term nature o f the policy reform due 
to frequent changes in government policy led to rapid harvest o f timber by the farmers. This problem 
was particularly prevalent in the Southern Collective Forest Region. Liu D.C. and Edmunds, D., 2003, 
pp 31-38.
The collectives still manage around 20 percent o f the collective-owned forests, Hyde, W.F. et al., 
2003, p 10.
164 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003
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owned by the collective as a single entity. In other words, collective ownership of 
land is not the aggregation of individual ownership of the different parts of the land. It 
is inseparable and is owned as single unit by the collective body. The collective is in 
turn subject to the supervision of the state in terms of fulfilling political targets and 
production quotas. Many Chinese scholars have in fact described the collective as a 
mere ‘production arm/tool’ of the state165, despite its apparent independence. As a 
result, even though collective ownership of rural land is separate from state 
ownership, the state in effect controls the use of collective land.
Thirdly, collective forestland in China still faces the problem of incomplete land 
registration. Theoretically, all collective land ownership and private land use have to 
be registered with the local land administration offices.166 This is reiterated in the new
i £ n
Property Law , which aims to further strengthen collective and private rights. 
Furthermore, the new law also pronounces rural land contracting rights as real rights. 
One of the important requirements of the establishment of a real right (over an 
immovable thing such as land) is the registration of title. Hence, the need to register 
private land use rights is even more important following the introduction of the new 
law. In addition, registration of ownership of collective land would also help to 
alleviate the problem of ‘identity crisis’ and prevent encroachment of rights by the 
state.169 Registration of land use rights, however, is not complete in most places; in 
some places more than half of the households have not registered their rights.170 This 
is usually intentional due to impracticality of registration of rights.171 According to 
Peter Ho, incomplete registration of collective ownership rights is an intentional act 
by the government. This is because of two main reasons: firstly, it will facilitate 
economic development by allowing land to be requisitioned frequently; and secondly, 
it avoids widespread social conflict over land by not having to deal with contested
165 Liu Fengqin, 2005; Zhou Qiren, 2004.
166 Article 3 of Land Management Law 1998 and Article 23 o f Rural Land Contracting Law 2002
167 Article 9 and Article 127 o f Property Law168This refers to the lack o f a clear definition o f ‘collective’ mentioned briefly above, and which will 
be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
169 This is particularly important given the fact that forestland is deemed to belong to the state unless 
collective ownership can be proven. In other words, unless the collective can prove ownership by 
showing ownership certificates or registration, the land is owned by the state. This has caused hardship 
and injustice to the collective, Ho, Peter, 2005, pp 118-122.
170 Ibid., pp 17-43; Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003
171 Frequent land reallocations make it impractical to register land use right for a period o f 30 years for 
arable land and 70 years for forestland. This issue will be discussed in Chapter Two.
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ownership claims at the lowest level.172 Currently the problem of incomplete land 
registration is not perceived to be fatal due to the fact that land transactions are tightly
171controlled and infrequent ; however, it is highly likely that serious disputes will 
arise in the future when the land market is opened up further.
The problems of tenure insecurity and land use rights will be discussed in detail in the 
subsequent chapter. In fact, it is the main focus of this thesis, which looks at the 
underlying forestland tenure problems and the viability of a regime change in China. 
Apart from the issue of tenure insecurity, the ownership structure also has an indirect 
impact on how collective forests are governed. In particular, the incentive to invest is 
hampered by various restrictive government measures, such as the harvesting quota 
system and the logging ban. It can be argued that the existing ownership structure has 
enabled the state to adopt these restrictions. A change in the property rights regime 
will have far-reaching impact on all the forest-related discussed in this and subsequent 
chapters.
5.4 Inadequate Compensation for Forest Ecological Benefits
In 2004, the Chinese government set up a Forest Ecological Benefits Compensation 
Fund (FEBSF) under which the central government pays out money to entities that 
manage the ‘public benefit’ forests. These forests are usually natural forests or forests 
in strategic areas that provide various ecological services to the community. The 
current rate of compensation is 5 yuan per mu (approximately USD 9 per hectare), 
with 4.5 yuan to be allocated to the forest management units and 0.5 yuan for fire and 
disease prevention efforts. Even though this marks a major step forward for forest 
conservation and protection in China in the sense that private efforts are compensated 
via a public benefit scheme, its effectiveness is not at all clear.
There are several issues related to the forest ecological benefit scheme. Firstly, the 
subsidy provided is negligible and inadequate. The subsidy given covers only the 
tending/management cost of the forests whilst lost revenue resulting from restricted 
forest use is not compensated. In reality, it is likely that the 5 yuan per mu is not even 
sufficient to cover the full tree tending and planting costs, let alone the opportunity
172 Ho, Peter, 2005, pp 17-43
173 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003
56
costs, which can be high in certain areas. According to the suggestion of the 
Workshop on Payment Schemes for Environmental Services in relation, to the 
environmental payment scheme in the Guangzhou Province, the compensation level 
should be in the range of 30 yuan per mu for ecological forests.174 In addition, it is 
argued that regional differences and ecological characteristics should be taken into 
account when deciding on compensation levels.175 The small compensation payment 
could greatly compromise the viability of the Programme, especially if the price for 
timber is comparatively much higher.
Secondly, the scheme has not adopted the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle. The FEBSF 
was officially commenced nationwide in December 2004. However, the regulations 
do not specify how long the scheme will last and how long the government will keep 
paying money out of the central budget. The subsidy is allocated from the state budget 
and no contribution is collected from the beneficiaries of forest ecological benefits. 
One advantage of this scheme is that it has avoided the need to establish the market 
value of ecological services, and the link between the benefits accrued and services 
provided. These two things are particularly difficult to establish without detailed and 
long-term economic valuation studies. As a result, it has made expedient 
implementation of the FEBSF possible. On the other hand, considering that the 
government has only limited resources, it is not certain at all that the FEBSF scheme 
under the current format will be carried out indefinitely. Hence, in the long term, 
contributions from beneficiaries are desirable as they not only reflect the market value
177of the environmental services but also relieve the state from the financial burden.
174 CCICED, In Pursuit o f  a Sustainable Green West, 2002, p 9
175 Ibid.
176 A case reported in the paper serves as a warning shot to the long-term sustainability o f the scheme. 
In 2000, a pristine forest area in the Fo Gang County in the Guangdong Province was designated as a 
‘public benefit forest’ and was included in its Ecological Compensation Scheme. The farmers received 
8 RMB for every mu of forestland. However, since the end o f 2006, 1,000 mu of timber has been 
illegally logged. This was mainly because the price o f logs had increased a few folds (due to shortage 
of supply): timber could be sold for between 600-800 RMB per cubic metre. In addition, no forest 
guard had been hired by the collective since 2004 due to financial difficulties. As a result, illegal 
logging was rampant and enforcement was ineffective. The timber production sanctioned by the local 
forestry bureau was said to be double the amount set by the county forestry bureau due to the lucrative 
income the forest bureau could earn from transport permits and management fees, both o f which 
depend on the volume of timber transported. Xiang Zhenzhong, 29 March 2007.
177 For in-depth discussions of examples o f the use o f market-based mechanisms in forest ecological 
services compensation, see Pagiola, S., Bishop, J. and Landell-Mills, N. (eds), 2002.
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Thirdly, there appears to be no explicit and objectively measurable environmental 
targets. Without these targets, monitoring and evaluation is difficult if not impossible, 
and the effectiveness of the scheme cannot be assessed. Fourthly, the chain of 
implementation is too cumbersome especially in relation to collective-managed 
natural forests. In the case of state forest farms or state-owned forests, the money is 
paid out from the central government budget and is delivered to the provincial 
governments that would then dispense the money. In the case of collective-managed 
forests, the money has to go through the county and township governments and 
ultimately to the village authorities. Due to this long chain of implementation, there 
will always be the risk that some money will get lost or used improperly before it 
reaches the payee.178
Ecological compensation is a new and exciting phenomenon in China. However, it is 
still too early to make a judgment on the success of the scheme, especially when it is 
generally agreed that the subsidies paid are too low. China can no doubt further fine- 
tune the compensation scheme. Furthermore, there are plenty of examples of 
successful ecological compensation schemes around the world that can be used as 
references.179 In particular, even though the government may think that it is not viable 
to pay the market value at the moment, involving those who are benefiting from the 
environmental services can further increase the subsidy amount. In fact, striking a 
balance between environmental services providers and users may be the only way to 
ensure long-term provision of environmental services.
5.5 Implementation of Forest Law and Policy
Another major problem related to the forest and forestry in China is law enforcement. 
Problems with implementation of law and policies in China are not unique to forest 
governance; they are indeed embedded within the general governance system. Due to 
the one-party system and historical reasons, the central government has always 
possessed the ultimate governing power. Unlike the United States and many other 
countries, China does not have a federal system, and very little direct power is
178 One instance of mismanagement by the local authority in Huaiji County was reported in a news 
article, Luo Y.J. and Mao Z.Y., 14 September 2004.
179 Pagiola, S. Bishop, J. and Landell-Mills, N. (eds), 2002
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180   , #devolved to provincial governments. The provincial governments are not 
independent of the central government and their law-making roles are limited. For 
example they can only make laws to complement the law and policies already made
by the central government.181 To make matters more complicated, laws passed down
182from the central government are usually aspirational and rather less complex. In 
fact, most of the supposed ‘laws’ adopted by the central government are actually
1 o o
policies, which lack detailed and elaborate provisions. This certainly makes 
implementation of government policies more difficult and more susceptible to
• • • 184misinterpretation.
Even if the laws promulgated by the central government are clear, there is still a rather 
erroneous presumption that sub-national units of government have the will and 
resources to properly implement the laws. Ultimately, the interests of central 
government may differ from those of sub-national government: sub-national 
government most probably will be more concerned with local economic development,
compared to central government which may be more concerned with the
1 8 6environmental welfare of the nation. Furthermore, the difficulty of coordination
(both horizontal and vertical) within the government has not been highlighted
186enough. In 1988, Ross summed up forest governance in China in the following 
sentences: The state system is essentially bureaucratic and largely relies on hierarchy 
commands to secure compliance, the collective sector features campaigns alongside 
plans, and the private sector largely relies on material incentives organised through
180 However, increasingly more power is transferred from the central to local government mainly due to 
the economic reform. For example, provincial governments are now allowed to adopt ‘experimental 
legislations’ that, if proven successful, will be endorsed and sometimes implemented nationwide by the 
central government, Peerenboom, R., 2002, pp 189-190.
181 In fact, provincial and lower level legislative enactments are only valid insofar as they are consistent 
with national measures, Alford, W.P. and Shen Y.Y., 1997, p 128
182 Ibid.
183 Bledsoe, D. and Prosterman, R.,2000
184 Beyer, Stefanie, 2006
185 The ‘interests incompatibility’ situation can be found in the USA, which illustrates the different 
priorities o f the federal and state governments in relation to forest governance, Koontz, T., 2002
86 In China, forest governance involves departments such as land, water, wildlife and conservation, 
mining, and forest to name a few. These different departments have their own mandates and govern 
uses of forest and forest resources. Given that coordination across departments is notoriously 
complicated, it is even truer in China where the legal and political systems are still yet to mature, 
Alford, W.P. and Shen Y.Y., 1997, p 140.
59
market-type mechanisms. The prominence of each at any given point in time is 
largely a reflection of broader political dynamics.187
Another major problem of land and resource management in China is the 
effectiveness and fairness of law implementation. Due to the lack of an open and 
transparent monitoring system, corruption and abuse of power often have plagued all
1 RRlevels of government in China, including the highest level of governance. The 
presence of rampant corruption in the country’s administration means that laws and 
policies are not properly implemented and the goals of the central government cannot 
be achieved. At the lower level of government, local officers are usually stationed in 
one place for an average of five years. These short periods of service make long-term 
devotion to a specific place almost impossible; as a result, local officials are more 
concerned with short-term results. A report published recently on the development of
1 RQnon-state enterprises (including village enterprises set up or supported by local 
governments) shows that the average ‘survival’ period of a non-state enterprise is 
three years. It has been suggested that this could perhaps be connected to the office 
term of local officers who play an important role in establishing non-state enterprises, 
especially in the rural area.190 In addition, promotion (and demotion) is highly reliant 
on the achievement of targets set out by the government. Officials thus feel obliged to 
appease the higher level of government, which sometimes leads to disregard for the 
welfare of the people.
Lastly, enforcement of law is usually ‘top-down’, meaning that sanctions and 
penalties are imposed on the people by the authorities. It is very difficult, and against 
the norms in many places, for the people to bring action against the authorities or the 
collective.191 This not only means that the authorities, including the village leaders, 
can most likely get away with malpractice, it also highlights the insignificance of 
private rights, including private property rights. Partly due to the fact that many
187 Richardson, S.D. 1990, p 179
188 In year 20001 alone, the Communist Party has ‘disciplined’ more than 175,000 officials for crimes 
including bribery and corruption, ‘China Punishes Thousands of Officials’, 23 January 2002. Recently, 
Shanghai Party boss was sacked and investigated for corruption charges, Sommerville, Quentin, 28 
September 2006.
189 China’s Non-State Enterprise Development Report, from ‘How to Seize Government’s Resources 
and Opportunities’ (Sina Finance News) 30 August 2006
190 ‘How to Seize Government’s Resources and Opportunities’ (Sina Finance News) 30 August 2006
191 Li Ping, 2003, p 66
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officials do not believe in the legitimate entitlement of private households’ use rights 
over the land (or in the case of village leaders, they may be more concerned with 
fulfilling administrative targets than individual rights), they frequently give little 
thought to private rights and put public interest over the private interest. More 
worrying is that in some places, local courts have issued orders that exempt the courts 
from adjudicating on issues that are deemed administrative, but have great 
implications on private rights. For example, the High Court of Jiangsu Province 
issued a memo in 2001 that prohibits the courts within the Province to handle cases
1Q9involving major land use contract disputes. In addition, some courts would refuse to 
get involved in land requisition cases (which usually involve disputes about 
compensation); instead, these cases are handled by representatives of the 
government.193 Given the fact that the majority of these cases involve disputes 
between government officials and the people, this kind of dispute resolution is hardly 
satisfactory.
6. Conclusion: Approach of the Research
The dynamic relationship between the state, collectives and individuals in relation to 
the collective forest regime in China presents an interesting topic for research. First 
and foremost, the studies of existing property rights structure will shed light on the 
allocation of power between the three entities. The shift from a communist to a 
socialist economy has brought about many changes, including the perception of the 
role of the state and the legitimacy of private ownership. Although private ownership 
of land is still forbidden, private land use rights are now prominent in rural China. 
The growth of private enterprise and ownership means that the Chinese government 
increasingly has to rely on the power of regulation rather than the ownership structure 
to govern resource use and allocation. This has potentially decreased the arbitrariness 
in the decision-making processes regarding land use. Public regulations arguably are 
also open to greater scrutiny by the public and make enforcement more 
straightforward. In short, the socio-economic changes in China have led to changes in 
property rights, which in turn have shifted the power from the state to the collectives 
and their members.
192 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, p 91
193 Ibid.
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Secondly, the current land ownership structure demonstrates the role of land in 
China’s rural society: the state uses land control to achieve socio-economic targets 
which include agricultural production, egalitarian allocation of wealth and migration 
control; land is also a central feature of the collective system, which defines both its 
identity and physical boundaries; and lastly, ordinary households use land not only for 
agricultural production but also as the main source of social security. These different 
roles can complement each other but they can also come into conflict. For example, 
the use of land as the main source of social security would entail limited land 
exchanges; this may inhibit efficient use of land as an economic resource. Only by 
understanding the different roles of the land can one make informed choices about 
land ownership and use policies. Formulation of land policies without a deep 
understanding of the socio-economic significance of the land to the different 
stakeholder risks causing serious social problems that can potentially destabilise the 
rural community or retard rural economic growth.
Thirdly, the studies of land property rights are also essential for the understanding of 
the investment potential of China’s collective forest. Property rights provide 
economic incentives for right holders to invest in either establishing plantations or to 
manage the existing forest resources. Given the various reforms that have already 
taken place in China’s forest sector in the past two decades, particularly where 
emphasis has been given to preserving the natural forest and establishing more 
commercial plantation forest, it is important to find out how the existing property 
rights have enhanced or inhibited the achievement of these goals. The underlying 
tenet is that tenure security will provide the necessary incentives for right holders to 
adopt long-term resource utilisation and investment plans as there is no obvious need 
to exploit the resource quickly and in a wasteful manner. Arguably, however, the 
outcomes are context-dependent and will be contingent on the existence of certain 
prevailing conditions. It is therefore interesting to find out if property right reforms in 
China have indeed resulted in improvement in collective forest use and resource 
production.
Lastly, China’s collective forest in the context of the well-established theory of the 
common resource management regime will be discussed. It provides an opportunity to
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critically analyse the viability and adequacy of China’s collective forest regime. It 
will provide some indications as to what form the future collective forest reforms in 
China would or should take. A comparison with an actual working example of a 
relatively successful community forest management regime will provide an even 
better insight into the likelihood of success of China’s collective forestry. In order to 
make the comparison viable, the comparative regime must share some basic features, 
which include the composition of the collective, the nature and power of the collective 
and also the level of economic and social development. Although the conditions may 
differ and that a perfect comparison may not be possible, a comparison is still helpful 
in order to find out the weaknesses and strength of China’s collective forest 
management regime.
The body of the thesis consists of detailed discussions on the different but important 
components of collective forest such as the private use rights, collective ownership 
and governance structure, and collective management of the forest. The focal point for 
Chapter Two is the private land use rights. The chapter focuses on the development of 
land use rights of agricultural land in China generally, rather than focusing only on 
forestland. This is because not only forest and cropland have not been treated too 
differently in China, but also because development of forestland was greatly 
influenced by the development of agricultural land as a whole. The first section begins 
by discussing the evolution of forestland use rights in China, which started from the 
pre-1949 (establishment of the People Republic of China) period. The turning point of 
China’s agricultural production (and arguably the economy as a whole) came in the 
form of the devolution of the private land use rights to the households in 1978. It is 
fair to say that it was the single most important event that transformed the social and 
economic landscape of rural China. In relation to contemporary land use arrangements 
in rural China, the chapter discusses in detail the content of the private land use rights. 
It will become clear that although land use rights enjoyed by the collective members 
have been greatly enhanced by legislation introduced by the government, many 
restrictions still exist that not only create tenure insecurity but also cause social 
injustice. In the last section of the chapter, the new Property Law that came into force 
in October 2007 will be discussed. This would be the first time that land use rights are 
unequivocally announced as ‘real’ rights. And although the question of whether or not
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the new law will immensely enhance land use rights is still far from clear, it 
nevertheless represents one more step towards better protection of private rights.
Having looked at private land use rights, Chapter Three then analyses the composition 
and implications of collective ownership of forestland. The first section looks at the 
possible justifications for collective ownership of land in China. It lists out a few 
possible reasons why the Chinese government would want to maintain the status quo. 
These include high population-to-land ratio, migration control, use of land as social 
security, egalitarian concern of land use, and lastly the ideology behind collective 
ownership. The chapter highlights, however, that these justifications are either 
incorrect or are no longer valid in modem day China. The substance of collective 
ownership is very much related to the governance stmcture of the collectives. Given 
the fact that ‘bottom-up’ participation in the making of government policies is 
virtually non-existent, in most situations the collectives have become the mere 
executors of government orders or policies rather than active representatives of their 
members. Given the extensive power the state has over the collectives, it is widely 
recognised that while in many instances the collectives are the de jure owners, the 
government acts as the de facto owner of land. As a result, collective members benefit 
very little under the collective ownership regime.
Chapter Four takes a break from the legal and social analysis of the ownership 
stmcture and looks at the issues of collective management of the forest. Although 
many collectives in China have devolved use rights to households, some still retain 
the authority to manage the collective forest on behalf of their members. Given the 
sizes of the forests and the large management costs involved, it is inevitably that in 
some places the collectives would have to bear the management responsibility. To 
find out the strength and viability of collective forest management in China, it is 
important to look at the general theory on common resources management and 
compare the case in China with other community forest management regimes around 
the world. One particularly relevant comparison is with the community forest regime 
in Mexico. Mexico has a relatively successful and more versatile community forestry 
compared to China. This is based on the fact that the community forestry regime in 
Mexico has the following features: voluntary association of forest communities; more 
active stakeholders’ involvement in decision-making; direct involvement of
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community members in forestry activities; and more effective judicial redress. These 
features are absent in China. Although the latest collective forest reform in China has 
introduced measures to increase investment in forestry (by lowering taxes) and to 
promote more flexible and diverse management regimes (by allowing different forms 
of private and collective management), some inherent limitations that have not been 
addressed may inhibit the development of collective forest.
The last and concluding chapter discusses the possible property rights reforms that the 
Chinese government can undertake in order to improve its forest currently under 
collective ownership. Essentially the suggestion is for the Chinese government to 
allow privatisation or the establishment of permanent leasehold over forestland. 
Although it may sound controversial, privatisation of agricultural land has been called 
for by scholars within and outside of China. Reform of agricultural land ownership is 
not only necessary for economic growth but it also has significant social and legal 
implications. Given the characteristics of China, it is necessary, however, to control 
the pace of privatisation so that it will not cause sudden and severe social disruptions. 
In particular, two control mechanisms can be employed at the initial stage of 
privatisation, which are the restrictions on the privatisation itself, and the restrictions 
on the land market. A more gradual approach to land privatisation also needs to be 
accompanied by other equally important reforms in areas such as the social welfare 
system and the judiciary. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the state should 
forsake exercising control over land use via the ownership structure; instead, 
forestland use control should be achieved by using the state power to regulate. 
Provided that the laws are clear and enforcement is effective, control of land use via 




Rural Land Rights in China
1. Introduction
This chapter will look at one of the most important issues in the collective forest 
reform, namely rural land tenure in China. Due to the fact that in China, forest and 
arable land both fall into the category of ‘farm- or agricultural land’ and had been 
given the same treatment until recently, discussion of the issue of land in this chapter 
include both arable and forest land. In addition, as most of the literature on rural land 
issue focus on arable land, they can be used to shed some light on the discussion of 
forestland.
Land has always been one of the most important and contested issues in China. 
Despite the impressive economic growth fuelled mainly by industrialisation since 
China adopted the ‘open door’ policy in late 1970s, almost 61 percent of its citizens 
are still registered as rural residents.1 China embraced communism half a century ago 
and even though it has gradually turned to the market and capitalist ideology in many 
respects, it still retains flavours of a communist/socialist statehood in many others 
such as land use. China adopts a very different ideology compared to most of the 
Western states in relation to land ownership and allocation. In China, state ownership 
accounts for more than half of the country’s landmass. Land in the cities is owned by 
the state while land ownership in rural areas is divided between the state and the 
collectives. The collectives are the legacy of China’s communist past and continue to 
play an important role in China’s political and economic development, especially in 
the rural areas. Apart from ownership, land (especially rural land) use is also 
distinctly different from those in Western societies. In China, rural land allocation is 
carried out on an egalitarian basis where everyone gets equal and fair share of the land 
according to needs, which inevitably requires constant re-allocation of land to cater 
for demographic changes.
1 Ho, Peter, 2005, p 39
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In this chapter, we will first look at the evolution of rural land rights, from just before 
the establishment of the People Republic of China to the present day. We will see 
below that the most recent important rural land reform had started without legal 
sanction by the central government but was gradually approved and adopted by the 
government. Another characteristic of rural land reform in China is the trial system 
where the proposed reform would be tested out in a few counties before being 
implemented nationwide. The discussion of the evolution rural land rights is followed 
by the current regulations and practices in relation to rural land. It will be shown that 
in many instances, practices in reality do not reflect the spirit of the regulations and 
enforcement is ineffective. The subsequent section then looks at the characteristics of 
private land use rights and the various restrictions imposed on these rights. One 
particularly important legislation that will be looked at is the Rural Land Contracting 
Law 2002, which governs the use of all agricultural land. This piece of legislation 
explains the relationship between landowners and users, and outlines the rights and 
obligations of the parties. Private land use rights are further strengthened by a new 
law, namely the Property Law which came into effect in October 2007. This new 
legislation signifies a new era for the protection of private property rights, although it 
does not add anything substantial to the content of the rights itself.
The discussions of all the above-mentioned issues are aimed at providing a deeper 
understanding of China’s rural land use structure. The understanding is vital not only 
for the analysis of current land use practices but also for the discussions of future 
reforms. As we shall see in Chapter Three, institutions have great bearing on how 
natural resources are used and owned, and vice versa. Only with the full 
understanding of how the existing institutions work in China can one hope to provide 
accurate analysis of the current land rights arrangements and suggestions for 
improvement. As such, this chapter not only gives an overview of the history of China 
rural land use arrangement, it also sets out the underlying structure upon which the 
subsequent discussions on rural land use are based.
2. The Evolution of Rural Land Rights in China
Land has been one of the most important resources in China for centuries, especially 
in rural China. China has a population of 1.3 billion (21% of total world population)
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and 132 million ha of arable land (9% of total world landmass); the land area per 
capita is less than 1.4mu (around 0.093 hectare)2, making the pressure on arable land 
enormous. Similarly, even though China contains the fifth largest area of forest in the 
world, forestland per capita is only 0.1 hectare, 1/6 of the world average of 0.6 
hectares.3 Apart from pressure on land use, huge population also means that China is 
constantly looking for ways to achieve and maintain an adequate basic supply of 
resources to its citizen, both in the cities and villages. To achieve this, China has 
imposed strict control over land use, especially amid the industrialisation crusade that 
increasingly eats into rural land, making sure that there is enough arable land to 
produce grains and crops. The government controls the land market where only the 
State has the power to sell rural land for non-agricultural uses.4 At the same time, the 
Chinese government imposes production quota and compulsory purchase on farmers 
in order to procure and store enough food for the nation, especially for the urban 
dwellers.5 The state monopoly of land market plus the production quota severely 
restrict the land use choices of the collectives and rural households.
Prior to turning to the evolution of land property rights in China, some issues 
concerning arable land and forestland should be identified. Generally, arable and 
forestland in China have undergone similar changes and have been governed by the 
same set of regulations. For example, both types of land experienced de­
collectivisation in the late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s where use and 
management rights were devolved to the households from the collective (although to 
different extents6). Both are also divided into different categories according to their 
use, such as family and responsibility plots.
2 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 36. China’s population is expected to increase by 10 million per year, 
hitting a peak of 1.46 billion by 2030, China’s Population Passes 1.3bn, 6 January 2006
3 Lu, Wenming et al., 2002, p 9.
4 Article 43 of the Land Management Law 1998 provides that any unit or individual who needs land for 
development purposes must apply for use o f state land (except where collective land are used by the 
village to build village enterprises or housing construction for villagers).
5 Production quota and procurement of grains will be looked at in more detail below. For general 
discussions of China’s grain marketing system, see Findlay, Christopher and Chen Chunlai, 1999.
6 By the end of 1984, 99% of the Chinese rural population were regarded to be farming on an 
individualised basis, Kung, James K.S., 2002, p 795. There is no reliable data on the proportion of 
forestland under household management but an example from one case study shows that in some 
places, collective still retains nearly half of the forestland, Qiao Fangbin, Huang Jikun and Rozelle, 
Scott, 1998, p 25
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As we shall see, the discussions of the division of usufruct rights and ownership rights 
have come a full circle since the pre-1949 period to the present day. In both periods 
there have been separation of usufruct and ownership rights to the land itself, and 
power- and benefit-sharing between the different entities have remained the important 
features of land use. Discussions of the earlier form of land use arrangements would 
certainly shed some light on the present debates on land use rights. The primary 
difference between the two periods is the emergence and the role of the collective. 
During the post-1945 period, the collective have taken over the role of private entities 
as owners of the land; in fact, their role as owner is much more extensive than the 
private owners in the pre-1949 era in that they also controlled agricultural production 
and other social affairs of the peasant households. Towards the end of the 1970s the 
role of the collective has been greatly reduced, and comparatively private usufruct 
rights have become stronger. The progression in the dichotomy of use and ownership 
rights has again put a strong favour in a more robust private use rights regime, which 
was already prevalent in China before 1949. It is arguable that the new private rights 
regime is different from the old one in that the new use rights are subject to more 
social control so that the wealth gap can be kept to a minimum. In many cases, the 
aim of social equality is achieved at the expense of economic efficiency, and 
occasionally environmental protection. In the past century, China had experienced a 
dynasty, a short-lived democracy, communism and the present socialism. These 
political upheavals have had major impacts on land ownership rights as well as the 
social and economic structure of the society.
2.1 Pre 1949
Before communism took hold, most of the land in China was in the hand of a small 
number of landowners.7 Land ownership under the old dynasty regime was in 
principle very similar to the feudal system in Europe. Even though the Emperor was 
presumed to have the overriding claim over all land, most land were owned and 
managed by a small subset of people in the society. This is particularly true with 
regards to agricultural land on which the majority of people relied for subsistence 
purposes. In most cases landowners did not work on the land themselves. Most
7 Before the revolution o f ‘new dem ocracy’ that toppled the last dynasty o f China, less than 10% o f the 
population were owning 70%-80% o f  the land, Han Mingmo, 2001, p 105.
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ofarmers were renting the land from the rich landowners and were liable to pay rent. 
Different land use systems were in place before the establishment of the modem state 
of China in 1949, with the most prominent one being the ‘yong dian’ (yJiitB) system, 
which denotes ‘permanent tenancy rights’. The basic feature of this land use system is 
that land rights were divided into ownership and usufmct (or surface) rights. 
Landlords owned the land and the minerals underneath the land, but the tenants 
owned the use rights and crops or trees planted on the land. The two different parties 
had respective duties and rights, and they were enforceable by the local magistrates.
Surprisingly, land use during this period was very similar to the current land use 
arrangement, although there are obvious differences such as the owner entities, length 
of land use contract and the ideology behind the arrangements. In many ways, 
compared to land use rights possessed by rural households currently, land use rights 
possessed by the peasant households at that time were not only more secure but also 
more robust. For example, they had the right to earn income from the land, to transfer 
the use rights, to use land as collateral and to bequeath it to the next generation.9 In 
addition, they could also choose what to plant on the land and when to harvest. It has 
been reported that customary laws had given strong protection to the tenants’ rights 
from abuse from the landlords.10 For example, unreasonable increase in rent was 
prohibited and the landlord could only confiscate the land in extreme circumstances.11
Furthermore, there was evidence that use of land as collateral was common, which
10provided the peasants some financial assistance in difficult times. Farmers who were 
working on the farm had relatively extensive use rights13 although sometimes their 
rent burden was often so high that they could hardly earn a decent living out of the 
land.14
8 More than 90% of the population owned only 10%-20% of the land, ibid.
9 Zhou Rong, 2005
10 Ibid.
11 Furthermore, usually the landlord had no right to ask for rent ‘in kind’, namely in the form of 
agricultural products, Hu Hua, 25 July 2005.
12 Zhou Rong, 2005.
13 This was recorded in a PhD research carried out by a Chinese anthropologist studying at London 
School o f Economics and Political Science, published in 1939 by Routledge. Fei Xiaotong carried out 
comprehensive economic, political and social studies on a small village in the Jiangsu Province for 
over nearly 70 decades, recording the changes that took place, Fei Xiaotong, 2001.
14 Li Gengyao, 1948
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In pre-1949 China, forest landowners included private entities such as local nobles 
and state officials, and also collective institutions such as temples, schools and the 
community. Collective owners managed the land for the use and benefit of the 
institutions or community they represented. They usually had rules that outlined the 
purpose and manner of use for forestland, which included penalties and punishment in 
case of rule violations. Violations of rules for personal benefits were not uncommon 
on collective land, and perpetrators were sometimes punished.15 With regards to 
privately owned forestland, the practice was not dissimilar to the use of cropland 
discussed above. Usufruct and ownership rights on land co-existed and some form of 
benefit-sharing or rental arrangements were in place.
Given the vast size of the country, it was inevitable that practices differed from place 
to place. However, in most places incentives were arranged to encourage more 
efficient land use by usufruct right holders. In certain areas where land was planted 
with trees, customary law might specify that the term of the tenure should remain 
open-ended in order to allow enough time for the trees to grow.16 In the Fujian 
Province, there was a tenurial system known as ‘one field, two landlords’ ( 
where the land was rented out to a tenant. The tenant could not sell the land itself but 
was free to mortgage or transfer the surface rights on the land. The ownership of the 
forestland, usually known as ‘hills’, belonged to the landlord but the trees planted on 
the land belonged to the tenant. The tenant needed to pay rent every year but he could 
mortgage or sell the rights. There was no time limit for the ‘tenancy’, and the landlord 
could not take the land back or plant trees for himself. When the tenant voluntarily 
gave up his rights, he must clear the trees but there would be no other charges would 
be incurred.17
There were other examples of benefit sharing arrangements between the landlord and 
the tenant in relation to forestland use.18 According to surviving contracts, in some 
places, a landowner would lease out a hillside to a tenant, who took the responsibility 
for clearing the land, planting and caring for one crop of trees. The tenure contracts 
also specified certain species of trees to be planted. Profits were then allocated
15 Menzies, Nicholas K., 1994.
16 Ibid, p 97
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., pp 98-99
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between the landowner and the tenant after the harvest, with the tenant usually 
receiving between 50 to 70 percent of the profits. In the Fujian Province, the tenants 
were given more discretion as to how to establish and manage the plantation, although 
planting of commercial crop such as timber was usually required. The degree of 
control by the landlord over the use of forestland seemed to be influenced by the 
proximity of the land to the landowner. If the land was far away, which made 
supervision more costly and difficult, tenants were usually given more discretion to 
run and manage the land.19
Before 1949, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had campaigned on the 
basis of land use and ownership reform in order to attract the support of millions of 
landless peasants. More specifically, politicians had promised to vigorously push 
forward land reform so that ownership of land would not stay in the hands of a small 
group of people. The debate on the different forms of land use and ownership 
arrangements was hotly discussed even up until the eve of the establishment of the 
new People’s Republic of China. A reference book on the issues of land use published
90in 1948 discussed the different options of arrangements at that time. Surprisingly, 
the different options are, in substance, very similar to the different options debated by 
the present politicians and academics. The three main options of rural land use and 
ownership favoured by both the present and past academics and politicians are state 
ownership with private usufruct right, collective ownership with private usufruct 
rights, and private ownership and usufruct right.
The preferred choice of the author of the book was the collective/state ownership with 
private usufruct rights.21 According to the author, private ownership was not suitable 
mainly due to three reasons: land is a natural endowment and nobody should have an 
automatic claim to it; privatisation of land would lead to land fragmentation; and 
lastly lack of capital among the rural households would impede the development of
99the agriculture sector. Furthermore, it was pointed out that privatisation of land 
might lead to owner-labour (capitalist) economy when individuals started to sell or
Ibid.19
20 Li Gengyao, 1948
21 Ibid., pp 85-86
22 Ibid., pp 2 and 15
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transfer their land entitlements to others.23 This was a situation that was deemed 
unacceptable by the mainstream thinkers at that time as they were trying to change the 
existing land arrangement under the feudal system.
2.2 1949 -1956
The new People’s Republic of China was established by the Communist Party at the 
end of 1949 following the end of the civil war. Communist Party won the support of 
the farmers on the promise that everyone would get the equal right to own land. The 
idea of ‘land to the tiller’ was a huge attraction to the majority of the
farmers who had suffered under the old system. After the Communist Party took 
power, huge amounts of land were taken from the previous landowners (including 
rich but not ordinary peasant owners) to be allocated to farmers. These farmers 
became landowners for the first time and their incentive to work on the land greatly 
increased.24 However, in order to increase productivity and income from agriculture, 
and to catch up with the practice of the Soviet Union, the government had opted for 
collective management just a few years after the initial land reallocation.
In the early 1950s, farmers were encouraged to pool their land and resources together 
to form cooperatives (these were recognised as ‘elementary cooperatives’) in order to 
increase productivity.25 Participation was voluntary and farmers who joined were 
allocated shares. Benefits or profits were allocated on the basis of the amount of work 
the farmers undertook and the capital invested. This simple form of cooperatives 
kept private ownership of land alive as the farmers were the decision-makers 
concerning the use of land and resources, and they could withdraw from the co­
operatives if they wished. So, even though the land was managed collectively, 
ownership still lied in the hands of the farmers, not the collectives. By 1955, the
23 Ibid., pp 85-86
24 Agricultural productivity and farmers’ income also increased greatly. For example, total agricultural 
productivity increased by 53.5% in 1952 compared to 1949, with an annual increase o f 15.3%; farmers’ 
income also increased by 30% in 1952 compared to 1949. Han Mingmo, 2001, p 108.
25 Two Decisions ([Decision o f Central Government On Mutual Help and Cooperation in Agricultural 
Production ] and [Decision o f Central Government on Development of Agricultural Cooperatives]) 
were issued by the central government in 1953 to encourage farmers to form cooperatives, ibid., p 114.
26 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 52.
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proportion of rural households that joined elementary cooperatives was no more than 
60 percent.27
Collectivisation of forestland holdings was also carried out swiftly. In fact, by 1954, 
three-quarters of the afforestation was carried out by the cooperatives. 
Collectivisation of forestland was beneficial in many places due to the fact that 
peasants could now pool their labour in planting trees, harvesting trees and so forth, 
which would otherwise be too costly for individual households. Few cooperatives 
were engaged in industrial forestry but many had integrated horticultural crops (such 
as food and fodder trees) into the agricultural pattern.29 A Resolution on Agricultural 
Collectivisation was issued by the Central Committee in 1955, which stated that trees 
owned by collective members should remain under their care and even if the trees 
were included in collective management, there should not be any change in 
ownership.
2.3 1956 -1978
The simple form of cooperatives changed into a more advanced type in 1956.30 The 
main change accompanied by the adoption of the ‘advanced cooperatives’ was that 
the land and major farming equipments were taken from individual farmers and 
turned into collective assets. Farmers no longer had the discretion of not joining the 
cooperatives and profits were allocated according to the amount of work they put in. 
Even though farmers could still own scattered fruit trees, other non-timber trees 
planted around the homesteads and small farming equipment, and had alternative 
employment, they had virtually lost their ownership right of and right to income from 
the land and agricultural assets. Decision-making became centralised and involved 
hundreds of households (total number of households in an advanced cooperative).31 
This was the beginning of the real ‘communisation’ of land, both arable and forest 
land.
27 Liu Dachang, 2001, p 243
28 Richardson, S.D., 1990, pp 170-171
29 Ibid.




Trees and forests were also consolidated and managed by the collectives. In addition 
to the means of production, ownership of the existing trees on the forestland was also 
reverted to the collectives. The policy at that time in general provided that young 
forests, nurseries and blocks of ‘economic’ tree and industrial timber species should 
be collectively owned, and the previous owners of these trees should be compensated 
where appropriate.32 However, this was not adhered to in many cases and peasants 
were either under-compensated or not compensated at all.33 The role and power of 
collective forest farms were further strengthened by the adoption of an even stronger 
version of collective agricultural organisations, namely the ‘People’s Communes’. 
People’s Communes were higher forms of farmers’ cooperatives, and were formed via 
the merger of the advanced cooperatives.
People’s Communes were adopted during the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in 1958 and 
lasted until the end of 1970s. Under the people’s commune system, all production 
assets were collectivised and were owned by the collectives.34 Collective forest farms 
emerged under the new system. By May 1958, there were 1,455 collective forest 
farms in China and by 1960, there were 80,000 with a total labour force close to one 
million.35 In addition to collective ownership of production assets, collective sales and 
purchase were also established36 and the urban and rural residency permit system was 
adopted.37
Under the People’s Commune system, farmers lost their autonomy and became mere 
units of production. Morale and motivation were low among the workers. This was
32 Richardson, S .D ., 1990, p 171
33 Ibid.
34 All communes were created in a short period o f three months in 1958 and all rural households were 
involved, Liu Dachang, 2001
35 Richardson, S.D., 1990, p 171
36 The collective or compulsory purchase and sales o f agricultural produce was adopted in 1953 and 
was only changed in 1990s when the market for crops was opened up. For timber, compulsory 
purchase was in place until 1985 when timber market was opened. However, in an attempt to reduce 
illegal logging and deforestation, free timber market was shut again in 1987 and only forest 
departments and state timber companies were allowed to collect timber from farmers and act as 
wholesaler, ibid., p 255. Timber cutting in China is also subject to a quota system, and anyone who 
wants to cut down the timber needs to get a permit from the forest bureau.
37 In 1958, the Household Registration Regulations was adopted and it cancelled out the right to 
migrate between the urban and rural guaranteed by the Constitution. The residency permit system is 
controversial and is said to be the main cause o f the wide wealth gap in China. There have been plans 
to scrap the system in certain Provinces, especially the coastal provinces, Luard, Tim, 10 November 
2005
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because even though collective income was supposed to be allocated according to 
one’s work contribution to the team output, the subsistence nature of China’s village 
economy had obligated many production teams to distribute a large proportion of their
io
income according to needs, based on household size. In addition, land in the cities 
and towns were turned into state ownership.39 During this period, collective control 
over arable land was strengthened and land ownership and decision making power 
were concentrated in communes that consisted of thousands of households each.40 
This era ended in the late 1970s when de-collectivisation of land replaced the hugely 
inefficient production arrangements 41 Farmers in China suffered extreme poverty and 
starvation under the people’s commune system, amid the notorious the Great Leap 
Forward period.42
2.4 1978 -1998
De-collectivisation of land started to take place at the end of the 1970s. Due to 
widespread poverty and low productivity, some local officials in Anhui Province 
started to experiment with a new arrangement43 of land management rights in 1978 
(by doing so without the express authorisation of the Central Government, they risked 
being persecuted).44 The local officials devolved arable land management and use 
rights (ownership of land still belonged to the collectives) to the household level with 
the hope that it would give the much-needed incentives to farmers to increase 
productivity. This was soon followed by other provinces and was subsequently 
endorsed by the central government;45 this system is now officially known as the 
Household Responsibility System
38 Kung, James K.S., 2000
39 Xu Hanming, 2004, p 130
40 By the end o f 1958, 90% of rural households were incorporated into 23,400 communes across China, 
each consisted o f an average o f 4,800 households, Liu Dachang, 2001.
41 Agricultural productivity decreased rapidly between 1959-1961. Annual grain per capita dropped 
from 306 kg in 1957 to 215 kg in 1960, a 29.7% reduction. Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 70.
42 Estimates of people died from starvation run from 16.5 million to 41 million, ibid., p 72.
43 In fact, the ‘Households Responsibility’ system was not new at that time. It had been adopted several 
times since 1957 but it did not last long each time due to unfavourable political climate. Not 
incidentally, Anhui Province was taking the lead in contracting out land to rural households, which 
resulted in many local officials being persecuted when political climate turned unfavourable, Rural 
China in the 21st Century: The Land Resources, 2000.
44 Han Mingmo, 2001, p 117
45 In September 1979, Central Committee o f the Chinese Communist Party issued the [Decision About 
Issues on Accelerating o f Agricultural Development]. Under this Household Responsibility System, 
farmers manage the land as individual units and have the power to make decisions about production. In 
addition, farmers can keep the surplus after shares are given to the state and the collective. The essence
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Following the success of the Household Responsibility System (HRS), reform in 
collective forestland management and use rights followed suit. Decentralisation of 
collective forest management rights officially commenced in 1981 with the adoption 
of the ‘Three Fix’ policy.46 This policy outlined the three main reforms to be adopted 
for forestland tenure: 1. stabilising land tenure; 2. demarcating family plots; and 3. 
defining the household production responsibility system. This policy guideline 
defined the tenure and forest use right reforms subsequently adopted. At present, 
almost all of the arable land have been devolved to the household level47 whilst close 
to 80% of the collective-owned forests has been contracted out to households under 
the new Contract Responsibility System. In the Fujian Province, use and 
management rights of most collective land had not been allocated to the households; 
instead, some collectives had opted for the share-holding system where a ‘board of 
directors’ or equivalent were established to manage the forest for all members of the 
communities, who were issued shares and paid dividends from any profits earned. 
However, the latest collective forestland reform in the Fujian Province sought to catch 
up with the rest of the country with regards to allocation of private use rights to 
households.49
For China’s forestry, under the new system, the role of ‘specialised households’ was 
prominent.50 These households specialised in forestry and were actively involved in 
timber production and forest management. These households flourished in some 
locations where the right conditions were present such as suitable soil and remote 
mountainous areas not suitable for crop planting.51 Some of these households were
of the system can be appreciated from the propaganda adopted to educate farmers o f the new system: 
Guarantee the share o f the state, Provide enough for the collective, and Keep the remaining ( u E B ^
46 Even as late as 1979, the Forestry Act prohibited all forms o f forest management other than 
collective and state managemenet. In 1984, a new Forest Law was enacted. Article 23 o f the Forest 
Law acknowledged that households could own trees that they had planted around their houses and on 
land (barren hills and uncultivated land) that had been contracted out to them.
47 According to estimates, around 97% of the total arable land are now included in the HRS, Han, 
Mingmo, 2001, p 119.
48 Hyde, W., Xu, J.T., and Belcher, B. (eds), 2003, p 10
49 The reform involves only commercial collective forestland, and provides for a systematic and 
comprehensive process whereby collective land is allocated to households and individuals in order to 
encourage private investment. The Opinion of the Fujian Province People’s Government on Promoting 
the Collective Forest Property Rights Reform.
50 Bruce, J.W., Rudrappa, S. and Li Zongmin, 1995
51 Richardson, S.D., 1990, pp 172-177
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also provided with financial assistance to undertake afforestation and were also 
eligible for loans from the government. It was then believed that the outlook for 
collective and joint-venture forestry in China was bright mainly because it 
accommodated the diversity of contractual arrangements for forest establishment and 
management, and that it worked more according to the market in comparison to the 
state forestry. Furthermore, collective forestry enabled households to pool together 
resources to carry out forest management in a more cost-effective manner. Generally, 
it is widely agreed that the HRS has proved to be the impetus for the increase in 
forestland area in China during the 1980s and 1990s.53
The HRS proved to be the solution to the problem and agricultural productivity 
increased by a few folds in the subsequent years. For example, grain output increased 
from 320.56 million tonnes in 1980 to 407.31 million tonnes in 1994, with an annual 
growth rate of 6.17. At the same time, farmers’ per capita income increased by 16.74 
percent annually, from 191.33 yuan in 1980 to 355.33 yuan in 1984.54 Similarly, 
devolution of forestland management right has also encouraged afforestation activities 
by farmers although in some areas, deforestation actually took place before 
afforestation begun.55 A study by Zhang et al using data from four provinces over 
1978 and 1995 concluded that forestland tenure reform generally had a positive 
impact on forestland expansion in China.56 Similarly, a World Bank’s publication 
highlighted that timber plantations and non-timber product forests have increased 
fastest on plots allocated under the HRS. Afforestation was particularly prominent in 
plots over which individuals have more control and income rights.57 Evidence shows 
that both forest cover and standing volume on collective-owned forestland have also 
increased.58 In the last five years, nearly 90 percent of the total investment in forest 
industry came from private capital; non-state forests make up of more than 80 percent 
of the new plantation areas.59 Productivity has also increased as a result of the reform. 
Farm incomes have also increased steadily since the reforms began in 1978, with an
52 Ibid.
53 Liu Dachang and Edmunds, David, 2003, pp 27-44; and Yin. Runsheng, 2003, pp 59-84
54 Findlay, David and Chen Chunlai, 1999, calculated from State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo Tongji 
Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), Zhongguuo Tongji Chubanshe, Beijing.
55 Zhang Daowei, 2003; and Qiao Fangbin, Huang Jikun and Rozelle, Scott, 1998
56 Zhang Yaoqi, Uusivuori, J., and Kuuluvainen, J., 2000
57 Rozelle, Scott et al., 2000, p 44
58 Zhang Daowei, 2003
59 Hou Bingye, 2004
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annual growth rate of 15 percent between 1978 and 1999 but only 2 percent between 
1997 and 1999.60
2.4.1 Ways of ‘Contracting Out’ Land and Types of Land
The current arrangements of rural land use exist in various forms and the extent of use 
rights varies accordingly. The existence of these various arrangements is mainly the 
result of a half-hearted ‘privatisation’ reform that sought to ensure that devolution of 
private use right did not compromise the socialist ideology practised by the Chinese 
government. The following gives a general overview of the three main ways and 
forms of de-collectivisation of rural land in China.
2.4.1.1 Contracting out through administrative allocation
This is the earliest form of de-collectivisation of rural land where plots of land were 
allocated to households on the basis of either the number of household members or 
the labour force.61 Following the success of the HRS, collective wasteland and 
sparsely stocked forestland were distributed to farmer households to encourage them 
to plant trees to satisfy their subsistence needs for forest products. The underlying 
principle of administrative land allocation is egalitarianism where households’ needs 
are put on an equal footing in deciding how to allocate resources. These plots of land 
are usually in the vicinity of the family houses in order to make access easier. These 
lands are recognised as family plots and are to be used to provide for the subsistence 
needs of the family. Households are given relatively wide discretion when managing 
family plots. For example, they have the right to decide which species of trees to be 
planted, the right to dispose of forest products and the right to enjoy the full benefits
f \  9from that disposal. Trees on the family plots belong to the households and tenure of 
family plots is usually more secure and longer. However, the collective can take 
control of the family plots if households do not plant trees on the land.64 In addition 
the family plot, each household is also allocated a private plot of land ( 0  § M )  on
60 Zhang Daowei, 2003
61 According to a survey, in places with higher level o f poverty, less off-farm job opportunity and less 
land available, allocation tend to be based on the number o f household members so that equity can be 
achieved; on the other hand, in places with more off-farm job opportunity, more land and more wealth, 
allocation tends to be based on the number o f labour force in households in order to achieve the 
greatest efficiency, Kung, James K.S., 1995, pp 82-111.
Liu Dachang, 2001, p 248.
63 Kung, James K.S., 1995
64 Ibid.
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which the household can build a residential house65 with the option of the remaining 
to be used as a private garden. These private plots of land are generally not involved 
in agricultural production apart from for own use and are inheritable.
Even though egalitarian allocation of land use has provided millions of Chinese 
farmers land to live on, it has also hindered more efficient use of rural land. To 
maintain egalitarian allocation of land, local authority has to constantly readjust land 
holding to account for any demographic changes.66 This has created the problem of 
tenure insecurity. In addition, administrative allocation of land resources among rural 
households had also given rise to the problem of perception, which is closely related 
to the issue of legitimacy or entitlement. Local officials see that as land use right is 
‘given’ by the government, it can also be subject to arbitrary readjustment by the 
government, including cancellation of the land use entitlement. Despite the inherent 
problems, administrative allocation of rural land is still the most common way 
through which farmers obtain land, and encompasses the majority of the rural land. 
Currently, the law provides that administrative allocation of rural land should be 
carried out via the use of contracts.
2.4.1.2 Individual contracting out (mainly for investment purposes)
After the adoption of the HRS, the conflict on arable land between the aims of 
providing an egalitarian and fair society on the one hand and productivity efficiency 
on the other had become more pressing. To address this issue, many local 
governments had adopted different land use arrangements that divided arable land 
into different categories, each of which carried with it certain responsibilities and 
duties. For example, in the mid-1980s, the two-field system68 {M S0J)  for arable land 
was adopted in many parts of China. The two-field system consisted of family or 
subsistence plot and commercial or responsibility plots. The village authority first 
divided the arable land into these two categories before land allocation. All
65 To prevent abuse of land, each household is only permitted to have one residential house in rural 
China.
66 Constant readjustment, however, applies to only certain type o f land, such as the responsibility plots; 
tenure for family plots are more.
67 Land Management Law 1998, Rural Land Contracting Law 2002
68 Other types o f system include ‘economic land’, ‘four wasteland’ and ‘flexible land’, Rural China in 
the 21st Century: The Land Resources, 2000; and Prosterman, R., Schwarzwalder, B. and Ye J.P., 2000.
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households were allocated69 certain amount of plots as subsistence plot (this was 
usually the minimum amount of arable land a farmer was entitled to) and this land 
was mainly used for subsistence purposes. Harvests from the subsistence plot were 
usually not subjected to a production quota. The remaining arable land was then 
contracted out (via bidding or auction) to farmers who were interested in carrying out 
commercial plantation. Crops from this type of land were subject to agricultural tax 
and the production quota set by the state; on top of that, the farmers usually also had
70to pay fees to the collective. Variations of the two-field system were adopted all 
over China.71 These systems were put in place to strike a balance between egalitarian 
distribution and efficiency. By guaranteeing access to subsistence plots to all 
households, the socialist ideology was achieved; on the other hand, by allowing 
households who were able and willing to invest in larger scale production activities, 
more efficient production and higher yields could be achieved. Moreover, in many 
places, ‘spare’ land was separated from the two types of land, which was then used 
for re-allocation or readjustment purposes.
The different types of land have different implications on the importance of tenure 
security. Generally, households are more concerned with the threat of losing their 
subsistence plots. Households that have contracted substantial amount of 
responsibility plots from the collective do not perceive such threat, perhaps due to the 
unattractive potential returns for the production of grain.72 According to a rural 
household survey, peasant households associate ownership rights with subsistence but 
not responsibility plots or plots that are contracted for the purpose of fulfilling state 
quota.73 Furthermore, research has shown that reallocation of land usually involves 
responsibility land and not subsistence plots. In 1997, the two-field system was 
discontinued by the central government.74 This was to prevent misuse of power by
69Allocation of subsistence plots was carried out either on the basis of needs or labour or both. 
Allocation on the basis o f needs is arguably more egalitarian than allocation on the basis o f labour, but
the latter arguably results in more efficient production.
70 Rural China in the 21st Century: The Land Resources, 2000
71 Ibid.
72 Kung, James K.S., 1995
73 Ibid,, p 99. The rural household survey involves four counties in the Provinces o f Sichuan and 
Hunan. This conclusion is derived from the fact that households would like to have the rights to 
transfer, to inherit land and to use land as collateral in relation to subsistence plots but not the 
responsibility plots.
74 Central Committee Rural Work Document No. 16 prohibited the introduction o f the two-field system  
in villages that had not previously adopted it, and required villages that had adopted it without the
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local officials or village committees who had the discretionary power to allocate large 
plots of land as responsibility land.75 In many places, in order to increase agricultural 
production and to increase income, village authorities set aside a large area of land as 
responsibility land to be contracted out to households, which left only small areas of
7 f\arable land to be allocated to all households on an egalitarian basis. This had put 
poor households who could not afford to contract out responsibility plots in a 
disadvantaged position. The other problem of the two-field (and equivalent) system 
that the legislation aimed to address was the problem of small and scattered arable 
land. By segmenting the land into groups, it was inevitable that the average amount of 
land allocated to household would be smaller and more scattered. This not only 
increased the cost of cultivation, it also inhibited the development of agricultural
77production. The current reforms of arable land aim to give farmers more secure and 
long term rights.78
A very similar approach was taken in relation to forestland. Apart from distributing 
family plots to households for subsistence use, collectives have also ‘contracted out’ 
vast area of forestland to households for investment purposes. These are known as the 
‘responsibility hills’. Unlike the family plots, these are not wasteland or barren hills;
7Qinstead they are forested land owned by the collective. The objective of the 
‘responsibility hill’ system is ‘to improve the management of existing forests by 
modifying management methods within the collective system’. In return for the 
resources and time farmers spend on tending and guarding the ‘responsibility hills’, 
they are allowed to share the benefits of forest management. The terms of benefit 
sharing vary among collectives, depending on the terms of the contract between the 
collective and the households.81 However, trees that already existed when land was 
allocated to households still belonged to the collective, so access to timber resources
voluntary agreement o f village farmers to end the practice, Prosterman, R., Schwarzwalder, B. and Ye 
J.P., 2000.
75 Yan Mingkun and Xie Ying, 2004.
76 Rural China in the 21st Century: The Land Resources, 2000
77 Wang Pingjie, 2004
78 Ibid. However, the two-field system is still widely practiced in certain places, regardless o f the 
regulations in place, Prosterman, P., Schwarwalder, B. and Ye J.P., 2000. Also see Chen Xiaojun, et 
al., 2003
79 However, practices differ from place to place. In some places, bare land and wasteland are allocated 
to households as responsibility hills, and trees subsequently planted on these plots belong to the 
households, not the collectives, Liu Dachang, 2001.
80 Liu Dachang and Edmonds, David, 2003, p23.
81 Liu Dachang, 2001, p 248
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is more limited compared to family plots, where the trees that are subsequently 
planted belonged to the households themselves. ‘Responsibility hills’ have evolved in 
three different directions since the 1980s82: first, some of them were incorporated
oo
within family plots ; secondly, some were returned to collective management 
following widespread deforestation on these lands; and thirdly, most of them have 
remained ‘responsibility hills’ under household management.
In contrast to plots that are allocated on an egalitarian basis, the volume of land 
contracted out may differ from household to household. This is because it is carried 
out on the basis of the capability of the individuals (instead of labour or the need of 
the households) to increase investment and productivity. Tenure on responsibility hills 
is usually shorter; not unlike the arable land, responsibility plots are usually subject to 
reallocation.84 Practice varies from place to place in relation to fees: some collectives 
charge rent or fees for the land whilst others do not. Legally, both parties (collective 
as the assignor and individual as the assignee) must enter into a contract that sets out 
their respective rights and obligations. However, the use of a contract for land use 
arrangements in rural China is far from complete and many individuals do not have
QC
written contracts with the collectives. This includes land contracted out for 
investment purposes, even though one would expect the widespread use of contracts
oz:
in cases where huge sums of investments are involved. Lack of contract plus 
arbitrative administrative decisions by local officials may cause hardship to the 
individuals.
2.4.1.3 Public bidding, auction and negotiation (‘four wasteland’)
82 Ibid., pp 248-249.
83 This is consistent with the results from a household survey carried out in Guizhou Province in 2005, 
where many farmers do not distinguish responsibility hills from family plots, The ‘incorporation’ of 
responsibility hills was not actually sanctioned by the government, and the process was stopped by 
central government policy in 1987. However, responsibility hills that have been ‘incorporated’ into 
family plots were not required to be ‘re-done’, Liu Dachang and Edmons, David, 2003, p 24.
84 According to a village survey in which the author was involved, many villagers could not 
differentiate between family and responsibility plots, and subsequently treated them in the same way. 
This shows that perhaps in those places the distinction between these two types o f land is not 
significant. Zhang Shiqiu et al., 2005.
85 A survey that involved 17 provinces in China shows that about 61.7% o f the villages had not issued 
30-year land use right contract as o f 1999, Prosterman, R., Schwarzwalder, B. and Ye J.P., 2000
86 Zhang Shiqiu et al., 2005
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Other ways by which rural households obtain use rights of rural land are through 
public bidding, auction or negotiation.87 These are available specifically to the 
contracting out of the ‘four wasteland’, namely barren hills, barren ditches, barren 
mounds and barren shoals {Mllf, Mth> M l M P $ ) * % Regeneration of wasteland 
is one of the government’s main priorities in improving rural land use. Effective 
regeneration of large quantities of wasteland requires participation of and investment 
by rural citizens; hence, the government has created as many incentives as possible to 
attract community participation. These three different methods of land allocation are 
more transparent and fairer than the other two previously mentioned. Furthermore, by 
contracting out land to the highest bidder, it makes sure that the result is achieved 
with the least cost.
Contracting out of the ‘four wasteland’ is crucial in the process of increasing 
forestland area in China. This is because the law requires this type of land to be used
89for ecology protection purposes, especially for the prevention of soil erosion. It is 
also important because investment in forestland usually requires a huge initial capital 
and a long period of time before profits can be realised and the reality is that not every 
household would have the will or resources to invest in tree planting. Hence, most 
land has been contracted out to specialised households who have the resources and 
willingness to invest in silviculture. By doing so, maximum productivity and 
efficiency can be achieved. Management of the collective forestland by specialised 
households was already the predominant community forestry in China by early 1990s, 
where there were more than 150,000 such farms in 1991.90
In addition, contracting out of the wasteland is not only confined to village members; 
it is open to non-villagers as well. Unlike the other agricultural land, wasteland can be 
mortgaged.91 The contracting out of wasteland represents one of the most ‘market- 
friendly’ regimes available to rural land, with unlimited public participation and the 
use of competitive methods for allocation. This is because wasteland is not deemed to 
be ‘essential’, like cropland. Egalitarian allocation and tight control of cropland are
87 Art 45 Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL) 2002
88 Art 44 RLCL 2002
89 Art 46 RLCL 2002
90 Bruce, J.W., Rudrappa, S. and L. Zongmin., 1995
91 Art 49 RLCL 2002
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important because cropland is not only an important source of income but also a vital 
source of social security. On the other hand, wasteland has no or very little economic 
value and as a result, does not play such an important role.
2.4.2 Types of Regime under Collective Management of Forestland
As mentioned above, while the management right of collective arable land have been 
devolved to the household level, not all collective forestland have been allocated to 
households for management purposes. Collective management has remained an 
important feature of forestland in China. Part of the reason is the deforestation that 
took place during the 1980s when forestland management rights were first allocated to 
households. In many places, local government restored collective management on 
these lands in order to stop illegal cutting. This type of forest can be found in South 
and Southeast of China, such as Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangxi, and Yunnan Province. 
Since then, different arrangements of collective management of forestland flourished 
in China, many of which were initiated locally that took into account the unique 
features of their locality. This was possible due to the lack of a clear legal basis that 
set out the constitution of collective forest management; in addition, the Chinese 
government was more than happy to dispense with regulations and to allow local 
authorities to experiment with different management arrangements.94 Among the 
different types of collective management regimes, the most common are the 
following: centralised collective management; public association or shareholding; 
private association or shareholding; and ethnic minority management systems.
The first regime refers to the system where the village leader and village committee, 
on behalf of the collective members, make decisions about how collective forest is to 
be managed. These include what to plant, when and how to harvest, and how much to 
harvest,95 although timber harvesting is still subject to various government restrictions 
such the harvest quota and transport permit system. How much discretion the village 
leader and village committee have, and to what extent villagers participate in 
decision-making depend on the local institutions. In reality, in many places, villagers 
know very little of the management plans for collective forests, and are under­
92 Liu Dachang, 2001, p 248
93 Ho Peter, 2005, p 106
94 Bruce, J.W., Rudrappa, S. and L. Zongmin. 1995.
95 Liu Dachang and Edmunds, David, 2003, pp 24-25.
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represented in decision-making processes.96 Since the 1980s, election has been 
introduced in rural China, which has arguably greatly increased the efficiency and 
transparency of collective governance. The nature of village institutions will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
In relation to the public association/shareholding system, this refers to the situation 
where collective forests are distributed to farmer households in the form of shares 
rather than physical plots of land. One of the most-cited examples of the public 
association system is the shareholding system that was started in Sanming Town in 
Fujian Province. 97 Under the shareholding system, local households were not 
allocated the physical plots of the forestland; instead their rights over the use of 
forestland were in the form of shares. The shares were divided into two types: basic or 
‘old’ shares and ‘new’ shares. Each community member was guaranteed one basic 
share (on the basis of their status as a member) whilst new shares were issued in 
return for the investment of labour or other inputs. Forestland was managed by a 
board of directors and profits were given to the members of the community in the 
form of dividends. The share-holding management regime of forestland in Sanming
QQ
Town has since evolved to adapt to changes that had taken place. The shareholding 
system has received approval from government officials and academics, who have 
advocated this system as a way to overcome the various disadvantages under 
household-based management such as plot fragmentation and the problem of 
inefficiency. Despite this, the public shareholding system has not been widely 
practiced;99 in many places, farmer households prefer to initiate their own associations 
that place their forestland outside the control of the collective totally.
Private association, or self-initiated shareholding system, is where individuals pool 
resources together to manage the forest collectively. There are various forms of this 
kind of collaboration; there can be farmer-farmer collaborations, company-village
96 Ibid., pp 30-31.
97 Song Yajie et al., 1997.
98 For example, individual dividend payments had ceased and tenure contracts were going to large and 
specialised forest management service providers. The depletion o f high-value species and the 
requirement o f a more ecosystem approach to forest management meant that cash flow from the 
collective enterprise had reduced considerably. All these different factors contributed to the changes 
within the shareholding system, Song Yajie et al., 2004.
99 Liu Dachang and Edmunds, David, 2003, p 25; Bruce, J.W. 2000
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partnerships, and collaboration between villagers and non-villagers.100 In many places 
in Qiangdongnan Perfecture in Guizhou Province, the first type of collaboration 
(farmer-farmer) was found to be very common.101 Households (the number of which 
may vary), on their own initiative, pooled together their land, labour and capital, and 
managed them as one unit. This not only solved the problem of plot fragmentation, it 
also meant that labour investment in tending and guarding the forest was shared 
among the few households. There is yet a legal basis for this kind of association, 
hence the terms of obligations and benefits sharing were totally up to the agreement of 
the households involved.
The existence of all these different and ‘locality sensitive’ management systems are 
possible due to the relatively flexible implementation of the devolution of land use 
right policy and the necessity to accommodate conditions and requirements that are 
unique to the localities. However, collective management of forestland is 
experiencing a decline in recent years, especially since the latest forestland reform 
introduced in 2003, which again aimed at encouraging the involvement of households
109in forest management. This reform is generally taking place in the southern 
Provinces of China where collective management of forestland is still prominent. This 
new round of reform is seen as progress towards further liberation of forestry and 
forest management. Perhaps it shows that despite the various innovative collective 
management regimes that have sprung up in different localities, they are not adequate 
to meet the challenges faced by forest and forestry. The forest industry is now more 
susceptible to the world market since China joined the World Trade Organisation, and 
science-based ecosystem approach to forest management is increasingly becoming the 
norm. Collectives may find it difficult to satisfy the needs and requirements not only 
of the government, but also of the market. Whether or not the latest reform is 
warranted and whether or not collective management of forestland is coming to an 
end will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.
As we have seen above, collective management sets forestland apart from arable land, 
the use right of which has almost completely been privatised. Compared to arable
100 Ibid. p 23
101 Zhang Shiqiu et al., 2005
102 This new reform will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
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land, forestland is not as ‘privatised’ or ‘decentralised’ due to: 1. use of forestland is 
subject to stricter state control and the scope of choice in relation to use of land is 
much smaller in the case of forestland; 2. household rights over land are not as clearly 
demarcated and protected in the case of forestland where certain uses of land, such as 
the collection of non-timber forest product, are open to everyone in the village 
irrespective of the owner’s rights.103 Despite the differences between forest and arable 
land, there are two characteristics that are shared by both types of land: all land are 
subject to the two-tier (which is a totally different concept from the two-field system 
of arable land mentioned above) system, where ownership right and use right are 
separated and held by different entities;104 and management and use rights of both the 
arable and forest land have been subject to changes over the past few decades, which 
created tenure insecurity and mistrust by farmers of any new policy adopted by the 
central government.105 While still retaining the two-tier system, rural land reforms in 
China have since then focused on improving tenure security and flexibility (mainly 
referring to transferability of rights). In 1984, the central government fixed the 
contractual period of arable land to 15 years, and subsequently extended the period to 
30 years (by freezing land reallocations) in 1993.106 For forestland, the contract-out 
period was extended to 70 years. This will be discussed in the next section.
2.5 1998 - present
De-collectivisation of land in China was further strengthened and regulated with the 
adoption of the Land Management Law in 1998, the Rural Land Contracting Law in
103 Result from the village survey carried out in Guizhou in which the author was involved, Zhang 
Shiqiu et al., 2005
104 This has been described as the principal-agent relationship. Prior to 1978, the principals (state and 
collective who are the land owners) had tight control over the forests. However, after 1978, the 
principals’ monopoly on decision making was weakened, following the devolution o f management 
rights to households and autonomy given to state forest companies (both households and state forest 
companies are agents), Wang S., van Kooten, G.C. and Wilson, B., 2004, pp 77-78.
105 The mistrust by farmers o f policy adopted by the central government has been used to explain why 
rampant deforestation took place in many places, especially in the southern collective forestland, when 
de-collectivisation o f forestland first took place at the beginning o f 1980s. See Qiao Fangbin, Huang 
Jikun and Rozelle, Scott, 1998.
106 In 1984, the Communist Party Central Committee issued Rural Work Document No. 1 urging local 
officials to prolong the time period o f contracted land and in general the period should be more than 15 
years. A Chinese Communist Party Central Committee decision published in 1993 stated that the term 
for contracting land may be extended beyond the 15-year period. And in 1994, the Peoples’ Daily 
reported a Central Committee decision that land use right should be extended for another 30 years after 
the original 15-year period expires. Prosterman, R., Schwarzwalder, B. and Ye J.P., 2000. However, it 
was not until the Land Management Law adopted in 1998 that the 30-year period was stated in the 
regulations.
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2002 and the Forest Law (amended in 1998). The first two regulations mainly apply 
to all types of rural land (land in the city is governed by a separate group of 
legislations), while Forest Law only applies to forestland. These legislations represent 
the recognition of the need to protect the interests of farmers in the process of de­
collectivisation. Many of the provisions merely confirm the existing practices whilst 
some provide new security and flexibility to the rights of households. The major 
change required by the new laws is that all devolution of land use rights must be 
executed by written contracts. The three other main issues addressed by the 
legislations are the contracting period, rights transferability and land reallocation. 
Each of these will be discussed below. One issue that these new laws fail to address is 
land requisition by the state. Consequently, rural land use and ownership rights are 
still subject to the extensive power of the state to requisition land.
Firstly, as already mentioned, tenure of land allocated or contracted out is extended. 
For arable land, tenure has been extended from the original 15 years to 30 years under 
the new Land Management Law107 and Rural Land Contracting Law,108 while tenure 
for forestland has been extended to 70 years.109 This is aimed at encouraging 
households/farmers to invest in the land and to increase productivity. 110 For 
forestland, the lengthened tenure is needed to encourage afforestation efforts and 
sustainable use of forest and its resources. The direct implication of longer and more 
secure tenure is the restriction on land reallocation.111 Land reallocation is an essential 
tool for maintaining the egalitarian nature of land distribution in socialist China where 
an open land market is absent. Distribution of land in a village has to be ‘readjusted’ 
every so often following the changes in village population. For example, when a new 
member is introduced, or someone has died in a household, this changes the 
composition of the household, which forms the basis of land distribution (allocation
107 Art 14 o f Land Management Law (LML)1998.
108 Art 20 o f RLCL 2002.
109 Art 20 RLCL 2002
110 It has been suggested that the size o f the plot is the main determinant of investment decision by the 
farmers, not the duration o f the land use contract as widely recognised , Wen Tiejun, 2004. However, 
according to a survey, when asked about whether the interviewee would like to be able to work on the 
contracted land permanently, 61 percent o f the interviewees answered yes, 13 percent answered no 
while 26 percent answered no preference, Chen Xiaojun et al., 2004, p 15
111 Art 27 provides that there should not be any land reallocation during the contracting period, apart 
from in exceptional circumstances such as the occurrence o f natural disasters and is carried out 
according to the procedure. For contracts that expressly rule out land reallocation, the contractual terms 
must be followed.
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of land is usually carried out on the basis of household needs or labour or both, see 
above). As a result, in reality the legal contractual period is not adhered to. In many 
places the contractual period can be as short as three years, depending on how often 
land reallocation is performed.112 The issue of land reallocation will be discussed in 
more detail below.
Despite the many advantages presumably brought about by the new law, the extension 
of the contractual period has been met with criticisms. In particular, critics who are 
concerned about land fragmentation and unproductive land use have argued that the 
newly extended contractual period coupled with land use restrictions has exacerbated 
the problem of inefficient use of rural land as it has created a ‘lock-in’ situation where 
land is restricted to a particular use for a long period of time.113 This is a concern 
because exchange or transfer of rural land is still very much restricted in rural China. 
Critics who advocate for efficient use of land and competitive advantage have argued 
that in order to achieve economic development, more rural land should be freed up 
from the sole agricultural uses and should be devoted for urban expansion or 
industrial uses.114 This is particularly important in places where industrialisation has 
taken off and more and more land is needed to build houses and shops, such as in the 
Eastern provinces of China. In order to overcome the problem of inefficient land use, 
it has been suggested that China should relax the self-sufficiency policy and free up 
more rural land for commercial, development and industrial use.115 Alternatively, the 
Chinese government can also adopt a dual-track agricultural and land policy where 
economically developed coastal regions and areas near large and medium sized cities 
are treated differently from other agriculturally important rural areas. Land use rules 
should be relaxed for the former while strict restrictions on agricultural land use can 
still apply to the latter.116
Secondly, the new legislations allow the management and use rights to be transferred 
or rented out to a third party.117 Even though transfer of use rights was first allowed
112 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, p 18
113 Pieke, Frank, 2005
114 Ibid., p 91
115 Ibid., pp 91-94
116 Ibid., pp 91-94
117 Art 2 o f LML 1998 provides that “Land use rights may be transferred”. Transfer o f land use rights is 
also permitted by the RLCL 2002, Art 32.
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by the Constitutions (amended in 1988)118, and was made politically acceptable after 
the Fourteenth Chinese Communist Party Central Representative Meeting in 1992, the 
new legislations give the vital legal legitimacy to the practice.119 Transfer of land use 
rights took place in some areas even before it was endorsed by the central government 
as farmers who joined the ‘exodus’ to the cities to look for jobs in the late 1980s 
‘secretly’ transferred their land use rights.120 Transferability of rights is one of the 
most important elements of property rights. The ability to exchange adds value to 
ownership right. Thus, if the market does not exist and exchanges cannot take place, 
property rights will have little value.
The relaxation of right to transfer land is very important for those who take up off- 
farm work in the cities, as they can now legally dispose of the use rights without 
having to jeopardise their entitlement to the land. Transferability of land use rights, 
however, is limited. For forestland, only the use right over timber, fuel-wood and 
economic forests can be transferred; use right over special purpose forest and 
ecological forest cannot be transferred. Furthermore, control of land transfer is 
arguably important to make sure that the physical boundary of a collective 
corresponds with some certainty to the collective member users. This is partly the 
reason why land transfer is still largely confined to transactions between family 
members or villagers. In addition, transfer of land for non-agricultural purposes is still 
prohibited.
Articles 32 to 43 of RLCL 2002 govern the transfer of contractual rights and 
obligations. They provide, inter alia, that transfer of contractual right must be 
executed via contracts,122 that the transfer should be registered with the county or a 
higher level of local government, and that the original assignee is entitled to
118 Art 10 of the Constitution provides that use rights can be transferred.
119 The latest regulation concerning transfer o f use and management o f rural land rights can be found in 
the Transfer o f Rural Land Contractual Management Rights Regulations 2005 which was issued by the 
Ministry of Agriculture.
120 Rural China in the 21st Century: The Land Resources, 2000. One example is obtained from the 
survey carried out in three counties in Guizhou Province in 2005 (which was to assess the impact o f the 
Natural Forest Protection Programme on local communities) in which the author is involved. The 
survey data (publication pending) shows that many households transferred forestland use rights since 
the early 1980s.
121 Art 15 of Forest Law 1998
122 Art 37 RLCL 2002
123 Art 38 RLCL 2002
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compensation for any improvement carried out on the land.124 Transfer of land use 
rights can take the form of renting out, exchange, and permanent transfer and so 
forth.125 If the original assignee of the land wishes to transfer completely the land 
usufruct right to another party, he or she must first obtain the approval of the assignor 
(the collective or the relevant governmental department) before the transfer can take 
place.126 In this situation, the law also requires the original assignee to show that there 
are other reliable income sources available to him/her before the usufruct right can be
127transferred to a third party, who must also be engaged in agricultural activities. The 
law does not, however, prescribe under what circumstances application can be 
refused, or whether the original assignee can appeal against an unfavourable decision. 
In relation to all kinds of land transfer, the law also requires that priority should be 
given to members of the same village. Many local authorities have also gone a step
129further by prohibiting the transfer of usufruct rights to non-villagers or ‘outsiders’. 
The issue of transfer right will be further discussed in the subsequent section.
The third important issue that the Land Management Law 1998 and Rural Land 
Contracting Law 2002 address is the issue of reallocation of land. Land reallocation or 
re-adjustment which used to be a common phenomenon in rural China is now strictly 
controlled and is only allowed in a very few stipulated circumstances. Article 14 of 
the Land Management Law 1998 allows only the “appropriate isolated readjustment 
of land” during the 30-year land use term, while Article 27 of the Rural Land 
Contracting Law 2002 also allows readjustment triggered by isolated events such as 
natural disasters. Both regulations provide that readjustment needs the approval of at 
least two-thirds of the villager assembly or two-thirds of the villager representatives, 
and approval by the administrative agency responsible for agriculture at the township 
and county levels. As already pointed out, land re-adjustment has always been an 
essential part of China’s egalitarian distribution of rural land. Due to the fact that 
distribution of land is carried out on the basis of households’ composition, any 
changes in composition of households have to be accounted for by readjusting the
124 Art 43 RLCL 2002
125 Art 32 RLCL 200219 f\
Art 41 RLCL 2002. Other types o f transfer, however, such as renting out and exchange can take 
place without the approval o f the original assignor.
'27 Art 41
128 Art 33 RLCL 2002
129 Prosterman, R., Schwarzwalder, B., and Ye, J.P., 2000
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land contracted out to achieve the egalitarian goal. According to a nationally 
representative survey, 80% of communities experienced at least one reallocation of 
land between 1983 and 1990, and the number of reallocation experienced by an 
average village was 1.7 in 1996.130 Having said that, there is no evidence to show that 
reallocation of forestland occurs as frequently as the arable land. This is probably 
because arable land is more important for the subsistence needs of the rural residents 
and it is imperative to ensure that households have access to adequate arable land. 
This could also be related to the fact that the importance of tenure security for long­
term investment on forestland is recognised by village leaders and the farmers. In 
some places, instead of physical reallocation of forestland, households whose number 
has decreased are asked to pay monetary compensation to those whose members have 
increased.131
Despite what is provided by the law, in reality, many land use contracts contain the 
provision that ‘the collective can (or in some places ‘is required to’) reallocate the 
land if it deems necessary’.132 Total abstention from reallocation is proved to be 
impossible. Apart from the need to address demographic changes, many local officials
or leaders also use land reallocation as a tool to attain power or to carry out
1administrative tasks. By controlling the allocation of land, village leaders can thus 
influence household’s behaviour and subsequently fulfil administrative targets handed 
down by the central governments, such as the family planning targets, grain quotas, 
labour obligations and different kinds of taxes. Research has shown that the more 
personal interests that need protecting, the more likely that the leaders will control 
land rights.134 It also shows that when on-farm labour and rental markets are 
incomplete, village leaders are more inclined to use land reallocation to improve 
equity and the efficiency of farmers in villages where access to off-farm jobs may 
have created an imbalance among villages in their landholdings.135
X U  1U. Jj -T.
131 Hanstad, T. and Li, P., 1997
132 Prosterman, R., Schwarzwalder, B., and Ye, J.P., 2000
133 A paper by Scott Rozelle and Li Guo looks at the relationship between village leaders and land 
rights formation in China. It points out that readjustment of land, which is the most powerful tool 
possessed by the village leaders in relation to the use o f land, is usually carried out with three aims: to 
protect the interest o f village leaders, to minimise administrative cost and to improve equity and 
production efficiency. Rozelle,, Scott and Li Guo, 1998
‘34 Ibid.
135 Ibid. p 437
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Despite the assumption that tenure security is beneficial to land users, some studies
have thrown up results that are not so favourable of the new law. It seems that the
important role of land re-adjustment in ensuring every household has access to land is
not only recognised by the local governments but also the households themselves. A
1survey carried out in Meitan County in Guizhou Province in 1999 shows a
1 XIsurprising result whereby the majority of the farmers have indicated a preference 
for periodic land reallocations over the proposed, seemingly more stable, land tenure 
institution. An earlier survey by the same author also shows the support for land 
reallocation by farmers , where on the whole, most of the peasants interviewed by 
the author rejected the concept of ‘no readjustment’ for 30 years as impractical and 
unfair. The suggested rationale given for this phenomenon is that in rural areas where 
off-farm income is low or insecure, land is not only a means of production but also a 
means of social security: the majority of farmers would arguably assign more weight 
to the security-cum-insurance role provided by equal land access than to economic 
efficiency.139 According to a survey carried out in four Provinces in China (Zhejiang, 
Henan, Jilin and Jiangxi), land re-adjustment is more essential and more widely 
accepted in places where there is land scarcity and where off-farm employment 
opportunities are scarce.140 In places with abundant land and off-farm employment 
opportunities, the issue of adequate land for each household to earn a living is less of 
a problem.
Furthermore, direct evidence of the impact of the policy on investment behaviour is 
also less than clear. A welfare analysis research141 on the link between investment and 
land tenure insecurity in villages in China shows that guaranteeing land tenure (which 
means reducing the risk of reallocation) in the survey area (31 villages in Hebei and 
Liaoning Provinces) would yield only minimal efficiency gains. The threat of land 
reallocation does not appear to entail a substantial social cost in this part of China. In
136 Kung, James K.S., 2002
137 Up to 62 percent of the 800 farm households surveyed, ibid.
138 Kung, James K.S., 1995
139 Kung, James K.S., 2002, p 810.
140 Liu Shouying, Carter, M.R. and Yao, Yang, 1998
141 Jacoby, H., Guo Li and Rozelle, S., 2002.
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addition, another survey found that without being able to transfer land, higher levels 
of tenure security would only have a modest impact on increased investment.142
Before the new ‘no adjustment’ policy was implemented nationwide, trials were 
carried out in designated places, one of which was Guizhou Province. In 1994, the 
Guizhou Communist Party Committee declared that ‘the term of the contract be 
extended for another 30 years for arable land, and 60 years for non-arable land’.143 
The implementation guideline under this policy was a ‘no increase of land for 
increased population, no decrease of land for reduced population’ strategy. At the end 
of 1997, the party community issued another document that extended the contract 
term of arable land to 50 years (compared to 30 years nationally), and to 60 years for 
non-arable land, both starting from 1994.144 A few studies have been carried out to 
assess the impact of this policy on arable land use, households’ behaviour and 
investment. Results show that even though land reallocation was still practised, the 
element of ‘learning’ stood out. Compared to other Provinces that had not 
implemented the policy, households in Guizhou Province indicated more support for 
the new extension of contracting period and the corresponding restriction on land 
reallocation. According to the survey, the adoption of the policy at the village level in 
Guizhou Province increased a household’s propensity to have this policy choice as its 
first preference by almost 12 per cent.145
The discussion above illustrates the complications in addressing the issue of land 
reallocation. On the one side, frequent land reallocation disrupts the security of tenure 
and may discourage long-term investment by households; on the other, given the 
current development (or under-development) of the rural economy where land is still 
the main and only source of social security, land reallocation is vital to ensure that all 
households have equal access to land. As a result, different surveys produce varied 
results that are both for and against land reallocation. Despite such ambiguities, two 
points can be made that can potentially shed some light on the policy choice of land 
reallocation. The first is that results from some surveys show that households that had
142 Ibid.
143 Deininger, Klaus and Jin Songqing, 2002
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid. This can be contrasted with the survey result put forward by James Kung which found 62 
percent o f the households surveyed to be in favour o f period redistribution, Kung, James K.S. and Liu 
Shouying, 1997.
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experienced ‘no readjustment’ (during the trials) tend to support the policy than those 
that had not.146 This highlights that perhaps resistance by households that had not 
participated in the trials did not reflect the true picture. Furthermore, the results show 
that most of the resistance to the policy comes from households who have recently 
experienced a population change, who hence expect administrative intervention to 
help them to reach a new equilibrium. Secondly, ‘prior to a more thorough 
transformation of the rural economic structure, peasants’ preference of institutional 
arrangements governing land use are unlikely to change much’.147 As shown by the 
survey results, egalitarian distribution of land is less of a concern in places with 
abundant arable land and off-farm employment opportunities. Subsequently, land 
reallocation may be less necessary if other sources of income or better public social 
services are available to farmers. Also, it could be argued that administrative 
decisions can and should be replaced by market forces, provided that land market 
exists and local economy offers various off-farm employment opportunities.
In addition to these three main aspects, the Rural Land Contracting Law 2002 also 
provides a range of regulations that clarify the rights and responsibilities of the
1 J.R •contracting parties. These include the use of written contracts, rights and duties of 
the contracting parties,149 other ways of contracting-out land to individuals,150 sex 
equality,151 registration,152 and transfer153. The LRCL 2002 also allows contractual 
right to be inherited.154 The use of written contracts has proved to be a great 
challenge in rural areas in China as most farmers are illiterate. A survey that involved 
17 provinces in China showed that about 61.7 percent of the villages had not issued 
30-year land use right contract as of 1999.155 The absence of written contracts may 
also be due to deliberate acts by the local governments, who may find it impractical to 
issue contracts (and the corresponding land use certificates) when land is readjusted
146 Deininger, Klaus and Jin, Songqing, 2002
147 Kung, James K.S., 1995, p 106.
148 Art 21
149 Arts 12-17
150 Arts 44 - 50
151 Art 6
152 Art 23
153 Arts 32 - 43
154 Art 31
155 Prosterman, R., Schwarzwalder, B. and Ye J.P., 2000
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every 3-5 years.156 Despite greater clarification of the major themes of use rights since 
1998, there are still no provisions for the mortgage of land use rights.157
3. Contract-based Entitlements of Rural Households Over Land
The post-reform private rural land use rights in China have three basic characteristics: 
1. more secure (and longer) use right; 2. autonomy in land management; 3. right to 
transfer. Each of these will be discussed individually, together with the legal 
safeguards accorded to each of these rights. Analysis of the legal provisions will be 
central to this discussion, although attention will be paid to what actually happen in 
practice, which usually defies the purpose of the legislations. Before we proceed, it 
has to be pointed out that insecurity of tenure and mistrust of government policy were 
widespread among rural households, which explains the large-scale deforestation that 
took place immediately after management of forestland was devolved to the 
households. This was due to the fact that government policies had changed many 
times in the past. A classic example to demonstrate this is the changes in ownership of 
fruit trees in Chuxiong County, Yunnan Province, since 1950s. Ownership of the fruit 
trees was changed a total of 7 times within a space of 30 years: from households to 
advanced cooperative in 1956 and further to commune in 1958; commune back to 
households in 1961; households to production team in 1969; production team to 
households in 1971; households to production team in 1977; and production team to 
households in the late 1970s.158 For many places, the last transfer of forestland took 
place in the early 1980s (de-collectivisation) and tree ownership has stayed the same 
since then.
3.1 Right to Use
The most prominent component of the land use right ‘package’ given to households 
under the HRS is the right to use the land and its resources (apart from minerals). The 
right to use the land was effectively separated from land ownership and has become a 
self-standing right on its own. Right to use includes the right to cultivate the land and 
the right to utilise resources grown on the land. In addition, it also includes ownership
156 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003
157 Ibid. Art 49 of RLCL 2002 provides that only wasteland that has been auctioned out can be 
mortgaged.
158 Liu Dachang, 2001, p 245.
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right of the produce grown on the land, including timber. Inherent in the right to use is 
the right to derive income from such use. However, right to income is sometimes 
compromised by government policy. In relation to arable land, profitability used to be 
low due to excessive taxes and charges; while for forestland, it is due to both 
excessive taxes and the harvesting quota that restricts the right to log timber.
Issues relevant to the right to use are the length of use and security of tenure. As 
pointed out above, length of use has been extended recently by new legislations; it is 
usually long enough to cover one generation of land use. For forestland, the 
lengthened tenure is needed to encourage afforestation efforts. Furthermore, use right 
of some of the land is inheritable.159 The RLCL 2002 provides that the collective 
should not amend the contract and interfere in the usual enjoyment of rights during 
the contractual period160, and households affected by legal land reallocation or 
requisition161 are entitled to compensation.162 In addition, illegal occupation of land is
I zro
a criminal act and the person wronged is entitled to compensation. However, the 
issue of security of tenure is not as clear-cut. The current right to use enjoyed by 
private households is subject to uncertainties and possibilities of repudiation mainly 
due to the extensive power held by the state over land use control. The uncertainties 
come from two main threats, namely land reallocation by the collective owner, and 
land expropriation or requisition by the state. The issue of land reallocation has been 
discussed above; the subsequent paragraphs will focus on the issue of land requisition.
Rural land requisition is mainly associated with the development of land for non- 
agricultural or commercial purposes. Article 43 of LML 1998 provides that any unit 
or individual that wishes to carry out construction or (non-agricultural) development
159 Art 31 of the RLCL 2002 provides that for all contracted land, incomes or benefits that are accrued 
under the contract are inheritable; furthermore, use rights o f forestland are inheritable within the 
contractual period. This seems to mean that for arable land, only the benefits are inheritable and not the 
use rights per se. This could be because there is a real concern that allocation o f arable land should 
reflect the demographic change and should not be held up by family who arguably does not need it. 
There is no such concern for forestland because it is not generally used for subsistence purposes. Yin 
Fei, 2005, pp 336-337
160 Art 14
161 Art 65 o f the LML 1998 lists out the circumstances where collective can take the land back, 
including illegal use o f land and where the land is needed for public services construction.
162 Art 16. Compensation is also available for any improvement made on land by the farmer when the 
land is either transferred or given back to the collective, Arts 26 and 43.
163 Art 59
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on rural land must apply for the permission to use state land.164 It further outlines that 
the state land includes both state-owned land and collective land that have been 
requisitioned by the state. The state (which includes all levels of government such as 
county government and municipalities) has extensive power to requisition rural land 
for development purposes, and the law prohibits collective and households to transfer 
land use rights for development purposes.165 This power is further reinforced by the 
fact that all city land belongs to the state166: relatively well-developed rural area can 
be turned into a city, and as a result land is automatically turned into state ownership.
In China, there is a two-stage market involving rural land. The first stage of the land 
market involves the state buying land from the collective167 at a price set by the law 
and then selling it on to the commercial developer at the market price. The buying 
price is substantially lower than the selling price because the ‘former is applied to 
state units or non-profit land users, while the latter involves commercial land
1 Aftusers’. The second stage of the land market is where commercial land users 
circulate their land use rights to other commercial users. Land use rights can be rented 
out or used as collateral in the secondary market. Due to the profitability of the 
undertaking, state requisition of agricultural land has been rife and become out of 
control. The wish of the central government to protect dwindling agricultural land is 
sometimes defeated by the greed of local governments that see the land market as a 
great source of income.169
164 Use of rural land for public welfare undertaking, township and village enterprises and housing sites 
for the members o f the collective is exempted from this provision.
165 Art 63 of LML 1998. The provision also provides an exception to this rule, namely that any land 
legally converted for development purposes before can be transferred if the business using the land has 
experienced bankruptcy or merger. Another exception to the non-transferability for non-agricultural 
development rule is provided by Art 60 o f LML 1998, where it is provided that the collective economic 
entity can employ land use rights as shares to either set up or participate in shareholding companies or 
associated business with a third party.
166 Art 8 of LML 1998.
167 Art 44 of LML 1998 provides that agricultural land to be used for development purposes must first 
apply for land conversion permission. Art 45 then provides that the state can requisition the converted 
land for commercial use.
168 Lin, George C.S. and Ho, Samuel P.S., 2005
169 For example, the profit in the first-stage land market (earned by the state) in 2001 amounted to 132 
billion yuan while the profit in the second-stage land market (earned by the developers) amounted to 
718 billion yuan, Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 58, taken from a report by Huang Xiaohu.
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To capture the huge profits from land conversion, many land transactions have been 
carried out without going through the proper state expropriation process.170 Research 
shows that large areas of arable land have been converted, legally and illegally, for 
development projects undertaken by the state agencies at various local levels.171 
According to a cross-country investigation: only 53 percent of all development 
projects involving forestland had been approved by the Forestry Bureau; and only in 
53 percent of the cases felling permits had been obtained.172 As a result, the 
government issued two state documents to stop all forest requisition for land 
development in 1998 and 1999.173 It has been pointed out that as long as the huge gap 
between the compensation paid to farmers and the profits from subsequently selling 
the land in the land market remains, there will always be incentives for local 
governments to expropriate rural land.174
Although the government has tried to address the problems of illegal requisition of
17^agricultural land, the results have so far been disappointing. Every year there are 
thousands of public disturbances as a result of unfair land requisition by the
17 f\government, despite of the introduction of new laws that seek to regulate land
177requisition. Vast area of former forestland has also been requisitioned to make way
178for development. Clashes are common and widespread between farmers who are 
willing to risk everything to protect their main source of income (60 percent of
170 Lin, George and Ho, Samuel, 2005, p 420
171 Ibid.
172 Ho, Peter, 2005, p 115
173 State Council’s Notice on ‘The Protection o f Forest Resources and Halting the Destruction, 
Reclamation and Indiscriminate Occupation o f Forests’ (5-8-1998), and Notice on ‘The Continuation 
of Freezing All Forest Requisition for Construction Projects (30-7-1999). Ho, Peter, 2005, p 115.
174 Zhou Qiren, 2004, p 101. The highly lucrative business and relatively low transaction costs (land is 
requisitioned by administrative order rather than through the market channel) could also result in abuse 
and wasteful use o f land, ibid. The current legislative framework has perpetuated the lucrative business 
of selling off farm land for developmental purposes, Clarke, Donald, 2000.
175 According to estimates, there are currently 5,500 ‘development zones’, taking up 35,000 square 
miles of land. A ‘clean-up’ operation in 1993 found that 78% of the land requisitioned for industrial 
use were misused. In 2003, the State Council issued the Emergency Notification o f the Suspension o f  
Various Development Zones ( ) and carried out another ‘clean­
up’ operation, which subsequently freed 50,000 mu o f land back to agricultural use. Niu Ruofeng et al., 
2004, p 57 and Rural China in the 21st Century: The Land Resources, 2000
176 Public Unrest Increasing in China, 19 January 2006; China Village Fury at ‘Land G rab’, 10 
November 2006
177 In particular, see Chapter Five o f Land Management Law 1998
178 In 2002, 647 hm2 o f forestland were requisitioned in Linan City, Zhejiang Province. More than half 
of the requisitioned land were use for commercial purposes, Xu Xiuying and Zheng Xiaoping, 2005, p 
19
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farmers’ income come from agriculture)179 and developers who, more often than not, 
have the support of local government officials to obtain land that have been taken 
away from the farmers.180 It is undeniable that land requisition poses a great threat to 
farmers’ right to land.181
The government not only regulates when agricultural land can be turned into non- 
agricultural land, it also dictates how much compensation should be paid to those 
households whose land has been requisitioned. Article 16 of RLCL 2002 provides that 
the contracting households are entitled to compensation if their land has been 
requisitioned. Article 47 of LML 1998 provides the formula for the calculation of 
compensation for the land that has been requisitioned. The compensation is divided 
into three groups: compensation for the loss of land, resettlement compensation and 
compensation for seedlings. Compensation for the loss of land is calculated on the 
basis of the annual average productivity of the land for the past 3 years prior to any
1 R9requisition. Similarly, compensation for resettlement is also calculated on the basis
1of the past annual average productivity of the land and is subject to a maximum
1 QA
threshold. Land Management Law Implementation Regulations 1998 further 
outlines that compensation for the loss of land should be kept by the collective, while 
resettlement compensation is given to the bodies who are responsible for the 
resettlement of households. Lastly, compensation of the seedlings and any fixture on 
the land should be given to the contracting households.185
In reality, however, things are not as straightforward. The problems of underpayment,
1 86delayed and even no payment are rife. More often than not, the compensation 
money is ‘intercepted’ by a higher level of government such as township,
179 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 22180A few of these cases have been reported by the Chinese media. One case has attracted particular 
attention, both in the media and academic circles: Land Requistioning in Zigong, Sichuan. For 
comments on this case and land requisitioning in China generally, please see Chen G.D. and Chun T., 
2004; Sun Yafei, 15 July 2004; and Zhang Yaojie, 13 June 2004.
181 Donald Clarke pointed out that there is slower growth in agricultural production by individual 
farmer compared to the productivity o f town and village enterprises because the threat o f expropriation 
is higher than among township and village enterprises, Clarke, Donald, 2003, p 101.
182 Compensation should be around 6 to 10 times o f the annual average productivity, Art 47.
183 4 -  6 times of the annual average productivity of land for the past 3 years.
184 Compensation for every hectare o f land should not be more than 15 times o f the annual average 
productivity for the past 3 years.
f85 Art 26
186 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, pp 40-42.
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administrative village or other lower level administrative departments. This is 
exacerbated by the lack of a clear authority at the collective level, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. For example, of the average 200,000-300,000 yuan per 
mu compensation for the land requisition paid out at present, rural households only 
get 2,000-20,000 yuan.187 Some money is paid into the collective pot for public 
services purposes but the rest is illegally kept by government officials and village 
leaders.
As we have seen, rural land use right is not comprehensive. Although it encompasses 
the right to derive income and even the ownership right of the produce grown on the 
land, the protection of the right to use is far from satisfactory. The state still wields 
excessive power over rural land use, which is reflected in the right to requisition rural 
land for non-agricultural or commercial use. Recently it is also manifested in the 
power to withhold land use right temporarily under the logging ban. Current 
legislations so far have failed to address and control the state’s power to requisition 
rural land.
3.2 Right to Autonomy
The second characteristic of rural contracting land is the autonomy of right holders to 
manage land. Under the current system, households are given the right to make 
decisions concerning the use of land, subject to certain limitations. Article 16 of 
RLCL 2002 provides that the contracting household possesses the rights to use, to 
receive income from and to transfer the land; more importantly, households also has 
the right to make decisions about land use and disposal of things produced. 
Correspondingly, the collective should refrain from interfering with these rights188, 
the occurrence of which amounts to a breach of contract.
Until recently, rural production has always been subjected to restrictions and control. 
For example, households were subject to the provisions concerning production target 
and type of crops to be planted.189 This was mainly due to the result of the state 
procurement system, which was only gradually phased out in the past two decades.
187 Rural China in the 21st Century: The Land Resources, 2000
188 Art 14 of RLCL 2002
189 Rural China in the 21st Century: The Land Resources, 2000
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This system required farmers to sell a certain amount of their crops at a set price to 
the government every year to make sure that the government have enough food to 
feed the country.190 Village leaders or officials were given the task to make sure that 
targets were met and delivered. Failing to fulfil the target would result in 
administrative punishment to the officials, which might mean demotion or even 
dismissal. Thus, in many places, local government dictated what the farmers should 
plant on land and how much should be produced. The state procurement system aside, 
local government also had to collect agricultural tax that was fixed according to the 
area of productive land or number of residents. Hence, there was always pressure for 
the farmers to produce a minimum amount of crops so that the tax obligation could be 
met. ‘Dictated’ or ‘controlled’ production is now not a common occurrence and most 
farmers are free to decide what and how much they want to plant.191 The recent tax 
reform has further improved the situation.
Having said that, ‘dictated’ or ‘controlled’ production still occasionally takes place in
certain areas. For example, agricultural production has been tightly controlled by local
10 0authorities in some villages in Hubei Province. In 1986, the local government 
‘forced’ the farmers to plant grapes. In 1990, in order to impress the higher level of 
government officials who were visiting the area, the local government ordered 
farmers to plant wheat on both sides of the road. This continued to happen several 
times again, where the local government compelled farmers to plant certain products 
that were deemed ‘favourable’: apple trees in 1993 and mulberry trees in 1994. In 
1996, the government ordered the farmers to plant garlic on land along the road that 
had already been planted with wheat. Usually, local government or the village leaders 
feel the need to dictate production for two reasons: firstly, by organising unified 
production projects and establishing specialist households, local leaders hope that it 
would improve their ‘political achievement’ and hence increase their chances of
190 For China’s past procurement policy, see Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, pp 79-86. China’s procurement 
system has undergone several changes since 1979. When it was first implemented, the price of 
procurement was set by the government which was much lower than the market price. Subsequently, in 
1993, the government abolished grain vouchers in the urban areas to reduce state’s subsidies to urban 
grain consumption. However, the voucher system has to be resumed very soon after that as the market 
prices of grain soared dramatically. The government’s original plan o f allowing the procurement price 
to be determined by the market forces had to be put on hold. State control over grain purchases was 
reinstated.
191 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, p 16
192 Liu Fengqin, 2005, p 182.
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getting promoted; secondly, local leaders may want to maximise profits or income by 
forcing farmers to produce agricultural products that are deemed profitable.193
In relation to forestry, the state still exercises an overwhelming control over the sale 
and production of timber. Under the harvesting quota system, a cutting licence needs 
to be obtained before individuals can cut down trees (although no permit is required to 
cut down trees on the private ‘homestead’ plot). Thus, individuals’ right to harvest 
timber is restricted by the unified national production plan set by the government. 
Furthermore, in the ‘forest counties’ 194, the Forestry Department ‘functions as a 
virtual monopoly buyer of timber’.195 More often than not the Forestry Department 
operates the only timber market and sells timber through licensed outlets.196 
Alongside with the monopoly over the purchase and sale of timber, the Forestry 
Department also controls timber prices. In these places, households usually enter into 
production contracts with the Forestry Department, partly because of its monopoly 
over the timber market and partly because of the access to financing provided by the 
Forestry Department.197 In addition, Article 33 of the Forest Law provides that for 
timber not purchased by the state, a transport certificate must be obtained before the 
timber can be transported. This again reinforces state’s monopoly over timber 
purchase.
Apart from production control, households’ right to autonomy is also curtailed in 
other ways. One major deficiency is the restrictive practice of turning agricultural 
land (both arable and forest land) into non-agricultural land or for non-agricultural 
use.198 In some places, there are even restrictions on converting cropland to other 
alternative agricultural uses, such as orchards, and fishponds.199 The use of such 
intrusive measures to control use of land is controversial and costly, not least because 
it often presents opportunities for abuse by those in power and undermines the
193 Ibid.
194 These refer to important non-state timber-production regions such as the Fujian Province, which are 
mainly situated in the southern part o f China. Control is more relaxed in the aqua-culture oriented 




198 Art 4 of LML 1998, Art 15 o f Forest Law 1998 and Art 8 of RLCL 2002.
199 Rozelle, Scott et al., 2005
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integrity of use rights.200 Hence, restrictions on private land users’ autonomy often go 
hand in hand with the exercise of discretionary power by either the government 
officials or village governing body.
3.3 Right to Transfer
The third characteristic of the contract-out system is the right to transfer.201 As already 
mentioned, transfer of use right is now endorsed by the new regulations. Results from 
a village survey show that without the ability to transfer right, a higher level of tenure 
security will not result in a greater increase in land investment by the farmers.202 This 
is intuitive because higher tenure security is not a great incentive as such if the 
security is contingent on self-cultivation by the households.203 Thus, transferability of 
right not only can increases agricultural production (or more afforestation activity and 
survival of trees in the case of forestland) by allowing land to be cultivated or 
managed by those who can do it in the most efficiency way, it will also help to 
improve rural economy by allowing more rural citizens to work in the cities while 
renting their land out. In reality, practice differs from place to place. Transfer of land 
use right is still a rarity in many parts of rural China. A Ministry of Agriculture 
finding recorded that in 1990, a mere 0.44 percent of the contracted land were 
involved in land exchanges, although the figure had gone up to 3-4 percent in 1998.204 
According to a survey carried out in some provinces in China, in 1995, even though 
75 percent local leaders had reported rental activities in their villages, farmers still 
rented less than three percent of their land, and most of which were between 
relatives.205
According to one theory, the rural land rental market is very much influenced by two 
factors in rural China: the availability of off farm jobs and the market institutions. 
The first factor relates not only to off-farm employment opportunities, it also relates 
to the profitability of farming (as land held by farmers is only for agricultural use).
200 See above for problems associated with the state’s power o f land requisition.
201 Again, as pointed out above, right to transfer for forestland is only confined to users o f timber, fuel 
wood and economic forests.
202 Jacoby, H., Guo Li and Rozelle, S., 2002
203 Deininger, Klaus and Jin, Songqing, 2002, p 17.
204 Qian F.X., Ma Q. and Xu X. 2005, pp 1053-1054.
205 Rozelle, Scott et al., 2005
206 Qian F.X., Ma Q. and Xu X. 2005
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Before the agricultural tax reform, the heavy tax burden often made farming 
extremely unprofitable. Even after the tax reform, farming is still not profitable due to 
inflation and high input prices.207 As a result, not many people are keen to take on 
more land. On the other hand, the availability of off-farm jobs also ‘releases’ rural 
residents from farming, which in turn enables more land to enter into the market. The 
increase of land supply then stimulates demand. It is argued that the rural land rental 
market in China is ‘supply driven’ and that when supply is available, demand will 
arise.208 This is somehow proven by the fact that most of the ‘lessor’ families were 
involved in off-farm jobs209 while the contrary is true for the ‘lessee’ families.210 This 
is also supported by the fact that land transfer is more active in the East Coast of 
China and places where off-farm employment opportunities are more plentiful. Here, 
it is either the case that farming is carried out in larger scale and is thus more 
profitable, or households earn enough money from off-farm employment to pay for 
the ‘losses’ from renting out land.211
However, the availability of off-farm employment only is only part of the story. 
Although a lot of rural residents now take part in off-farm employment, most 
households212 do not wish to have their land taken back by the collective as the land 
act as a ‘fall back’ guarantee if they have lost their jobs at the cities.213 In many 
instances, households who rented out the land not only did not receive payment or
914,rent, they even had to pay someone to ‘rent’ the land from them. In relation to 
fulfilling agricultural taxes and quota, in most cases, the original contracting
91 Shousehold still bears the responsibility to pay for taxes and fulfil quota. Even if the
207 Wang Hongwang, 27 December 2007; Huang Xiangrong, 27 December 2007
208 Ibid. pp 1064-1065. This is in contrast with the ‘enclosure movement’ that took place in England in 
the 16th century where the launch o f capitalistic agricultural production increased demand for land, 
which subsequently created the need to deprive farmers o f their rights and push them toward city and 
off-farm employment, ibid. p 1072.
209 Other characteristics shared by the ‘lessor’ families are small family size, more young family 
members, and family members are more educated, ibid., p 1059.
210 The ‘lessee’ families generally share the opposite characteristics o f the ‘lessor’ families, such as 
large family size, more old and less educated family members, ibid.
211 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003
212 This is especially true with regards to households that only take part in local industry rather than 
outright migration to the cities, ibid, p 1058.
213 Similarly, most collectives in poor areas do not usually want to take back those land that have been 
contracted out as they want to get continuous contribution from households to fulfil the quota or tax 
obligation.
214 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003.
215 Although agricultural tax has theoretically been repealed by the government, informal charges and 
fees have again sprung up again in many places. See Chapter One above.
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responsibility is transferred, in the event of default, local leaders typically hold the 
original household liable for the quota. This has discouraged more active rental
91 f\transactions among the villagers. Lastly, rental transactions may be interpreted by 
local leaders as land misallocation, and subsequently may result in land reallocation 
and dispossession.217
The second factor concerns the substantial transaction costs involved in land 
exchanges due to the absence of institutions supporting or facilitating contracts of 
land. Even now, land registration does not exist in many villages, and as a result 
transaction costs can arguably be very high. That may explain why most land use 
transfers take place among family members or villagers where the need for certainty 
and market information is minimal. However, in some places, innovative market 
institutions have been created to facilitate land use transfer: a ‘land trust’ is used to act 
as a ‘broker’ between the assignor and assignee219; the ‘reverse renting and sub­
contracting’ mechanism220 is adopted to enable the collective body to consolidate land 
exchanges; and the ‘shareholding land co-operative’ is established to facilitate unified
991exchanges of land. The availability of these and other mechanisms is vital for the 
existence of a working land rental market in rural China. In fact, that the shift of 
labour to off-farm has begun earlier than the rental-market development shows that 
the establishment of a rental market is greatly dependent on the availability of the 
relevant institutions 222 Institution-building in turn depends very much on the active 
participation of local public authorities, without whom efficient ‘collective’ land 
market would not exist.223
216 Rozelle, Scott et al., 2005, p 135. This is supported by the survey data which shows that farmers 
rented an average of 7.9 percent o f land in places without quota, and only 2.2 percent in places with 
quota.
217 Ibid., p 136
218 This includes the registration o f collective ownership rights and registration o f private use rights.
219 Land trust is used in Shaoxing County in Zhejiang Province, Qian F.X., Ma Q. and Xu X. 2005, p 
1066.
220 This mechanism allows village authority to rent land from individual households that have been 
allocated land, and then contract the land out to agribusiness o f specialised households.
221 Qian F.X., Ma Q. and Xu X. 2005, pp 1066-1067.
222 Ibid., p 1070.
223 The existence o f ‘collective’ land market like the shareholding co-operative and the ‘reverse renting 
and sub-contracting’ mechanism is particularly important given the fact that private land rental market 
is still far from complete.
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Another restriction to the right to transfer is the inability of right holders to mortgage 
the land.224 Land as collateral is a very useful and vital tool for the right holders to 
obtain credits. More fundamentally, it denotes the power of the right holder to dispose 
of the right as he or she chooses. The scarce and unmovable nature of land makes it 
ideal and reliable collateral to be used to obtain loans or credits. In rural area where 
personal properties are limited, land plays an important role in helping farmers to 
obtain the much-needed credit for investment purposes or in the event of emergency. 
Availability of credits is especially important for farmers managing forestland, as 
activities such as tree planting, insect treatment and fire prevention usually require a 
commitment of relatively large capital. Apart from the initial financial inputs, 
continuous care and investment are required in forestland management, depending on 
how long the trees take to mature. Long-term management of forestland can only be 
possible if the farmers have access to credit facilities so that they do not have to rely 
exclusively on government subsidies and handouts. The prohibition to mortgage land 
exacerbates the problem of lack of access to credit facilities in rural China. The 
prohibition is perhaps due to the overriding concerns of land use control and the social 
welfare of rural households. Furthermore, anything short of ownership right (or 
long-term leasehold) may not provide the necessary assurance to banks and other 
lenders.
As we can see, the issues involved in the current land contracting-out system are not 
straightforward and involve various theoretical and practical complications, which 
reflect the difficulty of striking a balance between tenure security (which promotes 
efficiency) and equity. In addition, enforcement of the laws has been less than perfect 
and practices vary from place to place. Even though the law now strives to provide 
greater security to households’ right by demanding allocation of land to be carried out 
via written contracts, implementation has been far from satisfactory. Effective 
implementation of the law is impeded mainly by the presence of a large amount of 
administrative interference and arbitrage within the system. However, as more and 
more local economy blossoms under the market system, it is hoped that income 
equality can be achieved not by strict egalitarian allocation of land but via the
224 However, this does not apply to wasteland that has been allocated through public auction, bidding 
and negotiation, Art 49 RLCL 2002.
225 As pointed out above, many rural households see land as their most important source social security.
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opportunities to participate in other off-farm employments. Furthermore, as 
democracy and transparency become stronger at the village level, local leaders will be 
more accountable and abuse of power can be minimised.
4. The New Property Law
The last section looks at the newly adopted Property Law (also known as the Real 
Rights Law) in China. This law seeks to reconfirm and reinforce the protection of 
private property rights in China. Since it has just come into force in October 2007, its 
actual impact can only be speculated. The main sections of the Property Law in 
relation to rural land ownership and use rights are discussed below. In November 
2002, the Sixteenth Meeting of National Representatives declared that there was a 
need to further complete legal protection for private property. In the subsequent 
month, the Ninth Meeting of the National People’s Congress carried out the first 
deliberation on the subject and a draft on the Property Law was being revised. In 
March 2004, the Tenth Meeting of the National People’s Congress adopted 
amendments to the Constitution, adding a provision to recognise the legal protection 
of citizen’s lawful holding of private property. This was a significant move as it was 
the first time private ownership interest was recognised by the Constitution of the 
once communist country.
Prior to the new Property Law, legal protection of property rights could be found in 
the General Principles of Civil Law 1986, which recognised private property rights 
generally provided that they do not conflict with state policies and social interests.227 
The provisions limit to certain extent the intrusion of the state into social and 
economic relationship while retaining the power of the state to assert control. 
However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, law and regulation on property were 
mainly concerned with state-owned property and the extent of managerial autonomy 
granted to managers of state enterprises. When the Draft Property Law was 
originally arranged to be tabled before the NPC in 2006, it was suspected that the
226 Provision 13 of the PRC’s Constitution. The 1999 constitutional amendments merely provided that 
individual private and other non-public economics that exist within the limits prescribed by law are 
major components o f the socialist market economy, Article 11 o f the PRC’s Constitution.
227 Potter, Pitman, 2001, pp 62-63.
228 Ibid.
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controversy around the issue of private ownership rights had prompted the date for 
deliberation to be postponed. The major controversy was ignited by a letter posted on 
the Internet by a law professor in the University of Peking in 2005229, where he 
criticised the Draft Law as against the Constitution, the socialist culture of the country 
and of strengthening the wealth gap.230 On 16 March 2007, the Tenth National 
People’s Congress adopted the Property Law, which came into force on 1 October 
2007.231
The codification or formalisation of the property law was deemed essential for various 
reasons.232 Firstly, it will spur economic growth and provide incentives for efficient 
exploitation of resources. Secondly, the pressure to provide protection to foreign 
investment and enterprise has increased since China became a member of the
233WTO. Thirdly, China’s economy has diversified and is becoming ever more
234sophisticated. Many of these new economic sectors require a clearer and stronger 
property rights regime. Fourthly, the lack of a property law in modem China is argued 
to be untenable, and that Chinese legal scholars have become more active and 
equipped in drafting property law.235
In relation to the rural land use rights, on the surface, this new piece of legislation has 
not added anything new to the substance of the rights as provided by the LML and 
RLCL; however, the new law does strengthen the foundation of private ownership 
and use rights in the Chinese legal system. Before the incorporation of rural land use 
rights into this new piece of law, there have been heated debates about the nature of 
rural land usufruct rights: whether or not they are contractual rights or real rights or
229 Law Professor Gong, Xiantian posted a letter on the internet on 12 August 2005 to openly criticise 
the Draft Property Law to be unconstitutional and ‘against the basic principles of socialism ’, Zhao Lei, 
23 February 2006
230 For an example o f the debates between the proponents and opponents o f the new Property Law, see 
Han Fudong, 10 March 2006
231 People’s Republic o f China Property Law 2007
232 Chen Lei, 2007, pp 5-6.
233 Potter, Pitman, 2001, pp 59-61.
234 China’s economy has gone from ‘agriculture to industry, to real estate development, to mortgaged- 
backed securities, and to intellectual-property-intensive service industries’, Chen Lei, 2007, p 6.
235 Ibid.
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neither of these rights. The lack of a clear status made protection and enforcement 
more difficult, and facilitated the occasional interferences of rights.
4.1 Property Law and Land Ownership Rights in China
The Property Law in China largely follows the Civil Law system237 and divides 
property rights into three main categories, namely ownership right, usufruct and 
collateral right. Ownership right is the most comprehensive, which includes the rights 
to possess, to use, to derive income from use and to exclude others.238 As a result, it 
also encompasses the other two main rights, which are the usufruct right and collateral 
right. Properties are divided into two categories, namely movables and immovable 
properties. In China, there are very limited instances of private ownership of 
immovable properties, such as land. The Property Law mainly reiterates the existing 
arrangements of ownership of land and natural resources, where the only two owner 
entities are the state240 and the collective.241 Proof of ownership of immovable 
properties is only effective when the title is registered, although this requirement does 
not apply to state ownership of natural resources as prescribed by the law.242
State ownership rights of natural resources (including land) and other properties are 
vested in and enforced by the State Council, which is the highest executive body in 
China, the relevant departments and state enterprises. Collective ownership of land 
and natural resources are valid when prescribed by law, and registration of ownership 
is necessary. The new law provides that properties belonging to the rural collective
/)A 'l
are owned by the members of the collective as a whole. Collective ownership of 
land, forest, grassland and so on is to be vested in and enforced by either the village 
committees or village economic units (for village level collective ownership)244, or the
236 Xu Hanming, 2004, pp 150-156; Cheng Yunxing, 2004, pp 59-66; Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, pp 
230-235; Yin Fei, 2005, pp 297-304






Arts 46-49  
Art 58 
Art 9
243 Arts 59-60. Again, the new Property Law does not provide a clear definition o f ‘collective’, it 
merely uses the existing definition found in the Land Management Law 1998 and the Rural Land 
Contracting Law 2002. This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
244 Art 60 (1) and (2)
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township economic units (for township level collective ownership).245 The Law also 
identifies situations where collective decisions246 are needed: contracting out of 
land247, reallocation or readjustment of the contracting land248, use and allocation of 
compensation for loss of land249, matters related to collective enterprises250, and other 
matters that are prescribed by the law.251 Furthermore, it offers protection to collective 
members by providing them the right to petition to the court for the annulment of any 
decision adopted by the village representatives (village committee or economic unit) 
that has harmed the interests of the members.252 This provision has strengthened the 
concept and meaning of collective ownership by giving real powers to the collective 
members not only to decide on how to use the properties, but also to challenge any 
decision made on behalf of the collective.253
In relation to private ownership, the Property Law provides that private property 
rights are to be protected.254 In particular, it recognises and protects private ownership
- i f f
of capital such as investment equipment, buildings, and savings and so forth. The 
Law provides that the state has the responsibility to protect private property rights, 
and lays down the penalties for infringement of private property rights.256 There is, 
however, one important reservation in the protection of collective and private property 
rights, namely the state’s power for requisition. The Property Law provides that the 
government can, in the public interest, requisition private or collective property, 
provided that compensation is paid according to the law or reasonable compensation 
in the absence of any legal provision. In addition, an individual whose land has
- J f O
been requisitioned should also be, on top of the compensation, reallocated.
245 Art 60 (3)
246 Here, ‘collective decisions’ refer to decisions made by the members, rather than the representatives, 
of the collective, Art 59.
247 Art 5 9 (1 )
248 Art 59 (2)
249 Art 59 (3)
250 Art 59 (4)
251 Art 59 (5)
252 Art 63
253 However, a provision that requires the representatives o f the collective who have caused financial 
hardship to collective properties through misconduct to be held liable was taken out o f the main body 
of the law, Art 72 of the last version o f the Draft Property Law.
254 Arts 4 and 66
255 Art 64




Although the reservation of state’s power to requisition private property is not unique 
to China, given the already widespread practice of land requisition by the state, it was 
hoped that the Law would offer greater protection to private and collective interests. 
However, it merely confirms the ground on which a requisition can take place 
(namely in the public interest); it neither gives detailed definition to ‘public interest’ 
nor provides a list of circumstances in which requisition can take place.259 As a result 
the state still possesses wide discretionary power to decide when and where land 
requisition can be carried out. This is an area to be improved if private property rights 
are to be better protected.
4.2 Usufruct Rights of Rural Land
Chapter Ten of the Law outlines the meaning and composition of general usufruct 
rights. Article 117 provides that usufruct rights (of immovable property) consist of the
96Hright to possess, right to use and right to derive income from use. Article 118 
further provides that individuals or units can obtain usufruct rights of natural 
resources owned by the state and the collective. The Law also provides that property 
owners must respect the usufruct rights held by individuals or units, and should not
9 6 1interfere with the enjoyment of such rights. In particular, compensation is required
969when the usufruct rights are terminated prematurely (like in the case of requisition).
In return, usufruct rights holders are required to protect and carry out reasonable use
969of the natural resources.
Chapter Eleven provides details of the composition and types of rural land usufruct 
rights. The fact that a whole chapter of the Law is devoted to rural land usufruct rights 
shows that not only is the government keen to further strengthen the protection for 
rural households over land use, but that land use contracting out is also a policy that 
the government wants to encourage and actively promote. This is understandable 
because in a country where outright private ownership of land is still not acceptable, 
creation and circulation of usufruct rights at the lowest level of users are crucial in at 
least achieving some flexibility of land use that will promote efficiency and increase
259 Chen Lei., 2007, p 12.
260 Note that it does not include the right to exclude others.
261 Art 120
262 Art 121
263 Art 120. The Draft included the provision that usufruct right holders should not to cause harm to the 
interest o f the owners, but it has been taken out in the official version o f the Law.
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households’ incomes. One important caveat that governs all rural land contracting out 
is the prohibition to convert agricultural land into non-agricultural land use.264 This is 
the safeguard built into the system to make sure that agricultural land is not lost to 
competing uses such as housing development or industrial use.
However, the chapter on rural land usufruct land is a short one.265 The new law 
reiterates some important provisions relating to rural land usufruct rights, including 
the contractual period266, restrictions on land reallocation267 and transfer.268 In relation 
to the contractual period, a new stipulation has been added that is not found in the 
RLCL 2002, namely that upon the end of the contractual period, the collective 
authority ‘renews the contract in accordance to the law’. It is debatable whether or not 
this amounts to automatic renewal of usufruct rights; contrary to this ambiguity, the 
new law also provides that usufruct rights of housing are subject to ‘automatic 
renewal’ at the end of the contractual period.269 In relation to land reallocation, the 
same restrictions (namely only on rare occasion and with the necessary procedure 
provided in the RLCL 2002) apply. This again shows the government’s commitment 
to secure land use tenure. However, as already discussed above, tenure security is not 
favoured by everyone; and until the social and economic issues are addressed, it can 
be argued that reallocation will still take place regardless of the new provision.
Lastly, in relation to land use transfer, the new law merely refers to the existing 
provisions in RLCL 2002 regarding land use transfer. This means that for permanent 
transfer of use right, the transferor still needs to obtain the permission of the assignor 
(the collective), and the transferor must also prove that he or she has other sources of 
income, and that the second assignee is actively involved in agricultural activities. 
The Property Law also requires that members from the same collective are given the 
first consideration in relation to transfer of land. Furthermore, the law still prohibits 
the mortgage of land.270 During the consultation stage, members of the Legal
264 Art 128
265 There are only eleven articles in total.
266 Art 126 provides that the collective should or will renew the contract once the contractual period has 




270 Like the RLCL 2002, this prohibition does not apply to wasteland that has been contracted out vie 
public bidding, auction or negotiation.
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Committee of the National People’s Representatives argued that conditions were still
971not right to allow mortgage of rural land to take place. This was mainly because of 
the concern that agricultural land per capita is small, and that there is a danger that 
China’s agricultural land and the social welfare of rural residents will be jeopardised 
if mortgages were to be allowed. It was also argued that the problem of rural credits 
could be solved by facilitating the establishment of village-based financial services.
In general, the law has not added anything new to the existing law that governs rural 
land usufruct right. Again, the Chinese government has decided that the time was not 
yet ripe to introduce radical elements into the current land use system. The Law does 
not, for example, call for the establishment of a rural land market where private users
272can freely trade their use rights; nor does it allow the use of rural land as collateral. 
Instead, the Law reinforces private usufruct rights by recognising it as ‘property’ or 
‘real’ rights. The significance of this development will be discussed below.
4.3 Registration and Enforcement of Rural Land Usufruct Rights
A system of land registration is a pre-requisite to a properly functioning land market. 
Not surprisingly, the new Property Law reiterates the significance of registration of 
both ownership and usufruct rights. As already mentioned above, usufruct right can be 
created by contract but its existence must be proven by the registration of title with 
the relevant governmental department (usually at county or higher level of 
government). Without registration, the usufruct right will not be enforceable against 
an innocent third party273; and any changes in usufruct right, such as a transfer or
974exchange, must also be registered in order for this to take effect. At present, 
registration of land (and land use rights) is scattered among six authorities from 
different departments, namely the state land administration, the housing authority, the 
mining authority, the water administration, the fishery authority and the forest 
administration.275 Although the new law attempts to streamline the registration
271 The Fifth Deliberation o f the Property Law: The Time is Not Ripe to Allow Land Usufruct Rights to 
be Used as Collateral, 22 August 2006




275 Chen Lei, 2007, p 8.
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authority by requiring the formation of a uniform registrar office at the national level, 
so far this has not happened due to unresolved issues.276
Once the usufruct right is registered, the authority must issue a certificate of right to 
the right holder as proof of registration. The new law also introduces a new provision 
that seeks to remedy the existing law that fails to differentiate ‘real’ rights from 
‘contractual’ rights.277 Article 15 provides that if any creation, changes, transfer or 
termination of rights over immovable objects are provided in a contract, the contract 
will come into force even if the rights have not been registered accordingly. It has 
been suggested that unregistered rights are only enforceable as ‘contractual’ rights, 
not ‘real’ rights.278 Lastly, the composition of the usufruct right is to be reflected in 
the registration, and any conflicting claims must be settled by reference to what is 
contained in the registration.279 In order to protect the interest of the right holder from 
abuse of power by the authority, when carrying out the registration, the authority must 
not require the assessment of the value of the property or repetitive registration, or go 
beyond the boundary of its power.280
A registration fee will be charged but the amount should not be dependent on the size 
or value of the land; the exact fee to be charged will be set by the State Council281 
Relieves are also offered for losses or harm suffered by the right holder as a result of 
the mistake committed by the registrar: the right holder can apply for compensation 
from the registration authority itself, and also from the individual or individuals who
909
has caused the mistake to occur. In addition, any person who applies for the 
registration of interest by providing false information and subsequently causes harm 
to another person is required to pay compensation to the other person, and could even 
be made criminally liable.283
276 The questions that have not been resolved are which property rights should be registered, what 
procedures should be used, and which offices should be vested with the authority to register, Ibid.
For example, Art 4 of the Guarantee Law 1995 provides that a contract for mortgage will only take 
effect on the day the collateral right is registered. In other words, contractual obligations are made 
dependent on the creation o f the right over the collateral.












When a conflict arises regarding the usufruct right, the Property Law provides that the 
right holder can settle the matter via mediation or negotiation or bring the case to the
984court. When the property is unlawfully retained, the right holder can ask for
98Srestitution. Similarly, if the property is damaged, the right holder can ask for the
986damage to be undone. When there is interference with or impediment to the 
exercise of the usufruct or ownership right, the right holder can request for the
987interference to be removed. Infringement of usufruct right can entail civil action to 
be brought, and imposition of administrative and even criminal sanctions.288 And 
lastly, as already mentioned above, in the event that the state terminates usufruct right 
prematurely, the right holder is entitled to compensation unless provided otherwise by 
the law.289
In a nutshell, the Property Law has provided additional safeguards to protect right 
holders from any intentional or innocent mistakes committed by a third party in the 
process of registration. As pointed out in the previous chapter, land use right 
registration is still not carried out in all cases, despite the repetitive demands by the 
lawmakers. It remains to be seen whether the Property Law will provide new 
incentives to all right holders to register their rights. More importantly, the new law 
sets out the redresses available to right holders whose interests have been violated. 
The availability of some of these redresses, such as restitution, signifies the protection 
of land use rights as ‘real’ rights. Other important implications of this will be 
discussed below.
4.4 Implications of the New Property Law on Rural Land Usufruct Rights
As we have seen above, the Property Law sets out the basic structure of how 
ownership and usufruct rights can be created, protected and enforced. This is 
particularly significant because it is the first time China has attempted to consolidate 
the different types of property rights. The real implication of the Law, however, is not 
derived from the detailed provisions on rural land use rights but rather on a more 
significant level, namely the nature of these land use rights. This is significant
because it seeks to settle the disputes surrounding the issue that have divided the legal 
jurists for a long while. The new Law finally provides clarification to the nature of 
rural land use right by declaring it as a ‘real’ right, as opposed to a mere contractual 
right. The categorisation of land use right as a real right has significant implications to 
the protection of private rights against intrusion, especially interference from the state 
and the collective. This subtle change in the relationship between the state and the 
individual may bring far-reaching consequences in terms of how the state regulates 
land use, as will be shown below. Nevertheless, as the law has only recently come 
into force, its actual implications on rural land use rights can only be speculated.
Rights over a thing or property in China can be divided into two general types, 
namely ‘property’ rights and ‘creditor’ rights {imfX)- This dichotomy is similar
to the Western concept of ‘real’ (or right in rem) and ‘contractual’ rights (or right in 
personam).290 Both of these rights denote interests over a thing or property, but differ 
in relation to the extent of the right. It has been pointed out that right in rem refers to 
the relationship between the right holder and the thing or property, while right in
291personam refers to the relationship between the right holder and another party. 
Basically, if an interest is considered a ‘real’ right, then the right/interest holder will 
have a claim over the property against ‘the whole world’, or in other words against 
everyone else in the world. On the contrary, if an interest is considered as a mere 
‘contractual’ right, then the right holder’s interest is against the other contractual party, 
but not a third party who is not part of the contract that established the interest in the 
first place.292
The difference between ‘real’ and ‘contractual’ rights may seem subtle at times; it 
nevertheless has huge implications on the enforceability of right and the remedies 
available for infringement of that right. The following are a few distinctions between 
‘real’ and ‘contractual’ rights identified by a Chinese scholar.293 Firstly, a ‘real’ right 
holder has the exclusive discretion and power to govern the uses of the property: the 
right to use does not need consent or authorisation by a third party or a contract. In 
other words, the right holder has extensive autonomy over the use of the property.
290 Yin Tian, 2003
291 Ibid.
292 Cheng Yunxing, 2004, pp 59-66
293 Yin Fei, 2005, pp 54-55
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Secondly, ‘real’ right is created or conferred by law, and only the law can change the 
constitution of the right. Subsequently, the content of the right will not be affected by 
any individuals’ decisions or contractual agreement. Thirdly, a ‘real’ right is valid 
against ‘the whole world’ while ‘contractual’ right is only effective against the 
contracting parties. Lastly, a ‘real’ right holder has priority over a property claim 
while a ‘contractual’ right holder will only get the residual claim.294
In addition to the above, infringement of a ‘real’ right usually entitles the right holder 
to claim for the restitution of the property, while infringement of a ‘contractual’ right
^ Q C
usually entails only damages or monetary compensation. Restitution of the property 
may be of significant importance when it concerns a unique good such as land, which 
is scarce and not easily substituted. It is due to these significant implications of the 
nature of rights held by rural households in relation to land use that fierce debates 
among the legal jurists in China have been ignited. The adoption of the Property Law 
has put an end to the debate as it effectively identifies rural land use rights (currently
9Q f theld by individuals and households) as ‘property’, or ‘real’ rights.
The next question to be asked is whether or not the new status given to rural land use 
rights can help to address some of the right ‘deficiencies’ that are discussed above. 
The answer, unfortunately, would be no. Although land use right is now a ‘real’ right, 
it is nevertheless an incomplete one. The reason why is due to the following. Firstly, 
there is no indication that government control over land and land use is going to be 
greatly relaxed. As we have seen above, strict government control is one of the main 
reasons why private land use rights are grossly curtailed. One of the major threats to 
private land use right is land requisition by the government. So far no specific law has 
yet been prescribed to regulate land requisition and control abuse of power by
909government officials. Labelling private use rights as ‘real’ rights will be fruitless if
294 Cheng Yunxing, 2004, pp 59-60
295 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, p 233
296 This is not the first time where rural land usufruct right is included under the heading o f ‘real’ right: 
the Land Management Law 1998 that also regulates rural land usufruct right is grouped under the 
heading o f ‘real’ right in the Civil Law o f the PRC. The new Property or Real Rights Law, however, 
unequivocally indicates the nature o f the usufruct right.
297 There are three main issues concerning land requisition in China that still need to be addressed. 
First, the term ‘public purpose’ (the ground on which land expropriation can take place) is not clearly 
defined and is subject to various interpretations. Secondly, ‘fair and reasonable’ compensation is also 
not defined. In particular, the current yardstick for compensation does not include the market value of
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the law is not able to protect the rights from government intervention. Secondly, 
private land use rights are still strongly influenced by administrative decisions, 
including the very creation of the rights itself. The existing law merely provides the
908framework for the creation of private use right ; the contents of the contract are, 
nevertheless, still left to the discretion of the local authorities. The vague and 
discretionary nature of the rights is the opposite of certainty and autonomy that are the 
features of a ‘real’ right. Furthermore, the composition of private use rights is subject 
to administrative oversight and may change on the order of the local authority or 
village leader.299 Lastly, declaration of law without effective enforcement means that 
rights may only have force on paper. Stronger private use rights need to be 
enforceable, and the courts play an important role as the vanguard of private rights. 
However, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, the judicial system in China suffers 
from many fundamental problems, including the lack of judicial independence, 
corruption and lack of professionalism.300 More importantly, local courts are usually 
biased towards the local government; without proper support from the courts, 
individuals will not be able to enjoy the rights guaranteed to them by law.
Although it may still be too early to come to a definite conclusion, it seems that the 
impact of the new Property Law on rural land use rights is minimal. Nevertheless, the 
new law can potentially strengthen the protection of private land use rights and give 
right holders a new venue to contest any interference of rights that is either not 
sanctioned or prohibited by the law. And even though the new law does not negate the 
power of the state to requisition private property, the fact that households now hold 
‘real’ rights over rural land will give them some ammunition to fight against 
unwanted or unlawful requisition of land. In particular, they can now arguably bring 
action directly to the court against the entities that are involved in the illegal activities 
instead of having to depend on the collective (as land owner and assignor) to bring 
action on their behalf. In fact, this direct action is arguably available in any situation 
where unlawful infringement of use rights has occurred. Provided that the judicial
land. Thirdly, the existing law also fail to specify the expropriating authority, which leaves room for 
abuse o f power by government officials. Chen Lei, 2007, pp 12-13.
298 For example, Art 21 o f the RLCL 2002 lists out a number o f things that should be present in the 
contract such as the names o f the parties, the expiration date, the use o f land, the respective rights and 
duties, and the remedies for breach o f contract.
299 This refers particularly to land re-allocation.
300 Chen Albert, 2004, pp 151-159.
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system is improved and becomes more independent, the new law may in fact have 
wide-ranging implications on private land use rights.
5. Conclusion
China’s rural land policy has undergone many changes during the past few decades. 
At the beginning, the policy of self-sufficiency and equality was reflected in the 
collective land ownership and use arrangements. After the Cultural Revolution and 
the ‘open door’ policy in the late 1970s, the rural land policy was gradually moving 
toward a more open and efficiency-based system. However, due to political and 
security reasons, the Chinese government is still reluctant to let rural land to enter the 
market system. The current policy still keeps the division of land ownership and use 
right, where only the latter is enjoyed by farmer households. The existing law requires 
the collectives to enter into land use contracts with households and provides some 
safeguards for the various rights that are granted. Among the safeguards provided are 
the length of the contractual period, prohibition of land reallocation during the 
contractual period and compensation in the event of land requisition. The latest piece 
of legislation, namely the Property Law, has failed to introduce new substantive 
provisions in relation to land use right, although the classification of the rights as 
‘real’ rights can potentially have huge implications on how use rights are protected.
Despite the well-intended legislations, enforcement in reality is far from satisfactory 
and infringement of law is widespread. Land reallocation is still common 
notwithstanding the legal prohibition, and illegal expropriation of land is widespread 
in the countryside. The logging ban imposed by the central government is potentially 
a breach of the contractual right and whether or not compensation is required is still 
open to debate. In order to eliminate households’ mistrust against the government, 
more public consultation and open discussion should be held before a policy is put 
into place. By giving assurances to the security of tenure and use rights held by 
households, it will enable households to have greater confidence in embarking on 
long-term planning and putting in more investment. However, the problems 
associated with land use and land use control are complicated because they involve 
not only economic considerations, but also social and political ones. These various 
factors intertwine with the issue of rural land use and allocation, which means that the 
latter cannot be looked at in isolation from the rest. The next chapter looks at the
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meaning of ‘collective ownership’ of rural land in China. Apart from the less-than- 
perfect individual rights, the collective as a whole also suffers from ‘right 
deficiencies’. It will be seen that even though the collective are legally the owners of 
half the rural land in China, their power and discretion are subordinate to the interest 
of the state. In short, it is arguable that collectives are merely de jure owners of rural 
land while the real power lies in the hand of the state.
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Chapter 3 
China and Collective Property
1. Introduction
So far we have seen the transformation of China’s rural land use arrangements from a 
centrally planned and controlled regime to a system whereby private ownership (of 
assets other than land) and use rights are more acceptable. This is one of the most 
significant changes that have taken place in rural China, not least because it has 
successfully mobilised the force of hundreds of thousands of rural households to 
increase productivity and efficiency. Compared to the collective era from the 1950s to 
1970s, privatisation of the rural land use rights and production has not only freed up 
the labour force, it has also increased the incentive to work. When the government 
gradually loosened its grip on the overall production of agricultural products, rural 
households responded to the market and became even more independent. The 
previous chapter looked at the hard facts of the historical evolution and the nature of 
property rights in agricultural land. It also outlined the current laws that deal with land 
use issues, notably the Rural Land Contracting Law and the new Property Law.
This chapter will take a step back and look at the issues of institution1 behind past and 
current laws and policies in relation to rural agricultural land in China. The outcomes 
of an institution depend mainly on the interaction between the rules and the actors.2 
One of the factors that govern the relationship between the actors within an institution 
is property rights. Property rights not only regulate resource sharing or allocation 
among the different actors in an institution, they also determine the respective rights
1 The theory o f institution provides the basis o f discussions in this chapter. It was extensively analysed 
by the economist Douglas North, and has since been expanded by various economic theorists such as 
Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz and Yoram Barzel. The theory o f institution will be discussed briefly 
below.
2 An ‘institution’ is set against a background o f fixed natural endowments or resources, and rules are 
promulgated to regulate use and sharing o f these resources. Unlike technology, the quantity o f most 
natural resources are already fixed, hence their influence in the changes in institution is less fluid and 
more constant. However, changes in natural endowments, such as the discovery o f new stock or serious 
depletion, will have huge impacts on the institution as new rules and different mindsets are needed to 
rearrange the current approach to resources use and sharing. This chapter will focus on the more fluid 
factors that influence the shaping o f an institution, namely rules and actors. Another factor, namely 
technology, is less rigid than natural endowments but is also less fluid than rules and actors. 
Technological changes will not, however, be discussed in this chapter.
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and obligations of each actor.3 Actors in the institutional context include not only 
rule-makers, but also ‘rule-followers’.4 Depending on the political system adopted by 
each institution (a country can be an institution), the balance of power between rule- 
makers and rule-followers may differ. For example, in an authoritarian institution, 
rule-makers have exclusive access to the rule-making process; whilst in a democratic 
institution, rule-followers are given both direct and indirect channels to influence the 
rule-making process. However, even in an authoritarian institution like China, ‘rule- 
followers’ still have indirect influence on the making of rules. This indirect influence 
comes from the fact that even though an authoritarian institution may have control 
over all factors of production (like in China in the Maoist era until de-collectivisation 
in the 1970s), ‘rule-followers’ still have possession of something that cannot be 
totally subject to the control of a third party, namely their labour. As the experience in 
China shows, it is through the manifestation of their decision on how and how much 
to contribute of their labour that they will have an influence on the types of rules 
adopted by the institution.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The following section looks at the 
collective ideology that is gradually disappearing in the cities but is still haunting 
China’s rural social, economic and political landscape. It highlights the justifications 
(rightly or wrongly) given to support the preservation of collective ownership and 
control of land. The third section then looks at the institutional change in the 1970s 
with the introduction of the Household Responsibility System. It looks at how and 
why the change took place, and points out that the HRS triggered political and 
economic changes across China from the grassroots level (the lowest level of ‘rule- 
followers’). It is essential to go back to this period, which culminated in the HRS, 
because many existing features of rural land management (and ownership) trace their 
origin to that period. The fourth section then looks at the current collective system 
with regards to rural land and administration, in particular the role of the collective as 
representatives of rural households; and the interactions between the different actors 
in the collective system, which range from households, collective, local government 
and central government. In the last section, the shortcomings and incompleteness of
3 See Section Two of Chapter One above.
4 ‘Rule-followers’ used in this context refers to people who are expected to abide by the rules but who 
are not directly involved in the making o f these rules.
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the collective entity and their implications on the village level of governance will also 
be discussed. In particular, it questions the suitability of the collective to act both as 
the administrative agent of the state and as the owner of rural land.
2. Collective Ownership: The Ideology and Justifications
After the establishment of the new People’s Republic of China and before the 
nationwide land reform in 1956, the priority was to make sure that social justice was 
achieved, and everybody was given equal access to ownership of land. As already 
pointed out in the previous chapter, private ownership of land was allowed in the
early years of the Communist rule. However, the priority shifted in the 1950s and
changes in land holding ensued: land and other factors of production were 
consolidated and private ownership was abolished. The main aims of capital 
consolidation were to push up productivity, mainly based on the Soviet model, and 
also to increase government’s revenues. It has been pointed out that the reason behind 
the shift of policy was the wish of the government to speed up the growth of its 
industry.5 In order to achieve that, the government needed vast financial resources, 
and one important source of income then was agriculture. As a result, the government 
imposed a centrally controlled production process and consolidated revenue.6
A description of the state’s revenue from agriculture pre- and post-collectivisation 
illustrates the importance of the change. Before consolidation, residual profit from 
agriculture was around 30 percent, whereby 10 percent of this was paid to the
n
government as tax whilst households kept the remaining 20 percent. The effort by the 
government to increase its share of the residual profit (to capture a share that was 
bigger than 10 percent) by imposing higher agricultural and land taxes was met with
D
stiff resistance from the farmers. Hence, to increase its revenue from agriculture, the 
government decided to carry out radical reform so that it could have access to most, if 
not all, of the residual profit. The most effective and quickest way to do this was to
5 Ibid., pp 7-8
6 Ibid
7 Ibid., pp 8-9
8 It has been pointed out that the highest threshold o f tax acceptable to farmer households was 15 
percent o f the residual profit, ibid.
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change the property rights arrangements of factors of production. 9 After 
collectivisation, the government became the sole claimant of the residual profit and 
this greatly increased government’s revenues from agricultural production. However, 
as will be shown below, the increase in revenue was only short-lived and not 
sustainable.10 State’s revenue dropped constantly from 1959 (two years after the 
introduction of People’s Communes) and reached its lowest point in 1962.11
2.1 The Ideology of Collective Ownership
If the rationale behind large-scale collectivisation in the 1950s was correct, it shows 
that collectivisation was bom out not only of some abstract ideology that the ruling 
party aspired to, but also partly out of practicality to increase agricultural productivity 
and government’s revenues. Heated debates had been stirred up during the 
consultation stage of the new Property Law, whereby many academics and politicians 
still argued that China should retain its ‘socialist’ identity and that the embracement 
of the private property rights clashed with its ideology.12 Politically China is still a 
communist country although since the ‘open door’ policy in 1978, its economic 
system and society have gradually become more socialist in nature. However, so far 
land ownership is still reserved exclusively for the state and the state-controlled 
collective; privatisation of land is still considered to be too radical a reform to be 
accepted by the communist government. The current arrangements (whereby land is 
owned collectively and usufruct rights are privatised) are considered the most suitable 
because collective ownership is more easily reconcilable to the existing ideology on 
the one hand, and privatised use rights help to increase efficiency on the other. It is 
arguable that as long as the Chinese government regards privatisation of land as 
contrary to the socialist nature of its society, collective ownership will persist.
9 This is because property rights allow the owner to keep the residual claim of the property.
10 As we shall see in the subsequent section, production under the collective system had faced setbacks 
mainly due to the lack o f incentives for households to participate earnestly in production. This is ironic 
in the sense that by taking away households’ autonomy and rights over production, the state had also 
taken away the motivation to work, which in the end decreased government’s revenue.
11 Zhou Qiren, 2004, p 15. In 1961, the government temporarily relaxed collective control o f 
agricultural production, including allowing some sort o f private use o f land like the HRS. However, 
when productivity started to climb up again in 1964-1965, the relaxation was reversed and private use 
rights were put to an end, ibid., p 17.
12 See Chapter Two above.
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Furthermore, egalitarian allocation of rural land use is still considered the flagship of 
China’s communist past, which was one of the founding principles of the revolution 
that led to the establishment of ‘new’ China. Egalitarianism is only possible when 
property is either state- or collectively controlled and owned. This is because in order 
to guarantee equal access to an equal amount of land, constant re-allocation of land in 
order to reflect changes in demography is required. As a result, permanent entitlement 
to land by households (or private ownership) is undesirable or unfeasible. Under a 
collective ownership regime, private use rights are allocated to members of the 
collective whilst ownership rights (including the right to terminate or readjust use 
rights) still reside in the collective body.13 The dilemma of constant readjustment of 
land and enhancement of tenure security has been discussed in Chapter Two above. 
The conflict is likely to escalate as the demand for tenure security increases alongside 
with the spread of the market system, whilst at the same time egalitarian access to 
rural land is becoming more important as the issue of social welfare of poor rural 
households is getting more pressing.14
2.2 Land Use Concerns and Justifications
Despite calls from various quarters for further rural land ownership reform15, most 
commentators and especially the Chinese government have opted for the status quo. 
Even though privatisation of usufruct rights has done wonders to rural economy and 
productivity for the past three decades, many still refuse to consider privatisation of 
ownership rights. Aside from the ideological reasons discussed above, there are other 
social and economic reasons that have prompted these commentators and the Chinese 
government to insist on keeping the collective ownership regime. As we shall see 
below, these concerns are not unique to China, they are equally identifiable with 
problems faced by many developing countries. Examples of these concerns are high 
pressure on land, lack of economic development, subsistence nature of rural economy, 
unfamiliarity with the market, lack of market facilities, lack of general amenities,
13 Collective land in China is not broken down into separate units owned by individual collective 
members (in other words, it is not the aggregation o f individual private plots); rather, it is owned by the 
collective as one whole unit and individual claims o f ownership by the collective members is not 
possible.
In most rural places land is still regarded the only social security for poor households, hence is has a 
high social welfare value. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent subsection.
15 Hanstad, T. and Li P., 1997; Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, pp 220-221. Most have suggested 
either granting permanent leasehold or even privatisation of land.
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illiteracy, limited resources, and so forth. Some of these concerns are more prominent 
in China due to some distinctive features of rural China, such as the huge population 
pressure. All these difficulties or complications have affected the choice of land 
ownership types, either directly or indirectly. The following discusses these issues in 
the context of rural China; it will show how and why many would still argue that 
collective ownership of rural land is to be preferred over private ownership (the 
debate of ideology aside).
The first issue is the high population-land ratio. China is the most populous country in 
the world, with almost 20 percent of the world’s six billion population. Even though 
the physical size of China is big16, its productive land is small and limited compared
1 n
to its population. To make matters worse, more than half of its population still
resides in rural areas, where labour surplus stands between 150 million to 170 million
18people. Land pressure has been made worse by the recent loosely regulated 
expansion of factories, offices and urban housing on to rural land.19 Apart from the 
essential development needs, conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural land is 
also motivated by the fact that non-agricultural land is ‘completely commoditised’ 
whilst agricultural land is ‘non-commoditised’ under the current land use 
arrangement.20 Agricultural land is incompletely commoditised mainly because it is 
very difficult to transfer rights of such land, and in some places, the land is ‘subject to 
an obligation to make grain deliveries to the state at below-market prices’.21 In 
contrast, non-agricultural land is subject to fewer restrictions (especially in relation to 
transfer, sale and mortgage of land). As a result, the conversion of agricultural land to 
non-agricultural has been carried out wantonly and the situation has gone out of
16 With 9.6 million square km, China is the fourth largest country in the world after Russia, Canada and 
the United States.
17 As pointed out in Chapter Two, the land area per capita is less than 1.4mu (around 0.093 hectare); 
although in one third o f the provinces, the land area per capita is less than 1 mu, and in one third o f the 
counties, land area pre capita is 0.8 mu, Wen Tiejun, 9 May 2004.
18 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 103
19 In 2003 alone, China has lost 2.5 million hectare o f arable land. From 1997 to 2003, the total amount 
of arable land lost was 6.9 million hectare. Since the last decade, however, the main cause o f cropland 
losses has gradually moved from commercial and industrial development to ecological projects that 
required cropland to be converted into either forest- or grassland, Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, pp 76-77. 
This, for the first time, pits one type o f agricultural land use against another. The conflict was 
predictable as various large-scale ecological projects such as the Sloping Land Conversion Programme 
have been pushed up the government’s priority list, especially since 1997.
20 Clarke, Donald, 2000, p 2
21 Ibid.
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control, which has prompted the Chinese government to issue emergency orders to 
halt further conversion of agricultural land on several occasions.22
High population pressure on land is one of the causes of widespread poverty in rural 
China (especially in the Western region23), as there are not enough resources to 
provide for everyone. Although China’s rural population is decreasing24 (mainly due 
to migration to the city and the One Child Policy25), population pressure on land is 
still immense. Furthermore, agricultural production in China is still reliant on the 
small-scale, conventional family farming where mechanisation level is low. In these 
circumstances extended families operate traditional farming operations that combine 
family endowments of labour with little advanced technology.26 Farmers are mostly 
concerned about crop yield rather than quality or efficiency and high production is 
achieved via the relatively high use of labour, fertiliser and pesticides.27 Hence, access 
to agricultural land is absolutely vital for the survival of most of its rural population 
and also for social stability in rural China. As a result, the Chinese government feels 
the need to impose control on land use to make sure that everyone has access to 
enough agricultural land.
The second land use related issue concerns the lack of a social welfare system in rural 
China. Unlike the cities where the social security or welfare system is relatively
22 The State Council issued ‘emergency orders’ in 1986, 1997 and 2003 to halt further and 
uncontrolled conversion o f agricultural land. The persistence of this problem is explained to be the 
result o f the two-stage land market system explained in Chapter Two above, where the state first 
requisitions land from farmers by paying them non-market based compensation and then sells it on at 
the market price. As long as local officials or collective representatives can reap huge profits from sale 
of agricultural land, the recurrence o f this problem is to be expected, Zhou Qiren, 2004, p 101.
23 61.8 percent of population living in poverty concentrate in China’s Western region, which is made up 
of 12 provinces. The government recognises the problem of ‘unequal development’ and has, in 
September 1999, launched the Western Development Strategy, which aims to improve the standard of  
living and reduce poverty among people in the Western region. The Western Development Strategy 
has three over-aching aims: infrastructure development; ecology protection and improvement; and 
rapid industrialisation with the use o f science and technology. Yeung Y.M. and Shen J.F., 2004
24 Rural population in China has decreased from 866.37 million (70 percent o f the total population) in 
1997 to 737.42 million (56 percent) in 2006. Figures obtained from China’s Statistical Yearbook 1998 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/data/urban/urban 5.htm and Statistical Communique 
2006 http://english.peoDle.com.cn/200703/02/eng20070302 353783.html
25 The effectiveness and morality o f the coercive nature o f population control under the One Child 
Policy has been questioned by Amartya Sen. It has been suggested that the various social and economic 
programmes adopted by the Chinese government over the decades would have reduced China’s birth 
rate regardless o f the compulsive policy, Sen, Amartya, 1999, pp 220-221
26 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, pp 154-170
27 Zeng David, 2003
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established, there is yet to be such a system in the rural areas.28 For example, only 20 
percent of the national spending on health is allocated to the rural area and 87 percent 
of the rural population pay for healthcare out of their own pocket.29 Furthermore, 
although 63 percent of the participants in the national compulsory education system 
were rural residents, state allocation of funding to the rural area was only 54.2 percent 
(out of the total funding for national compulsory education system) in 2000. As a 
result, unpaid teacher’s salaries in rural area amounted to 1.35 billion yuan in 2004, 
which was equivalent to the annual salary of nearly 30 percent of rural teachers.30 The 
social welfare system not only is confined to urban residents, it is also unavailable for 
migrant workers who work in the cities but nonetheless retain their ‘rural residency’.31 
The lack of access to a properly functioning and comprehensive social security system 
has inevitably caused rural residents to regard land as their main and only security. As 
a result, not only are rural citizens unwilling to part with their land, migrant workers 
in the cities are also reluctant to give up their entitlements to land in the villages. 
According to a survey, the majority of the villagers interviewed indicated that access 
to off-farm employment by no means constitutes a sufficient condition for farmers or 
villages to give up their rights to land.32
Right of access to land is even more prominent in areas where off-farm employment 
opportunities are lacking or minimal. Despite the boom of village and township 
enterprises in the 1980s which provided hundreds of thousands of job opportunities to 
rural residents, many have since been closed down due to a slowing growth rate, 
declining profitability, growing losses and the impaired ability to absorb surplus 
labour. Land, being scarce and immovable, is an ideal source of social security for 
those who do not enjoy any of the modem forms of security that are enjoyed by urban
28 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, pp 26-28. Having said that, things are starting to improve as the Chinese 
government have introduced some reforms recently that aim at transferring some burden away from 




31 This is the ‘hu kou’ system where everybody is given one o f the two types o f residency, namely rural 
and city. This was adopted by the Chinese government to avoid great influx o f rural citizens to towns 
and cities, and to prevent over-burdening the social security system in the urban areas.
32 Kung, James K.S., 2000
33 Whiting, S., 2001, p 288. Employment from township and village enterprises (TVEs) remained 
steady since 1993, and the total number o f TVEs had declined from about 25 million 1994 to around 21 
million in 1999, Clarke, Donald, 2003, p 101.
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residents, namely free education34, subsidized healthcare35, pension36, unemployment 
benefits and so forth. Collective ownership arguably makes sure that land does not fall 
into the hands of a few people and subsequently deprive others of their vital means of 
security. It is said that given the current situation in rural China, where the value of 
social security has outweighed economic consideration of land value, it is
07
inappropriate or unsuitable to apply the principles of the free market. However, this 
heavy reliance on land to provide long-term security to households has come at a 
great cost, namely an extremely rigid land market as all land is tied up with hundreds 
of thousands of household units who are unwilling to give up the land.
The third land use related concern is the uncontrolled influx of the rural population 
into towns and cities. This is a serious concern of the government as it is worried that 
mass-migration from rural areas to the city could potentially collapse the urban social 
and economic structure, including its social welfare services. The Household 
Registration Regulation was adopted in 1958 to control rural-urban migration. Despite 
the impressive economic and social changes that have taken place in China in the past 
three decades, the ‘hu kou> system is still a defining feature of China’s rural 
community and economy. The ‘hu kou’ system not only enables the government to 
control intemal-migration, it also ‘allows’ the cities to reduce the costs of providing 
social services for city dwellers by excluding non-urban households. Land use control 
complements the ‘hu kou’ system in restricting intemal-migration. Under collective 
ownership, entitlement to land is based on the residency of the individuals, hence
34 Since 2006, the Chinese government has introduced a new ‘nine-year free education’ reform in rural 
area, where school fees are exempted for primary and secondary students. The first phase o f reform 
was carried out in the Western region, and was gradually spread to the Central and Eastern region, Wen 
Jiabao: The Nationwide Abolition o f  the Nine-Year School Fees o f  Rural’s Voluntary Educational 
System. 5 March 2006.
35 Like education, the Chinese government has also introduced some positive reform in rural healthcare 
system. For example, it introduced the New Rural Co-operative Medical Scheme where the 
government reimburses part of the health care bills. This Scheme is reported to be well received by the 
people, Bristow, Michael. 27 June 2007. Furthermore, in January 2008, the government has announced 
that it will introduce a universal national health service and promote equal access to public services by 
year 2020. This is aliken to the National Health Service in the UK, Chen Shirong, 7 January 2008.
Unlike the healthcare scheme, a special pension scheme that was introduced to target rural 
households whose land had been requisitioned by the government has not worked as expected. Under 
this scheme, those who age 60 or above pay 30 yuan per month, those who are between the age o f 16 
and 60 pay 40 yuan per month, and a 40 yuan top-up is paid by the government. Those who contribute 
can receive 80 yuan per month when they reach above 60. However, in places where this scheme is 
being experimented, it has not received widespread support from the residents mainly because they are 
o f the opinion that contribution is not matched by the pension payment; or in other words, the payment 
is too little, Wang Xueliang and Su Xiaoxuan, 17 September 2007.
37 Wen Tiejun, 9 May 2004
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limiting the mobility of rural residents. Furthermore, land use transfer is also 
restricted in the sense that the law and local policies still give preference to people 
from the same village.38 This means that more often than not individuals do not have 
access to social and economic security outside the collective realm, which is a 
deterrent to migration out of the rural collective. This again reinforces the tie between 
residency and land use rights.
China has proposed to consider ending the residency permit in 11 provinces, mainly
Q Q
along the developed eastern coast. This proposal not only addresses the issue of the 
widening wealth gap between the city dwellers and rural households, it also seeks to 
bring justice to millions of migrant workers who live in the cities without legal 
documentation who are denied access to welfare services in the cities.40 In reality, 
given the huge social and financial implications of abolishing the ‘hu kou’ system, it 
is very likely that any such a move will be opposed by the governments in the cities. 
Nevertheless, the ‘hu kou’ system has recently been relaxed in some places. In 2001- 
2002, locally set ‘entry conditions’ started to replace the migration quota in small 
cities and towns.41 These ‘entry conditions’ included the educational background, 
skills and age. Conversion from rural to urban residency was available to people who 
have fulfilled the ‘entry conditions’. 42 Relaxation in the lhu kou’ system is 
particularly important for eastern provinces where the demand of migrant labour is 
high.
The fourth issue that is used to justify collective ownership is the unfamiliarity with 
the market and lack of market infrastructure in rural China. Like many developing 
countries, there is a real concern that the rural population, especially farmers, may not 
be able to engage in meaningful market transactions (here it refers to the private land 
market) due to lack of knowledge or skills. This is compounded by the lack of market 
information and other facilities such as road, transport and telecommunication. Many
38 According to a study, village boundary does exert great influence on land exchanges. In particular, it 
was found that village authority exerts more control on outflow of land (renting out) than inflow  
(renting in), Qian F.X., Ma Q. and Xu X. 2005, pp 1068-1069.
39 Rural Chinese May Get City Rights, 2 November 2005
40 According to Xinhua news agency, there are about 87 million people living in areas where they did 
not have permanent residency rights, ibid.
41 Wang Feiling, 2004, p 129
42 Ibid.
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of the rural population still live in remote mountainous areas where access to the 
market is restricted. In addition, rural land market in China still faces a number of 
important obstacles, such as tenure insecurity, non-market valuation of land, lack of a 
properly functioning institution, lack of market information, lack of effective 
supervision and so forth.43 Privatisation of land is unworkable and undesirable in the 
absence of a properly functioning market system (and institution). This is because it 
will arguably expose rural households to exploitation and abuse.44 The difficulties 
faced by the masses following privatisation of land after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in the 1990s provide a good lesson.45 It has generally been agreed that the 
complications induced by the reforms to privatise capitals in the former Soviet Union 
were partly caused by institutional failure. When the planned economy system was 
brought to an abrupt end before a working institution for the market system was 
established, a vacuum was created which caused productivity to fall and subsequently 
the recession.46 As a result, until the rural population is ready, collective ownership of 
land can put off unwanted risks and exploitation caused by the privatisation of land.
In addition to the social, economic and political reasons given above, it has also been 
argued that collective ownership is the best regime for land with certain 
characteristics due to the physical nature of the land and its uses. This is typically 
argued in the case of forestland and grassland, whereby due to their unique 
characteristics, they may not be suitable even for privatised usufruct rights, let alone 
ownership.47 It is argued that forestland is best managed as a whole ecosystem rather 
than fragmented plots. This is particularly true with regards to protection forests 
whereby its importance is in the form of ecological services, such as the prevention of 
soil erosion and preservation of biological diversity. By fragmenting forestland into 
hundreds of small plots managed by different households, it will impede effective 
management of the ecosystem, and may even be destructive to the forest structure.
43 Cheng Yunxing, 2004, pp 109-114.
44 For example, without proper institution like impartial and effective courts, private rights will not be 
protected; and without the correct market information, individuals will not be able to make rational 
decisions.
45 Clarke, D., Murrell, P. and Whiting, S., 2006
46 Kolodko, Grzegorz W., 1999
47 Schwarzwalder, B. et al., 2001
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Furthermore, forest management can be costly compared to arable land, and requires 
specialist skills and knowledge. Tree planting and maintenance may require large 
initial investments and subsequent professional care that ordinary farmers may lack. 
These are legitimate concerns as not every farmer household will have the necessary 
resources and skills to ensure that forestland is managed in sustainable and acceptable 
ways.48 In addition, the investment period is longer in the case of forestland compared 
to arable land. While crops are harvested once, if not twice, every year, by 
comparison, trees may take a few decades to grow and the gap between each harvest 
may take years. The long investment period may not be appreciated by farmers as the 
risks they have to face are high. The lack of profit is also a reason why individual 
households may not have the incentive or motivation to manage forestland properly. 
Chapter One has shown that due to the high taxes and charges, timber production is 
not profitable. It has also pointed out that the compensation scheme for ecological 
services is still at an early stage and is clearly inadequate. Without sufficient financial 
rewards, it is valid to assume that investment from individual households will be half­
hearted, if not lacking. As a result, this may lead to the neglect and mismanagement of 
forestland. Collective ownership and management of forestland is hence deemed more 
appropriate as it can coordinate efforts to make sure that at least the minimum level of 
investment is provided.
Lastly, many examples have been produced to show that collective management of 
forestland is as, if not more, successful than the household contracting out system. 
These ‘success stories’ range from the traditional management arrangements of 
indigenous people49 to more modem innovative measures adopted by market-aware 
communities.50 Due to the lack of detailed legal provisions on how collective 
forestland should be governed or managed, local communities have had a free hand to 
experiment with different types of arrangements that were deemed to be the most 
suitable to the local conditions.51 This flexibility has produced creativity and
48 These concerns have actually been voiced by the farmers themselves, and were reasons why the 
initial contracting out o f forestland management had not worked properly in many places, ibid., pp 29- 
34.
49 Lai Q., 2003; Kenji Kitamura and Guanxia Cao, 2003
50 One o f the most well-known is the SHIFT (Shareholding Integrated Forest Tenure) in Fujian 
Province, Song Yajie et al., 1997. Other share-related arrangements can be seen in Schwarzwalder, B. 
et al., 2001. For more examples, see Li Weichang, 2003
51 Bruce, J„ 1999
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innovation that has made collective management in some places successful; however, 
the flexibility has also induced inconsistencies and opportunities for abuse. Most 
have agreed that it is time to inject more certainty into the system by introducing 
relevant laws.53 In support of the collective management regime for forestland (and 
grassland), many have urged the lawmakers to differentiate arable land from non­
arable land (namely forest- and grassland), and provide nationwide implementation of 
the HRS only for the former.54 It is argued that collective management is still 
preferred to the HRS in the case of forest and grassland.55 It is, however, accepted that 
the collective ownership and management regime does not work in all types of 
circumstances. There are preconditions that must exist in order to ensure robust and 
long-term collective management institutions. These preconditions are: clearly 
defined boundaries; congruence; collective-choice arrangements; effective 
monitoring; graduated sanctions; effective conflict-resolution mechanisms; and 
minimal recognition of rights to organise.56 It is reasonable to assume that not all 
these preconditions would be met in most places, and that imperfect forms of 
collective ownership are being practised throughout China. The issue of collective 
management of forestland will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.
2.3 Rebuttal of Justifications
The preceding paragraphs outline the justifications and ideology of collective land 
ownership in China. They demonstrate obvious and serious concerns related to land 
use and land holding in rural China. These concerns are voiced by academics and 
politicians alike to argue for the need to maintain the status quo. However, there are 
questions as to whether or not this view is correct. Some of the justifications may 
themselves be wrong; or even if the justifications are valid, collective ownership of 
land may be the inefficient or undesirable way to meet these concerns. The following 
discussion presents some of these arguments, and leaves open the question as to
52 Ibid.
53 However, there is disagreement over what type o f regime should be encouraged by the law. While 
some have advocated further strengthening of private rights, some have argued for the opposite. See 
Cheng Yunxing, 2004, Hyde, William et al., 2003, and Schwarzwalder, B. et al., 2001
54 Schwarzwalder, B. et al., 2001, pp 54-56
55 Ibid. This is in contrast with the recent large-scale forestland reform in many parts o f China, which 
aims at devolving more forest use rights to individual households. The reform will be discussed in 
more details below.
56 Ostrom, E. , 1999.
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whether or not it is now wise to move from (de jure) collective ownership to a more 
secure private rights regime.
China has been undergoing rapid changes for the last two decades. Since then, many 
things have changed as the government not only opened up its door to the world, but 
had also been transforming its political and economic rules at home. China became a 
member of the World Trade Organisation in 2001, and is a party to many international 
treaties. Membership of the WTO means that China has to create a favourable 
investment environment for foreign investors, which includes providing economic and
cn
political rules to facilitate the necessary changes. As a result, it is inevitable that 
private rights are allowed to flourish. Nevertheless, as explained above, politically 
China is still a communist country and the government has always said that further 
modernisation should have the ‘Chinese characteristic’58, meaning that it has to be 
adapted to suit Chinese society.59 The approach of the Chinese government so far has 
been cautious. This is described in China as the ‘crossing the river by touching the 
stone’ approach.60 As will be seen in the last section below, the cautious approach of 
the Chinese government has created a vacuum in the enforcement of land ownership 
rights against government officials and also village cadres whose predatory behaviour 
has caused hardship and injustice to the collective members (who although are the de 
jure owners of their land nevertheless lack effective representation to protect their 
rights).
In relation to the egalitarian approach to the allocation of land, it is arguable that it is 
gradually losing its significance mainly due to the fact that a large part of rural
57 In the 1990s, the Chinese government has passed many commerce-related laws that aim at 
facilitating the growth o f domestic businesses, such as the Company Law (1993), Securities Law 
(1998), Law o f Partnership Enterprise (1997), Insurance Law (1995), Law on Commercial Banks 
(1995) and Law o f Negotiable Instruments (1995), Chen, Albert, 2004.
58 Deng Xiaoping gave speeches on ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ during his southern tours 
in the early 1992. This concept provided the opportunity or platform for China to embrace capitalist 
market system after 1978. The fifteenth National Party Congress o f the Community Party o f China 
(CPC) promoted Deng Xaioping’s theory on socialism to become one o f the dominant components o f  
the official ideology o f the CPC in 1997, ibid., pp 82-83.
59 The guiding ideology o f Chinese Constitution can shed some light on what it means by ‘Chinese 
characteristics’. The Four Basic Principles that form the foundation o f the Constitution constitute: the 
insistence on the socialist road, insistence on the people’s democratic dictatorship, insistence on the 
leadership of the CPC, and insistence on Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping 
Theory (or the ‘theory o f the three representations’), ibid., pp 49-50.
60 Zhang Daowei, 2003, p 93.
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households’ income in many places comes from off-farm employment. Since there is 
no control over how much income one can obtain from off-farm employment, there is 
increasingly a disparity between households that have off-farm jobs and those who do 
not.61 Hence, it has to be questioned whether or not it is wise to still cling to the 
egalitarian approach in relation to land allocation, whilst in reality there is no longer 
social equality in rural China. Because egalitarian allocation of land results in 
fragmentation of plots and inefficient use of land resources (mainly due to tenure 
insecurity and infrequent land transfer), it would be unfortunate if the practice is kept 
even if the potential to achieve its aim has been greatly diminished. In addition, it also 
involves the more fundamental question of whether social equality and justice can be 
best achieved by giving egalitarian access to factors of production such as land. The 
issue of social justice has been explored intensively in the West. Contemporary 
political philosophers and politicians generally agree that some form of social justice 
needs to be upheld.63 However, most of these ‘socialist’ states64 endorse the use of 
income redistribution65 (via tax and social welfare systems) rather than rigid control 
of access to scarce and non-moveable factors of production such as land. In a market 
economy, income redistribution seems to be a more effective and less draconian 
method to provide social justice as it allows factors of production to be freely 
exchanged and put in the most efficient use. If China has in fact chosen to embrace 
the capitalist economy, it is inevitable that it will find its restrictive control over rural 
land comes into conflict with the ethos of the free market.
It has been pointed out above that a high rural population (with limited land resource) 
requires a centrally controlled and managed ownership regime. However, it is 
questionable whether such a system helps to reduce the pressure on land; in fact, it is
61 According to statistics, the average annual income of a migrant labour was 5808 yuan in 1998. In a 
survey involving 20 villages in the Jiangxi Province, it was found that the average annual income o f  a 
farmer in relatively high productivity area was 2260 yuan while the average annual income o f a farmer 
from low productivity area was only 584 yuan, Zeng Shaoyang and Tang Xiaoteng, 2004, p 123.
62 One o f the most famous theories o f justice in the Western academia is by John Rawls. His book A 
Theory o f  Justice (1971) revived the discussions on how to allocate and share the world’s resources 
among people of the same and different generations. See Chapter One above.
63 See Chapter One above.
64 The ‘socialist’ states here refer to democratic countries in the Western world, and are different from 
the ‘socialist’ authoritarian country o f China. Most developed ‘socialist’ states can be found in Western 
Europe where income redistribution is carried out in a liberal and democratic setting.
65 Contrast this to the libertarian political theory that does not advocate income or property 
redistribution; instead, libertarians advocate for a minimal ‘night-watchman’ role o f the state,
Kymlicka, W ill, 2002, pp 102-165. See Chapter One above.
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strongly argued that by tying its rural populace to rural land via the allocation of land 
based on residency, the Chinese government has in fact exacerbated the problem of 
land use pressure. Also, by strictly controlling land use the government is addressing 
the ‘symptoms’ (high people to land ratio) rather than the causes (tight rural-to-city 
migration control and inefficient land use) of the problem. Although the ‘one child’ 
policy has helped to prevent the situation from getting worse, there are other 
alternatives that can help to reduce the population pressure in rural China. The 
government should both relax migration control (in particular the ‘hu kou’ system 
discussed above) and create more off-farm employment opportunities (by 
encouraging investment in towns and villages) so that the population pressure on 
agricultural land can be reduced in a way that does not compromise the efficiency of 
land use.
Closely related to the problem of the population-land ratio is the concern of protection 
of agricultural land from further encroachment from industrialisation and 
urbanisation. However, it can be argued that what is needed is better enforcement of 
existing laws rather than creating incentives for government officials and village 
cadres to expropriate land.66 In reality corrupt officials seize productive land wantonly 
for non-agricultural use only to abandon it later. In addition, productive land is also 
abandoned in large scale by farmers or households who do not want to get involved in
ZTQ
agricultural production due to low profitability. On the other hand, the policy of 
self-sufficiency is also disputable. The current strong economic growth experienced
66 As already explained above, the conversion o f agricultural land into non-agricultural land involves 
the state taking the land from the collective at non-market price and then selling it on at market price. 
The difference between the two prices makes it a very lucrative venture.
67 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 57. One such cases took place in Guangdong Province, Maichen Town in 
Xuwen County. In 1997, the township government wrote to the county government to seek approval to 
build a fruits and vegetables market on the agricultural land owned by the collective. According to the 
plan, the new market would create 7000 new jobs and the annual tax payable to central government 
would be 2 million yuan. The county government granted the permission to requisition 42.3 mu of  
land. Subsequently, the township government issued a notice that 90 mu o f land was to be requisitioned 
at a certain date. The project was faced with strong resistance from the residents and violent clashes 
took place between the crowd and township government representatives. Many residents were also put 
in jail. Until now, the land that had been requisitioned had so far been left unattended and no market 
had been built. It has been pointed out that the township government has pocketed around 1 million 
yuan from this whole affair. The township government entered into an agreement with the developer 
with whom they were doing business that the government would get 30 percent o f the profits from the 
resale o f the land by the developer. It was decided that compensation to the residents was 40,000 yuan 
per mu, while the resale price was 880,000 yuan per mu. The extremely huge profits from land 
requisition and resale prompted the township government to act in a predatory and wasteful manner, 
Zhou Qiren, 2004, pp 99-101.
68 Zeng Shaoyang and Tang Xiaoteng, 2004, p 55; Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, pp 73-74.
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by China inevitably raises the value of rural land in many parts of the country, which 
in turn increases the opportunity cost of retaining land solely for agricultural 
purposes. In addition, China has to carry out more intensive cultivation to support its 
increasing population, which may put undue burden on its environment. The 
credibility of the self-sufficiency policy was further undermined by the accession of 
China to the WTO, as trade with other countries is freed up even more quickly.69 As 
one author pointed out, China should now ‘focus on raising rural incomes rather than 
maintaining grain self-sufficiency’ .70 A relaxation in its self-sufficiency policy would 
also loosen up state’s overly tight control over agricultural land.
It has also been pointed out above that rural land is subject to strict control because 
land is more often than not the only social security that rural residents possess (due to 
the lack of a comprehensive welfare system). However, the unique features of land 
make it extremely costly to tie it up not only for one particular use, but also to 
hundreds of thousand of small households when alternatives exist to provide the 
necessary social security to its rural citizens. The high value of land stems from the 
fact that it is scarce, immovable, available for many uses, and long lasting. The 
market value of land in China has increased since three decades ago when the market 
economy was first adopted; this is particularly true about land in the Eastern coastal 
provinces, which are where many of the most developed cities in China are situated.71 
Land scarcity has also greatly increased the value of land: there are now 50 million
79farmers in rural China more now than fifty years ago. Hence, the opportunity cost 
of using land as the main form of social security has also increased.
Furthermore, the use of land as social security for the rural population can be counter­
productive. It could be relied on as an excuse for delaying setting up a proper social 
security system in the countryside and could potentially amount a vicious circle. So 
long as land is perceived as the only social security by millions of households across 
China, land (and land use) transfer and exchange will be severely limited. This will 
prevent the land market from maturing and make land use inefficient. In addition, it
69 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 89.
70 Rozelle, Scott and Huang Jikun, 2005, p 13
71 For example, government income from the sale o f land has increased from 26,000 yuan per mu in 
2000 to 84,000 yuan per mu in 2001, Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 59.
72 Rozelle, Scott and Huang Jikun, 2005, p 13.
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has been pointed out that many rural citizens now do not regard land as their main 
social security, mainly due to the availability off-farm employment opportunities and 
the low profitability (and high risk) of agricultural activities.73
Another important justification given above is that collective ownership complements 
(accidentally or otherwise) the ‘hu kou’ system. Collective ownership of land ties 
rural residents to the land and makes rural-urban migration less desirable for those 
who do not want to lose their entitlements to land. The ‘hu kou’ system has attracted 
criticisms from various fronts in recent years. Some see this as the ‘peasants 
apartheid’74 because citizens with rural household registration do not receive equal 
treatment as their urban counterparts in relation to access to jobs in the cities and the 
welfare system. There have been many instances whereby either the workers did not 
get their salaries75, or the children of these workers were neglected due to the
Ifsdiscriminatory system in the city. The division between the cities and rural parts of 
China has become larger since the economic reform in the late 1970s77, and is partly 
due to the rigid ‘hu kou’ system. In addition, the ‘hu kou’ system also ties a large part 
of China’s population to its rural land, thus inflating the problem of land pressure.
Apart from adding to the problem of land pressure, tying its population to rural land 
also has other negative implications. As land is allocated according to residency, those 
who would want to find work or get education in the cities find themselves in a
73 Xu Zhiyong, 2005.
74 Luard, Tim, 10 November 2005. This article reported that the Chinese government was considering 
abolishing the residency permit system in 11 provinces. However, in another news article, China
‘Facing M igrant’s Underclass’, 1 March 2007, reported that many migrant workers are still denied 
‘rights to adequate health and education services and are vulnerable to exploitative working 
conditions’.
75 In fact, the non- or delayed payment o f salaries has become a common problem among industries 
that hire migrant labour. Some provincial governments have passed laws that aim at tackling this issue. 
In some cities, local governments have adopted policies to set up funds to help workers that have not 
been paid. Guangdong Province Considers Adopting Salary Payment Regulation, 17 December 2003.
76 The two main concerns related to children o f migrant workers living in the cities are education and 
health care. In most places they are still segregated from the children with city registration; as a result, 
schools for mainly migrant workers’ children have sprung up in less desirable areas o f the cities. China 
‘Facing M igrant’s Underclass’, 1 March 2007.
77 The Gini coefficient (which is an internationally recognised measure o f income disparity in which 
“0” reflects perfect equality and “1” represents inequality) in China has risen from .18 in 1978 to .36 in 
1990 and to .52 in 2002. In comparison, the coefficient for Scandinavian countries is .25 and .4 in the 
United States. It is said that even though some South American and sub-Saharan African countries 
have higher Gini coefficient, the effect is felt more keenly in the PRC due to the fact that egalitarianism 
and commitment to the welfare o f the workers and peasants were the founding principles o f the new  
PRC. Teufel Dreye, June, 2006, China’s Political System: Modernisation and Tradition, 5th Edition 
(USA: Pearson Longman) p 161.
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dilemma: on the one hand, there are more opportunities in the cities; but on the other 
hand, they may not want to give up totally the land and their rights to land before they 
have established themselves in the cities. There are serious and long-term 
consequences resulting from this inflexibility or immobility. One of these occurs at a 
personal level: it has deprived rural residents of the right to seek work anywhere 
without the fear of losing something substantial. Furthermore, there have been cases 
whereby in order to keep the entitlement to land in the village, old parents volunteer 
to work in the fields so that their children can look for opportunities in the cities. In 
many families, there are men and women who are in their sixties or seventies who still 
toil the land not for commercial production but to retain the entitlement to the land for 
the family.78 They have to show that they are still ‘using’ the land so that the land is 
not taken back by the collective. On the national level, tying up its rural population in 
the rural area and in agricultural production has huge repercussion on China’s 
economy and its future growth. Apart from causing millions of labour surplus in the 
rural area and adding pressure to the land, it also ties millions of its population to the 
primary sector and makes transition to secondary and tertiary sectors more difficult 
and slower, especially in its least-developed regions.
In relation to the argument that low market exposure in rural China requires some 
form of collective ownership, it may not be entirely true. It is arguable that current 
Chinese rural households have had more exposure to the market system than their 
counterparts in the ex-communist states of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. The 
exposure has come from two fronts: the establishment of township and village 
enterprises, and migrant labour. Even though many township and village enterprises 
did not survive after the initial years, they had in one way or another introduced
79elements of the market system (known as local corporatism) into the rural area. In 
addition, recent mass rural-urban migration has also helped to accelerate the 
introduction of the market system into rural China. Many of the young migrant 
labourers have obtained entrepreneurial skills from the cities and brought them back
8 Oto their villages. One example of farmers’ involvement in the land market is the 
establishment of houses with ‘small’ home ownership or estate right. This refers to the
78 Zeng Shaoyang and Tang Xiaoteng, 2004, p 63
79 Whiting, S., 2001; Li Ping, 2005
80 Zeng Shaoyang and Tang Xiaoteng, 2004, p 93
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situation whereby commercial houses are built on collective agricultural land and are
R 1 0 9then rented out for profit. This is against the law , which prohibits agricultural land 
being converted into non-agricultural use without going through the state mechanism 
(which basically means being requisitioned and subsequently sold on by the 
government). This phenomenon can be found in rural or sub-urban areas near big 
cities both in the eastern and western parts of China such as Beijing, Chongqing and 
Chengdu.
Thus, it seems that China’s rural population is not totally unfamiliar with the market 
system. What are perhaps lacking are the market institutions that would enable and 
facilitate market transactions to be carried out properly. These include not only the 
establishment of institutions that oversee and facilitate market transactions, but also a 
set of regulations that set out the ‘rules of the game’. More importantly, property 
rights must be made unequivocal and protected against arbitrary confiscation by the
OA
government. It is vital that the necessary market institutions are established before a 
land market is pushed forward. In fact, it has been proposed that instead of prohibiting 
the ‘small’ home ownership rights, the government should create a ‘land exchange 
market’ that allows collective rural land to be sold for commercial housing
oc
purposes. In short, there is evidence that shows that China’s rural population has 
already started to embrace the market system; it is now mostly down to the 
government to start building the network and institutions.
It has also been argued that due to the unique characteristics of forestland, collective 
ownership and management may be more suitable and desirable. However, it is 
arguable that the choice of ownership for forestland would depend on several factors
81 Ye Tan, 23 June 2007
82 Despite the illegality o f these houses, they prove to be very popular among low-income urban 
residents and partly solve the housing problems in the cities. However, there have been cases where 
these houses are subsequently pulled down by the government. There have been calls for the 
government to legalise the titles o f these houses because o f their social and economic significance, Qiu 
Feng, 23 June 2007 and Wang Xiaoqiao, 11 October 2007.
83 See Chapter Two above.
84 Donald Clarke has argued that protection o f rights from government interference is one o f the main 
reasons why there is economic progress in China generally. He made a distinction between contract 
rights and property rights. The former is where people have the rights to enter into contracts and to 
have their rights protected. The latter refers to the fact that property is safe from arbitrary confiscation 
from the government. According to him, ‘a reasonable assurance to would-be investors that the fruits o f  
their investments will not be confiscated unpredictably is far more important to economic development 
than a formal legal system that enforces contract rights’, Clarke, Donald, 2003.
85 Wang Xiaoqiao, 11 October 2007
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other than just the characteristics of the land themselves.86 There is no single model of 
management system for any particular type of forestland; the success of a 
management regime greatly depends on the form of governance and its incentive 
mechanisms. An effective reward and sanction system is particularly important as it 
would ensure that the rewards match the costs involved. Costs that are particularly 
relevant are the costs of gathering information, defending boundaries, implementation 
and monitoring. Different management regimes may entail different calculations of 
cost. For example, the cost of defending boundaries may be lower in a collective 
management regime but the cost of regulating the use may be higher than in a private
87management system. However, even this kind of assumption is not absolute as the 
overall cost of management depends on the ‘receptiveness’ of the important players to 
the arrangements within the regime. For example, social capital built around 
traditional beliefs and norms may be absent in a modem rural community where 
residents do not share (or are oblivious to) a single tradition or custom. Costs of 
collective management in the former may, in most cases, be lower than the latter. 
Another example would be the presence of an open and ‘user-friendly’ legal 
framework within which coordination between individuals can be achieved with
oo
relatively little cost. As we shall see, collective management of forestland had not 
been successful during the collective era; there are also serious failings inherent in the 
current collective governance structure in rural China that give rise to inefficient land 
use and opportunity for abuse of power.
Lastly, despite the few examples of a successful collective forest management regime, 
the latest forestland reform shows that things are not all rosy. Due to the significance 
of this reform, it will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It suffices to say 
that the forestland reform involves not only changes in land use rights but also 
involves adjustments in other aspects of forestry such as taxation and land transfer. 
The catalyst for this last reform was mainly the low productivity and lack of 
investment by households in forestry.89 Many collective entities lack the necessary 
resources to carry out forestry activities. Furthermore, it is also due to dissatisfaction
86 Ostrom, E., 1990
87 Ostrom, E., 2000, p 343
88 An example o f the impacts o f the different legal environment on the types o f  resource management 
can be found in the case o f groundwater management in different locations in the State o f California, 
see Ostrom, E., 1990, pp 103-139.
89 See Chapter Four below.
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among rural households in that some village leaders were abusing their position to 
make profit out of collective forestland.90 Many of these problems are caused by the 
inherent difficulties within the collective system itself, such as the lack of a clear 
definition of ‘collective’ and the usurpation of power by local government.91 In 
addition, one of the most-cited examples of successful collective management based
92on the share-holding system has also failed to hold up in many places.
So far, the above has shown that there are indeed concerns that are social, economic 
and political in nature that can be used to justify a collective ownership regime for 
China’s rural land (specifically forestland). At the same time, however, these concerns 
are not conclusive: there are either other ways to meet the concerns or the concerns 
are themselves not justified. Having said that, some of these concerns are serious 
issues that need to be addressed before any legal reform is carried out in relation to 
land tenure. Social reforms are needed if issues like social welfare and population 
pressure are to be addressed. Without first dealing with these issues, which are usually 
the causes of the complications faced by rural China today, mere legal reform of 
property rights will not be sufficient or desirable.
3. Productivity and Property: The Household Responsibility System
Having looked at the justifications (and their rebuttals) of collective land ownership, 
this section will trace the reasons behind the major institutional change that took place 
in rural China in the 1970s: the establishment of the Household Responsibility 
System. Apart from stimulating agricultural production, the introduction of the HRS 
acted partly as the catalyst for the new wave of rural industrial sector when the overall 
political and economic atmosphere became more open. The HRS shows that in the 
case of China, privatisation of land use rights did have a positive impact on land use 
efficiency. Furthermore, rural welfare and income have also increased following the 
economic growth that was induced by the HRS.93 During the early stages of the HRS, 
agricultural production efficiency had been greatly boosted;94 tree planting activities
90 Liu Chang and Dong Wei, 24 August 2006
91 These will be discussed below.
92 This refers to the share-holding system discussed in Section 2.4.2 of Chapter Two above.
93 See Chapter Two above.
94 See Chapter Two above. However, since then crop production has not been consistent mainly due to 
the price control and the procurement system put in place by the government. When prices were
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by households have also increased since the inception of HRS, and currently China 
has the largest area of plantation forests, most of which are in its southern region 
where the collectives own most of the forests.95 However, fragmentation of land and 
lack of capital and technology have been cited as grave concerns for household 
management of forestland in China.96
97The HRS was adopted in the late 1970s when crop production was very low and the 
people experienced extreme poverty. However, the conditions of production such as 
technology and capital had not changed98, nor had there been an unprecedented surge 
in demand.99 What actually took place at that time was that for the first time, the 
farmers were given the opportunity to react freely to the situation. The early 
collectivisation process was imposed on the farmers by the government, and had then 
been kept in place by the government with an iron fist. When the control was relaxed, 
farmers seized the chance and demanded a change. Hence, the catalyst of change in 
the late 1970s from collective management to private use rights was the change in the 
political and social environment in Chinese society.100 As we shall see below, the 
political change was in turn the result of the government’s reaction towards low 
productivity and high enforcement costs. The change in land use arrangement took the 
shape of a more private-oriented right, whereby households were given not only the 
usufruct right, but also ownership right of things planted on the land. Furthermore,
artificially suppressed, farmers did not have the incentives to produce more crops, Niu Ruofeng et al., 
2004, pp 72-75, and Lu Xueyi, 2002, pp 74-82. For timber production however, the question of  
efficiency is overshadowed by the main restrictions imposed by the government, namely the logging 
quota and logging ban.
In 1995, China has the world’s largest plantation forest area, namely 21.4 million ha, Brown, Chris 
2001. Since 1997, the Chinese government has launched more large scale tree-planting projects (the 
NFPP and SLCP) that would have increased its forestland area by millions o f hectare. Between 2000  
and 2005, China posted an overall increase in forest area o f more than 4 million ha per year, Asia- 
Pacific Leading the World in Forest Plantation Developm ent, 13 April 2006.
96 Ferguson, I. and Chandrasekharan, C., 2005, p 73. However, the gravity o f these concerns has not 
been reflected in the case studies, which show households’ ingenuity in setting up informal groups to 
help reduce the cost, and which also show that the main concerns faced by farmers are in fact the 
logging restrictions imposed by the government.
97 Agricultural production fell consistently between the period between 1974 and 1977. Production in 
1977 was even lower than production in 1961 when China was still suffering from the great famine, 
Zhou Qiren, 2004, pp 26-27.
98 The factors that influence the context o f property rights are discussed in Demsetz, Harold, 1967, pp 
347-359, and Libecap, Gary, 1989, pp 16-19.
99 A boost in fur trade (or surge in demand) was cited by Harold Demsetz as the main factor that 
triggered the change in property rights arrangement among the North American tribe, Demsetz, Harold, 
ibid.
100 In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, who served as a de facto leader o f China at that time, launched the socialist 
market economy reform in China that essentially opened up parts o f China and its economy to the 
world.
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over the years, the law has not only recognised the private-based rights, it has also 
actively promoted the creation of such rights and built in safeguards that further 
expand the remit of the rights (see Chapter Two above). This was largely a result of 
what the government perceived as the wish of the people. The HRS was not a top- 
down decision; rather it started off as a ground movement and was gradually accepted 
by the government.101 So, the next question to be probed is why was it that the rural 
residents in China preferred a more private-based approach to a collective- or state- 
based system.
3.1 Mismatch of Reality and Ideology
Since the adoption of the HRS, many analysts and academics have written on this 
subject.102 Many have welcomed the change and justified the HRS as a step towards 
more rational management of rural land, which has benefited not only productivity
i mbut also the people’s standard of living. Generally, during most of the collective 
era, people worked in the collective fields and owned none of the production capital. 
All the crops produced belonged to the collective and the collective in turn followed 
the order of the state. Furthermore, allocation and use of labour were also determined 
by the government. The state dictated what to produce, how much to produce and how 
food should be distributed; the collective were allocated tasks and these tasks must be 
fulfilled.104 In effect, the collective was the ‘administrative arm’ of the central 
government, which also controlled the price and the market of agricultural products. 
In return for their contribution, individuals and households were allocated grains and 
provided with public amenities. In a nutshell, people lacked the ‘exit right’ and the 
right to ‘make voice’. 105
101 As pointed out in Chapter Two above, when the HRS was first implemented in Anhui Province, 
government’s policies were unfavourable to it. Even though the outcome o f the Third Plenum o f the 
Party’s 11th Central Committee encouraged flexibility and local experimentation with different 
regimes, the HRS was never expressly approved by the government. The Central Committee (through 
Central Document No. 75) only officially endorsed it in 1980, and it took twenty years for the 
government to include it in the law, which was the Land Management Law revised in 1998, see 
Chapter Two above.
102 Du Runsheng, 2005; Hyde, William et al. (eds), 2003; Lu Xueyi, 2002; Liu Fengqin, 2005; Liu 
Jinhai, 2005; Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004; Whiting, Susan, 2001; Zhou Qiren, 2004; Ho, Peter (ed), 2005
103 Ibid.
104 For detailed description o f an example o f  the ‘chain o f command’ in agricultural production, see Liu 
Jinhai, 2005, 70-79.
105 These terms are taken from A. Hirschman’s theoretical concept. ‘Exist right’ refers to the right to 
withdraw oneself from a relationship or arrangement; right to ‘make voice’ refers to the right to 
communicate grievances and complaints. It was asserted that during the collective era, farmers did not 
have either the ‘exit right’ or the right to ‘make voice’. Their participation in the collective production
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Allocation of food and income during the collective period was supposed to be based 
on one’s contribution towards the team’s output; but the reality was that output was 
gravely insufficient and as a result the collective had no choice but to carry out 
allocation on the basis of need.106 This created a situation where people who had 
worked for their share were treated equally as people who had not. The latter are 
known as the ‘free-riders’.107 The ‘free-riders’ problem is prominent in a collective 
regime where there are opportunities for people to free-ride on the efforts of others. 
At the heart of the problem is the fact that nobody within the collective can be 
excluded from the collective benefits, and each person is motivated not to contribute 
to the joint effort.108 The presence of ‘free-riding’ means that the collective benefit 
will be either not optimum or even absent. During the collective era in China, the 
problem of free-riding was widespread and this sent out a negative signal to people 
that labour was not properly rewarded.109 As a result, more and more people were 
reluctant to put in effort on the collective land, and due to this the overall productivity 
had gone down.110 In the end, a situation similar to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
occurred whereby group productivity suffered, only that in this scenario, the 
inefficient extraction or use of common resources was caused by ‘under-utilisation’ 
rather than ‘over-utilisation’.111
system did not come from their ‘loyalty’ to the collective, but rather they did not have the choice either 
to withdraw or to engaged in other economic activities, Zhou Qiren, 2004, p 18.
106 Liu Fengqin, 2005, pp 114-122.
107 The problem of ‘free-rider’ and the theory o f prisoner’s dilemma explain the difficulty associated 
with human cooperation. Many social scientists have explored the conditions under which cooperation 
can be achieved and maintained. According to Russell Hardin (1982), the difficulties o f collective 
action depend not just on the size o f the group, but also on the ratio of costs to benefits. Howard 
Margolis argues that individuals have two types o f utility functions, those that favour group-oriented 
preferences and those that favour selfish preferences. Individuals often make trade-offs between the 
two. All can be found in North, Douglas, 1990, pp 13-14.
108 Ostrom, E., 1990, p 6.
109 Liu Fengqin, 2005, pp 141-146; Zhou Qiren, 2004, p 18.
110 As mentioned above, farmers did not have the choice either to withdraw from the collective 
organisation or to engage in other types o f econom ic activities. Hence, their only option (to protest 
against the mismatch o f efforts and rewards) was to invest only the minimum effort and time in 
collective agricultural production, Zhou Qiren, 2004, p 18, and Liu Fengqin, 2005, pp 146-150.
111 Chapter Four below discusses common resource management and the related problems, including 
the problem o f the ‘tragedy o f the com m ons’.
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On the other hand, farmers showed exceptional dedication to the ‘homestead’ plots on 
which they grew crops and vegetables mainly for their own consumption.112 The 
differential treatments highlighted the problems of the collective system. Low overall 
productivity was not caused by the fact that farmers were lazy or incompetent; 
instead, it was due to the mismatch between effort and reward caused by the property 
rights arrangement at that time.113 Farmers not only could not reap the rewards of the 
effort they put in, they also lacked the autonomy to decide what to plant, when to 
plant, how much to plant, when to sell and how much to sell for. In modem 
economies, all these questions are answered by referring to the market, which sends 
out the relevant information to farmers. A free market exists when things can be sold 
and bought freely, or in other words, where property rights can change hands freely. 
During the collective era, individual farmers not only lacked the ability to retain the 
rewards, they also lacked the ability (or authority) to trade the excesses. This coupled 
with the ‘free riders’ problem explains why there was no incentive for farmers to 
invest time and effort on collective land, or to have a long term plan for the 
continuing use of the land.
3.2 The Costs to the Government
The above situation was putting a huge strain on the governance system and the 
government budget. Not only was low productivity a concern, the government also 
had to pour in a lot of resources to monitor and enforce government targets.114 The 
government relied on the collective to enforce government policies; even with the 
greatest zeal, in many cases the collective cadres were not able to force everyone to 
work for the common good due to the reasons explained above. As a result, the cost of 
implementation was prohibitively h igh.115 When this happened, the government 
responded to the situation in ways that would help to reduce the cost.116 One of the
112 In fact, the productivity o f the collective land amounted to only 14 to 20 percent o f the productivity 
of the private plots, Zhou Qiren, 2004, p 52.
113 Ibid., p 12
114 Liu Fengqin, 2005, p 145; Zhou, Qiren, 2004, p 18.
115 Zhou Qiren, 2004, pp 14-16. Implementation costs are greatly influenced by the structure and 
organisation o f the institution. In China, the collective management structure determined the 
enforcement and information costs o f  the implementation o f government policies. The nature of  
collective management and entity will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
116 Known by some as a ‘superfirm’, it is argued that a government also behaves like a private firm, and 
costs and profits are important determinants in a government’s behaviour. This theory, known as the 
firm theory, was first proposed by Ronald Coase in The Problem o f  Social Cost, see Chapter One 
above. According to Coase, a firm is an alternative form o f economic organisation which could curtail
148
means available to the Chinese government was to relax its grip on collective 
production. In fact, as pointed out by Zhou Qiren, the relaxation of collective control 
coincided with the times when costs incurred by the government were high.117 This 
happened twice between 1952 and 1982. The first was in 1961 after agricultural 
production had dropped drastically in 1959 and had prevailed, causing serious famine 
in China.118 It prompted the government to allow some form of private/household 
management at that time. Like the HRS, production responsibility was assigned to 
individuals and the team cadres’ only responsibility was to ensure that quotas were 
met. However, unlike the HRS, the relaxed control was only temporary, and when 
production started to climb again in 1964 and 1965, the government terminated the 
responsibility system.119 The second time collective control was relaxed was in 1978 
when the HRS was re-introduced.
The reactions of the government can be explained by understanding how an institution 
responds to social and economic changes. According to Douglas North, economic 
performance of an institution (a country can be regarded as one of such institutions) is 
greatly influenced by both its political and economic rules, including the rules on 
property rights. Political rules usually influence the economic rules (through 
allocation of rights between the different actors) although the role can be reversed. 
When political transaction costs are low (such as when there is widespread support for 
government policy and enforcement is relatively smooth) and the political actors are 
properly guided (such as when there is adequate access to important information 
relating to what people need and how to achieve efficient results), efficient property 
rights will exist, which in turn will result in economic growth. On the other hand, 
‘high transaction costs of political markets and subjective perceptions of the actors 
would result in property rights that do not induce economic growth’.120 This can be 
caused by the presence of opposing interests and the problem of information 
asymmetry. The presence of strong opposing interests increases enforcement cost (as
transaction costs and subsequently increase the value o f production by altering and combining rights 
through the market. A government will also try to look for ways to keep transaction costs to the 
minimum, and one way to do this is to alter property rights.
117 Zhou Qiren, 2004, pp 14-16
118 According to the statistics, around 30 million died from starvation during the great famine, Zhou 
Qiren, 2004, p 16.
119 Ibid., p 17.
120 North, D., 1990, p 52
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the ruler has to either ‘buy off the dissidents or push through the reform in the face of 
strong opposition); while information asymmetry causes the wrong or non-optimum 
decisions to be made.
Both of these problems plagued the government during the collective era where 
inefficient political rules limited economic growth. In relation to the former, the 
government faced ‘silent opposition’ from the people. Although the authoritarian 
institution set up by the government had control over all factors of production (and 
their uses), farmers nevertheless still had possession of something that could not be 
subject to total control by a third party, namely their labour. Hence, farmers were able 
to show their ‘discontentment’ via reducing either the quality or the amount of their
p i
labour contribution. As a result, an institution that had to be enforced at a high cost 
was created. Secondly, the failure of the centrally planned economy (which covered 
not only the whole production and distribution processes, but also the use of factors of 
production) was a clear manifestation of the problem of information asymmetry. It 
highlighted the impossibility for the government’s planning, no matter how 
meticulous it was, to gather and produce all information related to production, 
consumption and also the preferences of its people. Even in a free market society, the 
problem of information asymmetry still exists mainly due to incomplete information 
and the subjective perception of the environment by different actors.122 This problem 
was magnified in a system that did not allow feedback and free-flow of information. 
The ‘suppression’ of China’s economic (and social) growth by its political rules only 
started to ebb in 1978 when the HRS was introduced. In the decades that followed,
19^economic performance and social development in turn influenced the political rules 
and completely changed the political landscape.
121 Zhou Qiren, 2004, p 18.
122 According to North, there are two particular aspects o f human behaviour that are o f great 
importance in an institutional analysis: motivation and deciphering o f the environment. He points out 
that in many cases, individuals are not only motivated by wealth-maximising behaviour but also 
altruism and self-imposed constraints. Similarly, individuals decipher the environment by processing 
information through the pre-existing mental conditions and make decisions accordingly. North 
concludes that the process o f decision-making is both subjective and incomplete; since knowledge and 
the computational power o f the decision-maker are severely limited, one must distinguish between the 
real world and the actor’s perception and reasoning o f it. In short, North thinks that the regularised 
interactions known as institutions may be inadequate to deal with the economic problems at hand. 
North, D., 1990, pp 22-23.
123 Since the past two decades, the society o f China has transformed from a conservative agricultural 
society into a more vibrant and diverse industrialised and modern society. Alongside the economic 
growth, people, especially the young generation, have come appreciate more the importance o f some
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The HRS was the turning point in China’s rural development history. It had 
encouraged farmers to be actively engaged in production as the income they received 
was more or less commensurate to the investment they put in. The abolition of the 
procurement system, price control124 and agricultural taxes125 had all helped to 
increase incentive for the farmers to produce. The same also happened to forestland, 
although at a much slower pace. The timber procurement system was officially
• 19Aabolished in 1985 , although in 1987, the central government introduced a quota
system for both commercial and non-commercial timber harvest. In addition to the 
relaxation of agricultural production, the new arrangement also solved the problem of 
‘free-riders’ as households now had to rely on their own labour input to survive. As 
pointed out in the previous chapter, the HRS brought about great increases in 
productivity and also the expansion of plantation forests. The HRS has always been 
hailed as a success story not only because it managed to inject the necessary 
incentives into agricultural production, it has presumably also saved China from 
potential political and social turmoil as it did not cause sudden and abrupt change to 
the land ownership structure.127
However, there is a danger that the success of the HRS is coming to an end as 
households now find off-employment more profitable than farming, and new 
incentives have not been put in place to attract young people to stay in farming. The
basic rights such as right to participate and right to private ownership. The numerous amendments 
made to its Constitution, Civil and Criminal Codes in the past two decades demonstrate the fast- 
changing society in China, Chen, Albert, 2004.
124 Crops production has a long history o f state control, as production o f food is seen as a national 
security issue by the socialist state. Several attempts were taken to liberalise the crop market by the 
central government from the 1980s to 1990s but each attempt had been met by setbacks: each time 
when there was a shortage o f  grain, the government would intervene and control the market and price. 
However, in 2004, the government adopted a D ecision to replace the central administration system  
with a more efficient entrepreneur-like organisation structure, and more importantly, the grain market 
is to be further opened up to allow it to becom e a functioning competitive market. Niu Ruofeng et al., 
2004, pp 79-86
125 Since 1 January 2006, agricultural tax was abolished and millions o f farmers are benefiting from the 
tax slash. Forestry taxation reform is also being carried out in a few provinces such as Jiangxi, Fujian, 
Hebei and Guangdong. See Chapter One above.
126 However, due to the concern o f over-logging, the procurement system was re-established in major 
timber-producing counties in 1987. All price controls were finally lifted in 1993.
127 According to Peter Ho, the HRS has proved that moderate reformers are right on two counts: 1. 
privatisation o f use rights rather than land ownership rights has proven economically viable; and 2. the 
decision o f Chinese government to maintain the Marxist-Leninist principle o f state and collective 
ownership has also avoided large-scale land-related grievances over pre-revolutionary ownership that 
ruptured many transitional econom ies, Ho, Peter (ed), 2005, p 12.
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current government control over land use is too rigid and as we shall see below, there 
are signs that the problems of ‘opposing interests’ and information asymmetry are 
once again present. The relaxation of control over agricultural production (in terms of 
how and when to use labour) took place in a more open atmosphere, which also 
prompted the growth of the local industrial sector. Industrial boom and urbanisation 
increased the demand for labour and attracted hundreds of thousands of migrant
198workers. The movement of labour and shift in the labour pattern (from agricultural 
to non-agricultural) in turn had changed the rural land use pattern. For example, non­
permanent land use transfer was essential for those who wanted to join the exodus but 
did not want to just leave the land unattended. Also, access to off-farm employment 
opportunities lessened households’ reliance on land, and hence reduced the conflict 
between the need for tenure security (by introducing a longer use period) and the need 
to readjust land holdings.129
Furthermore, when more and more households abandon farmland to pursue off-farm 
employment in the cities, land holding per capita increases in these places and allows 
large-scale farming. In fact, this is already happening in some eastern coastal cities130 
although in many places, large-scale farming did not take off and land is just left 
unattended.131 When land supply exceeds demand, agricultural production would be 
negatively affected.132 The government would have to introduce some measures that 
should not only increase the profitability of agriculture, but also the value of land. 
These measures may be similar to those already adopted by most developed countries
128 Labour migration was not significant until the 1990s when mass rural-urban migration took place. 
At the early stages o f industrial growth, most labour found work in nearby towns and cities, and 
migration was less common. However, soon after labour movement became more diverse. Now many 
rural residents travel to different provinces to find work, and they stay away from home for a much 
longer time (some even end up staying in the cities permanently). Zeng Shaoyang and Tang Xiaoteng, 
2004, pp 32-43
129 See Chapter Two above.
130 For example, in Suzhou City in Jiangsu Province where industrialisation is widespread, many 
farmers have given up agricultural activities. In one village, the collective is carrying out large-scale 
farming on land that have been returned by the farmers, Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, p 92
131 It has been pointed out that large-scale farming would not necessarily be adopted even if more and 
more people left their land. Survey in Jiangxi showed that due to labour migration, a lot o f land had 
been abandoned and large-scale farming did not take off. This was mainly due to the lack of 
profitability in the agricultural sector. Households that stayed behind did not wish to take on more land 
(so that large-scale farming could be carried out) as they did not see farming as a good source of 
income, Zeng Shaoyang and Tang Xiaoteng, 2004, pp 127-128.
132 Some evidence from Jiangxi Province shows that when labour devoted to agriculture decreased, 
grain production dropped. For example, ‘twin-season’ field, which was popular after the introduction 
of HRS, had gone back to ‘single-season’ field due to inadequate labour input, ibid.
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such as agricultural tax cuts or exemption133 and subsidies134, or even land ownership 
reform. Whether or not this will actually happen in the future depends on several 
factors, such as economic growth, population growth and labour mobility. As 
highlighted above, apart from its impact on the land, the huge ‘drainage’ of rural 
labour has had a negative impact on rural society as more and more young people 
leave the countryside.
In conclusion, this section highlights an important fact: the reactions of the economic 
actors forced the Chinese government to change its political rules at the beginning of 
the reform era. There is a possibility that it will continue to do so, although this time it 
is the shift from agricultural to non-agricultural labour that will have an impact on 
land use policy. It seems that in China for the last three decades, political rules have 
had to always catch up with the economic rules. Perhaps it is compensating for the 
extensive political interference during the Maoist era.
4. Collective Land Ownership: A Thing of the Past?
Following the discussions of the relevance of collective ownership and the changes 
introduced by the HRS, this section will look at the role and nature of the collective 
entity itself. More interesting is the change in the role of the collective since the 
reform era, especially after the concept of ‘village self-governance’ was introduced in 
the early 1980s. The reform of the village governance system was significant for 
various reasons, not least because it introduced ‘election’ at the village level and 
changed the dynamics of the relationship between the central government, local 
government, the collective and lastly the collective members.
133 As seen in Chapter One above, the government already abolished some agricultural tax. However, 
this has not helped to improve the situation due to two main reasons: low profitability in agriculture 
and the government’s fiscal arrangement that requires local government to be self-reliant.
134 For the different types o f subsidies the government can provide, see Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, pp 
90-93.
135 The collective entity discussed in this section refers to the mainstream non-indigenous communities, 
which are the majority o f the collective regime in China. It does not include traditional communities 
that mostly consist o f minority tribes, which can be found in several provinces such as Yunnan,
Sichuan and Guizhou. The special status o f these indigenous communities is acknowledged and they 
are usually given more autonomy to govern the community affairs. For example, Article 9 o f the Forest 
Law gives indigenous communities ‘more autonomous rights for forestry development, timber 
distribution and use o f forestry funds in ethnic autonomy regions’.
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The current power and representation of the collective are manifested at the village 
level, both administrative and natural villages. After de-collectivisation, the 
government had to readjust its fiscal and the collective administrative systems to 
accommodate the changes that were taking place. For example, in 1980, the fiscal 
reform made each sub-national level of government responsible for its own revenue 
and expenditure.136 And in 1983, administrative power was transferred from the 
commune and brigade administration to township and village administration
137respectively. More importantly, accompanying the administrative reform was the 
severance of the party and the government from the economic activities, especially at
1 38the township level. This was an important development as it was aimed to lessen 
political interference in the economy and increase economic efficiency. However, as 
we shall see below, there has never really been a real separation of these three (party, 
government and economic) functions at the township and collective levels.139
4.1 Relationship between the Village Governance, Local and Central 
Government
This subsection looks at the relationship between the collective governance and the 
state. It will show that despite supposedly being an independent entity, the collective 
is heavily influenced by the government. This is due to the inherent inadequacies and 
inconsistencies that are found within the institution of the collective. Even though the 
collective is the owner of a large part of rural land in China, there are plenty of 
ambiguities in relation to what collective ownership really means. Firstly, the concept 
of ‘collective’ is not defined. There are three different entities at the lowest level of 
governance: township government, administrative village, and natural village or 
village groups (which corresponds to the commune, production brigade and 
production team respectively during the pre-de-collectivisation era).140 More often
136 Before 1980, China’s fiscal system functioned under a ‘unified income and expenditure’ system  
where each level o f government turned over virtually all taxes to the central government. The central 
government then allocated the money from the central budget to local governments, Whiting, S., 2001, 
pp 75-76.
37 Township government replaced the people’s communes, while administrative and natural villages 
replaced production brigades and production teams respectively.
13* Whiting, S., 2001, p 76.
139 Even at the beginning o f the administrative reform, the separation o f functions did not really take 
off, ibid., pp 76-77.
140 Out o f these three administrative bodies, only the township government is officially part o f the state 
governance system; the other two are independent self-governing bodies.
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than not legislation fails to identify which level of collective is referred to.141 Also, the 
level at which land rights decisions are to be made is not clarified.142 To make matters 
worse, different legislations have given the ownership right to different levels of 
collectives. For example, both the Constitution and Land Management Law 1998 
stipulate that all rural land, apart from state-owned land, belongs to the farmers 
collective', however, under the Organic Law of the Villagers Committee 1998, non­
state owned land is said to belong to the village collective.143 Furthermore, in many 
places, even though the village level is the official owner entity, actual decisions 
regarding the use and management of land are made by smaller village groups.144 
Thus, there is a mismatch between de facto and de jure owners, which may cause 
complications and confusion.
It has been suggested that the ‘undefined collective’ is an ‘intentional institutional 
ambiguity’.145 In fact, according to a scholar, the lack of identity and power of 
collective is the manifestation of the overriding interest of the state.146 It is the result 
of a deliberate act (or ‘conspiracy’) by the government ‘to avoid an escalation of land 
disputes between the various levels of the rural collective’. 147 Even though the 
ownership of land and other means of production were vested in the production team 
(or the rudimentary cooperative) after the last reshuffle within the collective system 
before 1980, land exchanges had taken place between the different levels of collective 
governance.148 As a result, in many places the ownership entities are not clear-cut and 
the administrative village tends to usurp the ownership rights of the natural village.149 
Furthermore, many natural villages or village groups lack the legal status to be 
legitimate owners of land.150 Hence, the collective body that owns land differs from 
place to place, and in some cases ownership is never clear and is subject to claims by
141 Rural China in the 21st Century: The Land Resources, 2000; and Yang, Cairan, 18 June 2003.
142 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, p 56; and Rozelle, Scott and Li Guo, 1998.
143 Niu Ruofeng et al., ibid.
144 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003
145 Ho, Peter, 2005, p 42
146
149 Ibid., pp 44-68. It has been argued that the Chinese government has tried to unify rural land
ownership by delegating to the administrative village the authority to manage the farmland; this is
manifested in the fact that according to the law, administrative (not natural) village is entitled to sign 
land contracts with peasant households, Cai Yongshun, 2003, p 665.
150 In some places village groups lost or have their official stamps taken away, which have prevented 
them from acting as independent authorities, Chen Xiaojun et al., 2005
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different levels of village governance. Nationwide investigations of 271 villages in the 
late 1990s show the percentage of land owned by different rural collectives: 40 
percent by administrative village; 45 percent by village small groups; and 15 percent 
by both village and village small groups.151 The problem of ‘definition vagueness’ has 
two major implications: it is highly probable that any future delimitation of boundary 
and registration of ownership rights will cause large-scale social unrest in the rural 
area; and by keeping the definition vague, the government can easily requisition land 
for ‘public benefit’ purposes.
The second issue relates to the governance structure of the collective. A major 
development in relation to collective administration since the de-collectivisation was 
the introduction of the status of ‘self-governance’ at the village level.152 Like the
1 STHRS, village ‘self-governance’ was ‘experimented’ with by local governments in 
several provinces in 1980 at a time when there was no official approval by the 
government.154 The legality of these locally elected village committees that managed 
rural affairs was only confirmed in 1982 when a provision was inserted into the 
Constitution155, which was then followed by a nationwide experimentation. The first 
provisional legislation156 on the regulation and establishment of villager committees 
was adopted in 1987 and in 1990, the government launched the model nationwide. It 
was not until 1998 that the first official legislation was adopted.157 Under the new law, 
rural affairs are to be decided and carried out in the village meetings, which are to be
1 CO
presided over by the village committees, whose members are to be elected locally.
151 Cai Yongshun, 2003, p 665.
152 Here it refers to the administrative villages, which are assisted by natural villages or village groups.
153 It has been pointed out that village elections were promulgated for several reasons: as a means of 
rectifying the deteriorating village-cadre relations; to prevent civil unrest in countryside by making 
cadres more accountable; and ideologically speaking elections appealed to the origin o f Chinese 
socialism where the government governed according to the will o f the people. Peerenboom, R., 2002, 
pp 203-204
4 The first self-governing village committees were set up in Yishan County and Luocheng County in 
Guangxi Province. These village committees were initially set up to provide community services such 
as community safety and protection o f irrigation facilities. Self-governing village committees 
subsequently appeared in other provinces such as Sichuan, Henan and Shandong, Pan Jiawei and Zhou 
Xianri, 2004, p 33.
155 Ibid., pp 33-34.
156 Organic Law o f Villagers Committee (Experimentation)
157 Organic Law of Villagers Committee, Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, pp 33-35
158 Even though theoretically villagers elect their leaders in democratic and open elections, things do 
not always take place according to law. Apart from the fact that candidates sometimes use power or 
support o f the township government to win, there are also instances where the posts are dictated or 
even filled by local party leaders, ibid., pp 146-149.
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The village committees can also be supported by the village groups that represent 
collective members at the natural village level. In addition, approximately 40 percent 
of villages in China now have village-level regulations that facilitate
village governance.159 These regulations are adopted and enforced by the village 
committees/leaders, and they regulate village affairs and are binding on members of 
the collective. These regulations are adopted locally and have no direct relation with 
state legislation.160
The government administration structure officially ends at the township level, which 
is one level higher than the administrative village. The village administration hence 
works as a ‘bridge’ between the government and the people. Township government’s 
role is to ‘guide, support and help’ village committees and leaders, while the village 
committee’s role is to assist the township government. 161 It is the township 
government’s role to, inter alia, guide villagers in carrying out democratic elections; 
to help the village committee train its members; to help set up a monitoring and 
reporting system; to guide the village committee in implementing government’s 
policies; to help and guide the village committee in providing social services; and to 
guide the village committee in formulating village regulations.162 In return, the village 
committee is expected to help the township government to (inter alia): implement 
government’s policies such as economic, social, legal and health policies; to meet 
various government’s targets; and to assist in keeping township government abreast of 
rural affairs.163
The current arrangements of township and village governance as explained above 
have two fatal shortcomings. Firstly, the township government, being part of the 
government structure, is given the responsibility to implement and oversee 
government policies at the village level and rural affairs. However, this is difficult if 
not impossible if it only has an ‘advisory’ role in relation to the village committee. 
This essentially creates a vacuum between the government (with township
159 Ibid., 2004, p 67
160 Ibid.
161 Article 4 o f Organic Law o f Villagers Committee
162 Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, pp 87-88
163 Ibid.
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government as its representative) and the collective members (the rural population).164 
In other words, it creates a gap that, in theory, is incapable of being closed; or if it is 
to be closed, depends entirely on the self-motivation of the collective, which makes it 
to fall outside of the realm of the ‘government’. Hence, in reality, this administrative 
vacuum is either filled up by the township government going beyond their advisory 
role, or is left as it is.165 The consequences of the latter can be detrimental when the 
misuse of power by the village committee and village leader cannot be reined in.166
Secondly, the notion of ‘self-governance’ itself is questionable. In rural China, it 
seems that ‘self-governance’ simply means using collective resources and governance 
structure to carry out tasks that are handed down by the government. Although village 
committees and leaders are officially not civil servants, they nonetheless shoulder the 
responsibility to implement and enforce government policies and administrative 
targets. Many of these village leaders run the day-to-day affairs of the villages, 
including collecting taxes and charges, imposing government targets in relation to 
agricultural products, and carrying out other administrative policies such as the one-
i f achild policy. Furthermore, although all villages are expected to set up village 
committees that consist of representatives of the village members, most decisions are
164 Ibid., pp 88-91.
165 According to one analysis, there are two types o f village governance models, which are further 
divided into four different classes. The first type is known as the ‘standard’ model where the 
governance system fulfils government’s criteria o f an ‘exemplary’ village. This type is divided into 
those that have a healthy and complete governance structure, and those that have achieved considerable 
economic growth although the governing structure itself maybe less than desirable. The second type is 
known as the ‘substandard’ model where the governance system is less than desirable. This type is 
further divided into those called ‘administrativised’ villages where the village committee is subject to 
total control o f the township government, and those called ‘out-of-control’ villages where the village 
committee has the free rein and there is no supervision from the government. According to a survey, 
around 60 percent o f all villages in China are ‘administrativised’ villages, ibid., pp 102-103.
166 The inability o f township government to interfere actively in village governance can have negative 
impacts on the welfare o f rural communities sometimes. For example, there was a case where a village 
committee annulled a village election just because the former village leader was not re-elected. The 
election results were then declared valid by the township government after the collective members 
sought help from it. However, the village committee brought the township government to court on the 
reason that it had ‘violated and over-stepped’ its responsibility, ibid., pp 104-105.
167 The contents o f some village-level regulations reflect the complexity o f the village governance. For 
example, many regulations include matters such as the fulfilment o f government policies in relation to 
population control and healthcare, development o f local economy and also the regulation o f social 
relations, ibid., pp 67-71. In some places, monetary fines are imposed on anyone who has breached the 
provisions. Some scholars have questioned the legitimacy o f the ‘localised’ laws, especially those that 
impose positive duties and monetary fines. This is because village regulations are not subject to review  
by the courts or other administrative bodies. There is no obvious way for rural residents to dispute the 
legality of those regulations that are deemed unfair or excessive. Ibid., pp 110-111.
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still made by the village leaders or party leaders.168 The subordinate nature of the 
collective governing body throws up doubts about its ability to act independently for 
the best interest of the local community, especially in relation to economic and social 
development.
Another restriction faced by the collective is the financial constraint. Although the 
collective have to carry out ‘governmental tasks’169, they are nevertheless mostly 
financially self-reliant. Many of the public services and amenities that the collective
170entity needs to provide for its members are provided by the government in the city. 
For example, the collective is expected to pay for school construction costs, the 
salaries of teachers, road construction and so forth. This puts a heavy burden on the 
finances of the collective, as a result rural taxes (agricultural and non-agricultural) can 
be prohibitively high. As pointed out in Chapter One, although the Chinese 
government abolished agricultural taxes in 2006, many illegal charges and fees have 
again sprung up. The need for self-finance explains why this has happened. 
Furthermore, the fact that a great proportion of village income is given to the central 
government is seen as a huge compromise of village authority and has led many
171farmers to believe that the state is the actual owner of the land. In fact, according to 
a case study, 60 percent of the interviewees named the state as the legal owner of the 
land, while only 27 percent said the collective was the legal owner.172 Some 
interviewees did not think there was any difference between state and collective 
ownership.173 This is a significant finding as it points out how serious the mismatch 
between the de jure and de facto owner is.
Hence, it seems that ‘self-governance’ is limited only to choosing the right person to 
implement government policies; the collective members themselves provide no inputs 
into the policy-making process. The ‘chain of command’ is still top-down and there is
168 In addition, many village committees meet irregularly like once a year, which makes it impractical 
for all decisions to be made on the basis o f the majority wishes o f the villagers, Zhang Xiaoshan, 13 
October 2005
169 This refers to the fact that most o f the tasks required of the village collective are usually the 
responsibilities o f the government such as economic development, provision o f public amenities and 
social services, Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, pp 97-101.
170 Ibid. p 113.
171 Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, p 9
172 7 percent thought that village group was the legal owner and 5 percent thought that the individual 
land user was the legal owner o f the land. Ibid., p 5
173 Ibid., p 9
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no official feedback channel available to the members of the collective, represented 
by their elected leaders, to influence government policies. Due to the extensive 
control and power over the collective land by the state, some critics have said that 
collective land is in fact subject to dual-ownership, which are the collective and the 
state ownership.174 In many cases, the power of the state is so overwhelming that it is 
clear that collective’s ownership is subordinate to the interest of the state. Describing 
the nature of the collective, Zhou Qiren wrote, ‘the collective system is not a ‘co- 
ownership or co-operative type of private property’, it is also not purely state 
ownership; instead, it is a type of rural socialist property rights system that is 
controlled by the state but the consequence of which is shouldered by the 
collective.’175 He also pointed out that in the vast and fluid institution of collective 
governance, all activities are carried out by the ‘Agents’, and the ‘Principals’ cannot
1 *7 f \be identified. In short, the collective has arguably become more independent 
following the policy shift since the late 1970s in relation to ownership of assets and 
running enterprises, but they are still far from being ‘self-governing’.
4.2 Relationship between the Village Governance and Collective Members
Following the brief explanation of the nature of the ‘self-governing’ collective and its 
relationship with both the central and local governments, the relationship between the 
collective representatives and collective members will be looked at. In relation to 
village governance of rural land use, the collective could be seen as both too powerful 
on the one hand and too weak on the other. Before we proceed, it has to be pointed 
out that the collective in rural China plays not one, but three important roles: grass­
roots administrative unit; collective economic unit; and democratic organisation of the 
masses.177 As pointed out above, the collective is given extensive power to govern 
rural affairs, ranging from economic development and control of production to the 
provision of public services. And since village elections were introduced and the 
village administrative level was made self-governing, the collective has also become 
the only democratic organisation of the masses in China. Whether or not these roles
1/4 Wang Pingjie, 2004
175 Zhou Qiren, 2004, p 7. He also pointed out that in an organisation where individual ownership of 
the resources is prohibited, it is not possible for the individuals to choose the economic organisation or 
to shoulder the corresponding financial responsibility.
176 In Liu Fengqin, 2005, pp 205-206
177 Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, p 96.
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make the collective a coherent entity, and whether or not the collective in its present 
form best represents the rural population will be discussed below.
The power of the collective can sometimes be overwhelming when it comes to rural 
land use control. For example, the collective not only retains the land ownership right, 
the collective administrative body also oversees how the land is used, and sometimes 
this even includes what crops to plant on the land. This over-supervision is possible 
mainly due to the fact that until recently, the law had not given enough protection to 
land users to resist interference from the governing body.178 This is also caused by the 
fact that the collective body, acting on behalf of its members, is the owner of the land 
and subsequently wields enormous power over the economy of the village. As pointed 
out above, collective ownership of rural land in China means that the land is owned 
by the collective as one unified entity; ownership is not broken down into separate 
units held collectively by individual households.179 Hence, the village committee and 
village leaders, who are acting on behalf of the collective, make most of the land-use 
decisions. In many places, village cadres act as the de facto owner of the collective
land. This concentration of power in the hands of a small of group of people has given
1 80rise to corruption and abuse of power. An example of abuse of power by the village 
cadres took place in Datong Village in Guangning County, Guangdong Province in
I O 1
2006. In that case, the village cadres decided to sell 300 mu of the village’s 
protection forest to an outside investor who was going to establish a fast-growth 
plantation forest. They subsequently set a fire to destroy the plantation forest in 
preparation for the sale. Not only was this carried out without prior consultation with
the collective members182 (who are the de jure owners of the land), the protection
1 8^forest was destroyed without approval from the provincial forest bureau.
178 See Chapter Two above.
179 Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, p 205
180 For examples o f abuse o f power by village committee members, see Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 
2004, pp 208-210, and Cai Yongshun, 2003, pp 666-670.
181 Fu Miao, 6 August 2007
182 Article 19 o f the Organic Law o f Villagers Committee 1998 provides that consultation with 
collective members is required before the village committee make certain decisions, such as the method 
of collection o f charges and fees and their use; the use of profits from collective economic activities; 
and the planning o f collective economic activities. The village cadres in this case might have breached 
the last requirement. .
183 Article 23 o f Forest Law prohibits commercial destruction o f protection forest; Article 24 provides 
that protection forest cannot be logged without the approval o f provincial forest bureau.
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Being both the governing body and the landowner at the same time also gives the 
village cadres enormous power to influence and control local affairs. Apart from that, 
there is also the inherent conflict of interest in relation to the use of the collective 
property. Like public property, collective property, controlled by the collective 
governing body, is used for public purposes.184 On the other hand, the same collective 
property is also subject to private use, which aims to increase private utility and 
efficiency. In China, the collective interests dominate the use of collective land. The 
practice of constant land reallocation to reflect demographic changes highlights the 
public utility of the land. Interferences of right may not always be prompted by 
corruption or abuse of power by local leaders. Very often implementation of 
administrative orders and policies involve interfering with the farmers’ land use 
rights. This is not only because land is one of the main resources at the disposal of 
the governing body to control rural affairs, but also because as most land held by 
farmers now was allocated to them free of charge, it inevitably adds some ‘false 
legitimacy’ to the control of the governing body.
However, the overwhelming emphasis given to the public utility of collective land has 
enabled village cadres to disguise and justify actions that are actually detrimental to
the collective interests. Sometimes land use rights are sold off in the name of public
1interest although they actually benefit the village leaders and their cronies. One 
instance of misuse of power by village committees and village leaders took place in 
Datang Village in the Guangdong Province in 2001.187 In that case, during land 
reallocation, the village committee and village leader either kept some land for 
themselves unlawfully or sold the land for profit. When this was found out, violent 
clashes between the villagers and village cadres ensued. The situation was only 
rectified when the county government intervened on the villagers’ behalf. It is very 
difficult for the members of the community to dispute or for the court to adjudicate
184 Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, p 208. A  good example is the use o f land as a means of 
providing social security. As pointed out above, this creates the need to reallocate land (in the absence 
of a land market) when demographic changes take place.
185 This is particularly common in relation to the enforcement of the one child policy in rural China.
For example, Article 5 o f Beijing City’s Regulation on Punishment and Restrictions Upon 
Infringement o f Family Planning Law ( « i t rfr 331 Jx ( if  #J ^ $ \ ) PS r £ i j^ tb »  ) 
provides that families that have infringed the Family Planning Law are not entitled to extra family and 
responsibility plots, and are not entitled to extra allocation o f construction land.))
186 Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, pp 209-210
187 Ibid., pp 133-134.
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cases of alleged abuse of power as the line between public and personal interests has 
blurred. As a result, it is an inevitable outcome that the overall private utility derived 
from the property is lower.
On the other hand, in many cases the collective administrative body is deemed to be 
too ‘weak’ to represent the interests of collective members. This is particularly true in 
relation to land requisition by the state. As already mentioned above, the state has the 
exclusive right to requisition agricultural land and then sell it for non-agricultural 
uses. It has been argued that rural households can use ex ante and ex post measures to 
protect themselves from land requisition.188 Ex ante measures include objecting to and 
thwarting land requisition efforts. However, as the collective landowner is placed at 
the bottom of the state’s administration hierarchy, its power is too weak vis-a-vis the 
state and local officials. As already highlighted, even though local leaders are elected 
by the members of the collective, their main role is nevertheless to act as an agent of 
the government to oversee village administration. As a result, rural households can 
only resort to ex post measures such as staging protests and appealing to a higher
i  o n
level of government. This shows that the notion of ‘collective ownership’ is neither 
independent nor comprehensive, and in some cases it is even meaningless given the 
fact that the state exercises so much control over collective affairs and administration.
One exception to the state monopoly over land is the new legislation that was adopted 
in the Guangdong Province.190 It allows collective land to enter the land market191, 
where it can then be rented out or transferred to a third party for commercial or non- 
agricultural purposes.192 The regulation requires collective land to be treated on the 
equal footing as state-owned land, and that at least 50 percent of the profits from land 
conversion must be spent on the welfare and security provisions for the affected
188 Cai Yongshun. 2003, pp 663-664
189 In 1998, the Central State Council Letters and Visit Office received 460,000 letters and appeals, two 
thirds o f which consisted o f peasants’ complaints. Unauthorised fee collection, usurpation o f farmland 
and corruption are the most common complaints, ibid., p 672.
190 Guangdong Province Decision on Management and Transfer o f Rural Land Development Right ( «
)• This legislation came into force on 1 October 2005. 
http://www. gze.cn/show3-20324-1136121046473 .html
191 According to the regulation, transfer o f collective land can only take place with the approval o f 
more than two thirds o f the villagers; however, development o f commercial housing is prohibited. 
Guangdong Province: Collective Land can Enter the Land Market but Development o f Commercial 
Housing is Prohibited. 2 October 2005
192 Transfer or rental o f land use rights must be approved by either two third o f the village committee or 
two third o f the village representatives, Article 7.
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households. This new piece of legislation injects some market and democratic 
elements into the management of collective land in the Guangdong Province. As with 
the earlier legislations, this regulation merely reflected the existing (albeit unlawful) 
practices of many villages that transferred land use rights to commercial developers 
without going through the State.193 The possibility of this policy being implemented 
nationwide is questionable due to the unique characteristics of the Guangdong 
Province, which has one of the most developed market systems in China and where 
pressure on land from commercial use is enormous.
Apart from being the ‘agent’ of the state, another reason why the collective does not 
and could not truly represent the interest of the farmers or forest users concerns the 
mandate of the collective: it is not an ‘exclusive’ or ‘specialised’ body that only 
handles matters related to farming or forestry. The collective is not the usual farmers’ 
‘co-operative’ as commonly found that are specially set up to protect the interests of 
its members; nor is it a ‘forest community’ that sets out to protect mainly the interests 
of forest users. 194 As explained above, the collective in China works as an 
administrative body for the government that manages all aspects of rural affairs, and 
crop harvest may not be the sole concern of the governing body, with forestry even 
less so. Furthermore, there are plenty of political factors that affect the decisions taken 
by the village leader or governing body. Thus, to expect the collective to act in the 
best interests of the farmers or forest users is unrealistic and impractical. Although it 
can be argued that the presence of one governing body that oversees and balances all 
the aspects of rural affairs including social and economic development is desirable as 
a more comprehensive approach, it is also true that it is highly susceptible to political 
influence and the failure to achieve a proper balance.
In addition, village affairs are influenced and controlled by higher levels of 
government, such as the township and county government. As already pointed out 
above, the township government has the responsibility to provide ‘guidance, support 
and assistance’ to the village/collective administration. However, in some places, the
193 Yu Li. 30 September 2005
194 From the analysis o f the literature on community forestry from all over the world, it shows that 
regimes that have work successfully are those who are supported by and represent the interests o f local 
forest users. This is expected as the mandates o f these communities have not been diluted by other non­
forest related concerns or issues, Colfer, C.J.P. and Capistrano, D. (eds), 2005.
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village collective is virtually under the control of the township government.195 This 
sometimes means that township government treats collective properties as its own and 
disposes of them as it wishes. One example is the requisition of rural land by the 
township government for local development that took place in Qingkou Town, 
Minhou County in the Fujian Province in 1995.196 In that year, an announcement was 
made in some villages in Qingkou Town about the impending requisition of 2,400 mu 
of land to build a ‘car factory city’. According to the announcement, every individual 
would get 10,000 yuan of compensation197 and those over 50 years old would be 
getting 60 yuan per month as pension, and it was also guaranteed that at least one 
member of every household would be employed by the new car industry. These 
conditions were deemed satisfactory by most villages and 20,000 of farmers handed 
over their land before compensation was paid. However, after a year, farmers whose 
land had been requisitioned were only paid 800 yuan per person and so far no one had 
been employed at the factories. Upon investigation, it was found that the county and 
township government had detained the rest of the compensation money and used it to 
invest in the new venture. A party representative at the county government provided a 
common excuse used by higher level of government when detaining compensation
money, namely that the compensation money would have been squandered off
108because the ‘quality’ of some farmers is low. He also said that most of the money 
had been put into agricultural funds. However, when asked about whether or not 
consent from farmers had been obtained and who would be responsible if the venture 
failed, the party representative could not give any answer. In the end, following 
several protests and visits by farmers’ representatives at the provincial level, the 
county government agreed to gradually return all the money it had detained.
To further undermine the independence of the collective, leaders of all these other 
levels of government are not elected by the people but rather selected by the 
government. A direct consequence of this is that they are not answerable to the
195 As already pointed out above, more than 60 percent o f Chinese villages are hardly independent, and 
are under the control o f the township government. In these villages, village administration is viewed as 
merely a subordinate agency to the township government. Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, pp 102- 
103.
196 Zhou Qiren, 2004, pp 96-99.
197 It was later found out that Fuzhou City government (which was the mastermind behind this 
development project) had promised to pay 33,000 yuan per mu to the township government, 10,000 
yuan o f which was to be given to the villagers, ibid.
198 Here it generally refers to the educational background and wealth level o f the farmers.
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people. As a result, the interest of the state (sometimes disguised as the public 
interests) always takes precedence over the interests of the individuals and the 
collectives. Collective leaders are powerless when it comes to confronting the state’s 
interests. Furthermore, in most villages, village leaders are ‘assisted’ by local party 
leaders who also interfere with village administration.199 Article 3 of the Organic Law 
provides that local Communist Party representatives have an important role to play in 
the village governance. Local party leaders should be ‘at the centre’ of leadership and 
that their relationship with the village committee should be one of ‘support and 
guarantee’. Their tasks include implementing the Party’s policies and manifesto; to 
promote the socialist ideology; and to establish a close tie between the Party and the
900people. It has been pointed out that theoretically these party representatives should 
play only an advisory role (like the township government but only in relation to things
901concerning the Party). However, there have been cases where party representatives 
took power into their own hands, usually with the collaboration and support of 
township government or party representatives at higher levels.
One case in the Guangdong Province illustrates the seriousness of the arrogation and 
excessive power of party representatives and the vulnerability of village ‘democratic
909election’. To explain it briefly, in Hongxing Village, villagers had been subject to 
the control of township government and party representative until 1999 when a local 
election was carried out. But after the village committee was set up, the township 
government appointed the party representative (who was not elected to the village 
committee) to preside over the local economic cooperative, which basically controlled 
the finance of the village. To compete with the elected village committee, the party 
representative set up his own committee, which issued notices and made decisions 
about village affairs. Thus, there were two different entities that governed the village 
at that time, one democratically elected and one appointed by the township 
government. Even though the party representative had in fact usurped the power of 
the village committee, his position was acknowledged by the higher level of 
government. This is an extreme example whereby the power of the village committee
199 Cai Yongshun, 2003
200 Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, pp 143-144.
201 Ibid., pp 144-145
202 Ibid., pp 145-146
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was usurped by a non-elected body but it nevertheless shows the vulnerability and 
weaknesses of the ‘self-governance’ model of village/collective administration.
The underlying causes of the problems discussed above are associated with the nature 
of the rural collective institution itself. The ‘top-down’ nature of the institution 
denotes a lack of independence from the government. Instead of representing the 
interests of the rural population, the collective institution acts as a medium to channel 
government’s excessive power and control to the lowest level of governance. 
Furthermore, as pointed out above, despite the fact that the overhaul of the collective 
system following the de-collectivisation process in the 1970s was aimed at separating 
the administrative, economic and social aspects of the village governance, in reality 
this has not been successful. In addition, the judiciary system does not always give 
protection to the rights of the collective and its members when local government over­
steps its power. This is not only because very often local courts lack judicial 
independence, they are also often biased in favour of parties from the local regions to 
which the courts belong.204 The lack of independence and the presence of ‘local 
protectionism’ are the results of the organisational problem, where the local judiciary 
is ‘completely dependent on the local government in terms of funding, and personnel 
decisions relating to the local judiciary are also in the hands of the local party 
committees and local people’s congresses’. It has been pointed out that in fact, 
many leaders of the local government regard local courts as subordinate departments
AAZ"
of the local government.
Another complication associated with collective ownership of land is that it 
sometimes can jeopardise the very fabric of the democratic foundation of the village 
administration. This is because in reality, there are sometimes conflicts between the 
role of the collective as the landowner and the role of the collective as the 
administrative body. All members of the collective are endowed with the right to elect 
a body that governs collective affairs independently from the government. However,
203 Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004
204 Chen, Albert, 2004, p 153
205 Ibid.
206 In some extreme cases, these leaders even express to judges their views on individual cases pending 
before the courts, ibid, pp 153-154.
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not all members of the same collective are entitled to the collective-owned land.207 
Land is one of the main assets to be owned by the collective, and is one of the most 
important components of the rural economy. Decisions on land use will not only 
affect land users, but also non-land users through the state of the economy generally. 
In many places, local regulations provide that only land users (or those entitled to land 
use) are given the right to participate in decision-making concerning land use.208 
Hence, even within the collective governance itself, self-governing is compromised 
by the dichotomy between land users and non-land users.209 Furthermore, as long as 
the collective acts as both the administrative representative of the state, and also as the 
landowner, village economy will always be subject to state control. This in turn 
defeats the very aim of granting the self-governing right to the villages in the first 
place. It has been pointed out that without having economic independence, there will
910not be political independence. Thus, the emergence of a true democracy at the 
village level will only take place when the community is economically independent.
Following the discussions of the weaknesses inherent in the collective institution in 
rural China, one has to doubt whether or not collective ownership of land is conducive 
to economic, social and political development in rural China. If the Chinese 
government wishes to bring economic growth whilst at the same time give the rural 
population the autonomy to govern its own affairs, it is vital that it separates the 
administrative control from the economic control (via land). One may argue that this 
problem can be solved by promoting accountability and transparency of the village 
governance. However, a more open and democratic collective governance still cannot 
solve the problem of the intrusion of rights if the collective still has extensive power 
to control and dictate land use. As a result, it has been suggested that the current use 
rights arrangement should be replaced by a regime that allows permanent leasehold of 
land.211 This not only will improve the efficiency and openness of village governance, 
it will also produce tenure stability and increase private investment.
207 These may include non-farmer members o f the collective or outsiders who have moved into the 
village but are yet to be allocated land.
208 Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, pp 174-175
209 Ibid. p 210
210 Ibid. pp 211-213
211 Ibid. pp 218-221
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As a conclusion, the historical evidence, households’ feedback and the nature of the 
collective do not support an extensive role for the collective administrative body to 
govern rural productive land use. To exaggerate the role and capability of the 
collective is to ignore the fact that in reality in many places, the collective acts more 
as a hurdle to than as a promoter/protector of private interests. The above analysis 
suggests various reasons why the collective system in China is not capable of 
representing the best interests of China’s rural population. The most important reason 
seems to be due to the nature of the collective: it is a ‘top-down’ institution that is in 
charge of rural political, social, administrative and economic affairs. Furthermore, the 
underlying function of the collective is to act as the government’s administrative 
agent rather than to represent the collective members. The overly extensive mandate 
of the collective and the strong government interference inevitably increase instances 
of conflict of interest. As a result, in order to better protect the rights of the collective 
members, the government should change the nature of land use governance in a way 
that insulates private rights from unwanted interferences. Of course this should not 
deter or prohibit individuals’ initiative from establishing a collective-based 
management regime, but to super-impose a defunct institution on the regulation of 
rural land use is unwise. The ‘collective ownership and private use’ arrangement 
merely represents a compromise between the reformists and anti-reformists, it does 
not represent a better model of land use arrangement, not just in terms of economic 
performance but also in terms of social justice. This is the main reason why collective 
ownership and management of rural land can be arbitrary and inefficient.
5. Conclusion
The underlying tenet of the chapter is that maintaining the existing land ownership 
arrangement will hinder the future development of private rights in rural China. This 
is mainly due to the fact that the collective system does not, and could not, represent 
the rights and interests of the collective members. Even though the collective 
governance system has evolved alongside the production and property rights reforms 
in the 1980s, it is nevertheless ‘trapped’ in the rigid political framework set up by the 
government. For example, although there are now democratic elections at the village 
level, the state still has overriding power over the governance of rural affairs. 
Furthermore, the role and functions of the collective have remained the same under
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the new ‘self-governing’ system. Democratic elections in China do not mean 
democratic representation of the people as there is no opportunity for the public to 
participate in policy-making and to make policy-makers accountable.
The discussions in this chapter show that the justifications for collective ownership of 
land are based on shaky grounds. Some of the justifications are no longer applicable 
to the current state of rural economy and society which have experienced great 
transformation in the past two decades. In particular, the changes in the income and 
labour structure have had a great impact on the land use pattern. And as the rural 
society becomes more and more dynamic, the top-down, ‘agriculture-centred’ nature 
of collective governance will increasingly come into conflict with the demand and 
expectations of the rural population. And as the analysis of the collective system 
during the pre-HRS period shows, when the institution fails to work in a way that 
reflects the reality, it will face opposition, directly and indirectly, from the people. 
The problem of information asymmetry is also compounded by the rigid and top- 
down relationship between the government and the collectives. It is reasonable to 
predict that continuous rural economic and social development will again push for 
changes in the collective governance system in the future.
One of the changes that should take place is the abolition of collective ownership of 
rural land. The current arrangement not only allows economic decisions on land use to 
be dominated by political considerations, it also allows private interests to be 
overwhelmed by the public utility of the land. ‘Public utility’ in relation to rural land 
is widely defined in rural China where many characteristics of a socialist society, such 
as egalitarian allocation of land, are still retained. This coupled with the authoritarian 
governance system mean that rural land is open to abuse and exploitation by those in 
power. Private interests and rights are thus severely compromised under the collective 
ownership regime. As a conclusion, the current half-hearted private rights reforms in 
China may no longer be sustainable. The Chinese government needs to seriously look 
into the few fundamental issues that are having an impact on the direction the 
country’s private rights regime is moving towards. Apart from recognising the 
benefits of a more complete private ownership right regime, the government should 
also face the reality of the declining role of the collectives in relation to land use 
management. The next chapter will again highlight the inadequacies of the current
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collective governance system by using the general theory of common property regime 




China and Forest Use Management: Institutions for Governance Solutions
1. Introduction
Having looked at the evolution of land use rights and the nature of collective land 
ownership, this chapter will analyse the viability of collective forest management in 
China. In particular, the chapter will focus on the issue of institutions and will 
question whether or not the collective ownership (and management) of forest will be 
able to meet both present and future challenges. Although the studies of collective 
management of natural resources are relatively new, many theorists have contributed 
extensively to this discipline since the 1970s. Looking at the theoretical model 
developed from empirical studies of collective regimes all over the world will help to 
shed some light on the advantages and shortcomings of the collective forest 
management regime in China. Of course China’s collective regime may not 
necessarily be conducive to such comparison; it is nevertheless useful to identify 
those features that are likely to make collective management more successful.
As the previous two chapters have illustrated, the current arrangements of collective 
forestland ownership and use are still overrun with some fundamental problems. In 
response to this, the government has recently launched a second round of collective 
forestland reform that aims to complete the devolution of management rights of 
collective forestland. As will be seen below, however, the reform has left the 
underlying ownership rights structure untouched. It can be argued that the Chinese 
government needs to address the problems related to collective forestland tenure if it 
wants to take its collective forestry to the next level. This is because land tenure 
affects not only the pattern of forest resource use but also the future investment in 
forestry.1 To do this, the Chinese government does not necessarily have to ‘explore in 
the dark’; instead, it can refer to existing models of community-based forest 
management regime around the world. Although each model is set against a different 
social, cultural, legal and political background, there are nonetheless some general
1 See Chapter One above for the discussions o f the theory o f property rights.
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attributes that can be used as points of reference for the Chinese government. 
Comparative studies not only help to highlight the inadequacies of collective forest 
management in China, they also provide some guidance for the future direction of 
collective forest regime in China. In particular, they show that flexibility and public 
participation in decision-making not only are essential for the success of a 
community-based organisation, they are also important for the building of social 
capital among rural communities.
The next section takes a look at the theory of common pool resource management. It 
is built around the findings of some of the leading theorists in this field such as Elinor 
Ostrom, Arun Agrawal and Mancur Olson, and will explain and set out the general 
characteristics of common pool resource management identified by these theorists. 
These characteristics will then be discussed in the context of China’s collective forest 
regime to assess how many of the attributes are present in the regime. The third 
section then briefly compares the different community-based forest management 
regimes in different parts of the world. In particular, it will point out why some of 
these regimes are radically different from the collective regime in China and thus 
make them incomparable. Section four looks in detail at one community-based forest 
regime that is most comparable to China. The constitution of community-based forest 
ownership and management in Mexico is very similar to collective forest regime in 
China, which is why it is highly relevant to this research. It is hoped that the 
experience in Mexico can provide some useful lessons from which China can learn. In 
the fifth section, the latest collective forest reform in China will be looked at. In many 
ways, this reform is the continuation of the forestland contract responsibility system 
that was adopted in the early 1980s. The launch of this new round of change signifies 
that there are still problems with the current collective management (and ownership) 
system. The impacts of this reform so far will be briefly discussed.
2. Collective Management in Theory
Collective or community management of natural resources is one of the four main 
forms of resource management regimes identified so far: private, state, open access 
and common property regimes. The theory of collective actions or management shows 
that common property should be distinguished from the open access situation where
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nobody owns the resources and access is open to all. In an open access regime, 
everyone has the incentives to withdraw more units out of the resource before it is 
exploited by others. As a result, the tragedy of the commons will ensue where the 
resource is quickly depleted due to uncontrolled and competing withdrawal. Garett 
Hardin concludes in his famous 1968 article that: “Therein is the tragedy. Each man is 
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit -  in a world 
that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his 
own best interest in a society that belies in the freedom of the commons.”2
The theory of common property regime points out that when a resource belongs to, 
and is managed, by a distinct group of people or a community, the use of the resource 
involves a different set of considerations. Most importantly, there is no open access to 
all; only members of a particular group can have access to the resource. Furthermore, 
more often than not there will also be internal rules that govern access, ways and 
volumes of exploitation or withdrawal. In short, the theory aims to highlight the fact 
that ‘the tragedy of the commons’ is not the inevitable result whenever a group of 
individuals share the use of a resource, and that use of common resource can be 
sustainable.
Apart from highlighting the differences between open access and common property 
regimes, the theory of common property also provides explanation as to why and how 
common management regime arises and functions. Many theorists have looked at 
different community-based resource management regimes all around the globe, in 
both developed and developing countries. Even though these case studies come from 
different cultural, social, political and legal backgrounds, they nonetheless share some 
similar characteristics. These characteristics have been incorporated into a coherent
2 Hardin, G., 1968, p 1244.
3 Community-based forest management regimes have been looked at in Nepal (Acharcya, K.P., 2002; 
Adhikari, B. et al., 2004; Adhikari, B. and Lovett, J.C., 2006; Agrawal, A. and Ostrom, E., 2001; Dev, 
O.P. et al., 2003; Edmonds, E., 2002; Mehta, J. and Kellert, S., 1998; Timsina, N.T., 2003); the 
Philippines (Dolom, P.C., 2003; Gauld, R., 1998); Cameroon (Brown, D. and Schreckenberg, K.,
2001); Zimbabwe (Campbell, B. et al., 2001); India (Conroy, C., Mishra, A. and Rai, A., 2002; Hobley, 
N. and Shah, K., 1996; Kumar, S., 2002; Saigal, S., 2000; Sekher, M., 2001; Agrawal, A. and Ostrom, 
E., 2001)); Switzerland (Ostrom, E., 1990; Kiichli, C. and Blaser, J., 2005); Scotland (Ritchie, B. and 
Haggith, M., 2005); M exico (Richard, M., 1992; Bray, David B. and Merino-Perez, Leticia., 2002; 
Klooster, D., 1999; Klooster, D., 2000)
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analysis of common property regimes.4 The discussions in this section will help to 
shed light on the situation of collective land ownership and collective forest 
management in China.
2.1 Common Pool Resources
It has been pointed out that all common pool resources share two important attributes: 
first, it is costly to exclude individuals from using the good either through physical 
barriers or legal instruments; and second, the benefits consumed by one individual 
subtract from the benefits available to others.5 The first attribute (non-excludable) is 
typical of the nature of public goods such as air and national defence, while the 
second attribute (rivalry) is associated with private goods such as houses and food.6 
Some examples of the common pool resources discussed in the literature are water, 
fish and hunting game. Strictly speaking, forests may not necessarily be common pool 
resources because their physical boundary can be easily established and access can be
n
controlled in some circumstances, and in fact, many forests in the world are treated 
as private properties.8 However, there are three reasons why forests are subject to 
common property management, one of which only became apparent recently.
First, in many parts of the world, forests have always been treated as common 
properties.9 This could be due to historical, cultural or practical reasons. For example, 
at the time when user groups were small and large-scale commercial exploitation of 
forest resources was non-existent, forests were managed as common pool resources so 
that the management costs could be kept as low as possible.10 However, as the trade 
in, and market value of, forest resources increased, it became worthwhile to carry out 
large-scale exploitation of forest. In this scenario, forests were usually either
4 See Ostrom, E., 1990
5 Ostrom, E., 2000, p 337-338
6 Ibid.
7 This refers to the situation where physical boundaries have been clearly defined, there are enough 
resources that are dedicated to guarding the forest, and there is an effective property rights regime that 
offers protection to forest users or owners.
8 Most o f these private-owned forests are situated in industrialised countries such as the United States, 
Sweden, South Korean and Japan, Yao Shunbo, 2005, pp 55-75.
9 Colfer, C.J.P. and Capistrano, D. (eds). 2005
10 This was particularly true in relation to forests managed by indigenous communities where reliance 
on forest resources was mainly for subsistence purposes rather than for commercial exploitation.
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nationalised by the government and turned into public property11, or put under a 
private property regime, which is made feasible by the commercialisation of forest 
resources as profits from forest exploitation could now cover the management costs
1 9under a private property regime. However, collective management of forest is now 
making a ‘come-back’ as devolution and decentralisation of forest management takes
1 Tplace in many parts of the world. This is mainly due to two reasons: first, as human 
population expands and the size of the resource has become smaller or depleted, a 
common management regime can facilitate a more equitable and fair access to forest 
resource;14 and second, state management of forests has proved to be less than 
desirable and evidence of misuse and mismanagement of public forests abounds.15 In 
relation to the latter, it is argued that more sustainable exploitation of forest resources 
can be attained if local forest users have more control over the management of the 
resources.16
Second, community-based forest management can also be the product of intentional 
social-engineering by the government, where under certain political ideology, 
community ownership and management of natural resources is considered a more 
ideal form of arrangement (as opposed to private ownership). This is the case in 
China, where forests were put under the ownership and management of the collective
17units that had been constituted according to the communist ideology at that time. 
Along with collective ownership, central planning was also a strong feature of the 
communist regime; and the activities of these administrative collective units were
11 Nationalisation o f forestland in many developing countries took place after independence, largely 
following the footsteps o f the colonial governments that put natural resources under the control and 
ownership o f the state, Lynch, O.J. and Talbott, K., 1995, pp 31-65.
12 The transition from common property to private property over a natural resource is well illustrated in 
Harold Dem setz’s article Toward A Theory o f  Property Rights. Under private ownership where the 
community recognised the owner’s right to exclude others, resource extraction became more 
sustainable and the concentration o f benefits and costs on owners created incentives to utilise resources 
more efficiently, Demsetz, Harold, 1967
13 Lynch, O.J. and Talbott, K., 1995; Colfer, C.J.P. and Capistrano, 2005; Edmunds, D  and 
Wollenberg, E. (eds), 2004
14 The Joint Forest Management regime in India and the Community Forestry regime in Nepal were 
constituted to halt further degradation o f forests and to grant access to local communities, Agrawal, A. 
and Ostrom, E., 2001. Resources are put under common management instead o f private management 
because the former provides a more equitable access to the resources. Fair and equitable access to 
resources is particularly important in places where there is widespread poverty and members’ 
participation in the market is limited.
Repetto, R. and Gillis, M., 1989
16 Pierce, C.J. et al., 2005; Edmunds, D. and Wollenberg, E. (eds), 2004
17 The ideological debates about collective ownership in China has already been discussed in the 
previous chapter, see Chapter Two above.
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coordinated according to the central government’s plan.18 As a result, the collectives 
enjoyed very little independence or autonomy under the communist regime.19 
Normally, as political ideology changes, the forms of ownership will also tend to 
change. This is manifested in the former Soviet Union states where state and 
collective ownership were replaced by private ownership regime following the end of 
the communist rule. In China, as the political transition was gradual, so were the
90changes in the ownership structure. As a result, collective ownership of forest is still 
prominent in China, although its significance is increasingly subject to question.21
Lastly, forest provides ecological or environmental benefits that ‘spill over’ its 
physical boundary. Usually in a private property rights regime where access can be 
controlled, benefits from the use of forest are accrued to the property owner or to 
anyone to whom the right to receive benefits has been assigned. Many of the 
environmental services provided by the forest, however, cannot be contained, and this 
creates the problem of ‘externalities’ that are not accounted for. The importance of 
environmental services provided by forest has increasingly been recognised. As a 
result, policymakers have tried to turn these services into valuable commodities that
99can be purchased and sold in the market. With the increasing awareness of the 
significance of the environmental services provided by forest, the issue of ‘free­
riding’ has become prominent, especially in relation to ecological or protection forest. 
In short, while the owner (or owners) invests in and maintain the forest, he or she (or 
they) cannot prevent other people from benefiting from the environmental services 
that are provided by the forest. And unless the owner (or owners) can derive some sort 
of incomes or benefits from the forest that makes it worthwhile to continue that 
particular type of land use, he or she (or they) will be tempted to opt for commercial 
exploitation of the forest if the payoffs are higher.
18 See Chapter Two above.
19 See Chapter Two above.
20 Clarke, D., Murrell, P. and Whiting, S., 2005, pp 31-33
21 This issue will be looked at below when the latest collective forestland reform in China is discussed.
22 A few o f the main functions provided by forest that have been widely discussed are carbon 
sequestration (relevant to the debates on climate change), protection o f biological diversity (relevant to 
bio-prospecting), and as important watershed. Some of the functions have even been highlighted and 
recognised in international treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.
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With this in mind, forest can be subject to common management where community 
members share the cost and benefits of forest management. This can serve two 
purposes: first, environmental benefits that are accrued to the community as a whole 
can be ‘internalised’; and second, community as a management unit can deal with 
other parties that are receiving environmental services from the forest more 
effectively. In relation to the first, it is particularly true in relation to environmental 
benefits that are accrued locally, such as prevention of soil erosion, protection of 
biodiversity and water source, and even regulation of the micro-climate. These 
benefits can be at least partly ‘internalised’ when the burden and costs are shared 
among the members of the community, and the problem of free-riding can be 
ameliorated.23 In relation to the second, the transaction cost of ‘selling’ environmental 
services can be reduced if the ‘suppliers’ can act together to deal with the ‘buyers’.24 
Furthermore, the community as a whole may have more bargaining power than 
individual collective members if they were to negotiate with the buyers separately. In 
particular, more often than not forest communities in developing countries practice 
traditional customs and may lack the necessary institution (such as a legal framework 
that recognises and protects private property) that supports private ownership and the 
creation of the market. In these cases, collective management of forestland may 
provide the best alternative that can internalise both the cost and benefits of forest 
management. So far, however, there is little evidence that forest communities are 
actively involved in negotiation with third party buyers of environmental services.
The discussions above show that although forest may not necessarily be a common 
pool resource in all cases, there are circumstances in which common property 
management may be desirable or preferred. This is by no mean definite or 
unchangeable; as already discussed in the previous chapters, the institution of
23 An example o f the benefits o f  internalising both the benefits and costs o f forest management can be 
seen in the case o f watershed management in Sukhomajri, India. In this case, standoff arose after the 
building o f a check dam and runoff ponds between villagers above and below the ponds. The upstream 
villagers had no incentives to protect the watershed against erosion as the irrigation provided by the 
ponds did not benefit them. To solve this problem, pipes were laid so that most fields in the village 
would receive water; and more importantly, all households would equally share the ownership o f the 
water in the catchment ponds. These water rights accrued to both the landed and landless households, 
and these rights were tradeable, Kerr, J., 2002, pp 63-76.
24 Costs o f gathering and disseminating information, negotiation and decision-making can presumably 
be lower when a single entity, guided by internal rules and constitution, is empowered to adopt 
decisions on behalf o f the different ‘suppliers’.
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property rights is complex and is influenced by various factors.25 The following 
subsection will look at some of the important characteristics identified so far by 
theorists of common pool resource management.
2.2 Important Characteristics of Common Pool Resource Management
The study on common pool resource management has provided useful insight into the 
nature of this type of regime, especially the environment in which this regime is most 
likely to exist. This subsection will provide a brief overview of the factors that may 
have an impact on the success or failure of a collective management regime. The 
discussion of the common characteristics of collective resource management will 
hopefully shed some light on the viability of the collective forest regime in China. In 
particular, it will be able to give some explanation as to why the regime has or has not 
worked. Hence, in this subsection, the description of each attribute is followed by a
0f\discussion of the situation in China. It will be shown that China’s collective forest 
regime lacks most of the attributes that are deemed to be essential for the success of a 
common pool resource regime. The attributes outlined below are derived from the 
findings of Elinor Ostrom, who is one of the most prominent theorists in the study of 
common resource governance.27 The following analysis is derived from both her 
earlier and latter works.28
The characteristics of a collective governance of common pool resource can be 
roughly grouped into four categories, which are the nature of the resource, the nature 
of the users, the nature of the institution, and the relationship between the collective 
institution and the government. In relation to the nature of the resource, it is provided 
that the boundaries of the resource must be clearly defined, and so must the
25 See Chapter One for the theory o f property rights and see Chapter Three for the discussions o f the 
theory o f institution in relation to China’s collective regime. In particular, the institution o f property 
rights is affected by the changes in price and technology, the characteristics o f the users and the 
characteristics o f the resource.
26 Again, the discussions of forest collective entities here mainly refer to the mainstream non- 
indigenous communities. Indigenous communities in China are given more autonomy to govern their 
common resources and have different social institutions that make collective governance more robust 
compared to non-indigenous communities.
27 Ostrom paved the way for the studies o f common property regime, especially in relation to the 
management o f common resources. Her analysis has been widely accepted and is used by many in the 
subsequent studies of the same area. Her works are still regarded as authoritative and are representative 
o f this area o f research.
28 Ostrom, E., 1990; Ostrom, E., 2000. Subsequent analysis o f the characteristics o f common property 
regime by other authors mostly expands on Ostrom’s findings. For one example, see McKean, M.A., 
2000, pp 43-50.
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individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the
7Qcommon pool resource. Without clearly defined boundaries, there is a risk that 
‘outsiders’ will be able to reap the benefits produced by the efforts of the community 
members without contributing to the venture themselves. This will effectively amount 
to the ‘open access’ situation discussed above where the resource is continuously 
depleted at an unsustainable rate. Apart from the boundary issue, the value of the 
resource may also be a factor, although there is no single definite indicator. For 
example, in places where the value of production per unit is marginal but essential, 
collective management regime is set up to reduce the costs of maintaining and 
protecting the resource.30 On the other hand, there are instances where collective 
management of resource is still preferred although the value of the resource is high. 
One example of this is community forestry in Mexico where communities are not 
only involved in subsistence use of forest resources, but are also involved in
•o 1
commercial production of timber, which can be a lucrative business. Hence, the 
value of the resource itself is not conclusive; other factors remain equally important.
In the case of China, it has been pointed out that forestland in China is particularly 
affected by boundary disputes as ‘land was never systematically registered and there 
is no cadastre’.32 As a result, there are hundreds of forest disputes involving hundreds 
of thousands of hectares of forestland each year, and most of these cases are 
unresolved. The deficient land registration system is particularly detrimental to 
collective forest because unlike the arable land, forestland is presumed to be state- 
owned unless collective ownership can be proven.34 It has been argued that as a result 
of the boundary issues, the government has merely assigned ownership of the rural 
land to the ‘collective’ even though there is no clear definition of the ‘collective’ 
entity. This is to avoid the explosion of boundary disputes which could potentially 
cause widespread social unrest. Furthermore, the lack of clear boundaries has given
29 Ostrom, E., 1990, pp 91-92.
30 Together with low value o f production per unit, high variance in the availability o f resource units, 
low returns from intensification o f investment, substantial economics o f scale will also make collective 
management o f resource more attractive, Ostrom, E. 2000, p 344.
31 Bray, D.B. and Merino-Perez, L., 2002
32 Ho, Peter, 2005, p 100.
33 Ibid., p 119
34 Ibid., p 100. Art 8 o f Land Management Law and Art 2 o f Regulations on the Implementation of 
Land Management Law
35 Ho, Peter, 2005, pp 45-68. The problem o f definition ambiguity o f collective ownership has been 
discussed in Chapter Three above.
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local authorities or even the central government plenty of opportunities to exploit the 
situation.36
In relation to the nature of the users of the resource, there are three important factors, 
namely the number, homogeneity and commitment of the users. In early literature, it 
has been argued that common property regime is only feasible if the number of users 
is small.37 The evidence, however, is not conclusive38, although it is true that the 
larger the group of users, the higher the transaction costs in reaching agreement will
on
be. The same is true for group homogeneity. Although the importance of 
homogeneity is not conclusive, it has nevertheless been pointed out that group 
heterogeneity40 can increase transaction costs and conflicts between users.41 Lastly, 
the commitment of the users plays a substantial role in securing the success of a 
common property regime. For example, a collective management regime is more 
feasible if the participants share a common understanding about the necessity of, and 
benefits and risks associated with, the collective regime. Furthermore, a collective 
regime will also likely be successful if the participants share generalised norms of 
reciprocity and trust, which will reduce the costs of negotiation, implementation and
42monitoring. Active and sincere participation in decision-making is also an indication 
of a vibrant and healthy collective regime, although a precondition to this is that users 
should also have access to accurate information at relatively low cost about the 
condition of the resource and the expected flow of benefits and costs. When the 
above-mentioned attributes of resource users are present, common property regime is 
more likely to succeed than when they are not.43
36 In fact, the lack o f a poor land registration system means that it is always difficult for the collectives 
to prove ownership, especially if they invoke customary titles, ibid.
37 Olson, Mancur, 1982, pp 53-65
38 Agrawal, A., 2000
39 However, the increase in the group size will also decrease the burden borne by each participant for 
meeting joint costs, and it will also increase the size o f the assets held by the collective, Ostrom, E., 
2000, p 347
40 Differences within the user group may com e in many dimensions including the cultural belief 
systems, wealth, production technologies, time horizons and the degree o f reliance on the resource, 
Ostrom, E., 2000, p 348
41 Ibid.
42 Other characteristics o f participants that are conducive to the selection and performance o f common 
property regime are the following: the user group is relatively stable; and participants plan to live and 
work in the same area for a long time (similar time horizon), Ostrom, E., 2000, pp 346-347.
43 It has been pointed out that instead o f taking the attributes o f participants as given, one way of  
coping with a common property regime is to change the composition o f the participants. By increasing 
the proportion of participants who have a long-term interest in sustaining the resource, and are likely to
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Users of collective forest in China range from a few hundreds to a few thousands 
depending on the entity of the collective owners. For example, if a forest is owned by 
a natural village or village group, then it is likely that the number of users will be less 
than a forest community whose forest is owned by the administrative village. Even 
though the number of users tends to be relatively large, management of collective 
property is not impossible as day-to-day administration is carried out by the 
representatives chosen by the users. And given the fact that many villages are tribal - 
or clan-based44 and that not all residents (especially outsiders who have moved into 
the village) have the right to obtain land use right45, it can be safely assumed that 
group heterogeneity is not a huge problem in rural China. Having said that, there is 
very little evidence to suggest that users of collective forest in China share the 
commitment or enthusiasm for a fair and successful collective regime.46 A few factors 
may explain why this is the case.47
First, the establishment of the collective or user group was not initiated by the users 
themselves; rather, it was imposed on them by the government as part of the state- 
planned economic system. The lack of initial voluntary participation may affect users’ 
commitment to the arrangement. Second, the use of forestland is tightly controlled by 
the government and users possess little autonomy in relation to the use and transfer of 
the land. This is especially true after the adoption of the Natural Forest Protection 
Programme by the Chinese government in 1998, which not only imposes a logging 
ban on collective forests but also designates the use of certain collective forests as 
protected forests and as a result severely limits their use. Without real autonomy over 
the use of forest, there is very little incentive for users to be enthusiastic about
use reciprocity and trust, the likelihood o f a successful common property regime is higher, Ostrom, E., 
1999, Coping with Tragedies o f the Commons, p 23.
44 Han Mingmo, 2001, pp 173-176
45 Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, p 210.
46 For example, according to a survey carried out in the Fujian Province, when asked for the reasons 
why farmers were against unified management o f forestland, almost all interviewees stated that unified 
(collective) management failed to provide effective motivation and that farmers could benefit more 
from individual management, Wang Chunfeng, 2005. Some possible exceptions are communities that 
have taken active steps to improve collective governance and welfare o f their members, such as those 
that have participated in the share-holding system mentioned in Chapter Two above. Having said that, 
more often than not the establishment o f a successful collective management regime in China is driven 
by the inspired local leaders, rather than from the initiatives o f the members themselves.
4 These include only internal factors that are caused by the nature o f the collective institution itself; 
they do not include external factors such as the timber market or the tax policy that affects the 
profitability o f forestry industry.
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resource management. Third, individual users have little opportunity to participate in 
decision-making and as already seen in Chapter Three above, collective affairs are 
mainly managed by the village leader or party secretary. The lack of active 
participatory right not only dampens users’ motivation to participate in collective 
management, but also makes it impossible for users to influence decisions about the 
use of the common resources.
The nature of local institution has a substantial influence in the success of a common 
property regime. Institution here refers to not only the existing rules and norms, but 
also refers to the robustness and adaptability of the current governing structure. Rules 
and norms consist of both procedural and operational rules, which also encompass 
sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms. Operational rules refer to rules that 
govern the day-to-day use and management of the resource. They affect users’ 
decisions ‘concerning when, where, and how to withdraw resource units, who should 
monitor the actions of others and how, what information must be exchanged or 
withheld, and what rewards or sanctions will be assigned to different combinations of
A O
actions and outcomes’. In short, these rules affect issues such as appropriation, 
provision, monitoring and enforcement.49
Procedural rules are mainly concerned with the decision-making processes, and can 
be divided into two levels: collective choice rules and constitutional choice rules.50 
Collective choice rules govern policy-making, management and adjudication at the 
local level, which involve the resource users, their representatives, and / or external 
authorities. These rules can be promulgated by the communities51 and provide the 
basis for policy making in relation to how a common pool resource should be used. 
Constitutional choice rules govern decision-making at a higher level where the 
decisions on which communities are eligible and what specific rules to be used in 
crafting the set of collective choice rules are made. Constitutional choice rules are 
usually made by the government that set the boundary or extent of collective 
management of resource.
48 Ostrom, E., 1990, p 52.
49 Ibid., p 53.
50 Ibid., pp 50-55.
51 China’s village-level regulations provide a good example o f the collective choice rules. See Chapter 
Three above.
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There are three important issues relating to the rules and norms that govern common 
property regime, namely participation, sanctions and conflict resolution. The first 
concerns the role of the members of the user group or any external authorities in 
shaping the operational rules. This would depend on the content of collective choice 
rules, which determine who can, and how to, shape or modify operational rules.52 
Generally, it is assumed that a common property regime is more sustainable if most 
individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in shaping or modifying 
the rules. This is because of two reasons. First, the fact that operational rules are 
designed or made by users (as opposed to rules imposed by some external authorities 
who have less information about the use of the resource than the users themselves) 
may encourage compliance of the rules.53 Second, users possess information about 
local conditions that may have an impact on resource use. It is imperative that rules 
governing pattern and mode of use, provision of labour and so forth reflect the local 
conditions and the specific attributes of the resource because only then suitable 
arrangements can be made.54 Suitable or appropriate arrangements are important 
because they promote sustainable exploitation and decrease instances of conflicts.
To help improve compliance, graduated sanctions are essential.55 To be effective, 
sanctions must be perceived to be fair and proportionate by the users; heavy- 
handedness by enforcers may prompt resentment and produce the opposite effect. 
Lastly, given the fact that conflicts will always arise either between resource users or 
between resource users and outsiders (including government officials), rapid access to 
low-cost local conflict resolution facilities is important.56 The questions of what type 
of conflict resolution mechanism should be adopted, how it should be constituted and 
who can have access to it are determined by the rules. And apart from locally
cn
instituted conflict resolution arenas , resource users may also resort to formal 
adjudication institutions such as courts and mediation centres.
52 Ibid., pp 93-94
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p 92
55 Ibid., pp 94-100
56 Ibid., pp 100-101
57 These refer to local institutions that are presided by members o f the community that resolve conflicts 
in accordance with rules that govern local resource use. Examples o f these institutions can be found in 
Ostrom, E., 1990.
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A local resource management institution is very much characterised by the players 
within the institution and the rules and norms that shape its constitution. The 
interactions between the rules and the players not only influence the day-to-day 
operation of the collective management regime, but also determine the robustness and 
adaptability of the institution. When an institution is robust, it can insulate itself from 
threats from both within and outside the institution.58 The closer the rules reflect the 
local conditions and the more effective conflict resolution mechanisms are, the more 
robust an institution will be. On the other hand, the institution also needs to be 
adaptable to changes that are taking place within and outside the institution. As the 
society evolves, the belief systems and societal values may change; if an institution is 
too rigid, it is most likely that it will collapse when the underlying shared 
understanding that makes the institution a cohesive body in the first place falls apart. 
Extensive public participation in decision-making processes and a strong feedback 
system may help to boost the adaptability of an institution as changes can be swiftly 
adapted through the input of the members of the user group.
The many shortcomings of the institution of the collective in China have been 
discussed in Chapter Three above. The lack of a genuinely democratic process that 
allows members of the collective to choose their representatives, the overwhelming 
power of the state over the collective affairs, the rampant corruption and 
incompetence of local government officials and even collective leaders, and the 
failure of the justice system to protect the rights of the collective members59 are 
reasons why an overall successful collective forestry regime has eluded rural China. 
The collective regime in China is, at best, still in the infancy of ‘self-governance’ with 
the capability to improve, or at worst, merely the ‘administrative agent’ of the state 
with little or no autonomy. There has been no genuine intention to build up the social 
capital and expertise needed for successful collective regime by the government. The 
failure by the government to provide the necessary platforms that encourage the 
collective and its members to develop the necessary skills and expertise is prominent
58 The threats do not include minor or occasional conflicts that can be resolved via the conflict 
resolution mechanisms. They refer to more serious infractions or interference that challenge the very 
existence o f institution or the collective management regime. Threats from outsiders refer to 
intervention by third parties that potentially have control or power over the local institution such as 
government officials.
The problems o f China’s justice system will be discussed further below.
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when compared to the effort by the Mexican government in helping to set up 
genuinely independent community entities, as will be discussed below. Although 
village governance (in terms of public participation and autonomy) in China has come 
a long way since 1978, the truth is that it is still very much controlled by the 
government and is hardly a truly independent entity that represents the best interest of 
its members. This is perhaps inevitable in a country governed by a one-party 
government that still practices centrally planned economy to a great extent.60
Lastly, the relationship between the collective institution and the government also has 
an impact on the feasibility of a common property regime. Local collective resource 
management regimes do not exist in isolation; more often than not they form part of 
the wider structure of the government administration.61 This is because most 
community forest management regimes exist within the boundaries set by the 
government, and because members of the user group use public services, such as 
access to the formal adjudication institutions to resolve conflicts and protect their 
rights. It has been pointed out that for a common property regime to succeed, there 
should be at least some minimal recognition by the external governmental authorities 
of the community’s rights.62 This ‘external recognition’ is important in relation to two 
matters, which are the right to organise and legitimacy of the rules. Without the 
recognition of the right to organise, forest communities risk losing their forests to the 
government or third parties whose interests are recognised as legitimate by the 
government. In addition, if the ‘internal’ rules of resource management are not 
recognised by the government, any person who wants to get around them may go to 
the government to get the rules annulled. This will create a situation where different
60 The government’s control over the economy is not only confined to the agricultural sector, even the 
commercial and industrial sectors are largely under the influence o f the government via the share­
holding regulations, see Hutton, Will, 2007, pp 142-170, for more information.
61 This is true in relation to most o f the community forest management regimes that emerged the last 
few decades. These regimes were either set up or endorsed by the government, and formed part o f the 
administrative structure o f the government. For example, the Panchayats o f the forest community 
regimes in India and Nepal act as the lowest administrative units in the governance system. See note 3 
above. This is not unlike the situation in China where the collective is the governing bodies at the 
village level.
62 Ostrom, E., 1990, p 101
63 This took place in many developing countries at the beginning o f last century when ownership claims 
by indigenous communities were ignored and forests were nationalised by the state. The indigenous 
communities not only lost the ownership rights, they also lost their right to use the forests, Lynch, O.J. 
and Talbott, K., 1995.
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users apply different rules and the collective system will eventually collapse.64 This is 
why it is unlikely that a common property regime will be able to survive without at 
least some minimum recognition from the government.
However, too much interference from the government will also jeopardise the success 
of the common property regime. As already pointed out above, public participation in 
the decision-making process and the compatibility between the rules and local 
conditions are important factors in ensuring the success of a common property 
regime. More often than not the government, represented by the forest department, 
has little interest in, or understanding of, local circumstances, and may be primarily 
interested in forest revenues rather than the welfare of forest-dependent 
communities.65 Furthermore, the government may also want to impose one set of rules 
that work best for an entire jurisdiction, regardless of their compatibility with local 
conditions.66 Incongruence between the rules and local circumstances may jeopardise 
the survival of local common property regimes.
The relationship between the government and collectives in China has been discussed 
in detail in Chapter Three. It suffices to say that the government is an active party in 
the formation and supervision of collective affairs. This is mainly accomplished via 
the control over land ownership and the employment of party representatives at all 
levels of governance, including the village level, even though the latter is officially 
not part of government structure. As pointed out, the party secretary sometimes usurps 
the role and power of the elected collective leader; or in a more direct way, the party 
secretary is sometimes chosen as village leader to govern collective affairs. It is fair to 
say that the government plays a direct and active role in the development of the 
collective regime in China not least because it wants to make sure that the collective 
regime conforms to the values endorsed by the government and to avoid major 
upheavals in the rural areas. The extent of intervention of government in collective 
affairs is most clearly illustrated by the development and growth of Township and
64 For an example of this, see the collapse o f the fishing arrangement in Sri Lanka in Ostrom, E., 1990, 
pp 149-157.
6 Larson, Anne M. 2005, p 44
66 Ostrom, E., 2000, p 32
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Village Enterprises (TVEs), which was impossible without active the support of the
fnlocal governments.
As a conclusion, common property regime cannot exist in just any situation; there are 
certain important attributes that need to be present before it is feasible. Furthermore, 
even if a common property regime can be established, it does not mean that the 
regime will persevere unless certain attributes are present. The analysis above is based 
on the conclusions drawn from the many studies on various common property regimes 
in different parts of the world, which include forest and non-forest regimes. The 
discussions shed light on how common property regimes work. By using these 
attributes as points of reference, it is quite clear that China’s collective forest regime 
is far from the independent and efficient common pool resource management regime 
described by Ostrom. Recognising the need to improve its collective forest system, 
the Chinese government launched the latest reform of collective forest in 2003, which 
aims at further devolving management rights to households and to make collective 
forestry more competitive. Due to its short period of implementation, it is still unclear 
whether or not the reform has significantly improved the collective regime, although 
initial results show that the reform has not yet solved some fundamental problems that 
are imbedded in the collective institution. But before we move on to the analysis of 
the latest collective forest reform in China, some comparative studies of different 
community-based forest management regimes will be looked at. It is hoped that they 
will further help with the diagnosis of China’s collective forest’s present condition 
and future prospect.
3. Examples of Collective Forest Management in Practice
Successful community forestry regimes around the globe have been documented, 
which come from both the developed and developing world.68 This section will look 
at whether or not all or some of these success stories can be replicated in China. The 
different successful community forestry regimes can be divided into three main 
groups: the first two involve community forestry mainly in developing countries
67 Hutton, W ill, 2007, pp 104-109; Clarke, D., Murrell, P. and Whiting, S. 2005, p 10; Whiting, Susan. 
2001, pp 118-120; Li, Ping. 2005
68 Colfer, C.J.P. and Capistrano, D., 2005; Ostrom, E., 1990; Edmunds, D. and Wollenberg, E. (eds), 
2004.
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while the third involves community forestry in developed countries. In the first case, 
some developing countries in Asia and Africa have devolved forest management 
rights to local communities, such as the Joint Forest Management scheme in India and 
the Community Forestry scheme in Nepal. Local communities are usually 
‘contracted’ by the government to regenerate forestlands and in return are given the 
ownership rights over the trees planted and other forest resources.69 Most of the 
forestlands involved in these programmes are marginalised lands that have little or no 
economic value to the governments. Furthermore, these rights are usually limited in 
the sense that the use of forest resources are only allowed for subsistence purposes
70and not for commercial activities. This is in contrast with China where commercial
71uses of forest resources are not banned from collective forests.
The second group refers generally to community forestry in some Latin America and 
Asia-Pacific countries such as Mexico, Papua New Guinea and Fiji. In these 
countries, community ownership of forestland is prevalent. For example, in Papua 
New Guinea, 97 per cent of all forestland is owned by clan or tribal groups under
77customary law. Similarly, in Fiji, the majority of the forestland is owned by some
776000 Fijian communities. Community forest management in Mexico is slightly 
different in that community forests are owned by both non-indigenous (known as 
ejidos) and indigenous groups (known as comunidades). Many collectives that 
manage and own forestland also run the logging and timber processing operations for 
profits.74 The major difference between this type of community forestry and China is 
that these communities (whether or not they are part of the administrative structure of
69 Unlike China, the ownership o f these forestland still resides with the state, and communities were 
only given the usufruct rights. Agrawal, A., and Ostrom, E., 2001; Sarin, M. et al., 2004, in Edmuds, D. 
and Wollenberg, E. (eds), 2004, pp 55-126; Ferguson, I. and Chandrasekharan, C. 2005, pp 69-70
70 This is true in relation to the Joint Forest Management regime in some places in India and the Parks 
and People system in Nepal where the priority is to conserve the forests. Since the establishment o f  
community-based forest management in Nepal in the late 1970s, a series o f new legislations have been 
passed to expand the area of forests managed by local user groups and more significantly, to allow user 
groups to harvest forest products for commercial processing and sale. Lynch, O.J. and Talbott, K.,
1995; Agrawal, A. and Ostrom, E., 2001.
71 There are in fact a few private joint-ventures between companies and the collectives, which is an 
emerging phenomenon in China. For more details, please see Lu Wenming et al., 2002, pp 81-98.
72 Ferguson, I. and Chandrasekharan, C., 2005, pp 70-71.
73 Ibid.,
74 This is particularly true in relation to M exico, Bray, D.B. and Merinio-Perez, L., 2002. In Papua New  
Guinea and Fiji, although indigenous groups’ ownership o f forestland is unequivocal, the government 
and third party concessionaires play an active role in facilitating and carrying out commercial 
exploitation o f forest, although small-scale community-run logging and sawmilling operations have 
been created with the help o f foreign donors, Ferguson, I. and Chandrasekharan, C., 2005, pp 70-72.
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the government) are much more independent than their Chinese counterparts. For 
example, these communities have the final say as to how their forests are to be used,
nc
and they are entitled to profits derived from the use of the forests. More importantly, 
their entitlement to the forestland is secure and is protected against encroachment by
Hf\any third party including the government. This is in contrast with the collectives in 
China where forestland use is still tightly controlled by the government and the role of 
the collectives is limited to the fulfilment and enforcement of various administrative 
tasks and targets assigned by the government.
The third group of community-based forestry refers to those that exist in developed
countries. Countries like Switzerland and the UK (especially Scotland) have relatively
77
successful community-based forestry regimes. However, there are fundamental 
differences between these communities with the collectives in China: first, these 
communities exist in post-industrial societies where forestry is a small part of the 
GDP; second, there are no forest-dependent communities; and third, forest
70
management for timber and pulp is uneconomic and highly subsidized. Forests in 
China still serve a useful purpose in providing food, fuel, and income to local 
communities. Hence, the planning for forest management in China and industrialised 
countries involves different considerations that reflect the socio-economic differences.
Having looked at some of the successful examples of community forest management 
regimes and the features that set them apart from collective forestry in China, the 
author would like to discuss in more detail one particular community-based forest 
management regime that, in the author’s opinion, most closely resembles China’s 
collective forest regime. It is hoped that the comparative studies may provide some 
useful insights into the strength and feasibility of collective forest management 
regime in China. The regime that will be looked at is the community forestry in 
Mexico. As pointed out above, community forestry is well established in Mexico 
where the majority of the forests are owned and managed by local communities. 
Many of these communities were created by government decree (as opposed to the 
continuation of traditional forest communities), just like the collective regime in
75 Ibid., and Bray, D.B. and Merino-Perez, L. 2002
76 Ibid.
77 KUchli, C. and Blaser, J. 2005; Ritchie, B. and Haggith, M. 2005
78 KUchli, C. and Blaser, J. 2005, pp 152-155, and Ritchie, B. and Haggith, M., 2005, pp 212-228.
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China. The following section will outline the key characteristics of community 
forestry in Mexico and the key lessons that can be learned from it.
4. A Comparative Case Study and Lessons for China: Community Forestry 
in Mexico
70In Mexico, communities own around 80 percent of the forests. Large-scale transfer 
of Mexico’s forest natural assets from the government to the community took place 
between 1950-1980, during which around 40 percent of the forests changed hands.80 
The agrarian reforms continued in the 1990s where the control of community over
Q 1
forestland was further strengthened. Community forests in Mexico are divided into 
two groups: ejidal land (managed by ejidos) and comunidade land (managed by 
comudidades). As pointed out above, the former are non-indigenous groups while the 
latter are indigenous groups of forest users. Community forestry in Mexico is one of 
the most important examples of community-based forest management in the world, 
not only because it covers a huge proportion of the forest area in Mexico, but also 
because the forest communities play a non-marginal role in the commercial
89production of forest products. In particular, forest communities have representatives 
not only at the local level, but there are also national organisations that allow these 
communities to coordinate their effort and to have their interests represented.83
4.1 Key Characteristics of Community Forest Regime in Mexico
Community forestry in Mexico took root in the Mexican Revolution in 1910, when a 
massive and ongoing distribution of land (including forestland) to groups of peasant
84farmers had the consequence of allowing the communities to be in charge of the
79 Bray, D.B. and Merino-Perez, L. 2002, p 2
80 Ibid.
81 Brown, Jennifer, 2004. This reform will be discussed in more detail below.
82 The community-based forestry in M exico is hailed as the world’s few examples o f ‘formal market- 
oriented community enterprises established on the basis o f a common property resource’, Bray, D.B. 
and Merino-Perez, L. 2002, p 20. However, forest production plays only a minor role in the overall 
Mexican economy. In 1995, the World Bank concluded that forestry sector in M exico had 
underperformed due to high production costs, inefficient community-managed forests and lack of 
infrastructure that made most o f the timber inaccessible, ibid., p 12.
83 Ibid., pp 52-63.
84 The Constitution o f 1917 o f M exico mandated that land to be taken from large landholders and 
granted to landless labourers: groups that consisted o f at least 20 people could hold land communally. 
These groups are subsequently recognised as ‘ejidos’. Similar mechanism was provided for indigenous
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natural assets on their community lands.85 Land held by both the ejidos and 
comunidades is divided into several classifications, which are not too dissimilar to the 
collective land in China. These categories are as following: first, parcelised arable 
land held and worked by collective members; second, common land, generally 
consisting of forest, mountain, grazing or waste land, which is monitored and 
managed by a governing body democratically elected by the community members; 
and third, land for human settlements.87 The composition of the rights and power of 
the community and its members over the management and ownership of these 
different types of land vary. For example, plots for human settlements are fully owned 
by the individual holders, while some arable land can also be privatised.88 For 
common land, including forestland, it is usually inalienable and members have 
permanent use rights.89 Privatisation of community land is a key feature that sets the 
Mexican community-based regime apart from the Chinese collective regime. As 
Chapter Two and Three above pointed out, collective land in China cannot be 
privatised; unlike their counterparts in Mexico, collective members in China are only 
given land usufruct rights.
In relation to the internal governance and membership, there are generally three 
governance units in an ejido or comunidade: the assembly, which comprises of all 
members; the comisariado, which is the elected executive leadership body; and the 
vigilance council, which is elected to monitor the comisariado.90 Not everyone who
communities to reclaim their historic landholdings, which are subsequently known as ‘com unidades’. 
Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p 4.
85 Bray, D.B. and Merino-Perez, L. 2002, p 3. Community forestry here does not refer to traditional 
forms o f community-based forest management which were not recognised by the government. Instead, 
it refers to legally established community-based regimes that were sanctioned by the government.
86 This body is known as the comisariado, Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p 8.
87 Ibid. Collective land in China is also divided into arable land that is contracted out to individual 
households (which consists o f both family and responsibility plots), collectively managed land such as 
forest and wasteland, and private land for residential purposes, see Chapter Two.
88 Generally only ejidal land can be privatised; a comunidade land cannot be privatised unless it first 
converts to an ejidal land. Ejido can either privatise all ejidal lands by disbanding the ejido, or privatise 
parts of its land after the assembly votes to approve the transaction. In the latter case, members o f the 
land holder’s family and the members o f  the ejido  have the right o f first refusal to purchase the plot. 
According to the finding o f a research, the main reasons anyone would choose to privatise the land 
were for the purpose o f selling the land and to have access to formal credit. Generally most land 
holders feel that the permanent use rights they have over the land are secure, Brown, Jennifer, 2004, pp 
20- 22 .
89 Common land can be transferred under limited circumstances, such as if a two-third majority vote 
allow common land to be transferred to a civil company in which the community members participate, 
ibid., pp 21-22.
90 Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p 12.
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lives or works within an ejido or comunidade can be a member of the assembly: only 
those who hold land use rights are considered members and have the right to vote.91 
The comisariado consists of at least a president, a secretary and a treasurer while the 
vigilance council consists of a president and two secretaries. According to the finding 
of a research, election of the comisariado takes place once every three years as 
required by the law, and communities are generally aware of the law that prohibits 
consecutive terms.92 In some communities, fairness and transparency have been built 
into the governance system: elaborate systems whereby members rotate during their 
lives through a series of 15 posts, including the leadership positions, have been 
adopted.93
Recent reforms in Mexico have sought to curb the powers of the comisariado and the 
vigilance council by making the assembly responsible for most of the management 
decisions.94 To protect the rights of the members, the recent reforms have also 
required a representative of the Procuradfa Agraria (a federal agency created to assist 
community members in discerning their new rights under the 1992 reforms95) to be 
present at meetings where certain major decisions, such as privatisation of land, are 
made.96 Ejidos and comunidades can devise their own rules, which must be registered
• Q7 »
with the National Agrarian Register. The structure of the internal governance of 
these communities is quite similar to the governance structure of the collectives in 
China which comprises of a village assembly, a village leader, the village committee
QO
and sometimes local party secretary. However, there is no supervisory body that 
monitors the works of the village leader and the village committees. Also, no central 
government official is required to be present at important meetings to make sure that 
irregularities do not happen.
A democratically elected governing body and locally devised regulations mean that 
ejidos and comunidades have considerable independence and autonomy to govern
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p 13
93 Ibid., p 14
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., p 7
96 Ibid., p 12
97 Ibid., p 13
98 For the governance structure of the collectives, see Chapter Three.
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their own affairs. Like the collective in China, each ejido or comunidade is a self- 
governing body. It is, at the same time, an ‘instrument of political control, a mean for 
the organisation of production, and a body of peasant representation’.99 The 1992 
agrarian reforms have sought to give these communities more power to administer
local affairs, including the exploitation of forest resources, and to reduce state
100control. Although the decisions taken by the communities must comply with the 
law of the state such as the zoning and planning law and the Agrarian Law, the 
communities nonetheless have wide discretion to exercise autonomy in affairs that fall 
outside the ambits of the law.101 The community land owners can establish regulations 
to govern the use of the communal property and there are no over-restrictive 
legislations that limit the land to certain types of uses, unlike in China where neither 
the collective governing body nor its members can change the nature of the land from 
agricultural to non-agricultural.
The obligations of the comisariado (the equivalence of village committee including 
the village leader in China) include monitoring and managing common land, the 
exploitation of common resources and the management of human settlement land.102 
Like their counterparts in China, the ejidos and comunidades also provide services 
that either complement, or overlap, with the duties of local municipality such as 
policing activities and the local school committee. Community members share the 
obligations to provide these services; and in some places, any member that leaves the 
community for an extended period of time is required to make a payment to the 
comisariado to make up for the fact that he or she was not available during the time 
for service.104 Like in China, these local communities also face financial difficulties as 
they do not receive government’s help or grant in performing these duties.105 
However, there is no evidence to show that the administrative duties provided by
99 Bray, D.B. and Merino-Perez, L. 2002, p 51. As pointed out by Chapter Three, the collectives in 
China also play three important roles, which are grass-root administrative units, collective economic 
units, and democratic organisation o f the masses. These roles are virtually identical to the roles played 
by the ejidos and comunidades in M exico.
100 Ibid., p 19.
101 Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p 13.
102 Ibid., pp 13-14
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid., p 14
105 Ejidos and comunidades raise money through fines o f service charges imposed on the use of 
common goods, ibid., p 15. For the discussions o f financial impasse experienced by the collective and 
local governments in China, see Chapter One above.
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these communities are as great as those shouldered by the collectives in China. 
Collectives in China are responsible not only for all kinds of services that are usually 
provided by local municipality, such as healthcare and education, but also for carrying 
out government policies such as the one-child policy.106
Another major difference between the forest communities in Mexico and the 
collectives in China is the presence of second- and third-level organisations in 
Mexico. Many of these organisations were established to meet the requirements of the
i cnprovision of the forest technical services. Most second-level organisations are quite 
limited in the collective activities they undertake, which usually surround the issues of 
provision of forest technical services and the lobby for various forms of government 
support.108 Second-level coordination of forest management and marketing, however, 
is absent mainly due to the lack of trust among the different community groups.109 
Third- or national level organisations were strongly promoted by the government and 
three different national organisations have emerged, which were created at different 
times.110
The latest third-level organisation (known as the National Union of Organisations of 
Forest Communities) was created in 1993 and like the other two earlier organisations, 
it consists of both second-level organisations and individual community groups.111 
The organisations was established with the support of the Mexican government as it 
was hoped that a strategic alliance with the government would result in more financial
119assistance flowing from the government to the communities. Although it is a 
national organisation, most activities it undertakes take place at the regional level; the 
national structure serves primarily to facilitate communications between members and
106 See Chapter Three above.
107 The fourth Forest Law adopted in 1986 allowed either individual communities or organisations to 
administer their own forest technical services. However, communities were urged by the government 
and outsider organisers to band together as this was deemed to be the more efficient measure to provide 
forest technical services, Bray, D.B. and Merino-Perez, L. 2002, p 56.
108 Ibid., p 57
109 Ibid., p 58. Apart from the problem o f lack o f trust, second-level organisations also face the problem 
of high costs o f collective action: they often suffered from the defections o f the largest members 
because the perceived costs o f collective action were higher than the benefits, ibid., p 3.
110 Ibid., pp 59-63.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., p 61
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to carry out national lobbying.113 The organisation gets financial help114 from both the 
government and other donors (both foreign and local), and has so far established 
several projects in marketing, women’s projects, and certification of timber 
product.115 Despite its modest success, it has been pointed out that without the support 
of the Mexican government and foreign foundations, the national level organisation 
might not have survived as they have received very little material support from the 
member organisations.116 Furthermore, the presence of a few such organisations 
divides communities and prevents a unified voice representing all forest communities 
in Mexico.117
Forest communities in Mexico are not all identical. Apart from the indigenous and 
non-indigenous dichotomy, forest communities are also classified into different 
groups according to the degree of their involvement in the production of forest
i 10
resources. It has been proposed that there are five different types of forest 
communities in Mexico: potential producers; producers who sell timber on the stump; 
producers of forest raw materials; producers with capacity for transformation and 
marketing; and producers with capacity for processing of sawn wood.119 Potential 
producers are ‘owners of forestlands with capacity for sustainable commercial 
production that currently do not carry out logging because they lack an authorised
190forest management plan or sufficient means to pay for its elaboration’. These forest 
communities do not run any kind of community forest enterprises (CFEs). The second 
group is also known as the ‘stumpage communities’ as they, the owners of the 
forestlands, contract the forests out to third parties for commercial exploitation and do 
not get involved in any phase of the extraction process, although some may participate 
as labourers.121
Ibid.113
114 The organisation competes with another third-level organisation to get government’s funding and 





Ibid., p 63 
Ibid.
Ibid., pp 14-17. This is, however, not official classifications o f forestland by the Mexican
government. 




The third group is also known as the ‘roundwood communities’ where the owners do 
participate directly in some phases of the productive chain. For example, some
communities may own their own logging teams, and some may even own equipment
100such as skidders and trucks. The fourth group, also known as the ‘sawmill 
communities’, refers to communities that not only produce raw forest materials, and 
also have infrastructure for its primary transformation and carry out the marketing of 
their products. The last group of communities refer to ‘producers of roundwood 
that have a sawmill as well as other diversified processing infrastructure to give 
value-added to the sawnwood’.124 This is the most ‘advanced’ form of community-run 
forest enterprises where local communities are involved in all processes of the 
production of final goods, and do not have to share the proceeds with any third 
parties.
4.2 Comparisons between Mexico and China: Lessons to be Learned
So far, we have seen that there are many similarities between community-based forest 
management in Mexico and collective forest in China. For example, community land 
is divided into different categories according to its uses (such as arable land, common 
land and human settlement land). In addition, the internal governance structures of 
both the Mexican communities and the collectives in China are quite similar: both 
institutions are headed by democratically elected leaders and governing members, 
who make most, if not all, important decisions concerning common land use and 
community affairs. Lastly, both types of communities are not concerned exclusively 
with the use of forest and forest resources; both are local administrative units and 
must (to different extent) provide various kinds of services to the members of the 
community. More fundamentally, many of these collectives (in China) or 
communities (in Mexico) are not indigenous groups who claim their titles from 
traditional usage of the forests, but are administrative units created by the 
governments that actively pursue the policy of community-based forest regime.
Despite the similarities, there are stark and fundamental differences between these 




version of community-based forest regime. This is mainly because of the fact that the 
community’s autonomy over its affairs, including land use, is more extensive in 
Mexico. Chapter Two and Chapter Three above have shown the limitations of both 
the private usufruct rights and the collective ownership rights of land in China. In 
particular, community’s land ownership rights are more absolute in Mexico in the 
sense that land that are used by individual households (such as arable land and human 
settlement land) can be privatised; even common land can be privatised under limited 
circumstances. 125 In China, collective land cannot be privatised. Unlike in Mexico, 
however, collective forests (which are common land in Mexico) in China are also 
contracted out to households for private management and use.
The following subsections will look at the lessons that China can learn from the 
experience of Mexico. These lessons are broadly divided in two categories, which are 
the lessons on land and land use, and lessons on community forest management. In 
relation to the former, Mexico has a more liberal land policy which allows 
communities to exercise greater autonomy over their land. This autonomy has been 
further enhanced following the 1992 reforms that allow ejidal land to be leased,
1 9Amortgaged, transferred, and if approved by two-thirds of the members, privatised. 
The consequences of these reforms on land holding and the composition of the 
community can be used as references by the Chinese government. In particular, it 
would be interesting to look at the implications of the rights to privatise and to 
mortgage land, and how the communities cope with internal demographic changes. 
The Mexican experiences are not only relevant to collective forestland, they can also 
help to illuminate the future of collective land reform in China generally.
The second category looks particularly at community forest management. Unlike in 
China, community-owned forests are still managed as common land in Mexico, and
127forest common property is usually managed by a single community enterprise. Just 
like in China, however, multiple types of community forest management regimes 
have sprung up. 128 These different arrangements have devised rules on the
125 See n 89 above.
126 Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p 3. Communal land, including forestland, is still subject to stricter 
restrictions compared to arable land.
127 Bray, D.B. and Merino-Perez, L. 2002, p 72
128 Ibid., pp 72-74
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management of forests that reflect the local conditions; and given the fact that these 
communities face less restriction from the government on the use of land, they are 
able to adopt policies that serve the best interests of their members.129 In particular, 
there are community-run forest enterprises that are actively and directly involved in 
the commercial exploitation of forest resources.130 If China intends to revive its 
collective forest management regime, it can arguably learn from the experiences of 
these community forest enterprises in relation to the issues of management structure, 
benefit sharing, the role of the government, and so forth.
4.2.1 Lessons on Land Use Arrangement
The Mexican government introduced the agrarian reforms in 1992 to ‘revitalise the 
social sector of Mexican agriculture’, which was why it had eased the restrictions on 
community land’s transferability and alienability.131 Apart from allowing privatisation 
of and relaxing the restrictions on transferability of ejidal community land, the 
government has also introduced a no-cost registration process that aims to secure the
i  o o
title of land owners. The following paragraphs will look at the implications of these 
reforms on collective land use in Mexico based on the findings of a research that was 
carried out in Oaxaca State in 2002.133 In particular, it will focus on four key issues 
that could potentially be highly relevant to China, namely land privatisation, mortgage 
of land, registration of community ownership, and dispute resolution mechanisms.
Before privatisation can take place, approval of the village assembly needs to be 
obtained, and members of the community have the right of first refusal. Both partial 
and full privatisation requires a quorum of 50 percent, a two-thirds majority vote of 
those attending, and the presence of a representative of the Procuradfa Agraria and a 
public rotary. Furthermore, only recognised members can vote, which means most
129 Ibid.
130 The different types of community forest enterprises (which vary according to the degree o f their 
involvement in the commercial exploitation o f forest resources) have been discussed above.
131 Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p 3
132 Certificates are issued to those who have registered their titles. However, certificates are issued to 
the members o f the community individually, rather than to the entire family or jointly to both the 
spouses. This has the effect o f turning a household resource into the property o f the individual member, 
usually the male head o f household, ibid., pp 15-16.
133 This research was conducted by the Rural Development Institute (RDI). Oaxaca State is situated in 
southern M exico and is one o f M exico’s poorest states where much o f the state’s rural population 
practices subsistence agriculture. Half o f Oaxaca’s population is indigenous and 85 percent o f the land 
is held by either ejidos or comunidades, ibid., p 3.
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women are precluded from participating as they do not hold the land rights (only the
head of the households, usually male representative, is issued land certificate).134
According to the research, the only reason anyone would choose to privatise his or her
land was for the purpose of selling the land. In other words, if a farmer wished to
continue using the land, there would not be an incentive to privatise the land. It was
pointed out that ‘farmers feel that the permanent use rights that certification affords
them are secure and see little incentive to privatising’.135 Apart from selling the land,
another possible reason why farmers would want to privatise the land was to increase
the ability to access formal credit, although not many farmers have shown interest in 
1that. In addition, privatisation also entailed higher land taxes, which acted as a 
disincentive to land privatisation. The research concluded that it seemed not many 
community members would want to privatise land, except those who held land close 
to the urban centres where land had higher value for development.138
Although the situation in Mexico may not be directly applicable to China, it may 
nonetheless provide an indication of what might happen if land privatisation is 
allowed in China. If China follows the model of Mexico, the right to privatise will not 
be automatically endowed on all land users; rather, there will be steps that these users 
have to take to ‘activate’ the right to privatise. In short, there will not be an outright 
privatisation of collective land; rather there will be an option to exercise the right to 
privatise land if the collective and its members choose to do so. Although there will 
be farmers who would privatise and profit from the land, there is also a strong 
indication that if the farmers can derive enough income from the use of land and that 
usufruct right is secure there will be no incentive to privatise. Hence, it can be argued 
that instead of withholding the right to privatise, the Chinese government should 
make sure that there are incentives for the farmers to keep hold of the land.
The second issue concerns transferability of land, especially the right to mortgage. As 
pointed out in Chapter Two above, collective-owned land (except wasteland) cannot
134 Ibid., pp 20-21
135 Ibid., p 22
136 Although non-privatised land can also be legally mortgaged, many farmers have complained that 




be mortgaged or used as collateral in China.139 The research in Mexico points out that 
although the 1992 reforms have allowed community land to be mortgaged in Mexico 
(with the hope that it would increase access to credit in rural area), access to formal 
credit was still limited.140 Interviewees pointed out that they could not use their land 
as collateral to get a loan because the bank simply did not accept ejidal plots as 
collateral.141 This is likely to be due to the fact that if foreclosure occurs, the bank 
would only be able to sell an un-privatised ejidal parcel to another ejidatario (a 
member of the ejido), hence reducing the value of land for resale purposes.142 This 
problem can also be faced by Chinese farmers if mortgage of collective land were to 
be allowed.
The experience from Mexico shows that access to formal credit does not exist 
automatically once land is allowed to be mortgaged; the general rules on 
transferability will also affect the value of the land as collateral. In Mexico, the 
general rules on transferability state that an ejidatario can transfer their land rights to 
other ejidatarios or residents from the same population centre, whether or not the land 
is privatised.143 However, the member’s spouse and children have the first right of 
refusal to claim such land.144 This is not too dissimilar to China where the Rural Land 
Contracting Law specifies that members from the same collective should be given the 
priority if a land user wishes to transfer his or her right.145 The research found that 
although transfers between ejidatarios did occur, they were not very frequent.146 
Although the existing law does not require any approval for transfer of land, some 
members believe that the transfers must be approved by the comisariado. 147 
Generally, communities in Mexico face the same limitations in relation to transfer of 
land as their counterparts in China: being common property, emphasis is given to the 
use of land by members of the same community; and the regime is subject to potential 
manipulation by those who are in charge.
139 Article 49 of Rural Land Contracting Law 2002
140 Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p 26
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 The first time a privatised plot is sold, family members o f the land holder, other ejidal members, and 
the residents of the ejido population center have the right o f first refusal to purchase the plot, ibid., p 
20 .
144 Ibid., p 21
145 Article 33 o f RLCL 2002. Also see Chapter Two above, p 27.
146 Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p 22
147 Ibid.
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The third issue relates to the registration and certification of rights. The registration 
process seeks to register the rights of the community as a whole and its individual 
members, and certificates of entitlement will be issued to the ejidal members who are 
registered as land holders.148 This is similar to the situation in China where there is a 
two-tier registration of land rights: collective ownership and private usufruct rights. 
Unlike in China, however, registration is not compulsory and a vote of simple 
majority is needed to approve the registration process in Mexico.149 Prior to 
registration, external boundary assessment of the ejido or comunidade has to be 
carried out and any boundary disputes must be resolved. Maps are created to show not 
only the boundary of the community land but also individual parcels of land held by 
the community members.150 Each ejidatario would receive a certificate describing his 
or her land parcel and a map showing the exact boundary of the land. Each comunero 
(a member of the comunidade) has a certificate that describes his or her right to a 
certain percentage of the comunidade’s land.151
Like the collectives in China, comundades in Mexico also suffer from the dilemma 
between providing tenure security to its members on the one hand, and 
accommodating for demographic changes on the other. The research found that this
1S9dilemma has been handled in three different ways. First, like in China, some 
communities left part of the common land unassigned so that future members could 
receive a percentage of the land.153 Second, some communities plan to re-issue new 
certificates with new allocations of land to accommodate the change in membership 
number. Lastly, some communities have indicated that new additional members will 
not be allowed, and that new members can only obtain rights through the death or 
withdrawal of an existing member. Thus, it seems that communities in Mexico are 
also struggling to cope with the impact of demographic changes on the composition of 
collective land use rights. As long as the land is still collectively owned and members
148 Ibid., pp 15-16
149 Ibid., p 16.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., p 17. The difference between the two types o f communities is that an ejidatario  can have 
ownership right over a parcel o f land while a comunero only has usufruct right.
152 Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p 18.
153 Ibid. This corresponds to the ‘two-tier’ land system in China, see section 2.4.1.2 in Chapter Two 
above.
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of the collective have legitimate entitlement to the use of land, this dilemma will 
always persist.
The last issue to be looked at is conflict and dispute resolution. The 1992 reforms in 
Mexico established a separate court system with jurisdiction to resolve conflicts over 
the ejidal and comunidade lands.154 This court system consists of a total of 49 
Tribunates Agrarios Unitarios and one Tribunal Superior Agrario.155 These Agrarian 
Tribunals are responsible for adjudicating ejidal and comunal disputes, including 
boundary disputes, succession of members’ rights and tenancy conflicts.156 Ejidos, 
comunidades and their members can seek legal advice and representation from the 
Procuradfa Agraria, whose role is to defend the rights of, inter alia, ejidatarios and
i  cn
comuneros. According to the findings of the research, in practice, most disputes 
tend to be solved via negotiations or through a ground survey of the land with the help 
of the representatives from the Procuradfa Agraria. If the matter is still not resolved, 
the case will then be brought before the Agrarian Tribunal by the Procuradfa Agraria 
on behalf of the side that first contacted the office.158 In the state of Oaxaca, a special 
Junta de Conciliacwn Agraria was also established to resolve land boundary disputes 
between separate ejidos or comunidades mainly via conciliation. The Board or Junta 
organises meetings for the feuding parties and once an agreement is arrived at, both 
the parties sign a covenant which is then sent to the Agrarian Tribunal to be given 
legal effect.159 It has been pointed out that communities rarely ‘break’ the covenant 
once it is made because the agreement was reached by mutual consent.160
The presence of a special court system that is dedicated to dealing exclusively with 
rural disputes including land not only helps to expedite the process of land 
registration, it also offers a venue through which both the communities and their 
members can protect their interests. The special tribunals also offer expertise that 
normal courts may not have. Contrast this to China where not only there are no 
special courts or tribunals to deal with rural land disputes, there is also no special
154 Brown, Jennifer, 2004, p. 26
155 Ibid., p 8
156 Ibid., p 26.
157 Ibid., pp 26-27
158 Ibid., p 27
159 Ibid., p 28
160 Ibid.
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government agency that provides legal advice and representation to rural land users. 
In China, local land disputes are usually dealt with by the village leaders or local 
governments via negotiation and mediation.161 However, if mediation does not work, 
or if the feuding parties refuse to have mediation, they can bring the case to the court 
for adjudication.162 The lack of a fast and easy access to legal recourse in China may 
compromise the interests of rural land users. This is particularly true in relation to 
disputes involving rural land users and the government as existing system has been 
found to favour the government over the interests of the people.163 Furthermore, it has 
been pointed out above that boundary disputes are rife within the collective forest 
regime164; this situation is exacerbated by the failing judiciary system. It is arguable 
that until and unless land registration processes are improved and an expedient and 
impartial court system is established to help to resolve rural land disputes, further land 
reforms that aim to devolve land use rights to private entities will be problematic.
4.2.2 Lessons on Community Forestry
Having looked at the Mexican’s model on land use and ownership arrangement, this 
section will discuss the community forestry regime in Mexico. The main features of 
community forestry in Mexico have already been pointed out above, including the 
internal governance structure, the entitlements and obligations of community 
members, and the second and third-level organisations. This section will complement 
the discussions above by looking at the community forest enterprises (CFEs) in 
Mexico. These refer to forest enterprises owned and run by communities that are 
directly or indirectly involved in commercial exploitation of forest resources. The 
following analysis include a brief history of the evolution of CFEs in Mexico and the 
building of social capital, the different models of CFEs, and lastly, the difficulties 
encountered by the CFEs. It is hoped that the experience in Mexico will provide some 
reference to collectives in China that wish to be actively engaged in the forest 
industry.
161 According to a survey o f three provinces in China, 64.2 percent o f the interviewees chose to settle 
land disputes via mediation that involved village cadres, 4.2 percent chose mediation by township 
government officers, while only 2.7 percent chose to settle the disputes via the court, Chen Xiaojun et 
al., 2003, p 44.
162 Chen, Albert, 2005, p 131-150. Apart from adjudication, the court is also obliged to deal with 
complaints brought to their attention via the ‘letter and visit’ channel, ibid., pp 146-147.
163 See Chapter One above. Problems o f the judiciary system in China, including lack o f independence 
and corruption, are discussed in Chen, Albert, 2005, pp 151-159.
164 Ho, Peter, 2005, pp 100 -  119.
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The first CFEs in Mexico were established in the 1960s as a form of opposition to the 
domination of private companies in the exploitation of timber, where communities felt 
that their interests had been disregarded.165 Two agencies or organisations established 
by the government played a particularly important role in promoting the proliferation 
of the CFEs during that period, which were the National Fund for Ejido Development 
(FONAFE)166 and the General Directorate of Forest Development (DGDF).167 
FONAFE was put in charge of promoting the formation of CFEs to become suppliers 
of forest raw materials to the timber parastatals.168 The DGDF further spurred the 
establishment and independence of the CFEs by promoting the development of 
community capacities to manage their own forests, independently from the 
parastatals.169 This was facilitated mainly via the provision of technical advice and
170assistance. As a result of these efforts, private concessions and parastatals were 
gradually replaced by community forest enterprises. The growth of CFEs during this 
period was said to have increased dramatically the income of the communities and 
their members.171
Community forest enterprises underwent a few modifications during the 1990s. As 
pointed out above, community land tenure (especially ejidal land) was further 
liberalised where land privatisation and transfer were made possible. The main aim of 
the reforms was to encourage forest plantations and to turn over the management of 
natural forests to the market as much as possible.172 In addition to the land tenure 
reforms, some other measures were also introduced to facilitate the transition of 
Mexican’s forestry to the market system. For example, the law relating to the 
paperwork required for logging, transporting and processing wood products was
165 At the time, although timber resources were generally the properties o f communities and private 
landowners, logging concessions were given to private enterprises and were administered by the state. 
Under the system, communities complained o f ‘arbitrariness o f the companies, the failure to live up to 
the agreements and depredations o f their forest’, Bray, D.B. and Merino-Perez, L. 2002, p 33.
166 FONAFE was a government trust fund that carried out field operations to promote rural 
development. It was funded by the stumpage fees paid to the communities and according to law, 70 of 
the funds went to FONAFE accounts in the community’s name and the other 30 percent went directly 
to the community. Ibid., p 34
167 The DGDF was a unit within the Forestry Subsecretariat o f the Secretary o f Agriculture, ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid., p 36
170 Ibid., pp 37-38.
171 Ibid., p 39
172 Ibid., p 40
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simplified, and the provision of forest technical services was privatised. 173 
Furthermore, a ‘national consultative technical forest council’ was created to increase 
public participation and transparency in the formation of forest policy.174 Two other 
major programmes that have also had an impact on the CFEs are the Programme for 
the Development of Commercial Forest Plantations (PRODEPLAN) and the Forest 
Development Programme (PRODEFOR). The former concerns the government’s 
initiatives to spur investment in commercial plantations by providing subsidies to
17Scover the start-up costs. The second programme concerns sustainable management 
of natural forests where the government again provides subsidies (with contributions 
from forest operators) to natural forest owners to encourage them to carry out 
sustainable development of forest, reforestation and rehabilitation.176 These two 
programmes were implemented under the 1997 Forest Law.177
So far, the discussion on the evolution of Mexico’s CFEs reveals one important 
difference between Mexico and China, which is the degree of public participation and 
democratic decision-making processes that are present throughout the history of CFEs 
in Mexico but are lacking in China. Community forest and community forest 
enterprises started as communities struggled for the protection of their right to land; 
they have since been actively promoted by the government and other third parties
178such as non-governmental organisations and universities. A lot of these 
communities have had more than 50 years of experience in managing community 
forests. Although there are some that have been unsuccessful and disbanded, most of 
the communities have survived and flourished.179 It is arguable that the fact that these 
communities were created on a voluntary basis increased the chances of survival as 
community members may have more inclination to make sure that it works. The 
creation of ‘supra-ejidal’ organisations (organisations at the regional and national 
levels) is also an indication of the will and ability of the communities to build up the
173 Ibid.
174 The consultative body consists o f representatives from government agencies, academics, industry, 
non-governmental organisations and peasant organisations, ibid., pp 40-41
175 Ibid., pp 43-47
176 This programme was part o f the Programme for Forestry and Soil 1995-2000, ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 This is evidenced from the presence o f various government agencies that were set up to represent 
the interests of the communities, and the various programmes that sought to give support to community 
forest enterprises. Ibid., pp 48-54
179 Ibid., p 65
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social capital necessary for the coordination of efforts at a higher level. Multi-party 
dialogues and the participation of the interested parties in decision-making processes 
have ensured that community forestry in Mexico continued to grow and to adapt to 
new challenges.
Furthermore, the success of the community forestry in Mexico is also helped by the 
fact that the community members recognise some elements of community life as 
fundamental, such as ‘consensual decision-making, ritual offices, voluntary 
community labour, feast days and other moments in community life’.180 In short, 
community members show their commitment in the well-being of the common 
property regime by participating in community activities and most importantly, 
consensual decision-making processes. Consensual decision-making is vital for the 
survival and success of a CFE as it is via this process that problems and issues are 
debated and resolved. This is particularly relevant as the CFEs not only aspire to 
maximise profits, they are also concerned with generation of employment within the 
communities, the conservation of the forests, and the maximisation of community 
participation.181 The operation of a CFE is a complex task as it touches upon the 
social, economic and cultural aspects of the community. As a result, democratic 
decision-making process is necessary to allow members to deliberate on how their 
common properties should be used. For example, the community needs to decide on 
issues such as who should be in charge of the operation of the CFE, whether 
managerial roles should be rotated, how labour policies should be decided, what 
financial management and business strategy to be adopted, who can participate in
1 O '}
decision-making, and how to deal with issue of corruption and mismanagement. All 
these issues will impact on the efficiency and equity of the CFE.
There are four general models of community forest enterprises in Mexico. These 
different models range from entirely communal-based forest management to 
individual appropriation of common resources. The first model is where forest 
common property is undivided in any way and is administered by a single unit. Both 
the stocks and flows (profits from and products of forest resources) are treated as
180 Ibid., p 65
181 Ibid., p 76
182 Ibid., pp 74-76
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common property and are shared by the members.183 The second model concerns 
community management of private land. This is where private landholders are 
persuaded to join community-run logging operations. In return to the landholders’ 
agreement to follow a community management plan and to allow the community to 
log on their land, a stumpage fee is paid. Hence, although the stocks are privatised, 
the flows from the forest are communal.184 In contrast to this, under the third model, 
the stocks are treated as communal properties but the flows are divided up into a 
number of separate enterprises. Instead of a single communal administrative unit, a 
few ‘work groups’ have been formed and share the annual authorised logging volume
18Son a proportional basis. The fourth model consists of the combination of two 
management types. While the stocks remain to be communally-owned, the annual 
authorised logging volume is divided into two groups: the first consists of individual 
members who have obtained the right to log, and the second consists of several ‘work 
groups’. Hence, the flows are appropriated in an equal volume by both individuals
1 o / r
and work groups. The last model closely resembles the arrangement in China in 
relation to land contracted out to individual households. Under this model, communal 
forest is internally and informally parcelled out among the ejidal members (bearing in 
mind that forest is formally regarded as common property). Each member is entitled 
to appropriate timber resources on the land allocated to him or her in accordance to a 
communal management plan where the authorised volume that is divided and shared 
proportionally by all land users.187
The different models of CFE in Mexico show the flexibility that is enjoyed by the
communities in managing their common properties. In a way, this is similar to China
where different types of management regimes have been adopted by collectives
1 88according to the local conditions. However, it is arguable that the presence of 
community forest enterprises is minimal in China compared to Mexico. This could be 
because management of most collective forestland has been devolved to private
183 One community that has adopted this model is El Balcon in Guerrero, ibid., p 72.
184 An example o f this model can be found in the community o f San Juan Nuevo Parangaricutiro in 
Michoacan, ibid.
185 The community o f Petcacab in Quintana Roo has adopted this model, ibid., p 73.
186 This model can be found in four ejidos in the Union de Ejidos Forestales de Tamaulipas, ibid.
187 The community o f Cuauhtemoc in Quintano Roo has adopted this model, ibid.
188 Some examples of these different models are the share-holding, private association and public 
association regimes. See Chapter Two above.
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households. Furthermore, most community-company deals in China involve merely 
the collective providing the land while the operations are carried out by private
1 RQcompanies. Also, timber production in China has always been dominated by state- 
owned forest enterprises, which have control over most of China’s natural forest.190 
With the focus now shifted from natural forest to plantation forest as sources of 
timber following the adoption of the Natural Forest Protection Programme, it is 
arguable that collective forests, where the majority of plantation forests are found191, 
can play a greater role in timber production in the future. If the Chinese government 
indeed wishes to develop its collective forest industry in the future, it should promote 
the establishment of community forest enterprises that not only just contribute the 
land, but are also actively involved in the production operations so that more benefits 
can be accrued to the community. As seen above, a robust and dynamic social capital 
is an indispensable ingredient if a community forest enterprise is to succeed. Based on 
the experience of Mexico, there are many things the government can do to build up 
the necessary social capital, including the creation of government agencies and 
programmes that provide financial, technical and legal assistance to community 
members. Collective management and ownership of forestland can be enhanced by 
letting the collectives to have a genuine control over the use of their common 
properties.
Despite the dynamism of Mexican CFEs, some communities and their members still 
face with some major problems in relation to the management of community forest 
enterprises. Among the problems resulted from internal institutional arrangements are 
illegal logging, corruption, elite domination and professionalism. In particular, lack of 
management plans has spurred illegal logging.192 Furthermore, corruption has also led
189 The Eastern region of China managed to attract a few large-scale foreign timber companies to invest 
in forest plantation. For example, Finland's Stora Enso Oyj, one o f the world's leading paper 
manufacturers, has invested US$150 million in a 150,000-hectare plantation in Guangxi. In addition, 
Singaporean paper firm Golden Eagle recently invested U S$500 million in forests in the Jiangsu 
Province whilst Asia Pulp & Paper, which is one o f the world's top four paper producers, has been 
planting trees in China since 1995 and now manages forests in the Guangxi, Guangdong and Hainan 
provinces, Godfrey, Mark, 2004. These companies usually set up joint-ventures, facilitated by the local 
government, with local communities who would provide the land and the raw materials, Mayers, J. and 
Vermeulen, S. 2002, pp 144-145.
190 Rozelle, Scott, et al., 2000, p 105
191 Ibid., p 104; Liu Dachang and David Edmunds, in Hyde, W.F. et al., 2003, p 32.
192 It was pointed out that only half o f the communities with forest o f potential commercial exploitation 
have management plans, Klooster, 1999, p 367.
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to clandestine logging and timber smuggling, which resulted in forest degradation in
i  . 1 9 3at least one community.
A comparison between the forest community plagued by corruption and inefficiency, 
and the forest communities that have been successful has highlighted some important 
elements that have an impact on the different outcomes.194 The successful forest 
communities are able to enforce restrictions on individual uses of the forest, and run 
effective logging operations under community control. First and foremost, it was 
found that a strong and well-attended community assembly with vigorous monitoring 
increases greatly the effectiveness of the governance structure. This also promotes 
transparency and accountability in the decision-making process. Secondly, successful 
communities also have accounting and reporting practices that provide a healthy flow 
of information to their members. Thirdly, these communities distribute both the 
benefits from logging and the restrictions on forest use fairly. This has helped to avoid 
discontentment and frictions among community members. Fourthly, the successful 
communities also participate in technical aspects of forestry. Community members 
who are trained in forestry science provide technical advice and assistance to the 
managers of communal forests. In short, active participation by the members and 
transparent decision-making processes reduce the incidents of corruption.
Lastly, another problem that needs to be addressed is the issue of professionalism. 
This is particularly relevant to communities that have their own forest enterprises. The 
issue of professionalism refers to over-restrictive social practices that shut out 
external professional help which ultimately hampers the development of CFEs.195 
These over-restrictive practices are known as ‘communal fetters’, which prevent a 
CFE to become more competitive and efficient in the market place. It is a common 
trait of certain business organisations where cultural practices and community ties 
dominate economic decision-making.196 However, this problem can also be easily
193 Ibid., p 372. The author compared the case o f San Martin Ocotlan, a corrupted and failed forest 
community in Oaxaca, with seven other successful forest communities in his studies o f the impact of 
institutions on the outcomes o f community forest management.
194 Ibid., pp 374-376
195 Bray, D.B. and Merino-Perez, L. 2002, pp 66-68.
196 Business organisations run by Chinese families provide good examples to the understanding o f this 
phenomenon. A social researcher Fukuyama argued that ‘the Chinese family provides the social capital 
with which to start up new businesses, but it also constitutes a major structural constraint on these
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solved by training professional managers from within the community.197 Professional 
managers assisted by technical staff, all of whom are members of the community, will 
not only bring in the professionalism required, but will also enhance the autonomy 
and independence of the community.
4.3 Conclusion
The extensive experience of community forestry in Mexico has been discussed in this 
section. The purpose of the discussion is to provide China with a viable comparison 
with which it can use to either model China’s collective forest on or to predict the 
future direction its collective forest should move towards. From the analysis above, it 
seems that forest communities in Mexico are more dynamic and independent 
compared to the collectives in China. This is due to a few features that are unique to 
forest communities in Mexico: first, forest communities are established by the 
initiation of the community members themselves, rather than being forcefully 
imposed by the government; second, communities are given more extensive 
autonomy to deal with community affairs including use and privatisation of land; 
third, the government and non-governmental organisations have given much financial 
and technical support to communities in establishing community-owned enterprises 
that provide employment and incomes to community members; fourth, there are 
special government agencies and a special court system that are set up to promote and 
protect the interests of forest communities; and fifth, there are second and third tier 
organisations that push the forest communities’ agenda beyond the community level.
108As a result, community forestry is more vibrant in Mexico compared to China. It is 
also arguable that with community members fare better under the former as protection 
of rights, transparency and democratic decision-making seem to be stronger in 
Mexico than in China.199 The experience in Mexico shows that collective and private 
land ownership regimes can exist side by side; and that if the Chinese government
enterprises that in many cases prevents them from evolving into durable, large-scale institutions.’, ibid., 
p 67.
*97 Ibid.
198 For example, in the Oaxaca state alone there are 42 profitable community forest enterprises that 
range from ‘stumpage’ communities to ‘finished product’ communities, ibid., p 85.
199 The author refers exclusively to members o f forest communities and not the wider rural community. 
The differences in the impact o f the community land regime in M exico on its overall rural welfare 
compared to the impact o f the collective regime in China can only be speculated.
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decides to continue to emphasise collective ownership and management of forestland, 
it needs to play a more active role in facilitating and promoting the establishment of 
more viable forest communities. To do this, the government should first relax the 
control over land use and let the collectives decide (within the ambit of general land 
use law such as planning and zoning law) how to use the land according to local 
conditions. It should also provide more financial and technical assistance to further 
build up the social capital that are required for the collective self-governing regime. 
Although there have been improvement in private land use rights in China since the 
1970s reform, over-restrictive land use control by the government and the inherent 
weaknesses in the collective governance system (as discussed in Chapter Three) have 
continued to obstruct the emergence of a truly independent collective regime.
5. The Latest Forestland Reform: The Panacea?
Having looked at community forestry in other places and Mexico, this section takes a 
look at the latest collective forestland reform in China to see if it offers any viable 
solutions to the existing problems. In particular, China seems to be stuck between 
extremely conservative concept of private rights200 and under-developed collective 
self-governing institution. Despite the government’s effort to introduce stability into 
the tenure system by introducing new legislations (the latest one being the Property 
Law), development of collective forest is still riddled with problems. This is not only 
because of the many restrictions imposed by the government on land use, but also 
because of the nature of the arrangement which makes it impossible for China to 
transform its rural economy. The existence of these restrictions is closely related to 
the fact that ownership of rural land still resides with the collective, and that, as 
explained above, the collective entity is by no means effective or independent.
Even though China has the largest plantation forest (here generally refers to man- 
made forest) in the world, many of them consist of shelterbelts and economic 
forest.201 It is an undeniable truth that China is not even close to supply enough timber
200 The shortcomings o f the HRS in relation to the wider property rights issue has also been discussed 
by Donald Clarke in Clarke, Donald, 2000, and Clarke, Donald, 2002.
201 Economic forest here refers to orchards. In 1998, around one third o f the total plantation (man- 
made) forests consisted o f fruit trees, Country Report, 2003, p 12
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to fulfil its domestic demand.202 Even though the growth of plantation forest is the 
quickest and highest in its collective forest , it has not grown in a pace fast enough 
to meet the supply shortage, especially after the implementation of the logging ban in 
1998.204 There has not been more investment by the collectives partly due to lack of 
resources205 and lack of household participation.206 In addition, one of the most-cited 
examples of successful collective management based on the share-holding system has
907also failed to hold up in many places. Lastly, there is also dissatisfaction among 
rural households in that some village leaders were treating collective forestland as 
their own and abusing their position to make profit.208
Furthermore, although it is true that a large area of wasteland has since been 
contracted out and planted with trees, trees on these lands are mostly reserved for 
ecological protection purposes.209 The government has set a target of establishing 13.4
9 1 0million ha of new plantations during the period 2001-2015. According to the 
statistics, between 1991 and 2001, the four main forest regions211 in China had
9 1 9established 3.3 million ha of new plantations. Out of these plantations, only around
91 o
half were timber forests. In order to increase domestic supply of timber, the 
government needs to take vigorous steps to encourage and increase private 
investment. In particular, the stock volume in plantation forest is very low, accounting 
for only around 10 percent of the total.214 ^
The latest forestland reform in the southern provinces of China aims to address the 
existing problems faced by collective forests. The catalyst of the reform was the State
202 See Chapter One above.
203 In 1998, collective forest accounted for around 81 percent o f the total plantation area while state 
forest accounted for only around 19 percent. Country Report, 2003, p 12
204 See Chapter One above.
205 Yin Zhijuan and Liu Huagen. 2006, p77.
206 Wang Chunfeng, 2005.
207 For example, there were more than 400 share-holding forestland management regimes across Hunan 
Province in the 1990s, but only around 20 o f them were left now, Liu Jinnlong, 2006, p l5 .
208 Liu Chang and Dong Wei. 24 August 2006
209 Art 46 Rural Land Contracting Law 2002
210 Nilsson, S. et al., 2004
211 The North-East (mainly state forests), South-West (mixture o f both state and collective forests), 
South (mainly collective forests), and the Three-North farm forest region. Forest resources are mainly 
concentrated in the first three regions, and taken together, they account for 84 percent o f forest cover 
and 90 percent o f timber standing stock, Demurger, S. and Yang W ., 2006
212 Ibid.
2131.55 million ha, ibid.
214 Country Report, 2003
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Council’s Decision to Accelerate the Development o f Forestry, issued in 2003. The 
participating provinces produced individual laws that govern the implementation of 
the reform, although most of them focused on the same issues: tenure and tax 
reform.215 This reform, however, has failed to address other equally, if not more, 
important issues such as the logging quota and further marketisation of forestry. In 
relation to land tenure, one of the important features of the reform involves devolution 
of collective forestland that have not been contracted out to private individuals and 
rural households. Under the reform, land use rights can be devolved to the household 
level via various ways, including auction, administrative allocation, contracting out 
with a fee, share-holding system and so forth.216 The use of market mechanisms is in 
stark contrast to the early reform in 1980s where most of the forestland were allocated 
on an egalitarian basis. In addition, apart from devolution of use rights to the 
households, the reform also aims at increasing the efficiency of collective 
management of forest. For forestland that is still subject to collective management,
9 1 7  7 1 8either a share-holding or an association system was introduced.
The reform also aims to improve the transferability of forestland. The right to transfer 
land and land use rights is enhanced by the reform and many provinces will indeed 
allow transfer to take place with less restrictions, including the abolition of the right 
of first refusal by the village members.219 Furthermore, the right to mortgage is
770granted under the new reform in some provinces. In relation to the tax reform, the 
aim is to reduce the financial burden of farmers and to increase profitability of the 
forest industry. So far it seems that Jiangxi Province’s tax reform has gone the 
furthest: it not only abolished the Special Agricultural Tax (SAT) and other (county
215 For Fujian Province, see Fujian Province People’s Government’s Opinion about Introducing 
Collective Forest Property Rights Reform (2005)
For Jiangxi Province, see: Jiangxi Province Proposal for the Implementation o f the Trial o f Forest 
Property Rights Reform (2005)
For Hebei Province, see: Hebei Province People’s Government’s Opinion on the Further Reform of the 
Collective Forest Property Rights (2005)
For Liaoning Province, see: Liaoning Province People’s Government’s Opinion about Collective 
Forest Property Rights Reform (2006)
216 Qiu Ju, et al., 2006; Sun Yan, Xu Jintao and Li Ling, 2006; Yin Zhijuan and Liu Huagen, 2006.
217 Under a share-holding system, households were not allocated land; instead, they received shares o f  
the land.
218 Associations usually take the form o f village groups, or grouping o f village households.
219 The right o f first refusal by the collective members, however, is retained by Liaoning Province and 
Hebei Province.
220 Hebei, Liaoning, Fujian and Zhjiang Province, supra n 215 above.
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and local level) associated charges and fees for timber and bamboo products, it has 
also re-adjusted the rate of charges for afforestation fund. In addition, it has also re­
adjusted the percentage of the sharing of afforestation fund between the provincial 
government, county government, township government and the village governance.221 
Hebei Province has also halved the afforestation fund contribution rate from 12 
percent to 6 percent.222 Furthermore, 100 percent of the afforestation fund is now 
retained by the county government. Thus, it seems that apart from aiming to increase 
profitability of production of forest resources, the reform also seeks to increase 
afforestation activities.
One success example of the collective forestland reform is the change in benefit- 
sharing arrangements in Huangsha Village, Shixing County in Guangdong 
Province. There were 28,000 mu (1,866 hectare) of collective timber and economic 
forest in the administrative village: 16,000 mu had been contracted out to households 
in five village groups while 12,000 mu (that belongs to eight village groups) were still 
under collective management. Following the latest round of forestland reform, sharing 
of forestry incomes from the second group of forest has been re-arranged: 25 percent 
went to forest management unit that manages (including planting of trees) the forest; 
5 percent went to the village government; the remaining 70 percent went to the village 
groups whose trees have been logged. Tlte paid forest management tasks were carried 
out by members of the collective who have won the right to manage via competitive 
auction. This new arrangement has two main positive implications: collective forest 
management has become more efficient; and the legitimate interests of the collective 
members as owners of the land are recognised as they are allocated the largest share 
of the income. However, the new arrangement is still plagued by two major 
difficulties, which are the restraints imposed by the logging quota and lack of public 
participation in decision-making processes.224
It is still too early to assess the overall impact of the new reform on collective 
forestland. A few studies on the results of the reform have highlighted some positive 
development in forestry in the participating provinces, such as the increases in land
221 Supra n 215 above.
222 Ibid.
223 Xiao Jian, 22 January 2008
224 Ibid.
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transfer transactions, afforestation rate and household income. 225 According to 
surveys already carried out in one of these areas, the results are promising as 
forestland area and income of households from forestry have both increased.226 In 
particular, devolution of management rights and the introduction of market elements 
into the existing regime have greatly improved efficiency.227 However, there are still 
many issues that are left unresolved. For example, even though land use transfer has
998increased , they are by no means efficient. The three main problems associated with 
land (and land use) transfer are lack of proper agreements, unreasonable transfer fees,
990and lack of capital. In relation to the first problem, contracts have not been used in 
all transactions230; even if there are written agreements, some important provisions are
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either not inserted or are vague. Calculation of transfer fees is not scientific and 
does not reflect the market price. This usually results in abuse of transferors who may 
not have access to the relevant market information.232 Lastly, lack of financial capital 
prohibits more widespread land exchanges. Furthermore, as long as the issues of 
harvesting quota and excessive taxation are not addressed, forestry will stay 
unprofitable and land exchanges will be limited.233 If the problems associated with 
land use transfer are not addressed, there is a danger that devolution of land use rights 
to household level may not achieve the aims the reform sets out to accomplish. Land 
use transfer is particularly important in the case of forestland because fragmented tiny 
plots of forestland are not prone to effective management. Hence, effective and 
efficient forestland management in a modem economic setting requires uninhibited 
exchanges of land use rights so that land can be consolidated in the hands of those 
who have the resources and willingness to invest.
Similarly, even though forestland is now allowed to be mortgaged, it has proved to be 
difficult in reality.234 Apart from the less than straightforward procedure, valuation of
225 Zheng Linxun and Jiang Hong, 2006; Qiu Ju, et al., 2006
226 Qiu Ju et al., 2006
227 Cheng Yunxing, 2004, pp 175-194.
228 Hu Baoyu, 2006; Qiu Ju, et al., 2006
229 Hu Baoyu, 2006
230 Zheng Linxun and Jiang Hong, 2006
231 One example is the obligation to reforest the land once the trees have been cut down, ibid.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid
234 Kong Xiangzhi, 2006
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land or forest stock is also proved to be costly.235 Furthermore, forest farmers do not 
usually get sufficient capital from mortgage alone. In addition, mortgage of forest 
stock may affect application for harvesting quota.236 If this is so, it will defeat the very 
purpose of the reform in land mortgage since without being able to harvest the trees, 
there would be no incentive to invest in reforestation.
Besides the issues of land transfer and mortgage, the reform has also failed to increase 
investment in forestry significantly. According to the results of a survey in Fujian 
Province, labour and fertiliser investment in forestry have not really increased.237 In 
particular, the data shows that use of fertiliser is only significantly related to the size 
of the land, namely the bigger the size of the plot the more the fertiliser will be used. 
This lack of investment is deemed to be caused by low (or lack of) profitability of the 
forestry industry itself. Low profitability is mainly caused by excessive taxation (plus 
charges and fees) and the imposition of the logging quota. Even though taxation and 
charges are part of the reform, its impact on the forestry industry has not been clear. 
Also, the reform fails to address the issue of harvesting quota. In short, it is arguable 
that the latest foreland reform itself is incapable of taking China’s forestry into the 
next stage if other important issues related to the market are not tackled properly. In 
relation to land reallocation and requisition, the general laws apply although as 
already seen in Chapter Two aboye, implementation has not always been 
straightforward nor effective. Lastly, in relation to collective management, in many 
places it still suffers from the same drawbacks, namely lack of legitimacy, abuse and 
incompetence.239 It has been pointed out that the half-governmental and half-self- 
governance nature of collective body is not able to fully represent the interests of 




238 Forestry tax reform has been discussed in Chapter One above. The discussion points out that 
although tax reform is essential for the development o f forest and forestry in China, local governments 
suffer from shortage o f income as a result o f the reform. This inevitably impacts on the ability o f the 
local governments to provide public services and amenities or to pay for the day-to-day running o f the 
administration. As a result, covert charges and fess have sprung up again.
239 Hu Baoyu, 2006; Liu Jinlong, 2006
240 Liu Jinlong, 2006
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mainly positive reviews since the inception of the SHIFT system in Sanming, Fujian, 
it has not worked well in every place.241
Hence, even though the new collective forestland tenure reform in China has set out 
to tackle the issues of tenure security, land transfer and mortgage discussed above, the 
impacts are far from clear. This section shows that there are still problems within the 
households contracting out system. The early HRS reform succeeded in injecting the 
much-needed incentives into household management of agricultural land, including 
the forestland. However, the reality shows that mere ‘fine-tuning’ of private use rights 
may not be sufficient for further development, as many of the difficulties are 
associated with the collective ownership regime. There are still many hurdles to a 
properly functioning private rights regime. In particular, the current regime inhibits 
the establishment of a properly functioning land market that enables land to be 
exchanged and to be put to the most efficient use. For this reason, it is questionable 
whether the current ‘collective ownership and private use rights’ of forestland is 
tenable. It is debatable that China is now ready for and will benefit from a private land 
ownership regime; and that there is no reason for China to cling to the ideology of 
collective ownership, as pointed out in Chapter Three above. And even if the 
government thinks that radical and ownership reform is currently unacceptable, it is 
important to recognise that there are alternative arrangements, such as the community- 
based forest management regime in Mexican discussed above, that are viable or even 
more desirable.
6. Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of the theory of common property management 
and the community-base forest management regime in Mexico. They offer some 
yardsticks against which the rationality and viability of China’s collective forest 
regime can be measured. Although community-based timber production in Mexico 
can hardly be hailed as a great success, it nevertheless embodies some features that 
may make a community-based forest management regime more sustainable, such as 
voluntary association and public participation. It seems that China’s collective forest
241 Liu Jinlong, 2006
218
regime does not have the essential attributes of a successful common resource 
management regime identified by the theorists discussed above. For example, forest 
boundary disputes are abound; collectives’ autonomy to make decisions for the 
collective property is greatly restricted; members’ participation in decision-making is 
weak; effective conflict and dispute resolution mechanisms are lacking; and last but 
not the least, there is no regional or national organised associations that represent the 
collective interests of the members of the forest community, especially against the 
intrusion by the state.
The latest attempt by the Chinese government to further liberalise the collective forest 
regime has not introduced any radical changes to the collective forest system. It 
merely intensifies the contracting out processes (where collective land is contracted 
out to private households or individuals for management purposes), and attempts to 
reduce taxes and charges that have kept the profitability of forest industry low. The 
actual impacts of the reform on the forest industry and reforestation (and 
afforestation) activities are still too early to be discerned. However, all the ‘new’ 
measures are introduced within the existing framework of insecure property rights and 
a weak collective governance structure. It is difficult to envisage how collective forest 
regime in China can be significantly improved without addressing the underlying 
institutional limitations. Furthermore, a,radical reform in the forest sector itself will 
not be able to achieve the desirable results; as Chapter Three above pointed out, forest 
and rural land use in China are greatly influenced by the socio-economic conditions of 
rural China. For example, development and rural-city migration have impacted on not 
only the demography of rural area (and subsequently the supply of labour), they have 
also had an impact on land use. Also, without the improvement in the legal and 
judicial systems, protection of private property rights (which is one of the main 
elements in the latest round of forestland reform) will not be complete or effective.
The next and last chapter will look at the future direction that, in the author’s opinion, 
the Chinese government can take in order to improve its forest and forestry sector. 
Given the development path China has taken and the social changes that are taking 
place in its rural area, there is one thing that is certain for the future transformation of 
its rural land holding: public participation and democratic decision-making are 
indispensable ‘ingredients’ for a more successful and sustainable non-state forest
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management regime. These are crucial attributes whether the government chooses to 
further improve its collective forest regime by strengthening the collective 
management (and ownership) system or by allowing privatisation of collective land.
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion: Property Rights Reform
1. Introduction
The last chapter concludes the findings of the research by discussing the future land 
ownership reform of China’s collective forestland. Land ownership reform not only is 
necessary for the improvement of social justice and the economy in rural China, it 
also has the potential for greatly improving forest governance. Chapter One has 
discussed how property rights theory explains the role of property rights in promoting 
the efficient exploitation of resources1, and the importance of formal property 
institutions in promoting sustainable development of a thriving economy.2 It is 
assumed that ‘once a right or value is created, the owner has an incentive to maintain
5 3that value so that they can maximise the profits that accrue from selling that right’. 
Accordingly, private property rights are deemed to be able to induce the most efficient 
outcome (at least in a market economy) because of the obvious and direct relationship 
(which also indicates low transaction costs) between effort and reward. For other 
forms of property rights, the causal link is not always straightforward and as a 
consequence may result in inefficient and unsustainable use of resources.4
A private property regime, however, does not mean that the government has no role to 
play in regulating resource use. In China, the government has opted to regulate land 
use via the ownership regime. As a result, households’ land use rights exist within the 
framework of the collective ownership and are subject to various (and excessive) 
restrictions imposed by the government. The rigid land use framework is exacerbated 
by the fact that policies are imposed in a ‘top-down’ fashion, including the creation of 
the collective regime itself. In this circumstance, public participation in decision­
making and accountability are limited. Without the ‘bottom-up’ feedback system, the 
probability of the government making the ineffective policies is higher. Policies are
1 Demsetz, H., 1967; Posner, R., 2007
2 North, D., 1990; Chen, Lei, 2007, p 5.
3 Gunningham, N., and Grabosky, P., 2007.pp 70-71.
4 In an ‘open access’ regime, the causal link between efforts and rewards is tenuous or absent 
altogether so resource are depleted very quickly (see Chapter Four above). For state and collective 
ownership, the causal link may sometimes be too tenuous; as a result, monitoring costs can be high 
which in turn increases the inefficiency o f resource use (see Chapter Two above).
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ineffective when they fail to take into account the actual socio-economic conditions of 
the society, and when they produce unproductive or inefficient use of resources. As 
the pre-household responsibility system period shows, ineffective government 
policies could bring devastating consequences not only to the government but also to 
the people. Instead of controlling resource use via ownership rights, in most market 
economies, the government exercises control over resource use via public 
regulations.5 This creates a ‘win-win’ situation where private property promotes 
efficient management of resources at a low cost (to the government) and public 
regulations allow the government to control the externalities of individual activities 
by re-allocating property rights.6
Apart from its significance in inducing economic growth, rural land reform is also 
important for China’s legal and social development. A legally protected private rights 
regime allows individuals to have access to legal mechanisms to have their rights 
upheld. As seen in the previous chapters, protection of private property rights is only 
starting to be taken seriously recently in China with the adoption of the new Property 
Law. How significantly private property rights will advance against the power of the 
state is open to question as the new law has not curtailed some of the most arbitrary 
powers held by the state against private and collective properties.7 It is fair to say that 
although China’s society and economy have transformed beyond recognition in the 
last three decades, its political and legal reforms are still lagging behind. Having said 
that, the rapid economic growth has ‘propelled’ the government to play ‘catch-up’ 
with its legal system and China has churned out hundreds of new laws since 1978.8 As 
the rule of law is being strengthened in China9, it is highly likely that an evolution 
towards a more secure private property regime is inevitable. It is arguable that in an 
authoritarian state where individuals do not participate in democratic elections and
5 Public regulations such as zoning and planning law, pollution control legislations, and forest 
management law aim at balancing the interests o f individual resource owners with the general public 
interests. Public regulations usually prohibit certain types o f activities or demand certain desirable 
actions to be taken, and imposes sanctions or incentives accordingly.
6 See Coase’ theory o f social cost for more discussions on the role o f property rights in affecting the 
allocation o f social resources and the social costs, Coase, R., 1960.
7 One example is the right to requisition land for development purposes. See Chapter Two and Three 
above for discussions.
8 Since 1978, more than 350 laws and 6,000 lower-level regulations have been passed, Peerenboom, 
Randall, 2002, p 239
9 For problems associated with the lack o f rule o f law in China, including the judicial system, see Chen, 
Albert, 1999, pp 104-105.
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decision-making processes, private property rights can enhance the protection of 
individual rights as they can be used as a protective ‘shield’ against potential state 
oppression. The reform of property rights, however, will not be complete without the 
reform of China’s judicial system. As will be discussed below, without an 
independent and impartial judiciary, private rights will be devoid of meaning.
The chapter will begin by discussing the results of some case studies that looked at 
the significance of tenure security on investment in and use of forest resources. They 
show that the problem of unsustainable use of forest resources could be solved by 
enhancing private rights of resource users, especially ownership rights. This is 
followed by the discussion of property rights reform in relation to China’s forestland. 
At present, three options have been identified in relation to the possible property 
rights reform of rural land: nationalisation; privatisation; and further refinement of the 
collective ownership regime.10 So far, no radical moves have been taken to either 
nationalise or privatise collective forestland; preservation of the status quo seems to 
be the preferred choice. Yet, discussions in the previous chapters show that the 
current attempts by the Chinese government to improve tenure security are 
inadequate. As a result, it can be argued that privatisation or permanent leasing of 
land should be the next step forward. This does not mean, however, that land 
privatisation should be executed immediately and without reservation. In order to 
avoid destabilising the underlying fabric of the rural society, rural land rights reform 
in China should be carried out gradually and be accompanied by other social and legal 
reforms.
Lastly, the power of the state to interfere with forest management in the name of 
public interest will be briefly discussed. It points out that public regulation is 
particularly important under a private ownership regime to prevent and control the 
externalities ensued from individual activities that are imposed on the wider society. 
In this case, the government, equipped with the necessary information that reveals 
such externalities, has to step in. The state can, however, sometimes over-step or 
abuse its power, which may leave private individuals in a very disadvantaged 
position. Hence, it is important to look into how a balance can be achieved between
10 Cheng Yunxinig, 2004, pp 50-51; Chen Xiaojun et al., 2003, pp 220-227.
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private property rights on the one hand and the government’s power to impose public 
regulation on the other. The chapter will conclude that in order to attain a balanced 
growth, private individuals need to be given the right to protect their properties, and to 
participate in the decision-making processes. Only when the feedback system is 
efficient can the government make informed decisions about land and resource use.
2. Property Rights Reform
Rural, or more specifically forest, land ownership reform is not only aimed at 
increasing agricultural productivity, it will also bring far-reaching social changes to 
China’s rural population. In particular, it means that private usufruct rights will be 
free from arbitrary interference from not only the state but also the collective land 
owner. The rural land ownership reform also means that Chinese farmers can, for the 
first time, reap the fruits of the spectacular economic growth in China. Land can be 
exchanged or sold and be put to the most efficient use. The value of rural land has 
increased significantly in China, especially in areas near the cities.11 Currently the 
farmers and the collective owners do not benefit from the increase in value because
i ' j
they cannot sell their land for non-agricultural use; the state has a monopoly over the
supply of land for development purposes. In addition, once an area has been
designated as a city, the ownership of all land is effectively changed into state- 
1 ^ownership. As already pointed out in Chapter Three, the rigid rural land ownership 
arrangements are not only ‘short-changing’ the farmers, they have also created 
opportunities for government officials and collective leaders to abuse their power and 
exploit their position. It is fair to say that lack of land tenure security has put the rural 
population in a very disadvantaged position and stifled rural income growth. Hence, it 
has been pointed out that without a strong private property institution, China’s future 
economic development is not favourable.14
11 See Chapter Two above
12 In addition to their inability to sell the land, both the collective owner and private land users do not 
always receive adequate compensation for the land that the state has requisitioned. For more 
information, see Chapter Two above.
13 Article 8 o f Land Management Law 1998 provides that all city land belongs to the state.
14 In fact, it has been predicted that China will experience slower growth in the future partly due to its 
flawed property rights system, Hutton, W ., 2007, pp 195-218. Even a theory that seeks to question the 
‘rights hypothesis’ (which says that econom ic development is not possible without a legal system that 
offers predictable and stable rights o f property and contract) in China recognises that basic protection
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China has come a long way since the beginning of the reform in agricultural 
production in the late 1970s: household-level production is now predominant; 
individuals now have private land usufruct rights; private property rights are allowed 
and recognised by law; and more importantly, democratic election is now taking place 
at the village level. In relation to property rights, the trend is pointing at a gradual 
shift to a private regime. Since the 1990s, although cautiously at first, the Chinese 
government has adopted different laws that recognise and give protection to private 
property rights.15 Furthermore, there is no indication that the government is reversing 
or likely to reverse this course: it will be politically impossible to do so even if the 
government wishes to as private ownership is now prevalent in Chinese society.16 
With this fact in mind, it is right to suggest that rural land ownership reform is now 
feasible and a land market should gradually be introduced into the economy.
2.1 Tenure Security and Forest Management
Tenure security is usually associated with private ownership of property where the 
owner has, inter alia, the rights to use, to derive income from the property, to dispose 
of the property and to exclude others.17 Some empirical studies have been carried out 
to look at (though not exclusively) the relationship between tenure security and 
investment in forestland, especially^in developing countries. The results of almost all 
of these studies confirm that there is a positive relationship between tenure security 
and use of forest resources, meaning that the more secure the tenure the less wasteful 
forest resource use would be.
Some early studies have suggested that secure land property rights provide the 
incentive for efficient forest management, such as long-term planning, and discourage 
uncontrolled deforestation.18 One study in particular looked at two scenarios where
of property from unpredictable confiscation by the government or any party is essential for the future 
growth in China, Clarke, Donald, 2003.
5 See Chapter Two above.
16 In fact, literature on the development o f  rule o f law in China has painted an optimistic picture o f the 
future adoption o f a better functioning legal system where private rights will be respected and protected 
by the state. It is said that China is now in the critical stage o f social, cultural, economic, legal and 
political transition; the emerging market and civil society will push for the adoption o f a formal and 
rational rule o f law, Chen, Albert, 1999, pp 111-112.
17 See Chapter One above.
18 Mendelson, R., 1994. Deacon, R.T., 1994.; and Besley, T., 1995
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property rights might play a substantial role in influencing forest use.19 One was a 
model of ‘land development’ at the Amazon frontier where property rights were 
granted to those who ‘improved’ the wilderness; the second scenario involved 
squatters in forests in Thailand. The author looked at how access to property rights, 
and the lack of it, influenced the behaviour of the forest users, and whether or not 
their use was sustainable. In the first scenario, the high costs of obtaining and 
defending ownership title could offset the value of the resource. As a result, more 
resources were exploited so that benefits from the use could be maximised. In relation 
to the use of forestland by squatters, the author found that the possibility of eviction 
(because of the lack of tenure security) led the users to choose short-term destructive 
land uses with lower present values. The author concluded by stating that in order to 
avoid these problems, property rights must be secured in an efficient and prompt 
manner. This could be achieved via, inter alia, market allocation of property rights 
(price bidding and competition), empowerment of users (financial help by the 
government for the poor) and the adoption of a scientific approach (by allocating land
90according to the optimal size of the best land use in mind).
Some recent studies on forestry in China also come to the same conclusion that tenure
91security is vital in improving forest management and land use. These studies mainly 
focus on the impact of the de-collectivisation process that took place in the 1980s on 
the investment in forestry. All of them have provided unequivocal evidence to show 
that China’s forested area and investment from private households have increased 
since the inception of the de-collectivisation process, although in some places in 
southen China, deforestation preceded forest expansion due to the distrust of 
farmers.22
A couple of observations can be made about these findings. Firstly, tenure was not the 
sole factor that was looked at in these studies. Most studies also looked at other 
factors such as the market reform and population pressure. Market reform included
19 Mendelson, R., 1994
20 Ibid.
21 Liu D., and Edmunds, D ., 2003; Yin R., 2003; Zhang D., 2003; Rozelle, S., Huang Jikun and 
Benziger, V., 2003; (all the above can be found in Hyde, W., Xu J.T. and Belcher, B. (eds), 2003)
Zhang Y., Uusivuori, J., and Kuuluvaiinen, J., 2000; Demurger, S., and Yang W., 2006; and Qiao 
Fangbin, Huang Jikun and Rozelle, S., 1998.
22 See Chapter Two above.
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prices of timber and other agricultural products, profitability (the issues of taxation 
and charges), and the flexibility in production and sale of timber products (the issues 
of government control and procurement). The results showed that tenure was not the 
only or main determinant of forest investment and management pattern; property 
rights reform needed to go hand in hand with other reforms. Secondly, there were 
regional variations between the South and the North of China.23 Due to the differences 
in institution and the economic predisposition in these two regions, the outcomes of 
land tenure reform produced different results. In short, better tenure security and less 
government intervention in collective forestland in the North produced more cogent 
evidence of an increase in forest investment and productivity. Lastly, all studies 
concluded by confirming the positive impact of de-collectivisation on tenure security, 
with some even advocating for further improvement on tenure security.
Another study in China asked the respondent households directly the preferred form 
of forestland ownership regime. 24 According to the results, 89.12 percent of 
respondents preferred private ownership while only 4.1 percent preferred collective 
ownership.25 No respondent actually preferred either township or state ownership. 
When asked about the possibility of state ownership of all forestland, 40.16 percent of
96respondents strongly opposed, 36.15 percent did not oppose while 22.19 percent of 
respondents were indifferent.27 Unlike the previous studies that looked primarily at 
the impact of the past de-collectivisation process on China’s forestry development so 
far, this survey gives a faint indication of the future development of forestland 
property rights (at least according to the wishes of the farmers) in China. Despite the 
clear indication of the preferences of the respondents, the authors in the study came to 
the conclusion that the status quo, namely collective ownership and private usufruct 
right, should be preserved although the protection of households’ usufruct right 
should be strengthened. According to the authors, this is due to some important 
factors that may render the private ownership regime undesirable: the high 
population-land ratio; further fragmentation of forestland; and the impediment to
23 Yin R., 2003; and Zhang Y., Uusivuori, J., and Kuuluvaiinen, J., 2000.
24 Xu Xiuying and Shi Daojin, 2004.
25 Ibid.
26 It has to be pointed out ‘not opposing’ is not equivalent to ‘in favour o f ,  which will make this 
finding consistent with the above-mentioned results o f the preferred mode o f ownership.
27 Ibid.
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large-scale management of forestland due to the unwillingness of farmers to transfer 
land holding.28
2.2 Land Privatisation and Permanent Leasehold
Given the importance of tenure security on forest investment and resource use, the 
future property rights reform of China’s collective forest should involve either 
privatisation of land or the grant of permanent leasehold, where land owners or right 
holders not only possess the right to dispose of the land but also the right not to have 
their properties taken by the government without valid reasons and compensation. 
Before we proceed, two issues need to be highlighted. Firstly, one can argue that 
instead of privatising the land, which maybe too drastic a step, the government can 
overhaul the collective system to make it more likely to succeed, taking into account 
the important attributes identified in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the Mexican 
model of community forestry (as also seen in the previous chapter) can perhaps 
provide a good point of reference in relation to the future reform of the collective 
forest in China. The success of the former, however, is contingent on the presence of
9Qsome underlying features such as voluntary association , democratic decision-
-J 1
making, effective supervision , effective conflict resolution mechanism , and most 
importantly, independence.32 As already pointed out in Chapter Four, all of these 
attributes are currently lacking in China’s collective forest regime and any reform to 
introduce these elements can be as, if not more, drastic as land privatisation. 
Eventually, future reform of the collective forest regime in China, be it an improved
28 According to the same survey, 85.19 percent o f the respondents stated that they would not be willing 
to transfer their land title if  forestland were privatised. Ibid., p 72.
29 For example, a forest community is set up by the initiation o f the members themselves. Furthermore, 
forest communities are allowed and encouraged to form regional or nationwide associations to 
represent their interests.
30 This refers to not only the supervision o f  the work o f members’ representatives by the vigilance 
council but also by officials from the government agency created to assist community members in 
understanding and enforcing their rights.
31 This refers to an impartial and effective court system or specialist tribunal that deals with community 
forestland issues.
32 Forest communities in M exico are independent units that are given the right and power to govern 
community affairs. State mainly plays the roles o f a facilitator and mediator.
33 Similar to Chapter Three above, discussions o f forest collective entities here mainly refer to the 
mainstream non-indigenous communities. Indigenous communities are given more autonomy to govern 
community affairs and they may have more robust in-built social capital compared to other types of 
communities. There are examples o f successful cases o f indigenous forest communities although they 
can be differentiated from the mainstream collective entities on the ground o f the nature and 
composition o f the community, Kitamura, Kenji and Cao Guanxia, 2003; Qiao Fangbin, Huang Jikun 
and Rozelle, Scott, 1998; Su Yufang, 2004; Deng Weijie, 2003; Shen Maoying, 2001.
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collective forest regime or a private land regime, has to incorporate some vital factors 
such as reinforcement and protection of private rights, public participation in 
decision-making, transparency and accountability of government actions, and access 
to fair and effective judicial recourse.
Secondly, it can be argued that privatisation may have more positive impacts, such as 
increased efficiency, on timber and economic forests than on protection or ecological 
forest. This is due to three main reasons. Firstly, commercial exploitation of forest 
resources is prohibited in ecological forests and the current ‘management subsidies’ 
provided by the government under the Forest Ecological Benefits Compensation Fund 
are far from adequate.34 Hence, it may not be profitable or viable to manage these 
forests individually; joint or collective management may help to reduce the cost and 
subsequently increase efficiency. Secondly, in situations where users or owners of 
protected forest are plenty, joint management may be necessary as the provision of 
environmental services is usually contingent on the health and integrity of the whole 
ecosystem, regardless of the ownership boundaries. Joint management may not be 
necessary if there are strict and effectively enforced management regulations that are 
followed by individual forest owners. However, the absence of scientifically-sound 
management regulations and effective law enforcement in China means that collective 
management may be needed in order to reduce externalities caused by 
mismanagement of individual forest plots. Thirdly, as pointed out in Chapter Four, 
with the increasing recognition of the value of environmental services provided by 
forest and the creation of market for these services, joint management or ownership 
may strengthen the bargaining power of the ‘suppliers’ of the services. Thus, it is 
arguable that land privatisation may not be suitable for all kinds of forest. Until the 
issues discussed above have been satisfactorily dealt with, privatisation should 
initially be confined to timber and economic forests.
Apart from the above, there are also two land-related concerns that need to be 
addressed. Given that land is regarded by most rural households as their only source 
of social security, there is a genuine concern that rural poverty and social unrest will 
increase when land is sold or transferred under undue influence or manipulation. As
34 See Chapter One above.
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Chapter Three highlighted, in order to overcome the problem of heavy reliance on 
land as a source of social security, the government should accelerate the establishment 
of a viable welfare system in rural China. Although in recent years the Chinese 
government has improved the health care and education systems in rural China, these 
are far from adequate to ameliorate the situation.35 In addition, using land as the only 
source of social security also harms China’s economic growth as land is tied to 
unproductive agricultural activities. Urban and rural development can be accelerated 
when land is released from this constraint and enters the market where the market 
value of the land will be reflected.
Furthermore, it has been argued that privatisation of land is not desirable due to the 
concern of high population-land ratio, which would lead to fragmentation of land if 
land is privatised and creates impediment to large-scale land management due to 
households’ unwillingness to give up land. It is true that land fragmentation may 
present a serious problem initially when the current land owners refuse to sell the land 
as they want their children or grandchildren to inherit it. Having said that, as China 
experiences continuous urbanisation and industrialisation and more and more young 
people migrate to the cities for job opportunities, they may not want to work on the 
land passed on to them and may want to sell or rent it out instead. Thus, the worry 
that land will stay fragmented in small plots may prove to be short-lived, provided 
that land can be transferred freely between individuals and that land tenure is secure. 
Employment opportunities in the cities and rural-urban migration may offer the initial 
relief to population pressure on agricultural land; continuous urbanisation and better 
land use planning will provide the long term solution to the problem of land 
fragmentation as less and less people are involved in small-scale and unproductive 
agricultural activities.
35 See Chapter Three above.
36 However, willingness to give up land does not mean that there will be demand for the land. As 
pointed out in the Chapter Three above, due to the low profitability o f agricultural activities, not many 
people want to take on more land and as a result, land is abandoned at a relatively large scale. Low  
profitability in agriculture is due to two main factors: high input cost and the volatile market price; and 
the unsustainably large number o f  suppliers. Until and unless agricultural production is freed up (which 
includes the abolition o f production target for each household and the residence permit system) and the 
relatively smaller community o f  farmers are allowed to set up associations to protect their interests, 
agriculture will remain unattractive and large scale agricultural production will not take place.
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Both the concerns discussed above present real challenges to the government, 
politically and socially, as their solutions are either contingent on various measures 
that are yet to be taken by the government or would take some time before they take 
effect. Hence, it is reasonable to suggest that land privatisation in rural China should 
be carefully planned and if necessary, should take place gradually. Many of the 
current land use interferences or restrictions are imposed to stop activities that the 
Chinese government perceives to be harmful to its national interests, especially its
n n
social stability, although it is clear that the government sometimes seek to promote 
its own interests at the expense of the interests of the land users. (The lax supervision 
over rural land requisition is one good example of how the government puts national 
and self interests ahead of the rights of private households or individuals.) However, 
following rapid urbanisation and economic growth and the increasing involvement of 
China’s rural population in the market system, it is becoming clear that top-down 
command and control over land use is denying rural households the opportunity to 
‘ride on the back’ of the market economy, which is something that has been enjoyed 
by their urban counterparts. Land privatisation presents a good opportunity for the 
government to adopt more flexible and cost effective measures to strike a balance 
between social and economic development.
In this section, the author will provide neither an elaborate account of the steps that 
the government should take nor the timescale of the reform; instead, some general 
suggestions will be discussed as to what action the government can take in achieving 
the goal of land privatisation whilst not disrupting the fabric of rural society at the 
same time. It is important to emphasise that an outright privatisation of all collective 
forestland or a short timeline within which property rights reform should take place is 
not advocated. Rather, certain conditions should be imposed at the initial stage of the 
reform to make sure that land is not freed up too quickly and to give private 
households time to adjust. In addition, the discussion of forestland property rights 
reform may not necessarily apply to all China’s rural land,38 although privatisation of
37 The particular issues relating to population and social security for rural residents have been discussed 
in Chapter Three above.
38 The value and use o f cropland are in many ways different from the use o f forestland. For example, 
many rural households regard forestry as side-line activities and derive only minimal income from it.
As a result, the importance o f forestland as source o f social security is less than cropland, Ho, Peter, 
2005, pp 99.
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cropland has been discussed by scholars inside China39 for which the arguments for 
the need to privatise forestland are also equally applicable.40 Lastly, the main reasons 
behind the advocacy for forestland privatisation in this section are not only to promote 
the development of the forest industry, but also to give the people the power and 
opportunities to make decisions that serve both the individual and national interests.
There are two possible ways to regulate land privatisation during the initial stage, 
which aim to reduce the initial shocks as much as possible. The first is to control land 
privatisation itself and the second is to control the scope of the land market. Control 
of land privatisation means that land can only be privatised under certain 
circumstances or if certain conditions are met. One example of privatisation control is 
the privatisation of ejidal land in Mexico. As pointed out in the previous chapter, land 
allocated to the members of the community can only be privatised if the matter is 
raised in the community assembly (ideally it should involve all collective members 
and not just their representatives) and the approval of the majority of the members is 
obtained 41 Community members can choose to either privatise all community land 
and to disband the community structure, or privatise only parts of the land. In the 
latter case, the land holder’s family and members of the community have the right of 
first refusal to purchase the plot if it is put on sale.42 Hence, community members 
have the say over whether or not land is to stay as community land or to become 
private land. This arrangement allows land holders the right to propose privatisation 
while at the same time allows the community to have some control over the disposal 
of the common land. It is consistent with the underlying principles upon which the 
Mexican regime is built, namely voluntariness and autonomy.43 However, the 
conditional right to privatise land is only suitable if the collective ownership regime is
39 Niu Ruofeng et al., 2004, pp 62-63; W en Guanzhong. 9 March 2008;
40 For example, justifications such as the importance o f tenure security to boost long term investment, 
the need to protect land users’ right from interferences by the government and collective, the need to 
liberalise the land market to allow a more balanced rural and urban development, and the need to end 
land fragmentation through land exchanges and accumulation, are all relevant to the advocacy of  
privatisation o f cropland.
41 Brown, Jennifer, 2004, pp 20-22. Although privatisation in Mexico is only allowed for arable land 
and not forestland, which is used as common land, the author argues that it should not be restricted as 
such in China.
42 Ibid. See n 88 in Chapter Four above.
43 Forest communities in M exico are created by groups (which consisted o f at least 20 people) o f 
private land holders who decided to pool their land and resources together, which is in stark contrast to 
the top-down approach o f China.
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to be preserved; unconditional right to privatise is necessary if current collective land 
ownership regime is to be abolished.44
Due to the political nature and the inherent serious shortcomings of China’s collective 
body, it is reasonable to argue that collective ownership of land should be abolished 
and collective land be privatised. This, however, does not mean that the land should 
be put on an open and unrestrictive land market. Given the concern for social equity 
and justice, and also bearing in mind the problems that emerged in the former Soviet 
Union members following land privatisation, the scope of the land market for former 
collective forestland should initially be controlled. One example is to perhaps initially 
limit the qualified buyers to members of the same collective. This is to give members 
of the same collective the right of first refusal to purchase the private plot so that the 
initial shock in the change of landowner entities can be reduced. Another restriction 
on the buyer’s side is to limit either the number or size of the purchases of each buyer. 
For example, the government can limit the purchase of rural land for commercial 
development by each buyer to a prescribed number of hectares per purchase. 
Alternatively, the government can restrict the size of land available for sale at any one 
time (although there should not be any size restrictions for land that are to be rented 
out or mortgaged). This is to prevent large plots of land entering the market too 
quickly as this can potentially destabilise the rural economy and society. Another way 
to control the land market is to impose a minimum time limit that a landowner must 
retain the land before reselling it. This is to reduce instances of speculative land 
purchases and to introduce certain element of stability into the land market.
The above are just a few examples of how the government can regulate the process of 
forestland privatisation during the initial stage. While some may contest that the 
various limitations imposed on private land ownership are inconsistent with the 
principle of a liberal market that detests too much government interference, they are 
nonetheless justified on the ground of social fairness and stability, at least during the 
initial stage. A gradual approach to land privatisation would arguably induce a smooth
44 This does not mean that any kind o f collective management o f forestland is not permitted. Once the 
land is privatised, there should be no restriction on the right to association if land holders choose to 
pool together their land and resources to form a collective entity, association or even private company.
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transition from a state-controlled to a more open land market.45 Of course, liberation 
of ownership rights in itself is not sufficient; it must also be accompanied by the 
relaxation of other restrictions such as the right to transfer and the right to mortgage. 
Without a functioning land market and a more complete (with less conditions 
attached) right to transfer, privatisation of land will not achieve the desired effects, 
which are the maximisation of land use utility and the advantage of economies of 
scale. A land market is essential because land can then be exchanged according to the 
market value instead of according to prices set by the government. Right to mortgage 
is particularly important for forestland due to the huge sum of capital needed for 
investment; mortgage could become an important source of credit as other credit 
facilities are less developed or absent in rural China.46 Apart from private and 
commercial credit facilities, the Chinese government should improve or set up 
specialist credit facilities that give loan assistance to farmers for agricultural purposes 
including land purchase.47 Another issue that potentially has a huge impact on the 
success of land privatisation is the welfare system. If frequent exchanges of private 
land are to become a reality, the government needs to improve the welfare system in 
rural China so that land is not tied up for a long time.
Apart from land-related reforms, privatisation of forestland also needs to be 
accompanied by deeper institutional reforms, such as the judicial reform. Without a 
fair and effective judiciary, private rights cannot be protected and enforced. Although 
China has non-judicial redress systems such as mediation, administrative supervision 
and petition, the growth of individual rights that makes inter-personal interactions
A O
more complex means that a more efficient judiciary is needed. Judiciary in China 
suffers from a number of serious shortcomings such as low technical competence,
45 In fact, China’s gradual transition from a communist system to a market economy has been hailed as 
a success compared to the ‘shock therapy’ adopted by the former Soviet Union members, see Clarke, 
D., Murrell, P. and Whiting, S., 2005, and Stiglitz, J., 2002. China can arguably adopt the same 
approach in relation to the land reform. It has also been highlighted that until the right institutions are 
put in place, the state needs to intervene in the market to make sure that land does not fall into the 
hands o f a few. The state can control the market forces through the restrictions or even prohibition of  
land sales or certain types o f  land rental, Ho, Peter and Spoor, Max, 2006, p 583.
46 Around 65 percent o f the loans obtained by farmers are from unofficial channels such as from friends 
or family members, Zeng Shaoyang and Tang Xiaoteng, 2004, p 61.
47 The banking system receives one third o f the savings from the rural population; however, only one 
tenth o f the loan provided are to rural population. Apart from the Agricultural Bank o f China, there are 
also co-operative-style banks set up by the farmers themselves. Two third o f the loans provided by the 
rural financial co-operatives go to rural industry rather than to households, ibid.
48 Peerenboom, Randall, 2002, pp 414-424
234
corruption, lack of independence, and lack of authority.49 All of these not only affect 
the outcome of cases but also the accessibility to the judicial system itself. The 
relationship between local governments and the judiciary is particularly worrying as 
courts not only rely on local governments financially, but local people congresses also 
elect judicial personnel.50 With the financial and personnel ties, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for villagers to challenge the decisions of local government. Hence, 
without judicial reform, private rights will still be subject to the whim of government 
officials. ‘Deep’ institutional reforms for the judiciary have been suggested: the 
creation of a federalist system of national and local courts or a system of regional 
courts where local courts are not tied to local governments in relation to funding and 
recruitment; better training of judges; the increase of judges’ salaries to cut down 
corruption; and increased authority of the courts and the presiding judges.51
To summarise, collective forest in China can benefit enormously from the liberation 
of land ownership as it not only induces long-term investment but also improves land 
use efficiency. As pointed out above, land reform can take place in both the context of 
collective and private regimes, although the collective regime will need to have a 
complete overhaul to accommodate important principles such as better protection of 
private rights and public participation. It can be argued that the current collective 
regime in China should be replaced* by a private regime as the former is incapable of 
inducing efficient and market-oriented land use. Furthermore, it has also failed to 
protect the rights of individual land users against the power of the state. The use of 
collective ownership (of land) as a tool to achieve an egalitarian goal no longer makes 
(economic and social) sense in modem day China where accumulation of wealth from 
off-farm employment is in no way controlled, which results in wealth gaps even 
between rural residents.
A private regime potentially is also instmmental in balancing the power of the state 
and private interests, provided that enforcement and protection of private rights are 
effective. It can improve the performance and accountability of government 
departments and officials, and reduce the huge transaction costs involved in the
49 Ibid., pp 280-330.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., pp 318-330.
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supervision of local governments by the central government. It is arguable that a 
strong civil society would also induce political reforms that would eventually 
ameliorate some of the ‘harsh’ features of the authoritarian state. Past and future 
market reforms in China have shifted, and will continue to shift, the balance of power 
away from the state toward the society; property rights play a significant role in 
helping to achieve that aim.
3. The Impact of Property Rights Reform on Forest Governance
The shift of power toward the society following land privatisation does not mean that 
the government has no or a minor role to play in relation to the control of forestland 
use. On the contrary, the importance of the forest as a provider of environmental
52services and the creation of negative externalities from private use as discussed in 
Chapter Four are calling for a strong government role in regulating land use so that 
public interests can be safeguarded. Public regulation is particularly important in a 
market economy, where the true values of forest environmental services are currently 
not reflected (a problem of market failure), and where the majority of the economic 
activities are undertaken by private entities, who are not directly answerable to the 
public. It is also generally agreed that various types of forests need to be regulated 
differently: forest that mainly produces timber should be managed differently from 
forest that mainly provides environmental services.54 Management of ecological forest 
usually entails some negative obligations where activities that impact, or have the
• cc
potential to impact, on the integrity of the forest are prohibited. For example, 
commercial activities are usually prohibited in ecological forests.56 On the other hand, 
management of timber forest usually entails some positive obligations that regulate
52 Forest acts as a ‘public good’ in relation to the provision o f environmental services such as 
prevention o f soil erosion, regulation o f  local and global climate, biodiversity and so on. These services 
cannot be contained geographically so the problem of free-riding is particularly acute (see Chapter 
Four above). As a result, the relationship between ‘benefit-payment’ and ‘effort-reward’ needs to be 
properly aligned so that the true values o f  forest will be reflected in land use decisions.
It has to be pointed out that the protection o f  public interest is only one o f the rationales behind 
public regulation identified by commentators. Other rationales include the theories o f interest group, 
private interest and institution, Baldwin, R. and Cave, M. 1999, pp 18-33.
Chapter One above has pointed out that forests in China are divided into five different categories, 
and forest use is most tightly controlled in relation to ecological and special use forests.
55 Chapter Three o f the Forest Law provides som e general guidelines on how ecological forest should 
be protected, including the prohibition o f  mining, grazing, hunting and logging activities within the 
forest area.
56 In China, ecological forests are also not allowed to be transferred or exchanged. In addition, all 
forestland cannot be turned into non-forestland. Article 15 o f Forest Law.
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the tree-planting stage, extraction process, transportation of logs and finally
57reforestation. Public regulation plays an important role in ensuring that forests in 
China are properly managed.
In relation to land use in China, there has not been much requirement for legislations 
to regulate private land use as land is owned either by the state or the collective.58 The 
existing land-use legislations such as the Land Management Law offer only broadly- 
specified provisions or principles on the planning and restrictions on land use. Given 
the fact that land (including collective land) use is tightly controlled by the 
government59, these provisions resemble administrative orders more than public 
regulations as they are targeted mainly at government officials and departments who 
have extensive power over land use control.60 Hence, if indeed forestland is to be 
privatised, the Chinese government may need to adopt a new set of land use 
legislations. These legislations should co-exist with laws that protect private 
ownership and land use rights.
The following subsections briefly discuss the two main forest-related legislations that 
may be incompatible with a stronger private rights regime. As a result, they may need 
to be revised if land ownership reform is to be carried out. These two legislations, the 
logging quota and the logging ban, are coercive measures that are adopted by the 
government to directly restrict the rights of forest users without compensation. The 
logging quota system and the logging ban have been explained in Chapter One. The 
logging quota is an extremely inflexible measure adopted by the government to 
control timber production. It interferes extensively with the rights of tree owners to 
dispose of and to derive income from the trees. This is exacerbated by the fact that the 
allocation process can be arbitrary and subjective. The logging ban involves strict 
prohibition of forest exploitation, especially timber harvesting, in natural forests and
57 Chapter Five o f the Forest Law lays down the basic principles that govern timber extraction, such as 
the adoption o f annual production plan, the implementation o f the logging quota system, and the 
acceptable ways o f timber extraction.
58 As Chapter Three above pointed out, collectives in China are not independent and in fact acting like 
‘administrative agents’ o f the government.
59 See Chapter Two above.
60 The Chinese (both central and provincial) government has issued many administrative orders that 
aim at regulating land use and planning, especially to curb wanton requisition o f agricultural land. For 
example, in 2003, the State Council issued the Emergency Notification on the Suspension o f Various 
Development Zones ( ) to its various departments to stop out-of­
control land development.
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forests in strategic areas. It is controversial because although financial assistance has 
been provided for state forest farms/enterprises employees, users of collective forest 
nonetheless are not compensated for the suspension of their rights to cut down the 
trees. The following paragraphs will discuss briefly the changes that need to be 
adopted in order to make these two legislations compatible with stronger private 
property regime.
The logging quota was adopted out of concern for the environment and it is not 
exclusive to China: many developing and developed countries adopt a timber harvest 
quota to control timber production and to prevent over-harvesting.61 What makes it 
less fair and democratic in China, however, is the fact that the quota allocation is not 
carried out via competitive allocation and price determination such as public auction 
and bidding; instead, it is subjected to the discretionary power of the decision-makers. 
This element of the quota system is unfavourable to, and inconsistent with, the 
principle of private property rights. Although it is accepted that there is a genuine 
concern that competitive or market-friendly methods will ultimately exclude poor 
farmers who do not have the resources to participate in the bidding process, there are 
nonetheless ways by which this problem can be solved. Firstly, farmers should have 
access to either the private loan market or agricultural funds set up by the government. 
Secondly, they should be allowed fo mortgage their land in order to raise capital. As 
explained above, this will be more viable if land is privatised or is made subject to 
permanent leasehold. Thirdly, the farmers could form co-operatives that would enable 
farmers to pool their resources together and share the benefits of successful bids.
Apart from adopting more competitive methods to allocate the harvest quota that will 
also promote efficiency, the government arguably has other ways apart from the 
logging quota to regulate land use and timber harvest. For example, the government 
can require and vigorously enforce sound forest management plans, harvest practices 
such as selective harvest and gradual thinning, and more importantly, reforestation.
f OMost of these are already provided by Chinese law ; however, its effectiveness is 
questionable due to many reasons such as the lack of staff and resources, technical
61 Durst, Patrick et al. (eds), 2001.
62 Forest Law 1998
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knowledge, technology and in some cases lack of will due to corruption.63 The State 
Forest Administration already has a huge pool of employees who are currently 
involved in enforcing the quota system; it can instead train its staff to provide 
technical assistance and extension services, and to achieve more efficient and 
effective law enforcement.
China’s logging ban was introduced as part of the Natural Forest Protection 
Programme (NFPP) in 1998.64 The aim of the Programme was to reverse the negative 
environmental consequences perceived to be caused by deforestation.65 Apart from 
banning timber extraction in most major timber-producing state forest farms, the 
NFPP also initiated large-scale afforestation programmes.66 As the ban was initially 
planned to apply to only state-owned forest farms, no compensation scheme had been 
set up for collective forest members when the ban was eventually extended to 
collective-owned forest.67 The logging ban has brought about negative social and 
economic consequences in some forest communities. 68 In addition, without 
compensation, the ban has also unequivocally infringed the rights of forest users to 
derive income from and to dispose of the trees. Under a private property regime, this 
will entitle the forest users to seek compensation.69 Arguably, this right exists even 
without privatisation of forestland, as many of the forest resources (including trees) 
on collective land (that have been "contracted out) belong to the households, not the 
collective or the state.
63 Complications o f law enforcement, especially at the sub-national level, are analysed and outlined in 
Alford. W.P. and Shen Y.Y. 1997.
64 The logging ban was initially given a ten-year implementation period.
65 The main objectives o f  the NFPP are to conserve 41.8 million ha o f mainly state-owned natural 
forests and to establish 21.3 million ha o f  timber plantation from 2000 to 2005 in the upper reaches of  
the Yangtze River and the upper and middle reaches o f the Y ellow  River, Yang Yuexian, 2001, p 85
66 These afforestation efforts eventually gave rise to a separate programme called the Sloping Land 
Conversion Programme where the government paid subsidies to farmers to convert sloped agricultural 
land into forest and grassland.
67 Xu Jintao et al., 2001. This was partly due to over-zealousness o f local government officials who 
wished to achieve political recognition. In som e cases, local authorities adopt extreme measure by 
cutting o ff completely local com m unities’ access to non-timber forest products as well as timber.
68 Xu Jintao et al., 2001; Shen Maoying, 2001; Su Yufang, 2004
69 Some, however, have argued that although the logging ban may have infringed ownership rights, 
right holders are not necessarily entitled to compensation. According to one theory, if the government’s 
action, in this case the logging ban, sought to correct a ‘local collective action problem’ (such as the 
failure to prevent environmental problems caused by deforestation via local collective action), then 
there should be no entitlement to compensation. If, on the other hand, the government’s action sought 
to redistribute property rights among different groups o f people, then those who have lost the right are 
entitled to compensation. Mullan, Katrina et al., 2007
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Closely related to the issue of compensation is the more important question of 
whether or not the current ban is sustainable. A recent survey in the Guizhou Province 
showed that the majority of farmers were supportive of the ban, although it was 
believed that the ban was only a temporary measure and had a ten-year duration.70 In 
particular, most interviewees agreed that the improvement in the environment was a 
valid reason for the imposition of the logging ban. In addition, loss of income from 
timber had not been great mainly due to two reasons: most of the trees were still too 
young to be cut (the last round of cutting occurred in the 1980s), and timber had not 
been a major source of income for most households due to the logging quota.71 Thus, 
it is arguable that the logging ban (without compensation) will be tolerated only if it is 
a temporary measure and that income losses from timber will be minimal. If the ban is
« n oextended indefinitely , or if the harvesting quota system is terminated, it is doubtful 
if households will still continue to support the ban without receiving any 
compensation.
Hence, the long term implications and sustainability of the logging ban are still open 
to question. In particular, if the government wants to encourage continuous 
investment in forest protection and plantation, it needs to be able to provide a secure 
environment in which long-term forest investment plan can be executed. The arbitrary 
and temporary suspension of use rights without compensation sends out a negative 
signal to potential and existing investors that the fruits of their investment may not be 
enjoyed in the future. In addition, the execution of the logging ban needs to be better 
planned. For example, some kind of incentives could be put in place to induce
novoluntary compliance from the farmers. The government also needs to ensure that 
enforcement is effective in tackling illegal logging. Although the logging ban can 
potentially help the government to achieve the long term aim, which is to source all 
timber from plantation forest, it is not an indispensable tool. Instead of imposing a
70 The author was involved in a survey in Guizhou Province with a team o f researchers from University 
College London, Cambridge University and Peking University. The results o f the survey found that 
although income from timber had decreased, the amount was insignificant compared to the total 
income o f the households. In addition, the survey has also found that the welfare impact was not great, 
and most o f the interviewees seemed to support the ban, ibid. Zhang Shiqiu, et al., 2005
71 Ibid.
72 Although the logging ban was initially given a ten-year implementation period, the government has 
so far not confirmed that the ban w ill definitely end in 2010.
73 For example, the government can compensate farmers from the existing Forest Ecology Benefits 
Subsidy Fund, although the current rate o f  compensation/subsidy is far from adequate. See Section 5.4 
o f Chapter One above.
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logging ban, the government can encourage better and more scientific management of 
forestland that will balance the need for timber (and other non-timber forest products) 
and the need for environmental protection. Imposing a logging ban in plantation 
forests should be thought through properly given the fact that many of these forests 
were established for economic purposes in the first place.74
4. Conclusion
Following the discussions of the collective forest regime and private land use rights in 
China in the previous chapters, this last chapter concludes that a reform of land 
ownership rights is necessary, which should involve either privatisation of land or 
giving land users the right to permanent leasehold. The reform is necessary not only 
to increase land use efficiency (and to promote economic growth), it is also vital for 
the social and legal empowerment of collective members who have been, for a long 
time, subject to discrimination and oppression by government officials. Similarly, the 
collective, as land owner, suffers from various inherent limitations that have 
prevented it from acting in the best interest of its members. Successful collective 
forest management and enterprises are the exceptions rather than the norm; and even 
those who have been hailed as ‘successful’ usually involved local elites making all the 
important decisions while public participation is kept to a minimum.
r
Like in the cities, economic reform has brought about huge social changes in rural 
China. As China’s economy continues to grow, the rationale behind the collective 
ownership of land start to look more and more untenable. In particular, the rigidity 
within the rural land use system itself has prohibited economic growth and widened 
the wealth gap not only between urban and rural residents, but also between rural 
residents who are engaged in off-farm and on-farm employment. Since the 1990s the 
Chinese government has expressed the will to tackle the ‘Three Peasant Problems’; 
however, more than ten years later, the battle is still not over. One of the obstacles is 
the prohibition on households to capitalise on the increasing market value of the land. 
The exclusion of private households from the land market has bred corruption and 
abuse of power by local officials. This coupled with tenure insecurity create an unsafe
74 For example, logging ban should not be imposed in plantation forests (here refer man-made timber 
and economic forests) except forests that are situated in strategic places such as the riverine areas and 
on very sloped land.
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environment for long-term investment in not only commercial tree-planting but also 
the protection of forest for environmental services.
On the other hand, land privatisation in itself is not the panacea to the existing land 
and forest resource use problems, which involve various socio-economic issues that 
cannot be rectified by the change in legal ownership alone. However, land reform will 
provide a step in the right direction towards a more efficient and just rural 
development where arbitrary interference from local officials can be kept to the 
minimum. Given the socialist nature of China’s society, private property (especially 
land) rights do not need to subscribe to the libertarian definition of ‘property’ where
7Sthese rights are inviolable. Instead, certain elements of ‘social responsibility’ need to 
be incorporated into the definition of property rights.76 In practice, the concept of 
‘social responsibility’ is translated into government regulations that aim to achieve a
7'7balance between private and public interests. The time is now ripe for China to 
adopt a private land regime that is governed by the rule of law. In short, instead of 
governing land use via arbitrary ownership arrangements, which have failed to 
achieve neither sustainable rural economic development nor social justice, the 
Chinese government should learn to regulate land use and development by using other 
more benevolent (and less intrusive) tools such as public regulation. Lastly, the call 
for greater public participation in clecision-making processes will increase with the 
rise of a wealthier and more educated populace. Land ownership reform will certainly 
help China to become a more open and transparent society where state’s actions can 
be held accountable to the people.
75 See the theory o f property rights in Chapter One above.
76 For the discussions on the inclusion o f  ‘social responsibility’ into the definition o f  property rights, 




More Facts on China’s Forest and Forestry
1. Timber Trade and Timber Market in China
Table Two below shows the supply and demand of wood in China from 1996 to 2002. 
It shows that even though total demand has dropped slightly, export has increased 
while total domestic supply has decreased. One significant change is the import 
figure, which has increased a few folds since 1996. This is to make up for the fall in 
domestic supply which has continuously dropped since 1996. There has been a timber 
surplus every year although the number has fallen quite a lot in recent years.
Table 2 China’s Wood Supply and Demand, 1996 to 2002
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
Supply Surplus from  
previous year
3,947 4,262 3,815 3,957 4,190 4,315 4,050
Domestic
production
14,447 13,767 13,500 13,000 12,800 12,600 12,000









18,394 18,029 17,315 16,957 16,990 16,735 16,050
Import 318 446 460 1,013 1,361 1,686 2,009**
O f which 
coniferous
65 96 149 457 640 914 1,539
Total supply 18,712 18,475 17,775 17,970 18,351 18,421 18,050**
Demand Total domestic 
consumption
14,444 14,654 13,812 13,774 14,210 14,365 14,385
O f which 
house-building
4,127 4,158 4,230 4,250 4,360 4,300 4,350
O f which 
industrial 
production
10,317 10,496 9,582 9,524 9,850 10,065 10,035
Export 6 6.3 6.1 5.8 6 6 7
Total demand 14,450 14,660 13,818 13,780 14,216 14,371 14,392
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Surplus 4,262 3,815 3,957 4,190 4,135 4,050 3,658
Note: Figures are in 10,000 m3
*A11 figures for 2002 are estimates for the period from January to September only, apart from ** which 
are actual data for the same period; n.d. = no data.
Source: Based on data from Chinawood (May 2002 and October 2002) (Taken from 
Masanobu Yamane and Lu Wenming, Trends in China’s Forest-Related Policies -  
From the Perspective of the Growing Timber Trade, Policy Trend Report 2002 p 3)
1.1 Timber Imports in China
As mentioned above, one of the prominent problems faced by China’s timber market 
is the severe shortage of local supply to meet the demand. This is due to many 
reasons, such as the increase in wealth (which prompted increase in demand), increase 
in timber product exports and shortage of local supply of timber products. To satisfy 
the demand, China has to import a large amount of timber products from other 
countries, especially its neighbouring countries such as Russia and Indonesia. Timber 
product imports have also been facilitated with the reduction of import tariffs by the 
Chinese government, both due to the need to increase timber product import and the 
joining of the World Trade Organisation in 2001.
China is the world’s second largest wood product importer after the United States, and 
is the world’s largest importer of lumber and plywood. The three main suppliers of 
timber products to China since £998 are Russia, Indonesia and Malaysia. Total 
imports of timber products from these countries amounts to over 50 per cent of all 
timber products imported into China every year. In particular, timber imports from 
Russia have increased significantly, from over 970,000 cubic metres (RWE) valued at 
$93 million in 1997 to 15.8 million cubic metres (RWE) valued at $1,059 billion in
2002.1 The Chinese government has even given VAT preferential treatment to the 
border trade with Russia to encourage timber imports. Other countries that make up 
the second tier timber product suppliers to China are the US, Gabon, Germany, 
Thailand, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Myanmar, totalling more than 8.8 
million cubic metres (RWE) valued at £1.2 billion.2 Imports from all these countries 
have increased in recent years.
1 Sun Xiufang et al., 2004, p 9
2 Ibid.
3 For a detailed discussions and statistics o f China’s wood product import, see ibid.
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China has significantly reduced the import tariffs for many timber products. In 
particular, there has been a zero tariff for logs/lumber and pulp/waste paper imports 
since 1999 to supplement its domestic supply.4 However, tariffs for value-added wood 
and paper products have been continued. This is because China has a high demand for 
log/lumber whilst at the same time the government wants to promote value-added 
wood and paper industries in China. The government has also reduced the VAT rebate 
rates from 13 per cent to zero on a wide range of wood and paper products to 
discourage exports of various wood and paper products, which are in high demand in 
the domestic market.5 As a result of the shortage of domestic supply of wood and 
government policy, the trend of timber trade in China shows increasing imports of 
logs and lumber and increasing exports of finished or value-added wood products.6 
Since 1997 the export value of forest products from China has risen from $4 billion to 
$17 billion; at the same time, wood product, including furniture, from China to the 
United States and the European Union have increased 1000% and 800% respectively.7
The increasing import of wood products has caused grave concerns in China’s 
supplier countries. Many reports have been published detailing how the surge in 
China’s demand of wood products has increased logging activities in the
Q
neighbouring countries. One example is the supplier country Burma (officially
*
known as Myanmar), which is also the world’s largest exporter of teak. Two 
characteristics of timber harvest in Burma make increasing timber export to China 
problematic, namely the civil unrest and hardwood harvest. China has opened up its 
border trading (in the Southwest of China and Northeast of Burma), and has provided 
financial, political and military support to both the government and military groups, in 
exchange for its valuable raw materials, including timber.9 There have been reports
4 China’s Subsidisation o f  its Forest Product Industry, 2004, p 6
5 Ibid., p 21
6 The gap between the consumption and domestic forest production was 106 million m3 in 2002; the 
likely future gap around 2010 is estimated to be around 150-175 million m3 RWE, S Nilsson et al., 
2004, pp 299-300
7 Forest Products Annual Market R eview  2005-2006: Executive Summary
8 In particular, see Global W itness, 2003; Global Witness, 2005; Katsigris, E. et al., 2004
9 Since 1988, the ruling military regime, which calls itself the State Peace and Development Council, 
controls Burma’s forest resources. However, a ceasefire reached with the opposition military groups 
provided that these arm groups have control over natural resources endowed in the areas under their 
control, which include the forest resources (except teaks where the government required all teak to be 
sold via the capital so that the government could have sole control over the sale and revenue; however, 
many teaks have been logged and sold to China via the border illegally). Global Witness, 2005.
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that Chinese businessmen10 have business deals with both the government and the 
military groups to carry out timber logging and transport timber across the border. 
The money from these deals is used to fund the constant arms struggle between the 
government and the military groups, killing innocent civilians in the process. In 
addition, highly valuable hardwoods such as teaks are being cut down at an 
unsustainable speed, even though teak production is supposed to be under the control 
of the government. Illegal loggings are rampant at the border areas with China11 and a 
vast area of pristine forestland has been cleared. The ongoing conflict and destruction 
of forests has brought particularly grave consequences to local communities.
1.2 Commercial Forest Plantations in China
The government is also giving preferential treatment to foreign companies that wish 
to invest in the forest industry, especially investment in plantations and paper and 
pulp mills. US$1,73 billion has been designated by the Ministry of Finance to develop 
fast-growth-high-yield plantations by 2015.12 Local governments have also been 
given the power to grant fast-track approval of integrated plantation/pulp/paper 
projects, bypassing central government authorisation. Among the incentives given to 
foreign companies are low interest loans with long-term repayment terms and tax
1 "3exemption. So far China has successfully attracted a few large-scale foreign 
investments to its East coast region (foreign investment attraction in the Western 
Region has been less successful due to an inherent lack of wood fibre resources and 
suitable land, and poor infrastructure.). For example, Finland's Stora Enso Oyj, one of 
the world's leading paper manufacturers, has invested US$150 million in a 150,000- 
hectare plantation in Guangxi. In addition, Singaporean paper firm Golden Eagle 
recently invested US$500 million in forests in the Jiangsu Province whilst Asia Pulp 
& Paper, which is one of the world's top four paper producers, has been planting trees 
in China since 1995. The firm now manages forests in the Guangxi, Guangdong and 
Hainan provinces.14
10 This was usually done with the support o f local officials, ibid.
11 It was estimated that between 2001-02 and 2003-04 over 800,000 m3 (98%) o f timber imported 
annually to China via the border with Burma was illegal; and all cross-border teak export during these 
periods were illegal. Ibid., p 19.
2 China’s Subsidisation o f its Forest Product Industry, 2004, p 3
13 Ibid., pp 3-5
14 Godfrey, Mark, 2004
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The government has also launched various reforms to encourage investment in tree 
planting by local companies, households and farmers; the two most important reforms 
are the devolution of property rights and liberation of the timber market. The 
government not only has granted private entities the ownership right over trees 
planted in the 1980s, it has also extended the land use right to 70 years (90 years in 
exceptional cases) in 2002.15 Timber markets were liberalised when the Unified 
Procurement System for timber was dropped in 1985 and households were free to sell 
all their timber at market prices. In addition, recently some provinces have also 
carried out forestry tax reforms by either eliminating or reducing the high taxes and 
fees imposed on timber products.16 The latter reform is particularly important as 
currently forest products are subject to an excessive tax burden that not infrequently 
eats up more than 50 per cent of profits.17 This has acted as a great disincentive to 
households and farmers to invest in tree planting.
Despite all the reforms, the timber market in China is still not completely liberalised. 
Timber harvest is still subject to the annual timber quota set by the central 
government every five years, which applies to all commercial and non-commercial 
timber harvest. Not only does a fixed production amount distort the market, the quota 
system also creates complicated bureaucracy and the opportunity for decision-makers 
to abuse their power. In addition to market liberation, another issue that needs to be 
addressed by the Chinese government is the issue of consumption, especially 
domestic consumption. Pressure on timber and timber products can be reduced if the 
government takes initiative to reduce demand for these products, either by introducing 
alternatives or increasing tax for luxury uses. Trade in wood products needs to be 
balanced with sustainable growth and production of timber so that not only long-term 
supply can be guaranteed, the transition (of timber source) from natural forests to 
commercial plantations in China can be facilitated.
2. Nature Reserves and the Forest Ecological Benefits Subsidy Funds
15 Article 20 o f the Rural Land Contracting Law 2002.
16 These provinces include Jiangxi, Hunan, Hebei and Fujian, which are carrying out forestry reform to 
further encourage private investment.
17 Liu J.L. and Landell-Mills, N ., 2003, p 51
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Forest protection has become the central focus of Chinese government’s policies on 
forestry. Never has forest protection and sustainable management been pursued with 
such zeal and scale by any government in China before. This is a result of both the 
awareness of the importance of sustainable development (especially in the 
international arena) and the serious problem of resource depletion (and the resulting 
negative consequences) faced by China today. China is pursuing its aim from two 
fronts: protecting the existing natural forests (and forests in strategic areas) on the one 
hand and establishing more plantation forests on the other.18 Armed with the aim to 
increase its forestland to 26 per cent of its total land mass by 205019, the Chinese 
government not only has invested billions of yuan in silviculture projects such as the 
Three North Shelterbelt Programme, the Sloping Land Conversion Programme and so 
on, it has also adopted various reforms to encourage private investment in tree 
planting as already discussed above.
2.1 State-Sponsored Afforestation Projects
In China, most of the natural forests are owned by the state. For decades, these forests 
were regarded as mere stocks for the timber industry; production and profits were the 
main concerns of the state forest farms and enterprises that ran the production 
processes. During the ‘Big Leap Forward’ campaign in 1958 and the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), most forestry programmes were discontinued, except 
rampant timber cutting and highly inefficient afforestation campaigns. During that 
time, China’s forest resource base was devastated by unsustainable timber harvest and 
out of a total of 104 million hectares of trees planted during that period, the rate of 
success was a mere 20%.20 Not until the late 1970s did the government start to pay 
serious attention to the need to establish forests in strategic places and to protect 
existing natural forests; numerous major silvicultural projects were launched by the 
central government.
In 1978, the central government introduced the ‘Three-North Shelterbelt 
Programme’.21 Under this programme, a series of afforestation would be carried out
18 In fact, silvicultural investment have accounted for approximately 70 per cent o f total state 
investment in forestry, Zhang Daowei, 2003, p 87
19 Lu Wenming et al, 2002, p 11
20 Wang Sen, van Kooten, G. Cornelis and W ilson, Bill., 2004, p 74.
21 http://www.3northforest.com/gcii.htm
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across the Northern regions of China, from the Heilongjiang Province in the East to 
the Xinjiang Province in the West, covering 45 percent of China’s territory. It was 
adopted to combat serious desertification and to improve the ecological environment 
in the North22; the government aimed to invest RMB57.68 billion to afforest around 
35 million hectares of land by 2050. The programme is to be carried out in three 
different stages and will take a total of 71 years to complete (1978 -  2050). The first 
stage was completed in 2004 and a total of 24.6 million hectares of land had been 
afforested. Apart from the Three-North Shelterbelt Programme, the government had 
also adopted other long-term major afforestation programmes in other parts of 
China.23 These silvicultural projects mainly concentrated on important rivers and 
coasts in China. For example, afforestation has been carried out in the areas of the 
Yangzte River24, Huai River25, Zhujiang River26, Liao River27 and Yellow River.28 
Protection forests were also established in the coasts of southern provinces to protect 
them from hurricane invasion.29 Unlike the Three-North Shelterbelt Programme, the 
aim of these programmes is to protect important riverine and coastal areas from 
erosion. All these programmes, including the Three-North Shelterbelt Programme, are 
funded by the central government and international loans, and are administered by the 
State Forestry Bureau.30
2.2 Nature Reserves
Just as the government has started to carry out large-scale silvicultural projects, the 
number of nature reserves in China has also increased. The first nature reserve in 
China was set up in 1956 in the Guangdong Province; by 1983, there were 133 nature 
reserves in China consisting of 0.84 per cent of the total land mass. The number of 
nature reserves continued to increase rapidly and by 1997, there were 932 nature
22 The problem o f desertification in the North was taken seriously not only because o f the scale o f the 
problem itself, but also its impact on the Capital o f China, Beijing, which suffered from serious sand 
storms as a result o f  desertification in the North.
23 For more detail o f the major state-funded silvicultural projects, please see Zhang Daowei, 2003, p 97.




28 1996 and then in 2000
29 1988
30 In 2001, all the 14 major state-funded silvicultural projects were consolidated into five: the Beijing 
Area Protection Forest Project; the National Protection Forest Project; the Sloping Land Conversion 
Programme; the Natural Forest Programme; and the Plantation Forest Project. These five projects 
coupled with the W ildlife Protection Project are now known as the ‘big six’ forest projects, from Zhang 
Daowei, 2003, p 97.
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reserves, which took up 7.69 per cent of the total land mass. In the year 2001 alone, 
249 new nature reserves were set up, making the total of nature reserves in China to 
be 1,405, which makes up 11.35% of the total land mass.31
Nature reserves in China are categorised into three groups: ecosystem; wildlife; and 
natural geology. Nature reserves are also divided into national nature reserves and 
provincial nature reserves; designation of national nature reserves is approved by the 
State Council whilst designation of provincial nature reserves is approved by the 
provincial government. Nature reserves are subject to both unified and departmental 
managements: State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) is in charge of 
the general management of all nature reserves whilst the different Administrative 
bodies of the State Council such as forestry, agriculture, mining, water conservancy, 
oceanography and so on are responsible for their respective uses of forestland. Uses of 
nature reserves are extremely restricted, exploitative activities such as mining, 
logging, hunting, grazing, medicinal plant harvest and so on are prohibited.
Most of the nature reserves are situated in state forestland, and they usually are 
financed and managed by the government. However, some natural forests and forests 
in strategic areas belong to the collective, some of which have delegated the use rights 
of these forests to the households. Collective and households use rights over 
protection forests are restricted, as commercial logging is not allowed in these forests. 
Following the tightening of natural forests use in 2000 (the year the Natural Forest 
Protection Programme was implemented nationwide), many more households and 
collectives found that their rights to use the forests have been restricted. No 
compensation has been paid for the restrictions imposed on the use rights until 
recently, when the central government set up the Forest Ecological Benefits 
Compensation Fund (FEBCF).
2.3 Forest Ecological Benefits Subsidy Funds
The FEBCF represents a significant move towards the use of incentives to induce 
behavioural changes, which is still a rarity in China even now. It is in fact both a 
public compensation scheme for ecological benefits provided by private bodies, and
31 Zhou X.F., X ie G.B. and Fan, Z.C., 2004, p 71
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also part of the rural land use planning where the government is subsidising one 
particular kind of land use. Due to its potential significance, this section will take a 
detailed look into the formulation and implementation of the Scheme. The initiative to 
set up a Forest Ecological Benefits Compensation Fund (FEBCF) started in 1989 
when discussions were held between the then Ministry of Forestry and other 
Ministries. The State Council had also put forward suggestions for the establishment 
of FEBCF.32 However, no consensus was reached at this phase. Then in 1995, a task 
force was established jointly by the then Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of Finance 
to study the feasibility of a FEBCF. The task force proposed setting up a FEBCF and 
the capital should come from fees collected from units and individuals benefiting 
from forest’s ecological benefits, embracing the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle. The 
beneficiaries targeted were large state reservoirs, travel agencies, businesses in the 
tourism industry and so on.33 The State Council and Ministry of Finance did not 
approve this proposal mainly due to the high transaction costs involved.34
After the revision of the Forest Law in 1998, Article 8 was inserted and efforts to set 
up a compensation fund continued.35 In particular, the State Forestry Administration 
(SFA) proposed to the State Council that a fee scheme should be set up, whereby 3 
percent of governmental funds would be transferred to the compensation fund. 
Governmental funds include road maintenance fees, railroad construction fund 
electricity development fund, the Three-Gorges Programme development fund, and 
infrastructure development fund. The compensation fund would be used solely to 
maintain and develop ecological forests. However, due to many various reasons 
concerning the practicality of the fee scheme, it failed to win the approval of the State 
Council. At the end of 2000, the Ministry of Finance agreed to the proposal of the 
SFA to set up a compensation fund. Following this, classification of forestland into 
public interest forests (which would be covered by the fund) and commercial forests 
was undertaken.





35 Article 8 provides that the government should establish a forest ecological benefits compensation 
fund, for the purposes o f  forest establishment and protection.
36 Sun C.J. and Chen X.Q., 2002
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In 2001, a pilot scheme of the Forest Ecological Benefits Subsidy Funds (FEBSF) was 
carried out in 24 state-level nature reserves and 658 counties in 11 Provinces. These 
11 provinces are Hebei, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shanxi, 
Hunan, Guangxi, Xinjiang and Zhejiang. A total of 200 million mu of protection and 
special-use forests were covered and 1 billion yuan was invested by the central 
government. The Funds paid 5 yuan per mu37 per annum: 3.5 yuan went to forest 
management units and 1.5 yuan went to forestry departments for general protection 
such as fire, insect and disease control, and resource monitoring.
On 10 December 2004, the Chinese government announced officially that the FEBSF 
would be implemented throughout the whole country.38 In the first phase, central 
government would invest 2 billion yuan on 0.4 billion mu of targeted public benefit 
forests (which consist of protection and special-use forests). Out of the 1.56 billion 
mu of targeted public benefit natural forests, 0.73 billion mu were included in the 
Natural Forest Protection Programme (NFPP) while 0.83 billion were not. And out of 
the 0.83 billion mu of non-NFPP target public benefit natural forests, 0.4 billion mu 
will be covered by the first phase of the implementation of FEBSF.39 Each mu will be 
paid 5 yuan per annum (approximately US$ 9 per hectare). The allocation of the 
subsidy is slightly different from the pilot scheme in that 4.5 yuan will go to forest 
management units (including private households) while 0.5 yuan will go to forest fire 
prevention and insect and disease prevention. The Ministry of Finance and the SFA 
have jointly issued the ‘Central Forests Ecological Benefits Subsidy Funds 
Management Resolution’ to guide implementation of the FEBSF. For state forest 
farms and state-owned natural forests, the subsidies will be allocated according to the 
agreement reached by both the finance department and forestry department. For 
collective-owned natural forests, subsidies will be allocated by the village committees 
according to the contracts and rules. The tending staff shall not get less than 3 yuan 
per mu. Subsidies for targeted public benefit natural forests owned or managed by
37 1 hectare = 15 mu
38 A very similar type o f public fund based environmental services compensation scheme is the 
Conservation Reserve Programme. The government o f the United States o f America pays annual rents 
of US$ 125 per hectare to owners o f  cropland and marginal pasturelands for voluntary retirement of 
cropland. One important lesson learned from this programme is that a single rental rate will result in 
those with less valuable land over-compensated and those with more productive land unwilling to join.
A median-based compensation scale is in place now to provide payments on the basis o f opportunity 
cost calculations.
39 Nation-wide Application o f  Forest Ecological Benefits Subsidy Funds Scheme, 10 December 2004
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individuals will be given to the individuals, and they bear the whole responsibility of 
tending, protecting and managing the forests.40
One benefit of the FEBSF is that it has (or seems to have) done justice to farmers who 
have invested in forest protection, as it finally recognises the investment and efforts 
put into tree planting and management. Under various legislations, farmers are 
sometimes required to protect natural forests, or to plant trees, or to restrict their 
access to the forest. Apart from the NFPP and SLCP, there are also the Three-North 
Shelterbelt Development Programme, Soil and Water Conservation Programme, 
Coastal Shelterbelt Development Programme, and Desertification Prevention 
Programme. These programmes require farmers to plant trees in ecologically 
significant areas. Following the implementation of the NFPP which restricts logging 
in many forests, the hope of the farmers that profits can be reaped from their 
investment has been shattered. This has generated a feeling of injustice because they 
are not compensated for the public benefits that the forests bring to the wider society. 
As a result, implementation of the FEBSF is seen as recognition of the efforts 
invested by the farmers who are usually from ecologically disadvantaged and poverty 
stricken areas. According to an official website of the Xuzhou City in the Jiangsu 
Province,41 some ‘public benefit natural forests’ have experienced positive effects 
since the implementation of the pilot scheme in 2001. Generally under the pilot 
scheme, farmer receptiveness appears to be high and there has been competition 
among local authorities for their forests to be included in the scheme 42
Apart from the FEBSF, there are also local initiatives that sought to compensate for 
ecological benefits. In the Hubei Province, a Preliminary Provisions on the Use and 
Management of the FEBCF was implemented in 1999 where fees were collected from 
six sectors, namely drinking water, hydropower, scenic tourism, river transportation, 
mining in timberlands, and economic forest products.43 Another example was the 
initiative taken by the Xinjiang Province where funds are collected from monthly
40 Ibid.
41 Bringing Security to Tree Farmers, 14 December 2004. For example, in the Heilongjiang Province, 
not only have forest fires been put under complete control, forest crimes have decreased as much as 
90% and insect infestation decreased by 20 percent. In the Fujian Province, 800,000 mu of sparse 
forestland and shrubs have been turned into forestland; forest density has increased from 0.42 to 0.51.
42 Sun C.J. and Chen X.Q., 2002
43 Ibid.
253
salaries of employees in government departments, institutions and enterprises. 
Additional funds have also been collected from businesses involving crude oil, 
nonferrous minerals, scenic zones and forest parks.44 The effectiveness and impacts of 
these local initiatives on local communities cannot be ascertained as no detailed 
studies have been carried out so far.
Another well-cited example is the 1998 Provisions on the Development, Management 
and Compensation of Ecological Forests adopted by the Guangdong Province. It 
requires that no less than 30% of the total annual forestry finance shall be used on 
ecological forestry, and additional funds shall be collected from water user fees and 
government funds on soil erosion control. The compensation rate for ecological forest 
owners was, at the beginning, much lower than the compensation provided under the 
FEBSF, standing at 2.5 yuan per mu per annum from 1998 to 2000. From 2000 to 
2002, the compensation level increased to 4 yuan per mu, and from 2003 to 2007, the 
compensation level is 8 yuan per mu per annum.45 Even with the increased 
compensation level, it is still questionable whether it is adequate. And given that a 
large proportion of the ‘public benefits’ natural forests in the Guangdong Province 
consists of young trees, the question of adequacy of compensation will become more 
acute when the trees reach maturity and hence are worth more.46
This section gives a brief overview of China’s current forest protection and 
preservation policy, ranging from the establishment of nature reserves, to ecological 
afforestation efforts and finally to the innovative ecology compensation funds. All 
these point to the fact that the Chinese government is taking its environment seriously 
and recognises the importance of forests in relation to reducing various types of 
environmental degradation that are plaguing the whole nation. The FEBSF represents 
the use of financial incentives to encourage public participation in this effort; 
although, as we have seen above, the amount given is far lower than the market price. 
It is hoped that the FEBSF will ultimately adopt the ‘beneficiary pay’ principle so that 
the market value of the services can be better reflected.
44 Ibid.
45 Compensation For 5,000 mu o f  Ecological Forest in Guangdong, 11 November 2003
46 Guangdong Province Ecological Forest Still Needs More, 11 December 2001
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3. Forest Law and Administration
There are six administrative levels in China: the central government, provincial 
government, prefecture government, county government, township government and 
the ‘self-governed’ administrative village.47 Government officers from central to 
township government receive salaries from the government. The principle of ‘self- 
governing’ was adopted at the village level as early as 198248 although it was only 
enshrined in the national law in 1998 49 Due to the self-governing policy, leaders at 
the administrative village level are not considered civil servants as such and do not 
receive stipend from the government. Instead, they are financed mostly by the village 
treasury and receive nominal compensation from the government for their services. 
Decisions are usually made at the upper level of administration, and are expected to 
be implemented accordingly by the lower level of governance. Due to the absence of 
popular voting or election (apart from the village level), each level of governance is 
made directly accountable only to the upper level of administration and not to the 
people as such.
The Ministry of Forestry in China was set up in 1951, and was responsible for the 
protection and use of all forests in China. In 1956, a separate Ministry of Forest 
Industry was established as a response to the increasing demand for wood and lumber 
products. However, two years after that, the two ministries (Ministry of Forestry and 
Ministry of Forest Industry) were combined and later became the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry. In 1979, the Ministries of Forestry and Agriculture were 
separated. The Ministry of Forestry was later integrated into a new Ministry of Land 
and Resources in 1998 in order to achieve a better co-ordination of land 
administration. The forestry branch of the ministry is known as the State Forest 
Administration (SFA), and is responsible for most aspects of China’s forestry. There 
are twelve offices under the SFA, namely the Administration, Silviculture and 
Afforestation, Management of Forest Resources, Protection of Wildlife, Security, 
Policy and Regulation, Development Planning and Finance Management, Science and 
Technology, International Cooperation, Personnel Management, Party
47 Each administrative village has several ‘natural’ villages under its governance.
48 A provision was inserted into the Constitution in 1982, which recognised and advocated the 
establishment o f village committees, among other things, Pan Jiawei and Zhou Xianri, 2004, pp 33-34.
49 Organic Law o f the Villagers Committee 1998
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Administration, and Retired Cadre Management.50 The change in 1998 not only 
‘downgraded’ the Ministry of Forestry to an ‘Administration Body’, it has also 
changed the core of its responsibility. Amongst its twelve Offices, many are dedicated 
to forest protection and silviculture, echoing the Natural Forest Protection Programme 
and Sloping Land Conversion Programme adopted by the central government in 1998. 
The SFA has offices in all levels of administration, and the lowest level of governance 
is the County Forestry Bureaus. The SFA has devolved decision-making and law­
making power to these provincial, prefectural and county forestry bureaus.
There are different sources of forest law and regulations in China, and these laws are 
arranged in a hierarchical way. The National People’s Congress is the ultimate law­
making body in the country, which lays down the mainframe and basic principles of 
China’s legislations, which include the civil law, criminal law, administrative law and 
the Constitution. For example, the Forest Law 1984 (amended in 1998) and Wildlife 
Protection Law were both passed by the National People’s Congress. The National 
People’s Congress also approves the five-yearly forestry plans. These plans are put 
together by the State Planning Commission and upon being approved, the plans are 
issued by the State Council and the implementation is then in the hands of the relevant 
ministries and the Provincial People’s Council.51 The second level of law making is 
the State Council. The State Council makes regulations within the scope of the 
Constitution and laws laid down by the People’s Congress, which are mainly 
administrative and elaborative in nature in order to facilitate the implementation of the 
‘parent’ legislations. Examples of State Council’s regulations are the Implementation 
of the Forest Law Regulations 2000 and the Sloping Land Conversion Regulations 
2002. The different departments of the State Council also make ‘departmental’ 
regulations (which are known as the statutory instruments in the UK), which are also 
administrative and elaborative in nature. These regulations guide the departments 
concerned in the implementation of the legislations laid down by the National 
People’s Congress and the State Council. An example of forestry departmental 
regulation is the Forest and Wildlife Natural Reserves Management Decision 1985.
50 State Forest Administration, China http://www.forestrv. gov.cn/
51 Richardson, S.D., 1990, pp 160-161
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The next level of law making body is the Provincial government level. The 
administrative structure of provincial governments mirrors the structure of the central 
government. Similarly, there is a Provincial People’s Congress, which plays a similar 
role as the National People’s Congress but on the provincial level. These People’s 
Congresses have the power to make legislations for the specific provinces within the 
scope of the Constitution and laws made by the National People’s Congress and State 
Council. One example of this is the Decision of the Implementation of the PRC Forest 
Law in Anhui Province, passed by the 7th Committee Meeting of the Anhui People’s 
Congress in 1990. Not every provincial law making body is equally active in law 
making; less-developed provinces like Ningxia have less provincial-level legislations 
than other wealthier provinces such as Guangduang and Fujian. This further 
accentuates the disparities between different provinces, with wealthier provinces 
having more elaborate legislations to help them to implement central government 
policies. Implementation of all laws and policies at the provincial level is the 
responsibility of the Provincial People’s Council, which reflects the role of the State 
council at the national level. Lastly, the provincial governments and other city 
governments can also pass local regulations, which are effective in the areas under the 
control of the local government concerned.
The major legislation governing the use of forests is the Forest Law 1984, which was 
amended in 1998. The Forest Law was passed in 1984 to implement the State 
Council’s Decision on Issues Regarding Forest Protection and Development adopted 
in 1981. The main important change introduced by the policy was the recognition and 
protection of devolution of land use rights to the household level, which was 
incorporated into the Forest Law. In 2000, the State Council adopted the Regulations 
of the Implementation of the PRC Forest Law, which further elaborates the Forest 
Law to facilitate implementation. There are seven chapters in total under the Forest 
Law, namely general provisions, forest management, forest protection, tree planting 
and silviculture, timber logging, law enforcement and miscellaneous. Under the 
General Provision, the law sets out the general principles of forest management, and 
the different categories of forests. It also reaffirms the state and collective ownership 
of forestland, plus the land use rights devolved to households/farmers. It also sets
52 Article 3
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out the protective measures the government should take with regards to forestry, 
namely the adoption of a timber quota, tree planting loans for private entities, public 
payment for ecological benefits and so on. It also lays down the administrative 
structure of forest governance, specifying the different roles played by the State 
Forest Administration and various levels of forestry bureaus.
The chapter on Forest Management generally sets out the governance of forestland 
and what should and should not be done to forestland. For example, it provides that 
the use rights of protection and special purpose forests cannot be transferred, and that 
all forestland should not be converted into non-forestland.54 Any disputes concerning 
ownership and use rights should be reported to either the county or township 
government.55 In addition, it stipulates that if the use of forestland is necessary for 
construction or mining purposes, rehabilitation fees must be paid.56 The chapter on 
Forest Protection provides details for the protection of forests, such as fire detection 
and preparation, designation of nature reserves, and prohibition of forest destruction. 
The protection of forests is mainly the responsibility of the local government, which 
must set up forest protection teams.57 It also complements the Wildlife Protection 
Law by outlawing hunting in wildlife parks.58 In the Tree Planting and Silviculture 
chapter, the law requires all levels of government to actively participate in tree 
planting in order to achieve the target set by the government.59 In particular, it 
requires that wasteland and land adjacent to the roads, railways, rivers and so forth 
should be planted with trees.60 This should be carried out by the local government and 
the departmental units (such as the railway authority) concerned. More importantly, it 
provides that trees planted on family plots and contracted land should belong to those 
who carry out the planting or those who contracted out the land.61
Chapter five regulates timber harvest. Article 29 provides that the state should control 











growth rate of forests. Local government (starting from the county level) should 
provide estimates of the timber volume to be logged in one year and submit it to the 
higher level of government. These estimates then have to be approved by the State
f\0Council. The annual timber quota is set by the central government based on the 
estimates submitted by and the recommendation of the State Planning Commission. 
The annual production of the whole country should not exceed the quota set. The law 
requires that all state-own forest farms and enterprises should harvest timber 
according to the estimates set by the forestry bureaus, whilst private individuals
/TO
should apply for a logging permit from the county forestry bureaus. These logging 
permits may be attached with conditions, which usually require reforestation.64 In 
relation to the permit to transport logs, once it is satisfied that the logging permit has 
been adhered to, the forestry bureau should then issue transport permits.65 The law 
also lays down general harvest rules66, such as mature forests should be harvested by 
using selective or gradual logging and so forth. All types of logging except logging 
for rehabilitation purposes is prohibited in protection and special purpose forests.
Chapter six provides for law enforcement and legal liabilities. Basically punishment 
for infringement of forest laws takes three forms: criminal liability, monetary fines 
and administrative reproach. It is an offence to carry out illegal logging and to have 
violated any of the permit requirements. Administrative reproach usually applies to 
violation of the law by government officials, including officers from various 
ministries and forestry bureaus. Many of the above-mentioned violations may also 
amount to criminal offences depending on the seriousness of the cases. Enforcement 
of law is usually the responsibility of the local forestry bureaus and they are also 
responsible for rectifying the damage caused or the consequences of non-compliance.
Apart from the Forest Law, there are other regulations that are closely related to the 
management of forests, such as the Wildlife Protection Law, Nature Reserve 
Regulations, Land Management Law and so on. As mentioned above, different 







particular, the SFA provides regulations or administrative orders that govern the 
operations and responsibilities of State Forest Enterprises and State Forest Farms for 
the management of state-owned forestland. For collective forestland, one particularly 
important piece of legislation that governs the general use of forestland is the Rural 
Land Contracting Law 2002. The law spells out not only how forestland should be 
allocated, but also how they should be used and transferred. The structure and 
composition of private use rights under the collective system will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.
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